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hiS bOOk began in the State Archive of Bologna where, amidst 
the papers of the papal police, I stumbled across documents of a 
duel from the year 1823. According to the dusty documents, two young 
men, Cesare Arnoaldi, scion of one of Bologna’s wealthy bourgeois 
families, and Federico Francavilla, a marquis of Neapolitan extraction, 
had exchanged words of “gallantry” at a local theatrical performance 
on the evening of May 1. They had subsequently arranged to fight a 
duel early the next morning in a field not far from the city, and they 
had carried out their plan with the aid of two young aristocrats, Count 
Luigi Aldrovandi and Count Lataneo di Compignano, who had acted 
as “witnesses.” The duel was short and ended after Francavilla received 
a serious wound in his arm. Upon returning to Bologna, he quickly 
sought the attention of a doctor, explaining that he had cut himself 
while practicing a fancy fencing move at home. Meanwhile, rumors 
about the duel coursed through the city, and the police started investi-
gating the event that very afternoon. The case rapidly reached the desk 
of the top political official in the province, Cardinal Legate Giuseppe 
Spina, who now faced an unhappy predicament: As he soon informed 
Cardinal Ercole Consalvi, secretary of state of the Papal States, the res-
toration of power to the pope after the fall of Napoleon had brought 
 1. The relevant documents are in ASB, Ispettorato di Polizia, Atti Riservati, 1823, Busta 
27, and attached to Spina-Consalvi, May 3, 1823, #51. 
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with it a return to the law codes of the ancien régime, in this case the 
1756 Criminal Statute of Cardinal Legate Serbelloni. According to this 
venerable legislation, the penalty for dueling—no matter what the con-
sequences of the combat—was death for all involved, including the 
seconds.
 Spina argued that such severity was excessive in this case. The duel-
ists were young; they had been unaware of the penalties beforehand; 
they had not considered the possible pain to their families; they had 
no previous criminal records; and finally the charge would be difficult 
to prove in a court of law. Consequently Spina asked that Consalvi 
plead with the pope, Pius VII, for permission to allow him to handle 
the whole matter “economically,” that is, outside the normal channels 
of the judicial system. The pope agreed to this arrangement, and Spina 
ordered that the perpetrators, who had managed to flee the city, return 
and be relegated to various monasteries to contemplate their transgres-
sions. Francavilla had requested as well a passport to Lucca where he 
could take a special cure for his wounded arm, to which Spina agreed 
but with the stipulation that, because of the marquis’ Neapolitan prov-
enance, he not be allowed to return to Bologna. When informed of 
these provisions, the secretary of state replied rather heatedly that Spina 
had gone too far in his leniency. This was a serious crime, especially in 
the Papal States, and an example needed to be set. He therefore ordered 
extra time for those detained in the monasteries and instructed Spina 
to announce Francavilla’s banishment to the public at large. Yet in the 
end Aldrovandi and Arnoaldi were released after a little more than two 
months of relatively cushy confinement; Francavilla was later allowed to 
return through the intervention of the city’s archbishop; and the fourth 
participant, Count Lataneo, seems to have escaped any sanction what-
soever—certainly a far cry from the blade of the guillotine originally 
hanging over all their heads.
 The narrative power of this episode obviously proved compel-
ling, for here was social/political history at its most piquant. What had 
prompted the duel? Why had an aristocrat agreed to fight a commoner, 
albeit a wealthy one? According to the police, a history of bad blood 
between the duelists had set the stage for the encounter. Had Francav-
illa, who was described by Spina as insolent and frivolous, found his 
noble Neapolitan sensibilities affronted by the pretensions of a member 
of Bologna’s more porous urban patriciate? And what about the issues 
 2. Serbelloni 1756, 35–38. 
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of privilege, rank, and patronage that had quickly taken the case to the 
highest authority in the land and brought a resolution both reasoned 
and religious? These considerations were doubly engaging because from 
the beginning Spina had not been completely honest with his own 
superiors. Although it may well have been true that the young men did 
not know the current law regarding dueling, Spina’s other affirmation 
that it would prove a difficult case in court rang rather hollow when 
one considers that early in the game the police had managed to gather 
together some 27 pages of extremely telling evidence. Not only did 
they have people who had seen the duelists leave and return to the city 
with swords under their cloaks; they also had two eyewitnesses to the 
very event itself, one of whom had mentioned that after the fighting 
had stopped, a certain piece of paper had been torn up and dropped 
on the spot. With an alacrity seldom associated with papal justice, the 
police had repaired to the scene of the crime and managed to glue 
together enough scraps of this document to demonstrate that it was a 
cartello di sfida or writ of challenge, proof positive of the nature of the 
encounter. Still today the pasted-up note sits attached to the relevant 
police report residing in the archive.
 In short, the case was ready-made for an inquisitorial-style court, 
complete with two eyewitnesses, handwritten validation, and a host of 
circumstantial detail. Yet the cardinal legate had soft-pedaled the evi-
dence from the beginning and then imposed a penalty so slight as to 
earn a reprimand from the secretary of state. No doubt he genuinely 
felt the official penalty inappropriate to the actual offense, and the social 
prominence of the families involved was mentioned more than once 
in the dispatches. However, Spina also had to contend with the local 
political situation. The transition back to papal rule had been arduous. 
The Bolognesi had experienced some 16 years of Napoleonic rule, and 
during the Congress of  Vienna they had even asked to become part of 
Austria’s empire rather than return to the Papal States. Revolution was 
in the air, and major uprisings had recently been suppressed in Naples 
and Piedmont by Austrian intervention. Spina himself had been one of 
Consalvi’s most important liberal allies in the attempt to steer a middle 
course between clerical reactionaries on one side and radical carbonari 
on the other. Under the circumstances, one can understand that Spina 
was looking neither to alienate possible allies among Bologna’s top fam-
ilies nor to advertise the bloodthirsty attributes of an antiquated law 
code. Instead he had opted to take a lenient approach, mixing merciful 
largesse and political acumen.
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 Such was my introduction to the “politics of the sword,” and little 
did I know in just how many senses that phrase would become relevant 
in describing the history of the duel in Italy. Frankly, I would never 
answer all my questions regarding this particular duel; the trail ran cold 
in that single bundle of papers. But it had served its purpose and alerted 
me to the duel as a subject that offered a wide variety of perspectives 
on the past. When I was finally able to devote full-time attention to 
it, I soon discovered that I was anything but alone in my interests and 
that social and cultural historians, such as François Billacois (1986) 
and Robert Nye (1993) for France and Ute Frevert (1991) and Kevin 
McAleer (1994) for Germany, had begun breathing new intellectual 
life into a topic that had previously enjoyed an extensive but not very 
methodical literature. Of these, Billacois was the pathbreaker, and his 
lengthy tome on the duel in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century France 
remains a model of originality, industry, and esprit. He also captured the 
breadth of issues that the duel encompasses as a focus of research, defin-
ing it as a “total social phenomenon” that is a “touchstone” which offers 
“an aid to the identification and understanding of a particular period, 
society and political system, with its moral and aesthetic sensibilities and 
metaphysical and spiritual background.” Since that first wave of books, 
other works have appeared dealing with the duel in Ireland, America, 
Russia, and elsewhere, all of which have validated the vitality of the 
topic.
 With the exception of the Renaissance period, however, dueling in 
modern Italy has for the most part escaped scientific investigation. This 
lack of study is somewhat strange because following a severe decline 
in the practice during the eighteenth century, the duel returned with 
a vengeance during the Risorgimento, and after unification in 1861 it 
reached levels of frequency that rivaled anything in France or Germany. 
Commentators talked about the new country as being overcome by a 
“plague of duels” and a “duellomania” that offered the bloody spectacle 
of a duel a day. The duel’s enduring popularity created constant contro-
versy in liberal Italy as legislators, jurists, and moralists debated whether 
 3. Also see Kiernan 1989 and Wyatt Brown 1982.
 4. Billacois 1990, 5. 
 5. For example, Kelly 1995; Reyfman 1999; Steward 2000; and Freeman 2001; 
Shoemaker 2002; Matos E Lemos 1993; Gayol 1999; Piccato 1999; and Parker 2001. For early 
articles on England see Andrew 1980; Simpson 1988. 
 6. Aside from my articles (1998, 2001, 2005) see Fozzi and Da Passano 2000; Mazzonis 
1989; Cavina 2005, 236–88, and various sections of Banti 2000 and Geltmaker 2002. 
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and how to bring it under control. Pamphlets with titles such as “Down 
with the Duel,” “War on the Duel,” and “The Shame of the Duel” all 
communicated the passion and concern of those who could not believe 
that a country that had so recently returned to the path of progress and 
civilization had also wholeheartedly embraced such a “barbaric” cus-
tom. Yet the antiduelists were consistently countered by sober-minded 
men of rank and influence who felt that the duel was necessary for the 
health of the nation. Thus Iacopo Gelli, Italy’s most esteemed expert on 
the duel, vaunted its role in 1888 as a guarantor of the very concept of 
freedom: 
The duel, a result of noble sentiments, of man’s strong feeling of esteem, 
of the profound consciousness of personal dignity, of the moral duty to 
preserve intact and immaculate one’s own honor, even with the sacrifice 
of one’s life, was instituted to vindicate sullied honor, [and] to maintain 
moral sentiment and civil courage at a high level in the people (popo-
lazioni), because otherwise liberty perishes where the one declines or 
the other is lacking.
Certainly the duel was no passing fancy. As late as 1902 the country’s 
foreign minister, Giulio Prinetti, wounded the honorable deputy Leo-
poldo Franchetti in a saber duel resulting from angry words exchanged 
in the antechamber of parliament over colonial policy (see cover image). 
In fact, the duel remained a common custom in Italy well into the 
1930s, whereas most other European countries saw its demise after 
World War I if not before. Interestingly, its very longevity may help to 
account in part for the reluctance of Italian scholars to study what was 
clearly a vital cultural aspect of both liberal and Fascist Italy. Thus, when 
I approached native historians about this project, they often seemed less 
interested in discussing dueling as a social phenomenon than launching 
into a description of how their great-uncle or grandfather had partici-
pated in a duel back in the 1920s or even the 1930s. One historian 
related that he had himself been challenged to a duel after the Second 
World War (he declined the honor with humor), and one woman com-
mented that when taking catechism in the 1950s, she had still memo-
rized the three great mortal sins as being omicidio, suicidio, e duello. As 
useful and engaging as this all proved to be, it seemed to make the point 
that the modern duel was not yet “historical” enough for dissection; it 
 7. Gelli 1888A, 61.
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still resided in the common cultural memory as an “obvious” part of 
Italian life: the realm of anecdote rather than analysis.
 Be that as it may, it is my contention that the duel and the code 
of honor that it disciplined played an important role in the formation, 
consolidation, and functioning of united Italy. Specifically, it offered a 
common model and bond of masculine identity for those patriotic elites 
who, having created a country of great variety and contrast for often 
contradictory motives, then had to deal with the consequences. As we 
shall see, dueling became an iconic weapon during the Risorgimento 
struggle for liberation, with individual honor and courage standing as 
analogues of the nation’s right and need to free itself from the insult 
of foreign oppression. It maintained that role as it offered a continuing 
image of martial valor and moral discipline for the liberal state: an affir-
mation that became particularly important in the face of united Italy’s 
less-than-happy performances as a player on the stage of great power 
politics both in Europe and abroad. Eventually, the duel fed into the 
hypernationalism and the cult of violence that marked the early fascist 
movement, although in the end it would prove too individualistic in its 
definition of dignity to stand up to the totalitarian regime that would 
gradually emerge.
 Intertwined with these notions of nationalism was an evolving, gen-
dered discourse on Italy’s virility as a people and as a nation, and by 
studying the duel we gain a unique window on the critical role of mas-
culinity in the self-conception and worldview of Italian elites. Dueling 
was the ultimate mark and test of virility, and it was often defended if 
not promoted for the sake of the country’s biological, psychological, 
and political future. Conversely, the opponents of the duel would con-
stantly find themselves nonplussed by the need to show that they were 
no less virile than the other side, and many were the antiduelists who 
found themselves with sword in hand, defending their right to con-
demn the practice. Liberal opponents likewise took refuge in the fact 
that the ancient Romans had never dueled and thus combined manly 
images of military prowess with a patriotic pride in the nation’s classical 
heritage. Even those groups such as the Socialists and the intransigent 
Catholics who rejected the nexus of exultant nationalism and chival-
ric honor had to find ways to protect their masculine credentials with 
respective proclamations of revolutionary courage and muscular obedi-
ence to the pope.
 Politically, the duel played an important role in the formative years 
of the nation. Not only did it allow for the honorable settlement of 
	 Introduction	 /	 
disputes among men who had had quite different ideas on how the 
country should be created, but it also eased the transition of various 
groups of regular and irregular soldiers into a united Italian army. It 
likewise undergirded the new system of liberal government, buffer-
ing the consequences of untrammeled debate and allowing men to 
vehemently and sometimes violently disagree in word and print, only 
to return to reasoned relations with honor intact. At the same time, 
it provided a stage on which politicians could manifest the self-con-
trol, respectability, and courage thought necessary to operate in the 
public sphere, all the while offering the éclat of flashing swords and 
bloody combat for one’s constituents. More generally, it reinforced a 
system based on a highly restrictive suffrage in which the gentlemen 
who dueled were the same gentlemen who ruled—a powerful projec-
tion of privilege and exclusivity based on a supposedly ancient rite. 
Italy would share these features with other liberal regimes, and this 
book ends with a comparative analysis of dueling in Ireland, Belgium, 
and Portugal to illustrate the point. However, Italy’s political life was 
particularly prone to chivalric combat because the system of trasform-
ismo, which evolved and then dominated during the liberal period, was 
based on the deliberate confusion of personal and public power from 
top to bottom. Lacking political parties as a force of organization and 
discipline, Italian politics revolved around ever-mutating personal alle-
giances in which individual honor was constantly at risk and often in 
need of armed defense.
 Socially, the creation of the “gentleman” as a man hyperconscious 
of his reputation and willing to die (or kill) in its defense offered a 
psychological and social paradigm of distinction that allowed for the 
absorption and co-optation of successful newcomers while maintaining 
critical exclusionary standards against the vast majority of the popula-
tion. This cultural dimension is important in understanding the ruling 
elites of Italy, who have consistently evaded easy categorization accord-
ing to standard economic or ideological definitions of class. Historians 
such as Raffaelli Romanelli, Anthony Cardoza, Marco Meriggi, and 
Alberto Maria Banti have stressed the need to look at shared cultural 
values, life-style choices, and informal symbols of prestige to better 
grasp the social reality of liberal Italy; and certainly the code of honor 
provides us with a critical piece of the puzzle in such an enterprise. 
Particularly important in this regard is how the study of the duel reflects 
on the growing literature regarding non-economic forms of association 
and sociability among elite men. One journalist in 1888 complained, 
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“The country is populated with free associations, in which (particularly 
for the higher social classes) the laws of honor are a cult and common 
pact.” The duel was the final arbiter of behavior in Italy’s many clubs 
and circles, and in return those institutions enforced the code of honor, 
threatening expulsion for any member who failed to seek or give sat-
isfaction according to the rules. Deconstructing the dueling code and 
examining various affairs of honor shed new light on these social spaces 
which were critical in the development and articulation of “bourgeois” 
culture.
 The political and social importance of the duel in liberal Italy natu-
rally made it difficult to deal with in terms of the law. As we shall 
see, endless discussion surrounded specific sanctions against it, and the 
law courts had difficulty dealing with the dilemma of prosecuting and 
sentencing the best and the brightest, to say nothing of the most pow-
erful, members of society. The issue was particularly prickly because 
Italy’s liberal elites were great believers in law and order, and their own 
immunity from serious prosecution constantly came back to haunt their 
own premises of good government. In the end they would opt for a 
clumsy compromise that injected the fundamental tenets of the dueling 
code into criminal legislation while indirectly acknowledging the rise 
of a parallel system of “honorable” adjudication that naturally impinged 
on the regular judiciary. Meanwhile, the many codes of chivalry and 
tribunals of honor that appeared after unity would testify to the strength 
of the dueling ethic among Italy’s elites, but they would simultaneously 
indicate their own doubts about a system in which a man’s ability with 
a sword might trump all other considerations of his character.
 This book then is basically about the creation of what one might 
best call united Italy’s “chivalric community”—an elite “honor group” 
that borrowed the concept of chivalry or knighthood as a lexicon of 
proper behavior that suited its sensibilities and purposes. One might 
think that the pervasiveness of the duel after unification mirrored the 
example of other western European countries where emerging elites 
directly co-opted the chivalric traditions of their aristocratic forebears. 
Such co-optation would seem most logical for Italy, which is generally 
regarded as the birthplace of the modern point-of-honor duel during 
the Renaissance. Yet such was not the case. Although the modern duel 
evolved as a caste privilege and obligation on the peninsula during the 
 8. Indelli 1888.
 9. On honor groups and reflexive notions of horizontal honor see Stewart 1994, 54–
71. 
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fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, it had become exceedingly infrequent 
among the nobility in much of Italy during the eighteenth century, 
with the important exception of Piedmont. What brought the duel 
back to Italy was, I contend, the mass experience of Italians fighting 
under the French, whose military had maintained the dueling tradition. 
Indeed, prior to the publication of united Italy’s first dueling code in 
1863, Italians seeking to defend their honor turned to a nineteenth-
century French manual rather than one of their homegrown varieties 
from an earlier epoch. The dueling ethic thus returned to Italy during 
the course of the Risorgimento as an “invented tradition,” and the close 
identification with the creation of the country itself helps in large part 
explain its popularity and longevity in Italian society.0 This historical 
disjuncture also underlines the fact that as the Renaissance courtiers 
had recast medieval concepts of chivalry to suit their needs, so too did 
Italy’s liberal elites feel free to create their own version of what being a 
chivalrous gentleman really meant, and much of what follows seeks to 
illuminate that conception.
 Many men who considered themselves part of the chivalric com-
munity never met each other. It was in some ways an “imagined com-
munity” that matched the model set out by Benedict Anderson in his 
influential analysis of modern nationalism, and indeed it derived a large 
part of its motive force from its reciprocal relationship with Italian patri-
otism. Yet it was also an exclusive community based on horizontal and 
reflexive mechanisms of honor, and it spent much of its time and energy 
vetting and culling a gradually mutating membership. As perhaps befit 
a system built on individual honor, the center of the chivalric com-
munity was dominated by certain personalities, such as Paolo Fambri, 
Achille Angelini, and Iacopo Gelli, whose careers we shall trace as they 
came to be viewed as the arbiters of honor for the entire country. They 
were allied in their efforts with military officers and fencing masters, 
who enjoyed a special corporate relationship with the dueling ethic that 
gave them automatic authority over affairs of honor. Surrounding these 
core groups one finds politicians and journalists for whom the defense 
of honor was seen as a professional necessity, and beyond them the rest 
of the “ceto civile,” a relatively narrow, yet porous, segment of Italian 
society for whom the title, rights, and duties of being a “gentleman” 
were a defining feature. The majority of these men would never fight 
a duel, but they had to be ready to do so if the occasion should arise, a 
 10. On the concept of invented traditions see Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983. 
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contingency contributing to the popularity of dueling manuals by 
authorities such as Angelini and Gelli. Outside the chivalric commu-
nity stood the bulk of Italy’s population (workers, peasants, and women) 
although middle- and upper-class women were seen as being capable 
of understanding “true” honor if they were led in the right direction 
by their fathers, husbands, and brothers. The larger point, however, is 
that the chivalric community cast itself in its patriotic imagining as 
representing the entire Italian nation, while in fact it excluded most 
of the Italian people: a glaring contradiction which had rather serious 
ramifications for the liberal regime.
 For there is little doubt that honor was also at stake for Italy’s lower 
classes when they clashed one-on-one, knives in hand, with great fre-
quency and often fatal consequences. Scholars such as Pieter Spie-
renburg (1998), Thomas Gallant (2000), Lyman Johnson (1998), and 
others have contributed a great deal to our understanding of how 
important interpersonal violence was among urban and rural work-
ing-class men to their status within their communities. Elliott Gorn 
(1985) has shown how even seemingly irrational behavior, such as eye-
gouging matches among American backwoodsmen, made social sense 
in a frontier world of violent danger, where the one great demarcator 
at the bottom of society was between free men and slaves, the latter 
having no freedom over their bodies while the former could risk life 
and limb, to say nothing of eyes, in defense of their reputations. Thus, 
as Gorn states in general, “. . . how men fight—who participates, who 
observes, which rules are followed, what is at stake, what tactics are 
allowed—reveals much about past cultures and societies.” The present 
work then really takes on only half the task, for although nineteenth-
century Italy was notorious throughout western Europe for its ubiqui-
tous lower-class knife-fighting, relatively little research has been done 
on the topic, especially of a comparative nature among the different 
regions. Limited in space, time, and energy, I have restricted myself to 
discussing this wider world of Italian male violence only as it figured 
within the narrower context of what I call the “chivalric enterprise” of 
dueling and honor. But in that context it was vitally important, for, as 
we shall see, in Italy the demarcation of blood spilled with a knife as 
opposed to blood spilled with a saber was a resounding leitmotif of the 
politics of the sword.
 11. Gorn 1985, 18.
 12. The best work to date is Boschi 1998.
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In order to ease the flow of the prose that follows, it is necessary to 
offer a glossary of terms in Italian that will punctuate the text and 
whose constant translation would hinder rather than aid the reader’s 
understanding.
Vertenza: An affair of honor arising from an insult that could end in a 
retraction, an understanding (equivocation), or armed combat.
Sfida: A written or oral challenge that constituted the beginning of a 
vertenza.
La mentita: “Giving the lie,” the basic formulaic challenge of untruth, 
which derived its totemic power from the fundamentals of chivalric 
knighthood based on the importance of one’s word and fealty to the 
structures of feudalism.
Vie di fatto: Physical acts such as slapping or spitting which automatically 
occasioned a vertenza and most likely a duel.
Indegnità: The status of being disqualified from either asking for or 
receiving satisfaction through a vertenza.
Padrini: The “seconds” or “witnesses” who attended an encounter on 
behalf of the duelists or primi (singular: padrino and primo, respec-
tively).
Direttore: The person designated to oversee a duel and ensure that 
it conformed to the laws of chivalry. Usually he was one of the 
padrini, but he could be a third party brought in by mutual con-
sent.
Terreno: The dueling “ground” or “field” where the combat occurred.
Verbale: A written account of a vertenza stipulating as to the specific 
offense and the nature of the resulting retraction, understanding, or 
combat. If the combat did occur, a preliminary verbale set out the 
details of the duel (weapons, conditions, and participants), and then 
a second verbale di scontro reported the results, including the number 
of assaults with swords (or shots with a pistol), the wounds received, 
and whether the participants were reconciled and shook hands. If 
one of the duelists lost his courage or failed to follow the rules, it 
had to be noted in this final verbale, along with a condemnation of 
his actions. In any given vertenza, all verbali had to be signed by the 
padrini, with copies provided for each side as written evidence for 
future reference. Not uncommonly, verbali were published in the 
newspapers.
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Although it will be reiterated more than once, it bears saying at this 
juncture that the “perfect” duel as it developed in the nineteenth cen-
tury did not consist in one man besting another, but rather in having 
both men demonstrate their courage, according to the rules and with 
mutual respect for all involved—that is, as “perfect gentlemen.”
OOking back from the nineteenth century, Italians could either 
vaunt or lament their country’s past ties to the practice of dueling, 
for it is generally agreed that the modern code of honor, which relied 
on the rituals of the duel for its enforcement, evolved in Italy’s princely 
courts during the Renaissance and from there gradually spread to the 
rest of Europe.1 Brantôme, the great French courtier who fought in the 
Italian wars, maintained that the point-of-honor duel first developed 
among the “grands capitaines italiens,” and he described dueling as a con-
stant in the garrisons of the peninsula.2 With the rise of the duel itself, 
Italy also saw a veritable explosion of books and pamphlets that pur-
ported to justify, explicate, and teach the proper defense of one’s honor. 
Lawyers and moralists created and articulated an ethical code that 
refined and sharpened sensibilities to insult while dictating proper 
behavior among “gentlemen,” a handily ambiguous category that suited 
the social flux of the period. Print capitalism found this scienza cavaller-
esca or “science of chivalry” to be a tasty topic, and during the sixteenth 
century, Italian presses would crank out 46 new dueling manuals released 
in 110 different editions.3 This massive edifice of paper was reinforced 
by steel as Italians refined the rapier out of the broadsword and devel-
oped scientific fencing techniques to go with it. Such innovations 
 1. Billacois 1986, 70–75; Peltonen 2003, 4–64. 
 2. Brantôme 1887, 132. 
 3. Erspamer 1982, 58–61. 
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spread quickly to the rest of the continent through teachers such as 
Sanseverino, Lovino, Pompeo, Bonetti, and Fabrizio, as well as instruc-
tion manuals by Marozzo, Agrippa, Saviolo, and Capo Ferro.4 In short, 
Italy became famous as “dueling central” in theory, practice, and propa-
ganda for more than one hundred years. Even in the early seventeenth 
century, John Selden still felt comfortable using the Italian term Duello 
to adorn his English treatise (1610) on the topic. Yet, despite its pre-
eminence as the birthplace of the modern duel, Italy eventually lost its 
pride of place to the French. The actual number of duels fought on 
Italian soil gradually diminished throughout the seventeenth century 
and, with the exception of Piedmont, virtually disappeared after the 
mid-eighteenth century.
 Exactly why the point-of-honor duel arose in Italy during the fif-
teenth and sixteenth centuries is a sufficiently complex question that I 
have chosen to address it elsewhere.5 Nevertheless, four general themes 
emerge from the current literature.6 First, the rituals of the modern 
duel derived primarily from the traditional practices, or lois d’armes, 
of the soldier/knights who provided military muscle throughout the 
states of Italy. These customary laws began to be codified by Italian 
jurists starting in the 1470s and then spread to other elite sectors of 
society. Second, and of major importance, the modern duel—despite 
its later illegality—received substantial support in its infancy from the 
Renaissance courts, whose princes granted both their “fields” and their 
good offices to duelists. Many of the early duels of honor were offici-
ated by ruling princes, or judges appointed by them, thus reinforc-
ing the “legalistic” image of the duel being presented by the jurists.7 
The courts offered official sanction to an evolving rite of honor, and 
in return they gained the prestige attending an ancient but virtually 
defunct practice—the judicial duel—while introducing new forms of 
discipline among their elite subjects.
 Third, despite its links to medieval precedents—ordeals, jousts, tour-
naments, pas d’armes, melees—the modern duel was something differ-
ent: it was dependent on a new, private concept of masculine honor 
that raised men’s sensitivity to personal slights but simultaneously lim-
ited the field of those immediately involved in the conflict. Hence the 
appropriateness of the term “point” of honor, because the duel focused 
 4. Anglo 1990, 6–9; Brioist et al. 2002, 63–70; Gelli 1928, 54–58. 
 5. Hughes, 2007A.
 6. For a good bibliography see Cavina 2005, 303–10.
 7. Bryson 1938, 178–86.
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attention on a particular affront and reduced its resolution to a single 
point in both time and space. This narrowed the scope of honor from 
the collective notions of the past, which had extended commitments of 
vendetta and feud tied to family and friends across generations. Instead 
the duel placed one’s reputation as a gentleman on one’s willingness 
to seek personal satisfaction in a single, ritualized encounter. Birth or 
office might confer nobility, but it had to be constantly defended on the 
individual level.
 Finally, for all its chivalric trimmings, the dueling code did not 
arise in France or Spain, where the traditions and structures of feudal 
knighthood had retained much of their vigor. Instead it came from Italy, 
where the warrior aristocracy had suffered its greatest competition in 
both theory and practice during most of the Middle Ages. Thus the 
duel functioned in part to help redefine the concept of aristocracy or 
at least demarcate those who should be accorded the attributes of honor 
in a constantly shifting social landscape. It could “ennoble” talented 
elites while protecting the position of those traditionally accorded 
honor because of their rank, or at least who thought they should be. 
This social function was enhanced by the evolution of the rapier and 
scientific fencing techniques that allowed courtiers as well as soldiers 
to participate in a blood ritual that became increasingly divorced from 
what was happening on the battlefields of Europe. What bound these 
features of the early duel together was a search for legitimacy and sta-
tus in the rapidly mutating political and social environments of the 
Renaissance city-states. That search lead to an affirmation of the myth 
of medieval chivalry as a model of masculine behavior, but one that 
served the psychological and social needs of a rather different society. 
And this pattern would be repeated in the nineteenth century. On the 
other hand, understanding why and how Italy abandoned the dueling 
ethic during what later came to be perceived by patriots as a period of 
political stagnation and foreign oppression helps explain why its return 
became a keynote for men trying to prompt a resurgence of Italian 
identity and liberty.
 Italy’s primacy as creator and promulgator of the modern duel 
faded rapidly toward the end of the sixteenth century, and the epicen-
ter of chivalric honor shifted to France. Duels seem to have diminished 
through the next century and (excluding Piedmont) were relatively 
rare by the 1750s. Thus in 1756 the legate of Bologna, Cardinal Serbel-
loni, actually apologized in his code of criminal law for even mention-
ing dueling among the various forms of homicide because it had so 
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completely disappeared from use.8 Likewise, Paolo Vergani, in his 1776 
antidueling tract, Dell’enormezza del duello, fully admitted that his argu-
ments were aimed at a practice that had almost disappeared.9 This view 
was the same to foreign eyes, and Smollet, who in his Travels through 
Italy and France commented at length on the readiness of French offi-
cers in 1764 to fight over even minor affronts to their honor, made no 
mention of dueling in Italy at all.10 Samuel Sharpe, in his Letters from 
Italy of 1766, was highly interested in social customs, particularly those 
regarding relations between men and women. Observant and critical, 
he chastised the Italians for their system of cicisbeismo, in which married 
women were constantly paid court by a favorite gallant, a practice he 
found degrading and inappropriate. Gallantry prevailed, women could 
do what they wanted, and “the word jealousy is become obsolete.” Yet 
he did not once refer to the chivalric code or dueling as part of the 
Italian scene. On the contrary, he suggested that there was no way for 
men to “vent their indignation,” no “salve for their honor,” and hence 
“[i]t is amazing how many assassinations there are in Italy almost all of 
them effects of quarrels.”11 Literary tastes mirrored this general trend, 
and dueling manuals which were still prized possessions in the seven-
teenth century had become almost worthless by 1750.12 The extent of 
this “degradation” of Italy’s chivalric expertise would eventually have 
both indirect confirmation and practical results after the Restoration 
when, with the gradual return of the dueling ethic, Italian elites would 
find themselves relying on French dueling manuals rather than on the 
earlier efforts of their compatriots.
 The reasons for this diminution of dueling were complex and var-
ied. The most obvious cause was the impact of the Council of Trent 
which emphasized, propagated, and enforced the Papacy’s prior oppo-
sition to the practice.13 Cast within the Counter Reformation’s growing 
atmosphere of greater moral conformity, the Church’s severe con-
demnation, constant exhortation, and spiritual punishments—such as 
prohibiting Christian burial for duelists—apparently prompted some 
nobles to seek alternative means to settling private disputes.14 The 
 8. Serbelloni 1756, 35.
 9. Vergani 1776, 1–2.
 10. Smollett 1979, 135–38, 174.
 11. Sharp 1766, 11, 174. 
 12. Erspamer 1982, 18–20; also Cavina 2005, 206–12, Cavina 2003, 333–66.
 13. Angelozzi 1996, 271–308; Donati 2001, 134–62. 
 14. Di Simplicio 1994, 49–58. 
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growing efficiency and declining tolerance of the early modern gov-
ernments (which started passing antidueling legislation in the 1540s) 
may also have had an effect, but just as important was the stability (some 
would say stagnation) brought by Spanish hegemony in the latter half of 
the sixteenth century, which, for better or worse, reduced the social and 
political dynamism that had fueled the duel during the Renaissance. In 
addition, Billacois has suggested that the Italians became absorbed with 
the punctilious repartee of their own dueling manuals and turned to 
words rather than swords to adjudicate matters of honor.15 For the eigh-
teenth century, Francesco Erspamer has added the rationalizing effects 
of Enlightenment thought and pointed to the enormous publishing 
success and presumed influence of Scipione Maffei’s monumental anti-
dueling treatise, Della scienza cavalleresca, which went through some ten 
editions after its appearance in 1710.16 All of these factors figure into 
what Gregory Hanlon has seen as a well-documented tendency toward 
a more “policed” society in the eighteenth century by which the nobil-
ity in particular attempted to solve their quarrels without violence.17
 Equal in importance to all these causes, however, was the gradual 
yet certain demilitarization of the Italian nobility after about 1660, 
which has been carefully analyzed by Gregory Hanlon.18 The down-
ward trajectory of the military vocation among elites closely matches 
the gradual disappearance of the duel in Italy. It strongly indicates that, 
deprived of a military ethos and identity, Italian elites gave way to the 
aforementioned religious, social, political, and intellectual forces imping-
ing on the dueling ritual. That such was, in fact, the case was evidenced 
by Piedmont, which was the one clear-cut exception in the general 
process of demilitarization and which was the only region of Italy to 
maintain a vibrant and continuous dueling tradition through the eigh-
teenth century. Thus one commentator, Giuseppe Baretti, reported in 
1768 that the Piedmontese “are withal so punctilious and so ready to 
draw the sword, that more duels are fought in Piedmont than in the rest 
of Italy taken together.”19 The Piedmontese exception is all the more 
telling because, as Hanlon writes, the House of Savoy was “ferociously 
Counter-Reformation” in its religious policies, and thus the region’s 
 15. Billacois 1986, 79–81. 
 16. Erspamer 1982, 19–21. 
 17. Hanlon 2000, 306–7, 367. Also see Angelozzi and Casanova 2003. 
 18. Hanlon 1998, especially 303–27.
 19. Baretti 1768, vol. 2, 121–22; also see Fougeroux 1835, 294–95, and Bianchi 2002, 
71.
	 /	 Prologue
continuing tolerance of chivalric combat offers a healthy corrective 
to any assumption that the Council of Trent automatically tolled the 
death knell for dueling on the peninsula.20 It also provides an interest-
ing paradox by which the only early modern Italian state that managed 
to create a successful absolutist government, complete with a reliable 
service nobility and a centralized bureaucracy, was also the only area 
where dueling continued to flourish.
 Be that as it may, the evidence indicates that for the rest of Italy the 
duel had all but disappeared during the eighteenth century.21 However, 
its decline proved to be something of a two-edged sword. Foreign com-
mentators often attributed high rates of personal violence in Italy to the 
fact that gentlemen failed to face each other on the field of honor.22 
Anachronistically underwritten by the popularity of Machiavelli’s asser-
tions of princely deception, daggers and poison became the common 
descriptors of action among Italian men, and one English critic in 1595 
inveighed against “O Italy, the Academie of manslaughter, the sport-
ing place of murther, the Apothecary shop of poyson for all Nations: 
how many kinds of weapons hast thou invented for malice?”23 Nor had 
things improved much by the time Rousseau claimed, in his Nouveau 
Héloise, “At Messina or Naples, one waits for his man at the corner of 
a street and stabs him from behind. That’s what they call being brave in 
that country. . . .”24 Such unfortunate images could be mixed with for-
eign misapprehension of cicisbeismo to suggest that eighteenth-century 
Italian nobles were fecklessly unconcerned with protecting the morality 
of their wives.25 Certainly travelers other than Boswell must have gone 
off on the Grand Tour with the explicit hope of availing themselves 
of supposedly easy women.26 It was just this perceived combination of 
sexual nonchalance and dishonorable perfidy in Sharpe’s Letters from 
Italy that led Giuseppe Baretti in 1769 to proclaim angrily that, at least 
in Piedmont, people “mix in intercourse exactly after the manner of 
 20. Hanlon 1998, 348.
 21.  Henry Swineburne, an English traveler who visited the south in the late 1770s, 
tellingly reported that the Neapolitan nobility no longer wore swords as part of their dress. 
Reported in Davis 2006, 43.
 22. For example, Fynes Moryson’s comments in Hughes 1967, 402–7, and those of 
Dallington in Weinstein 1994, 213–15. 
 23. Nash 1592, 18. 
 24. Rousseau 1960, 130. Also see Branchi 2005, 51.
 25. On the lack of jealousy see Smollett 1979, 230–31; De Brosses 1991, 843–44; Brydone 
1901, 211–12.
 26. Boswell 1955, 15–17, 30.
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the French and the English, and the Piedmontese weapon in deciding 
sudden quarrels is the sword I say and not the dagger.”27
 The burden of such negative stereotypes might have been relatively 
light in the eighteenth century, but as Italy became caught up in the 
greater game of Napoleonic expansion, they would help spark a return 
to earlier forms of honorable combat. The whole science of chivalry 
as it developed in Italy had gone on to influence the rest of Europe, 
much of which would maintain a closer relationship to the duel. As Bil-
lacois would say for France, Italy provided two critical components for 
the development of the cult of honor: “a technique for single combat 
(fencing) and a juridico-ethical corpus (scienza cavalleresca).”28 Eventu-
ally, France would return the favor as its revolutionary armies brought 
new concepts of citizenship as well as a mass attempt to militarize the 
Italians; in so doing, they would reawaken the dueling tradition by both 
example and provocation. By the same token, Italians after unity would 
be able to refer with patriotic pride to a time when their country had 
taught the world how to put honor on the point of a sword.
 27. Baretti 1768, vol. 2, 124.
 28. Billacois 1990, 18.

f The dUel were dead in much of Italy by the end of the eighteenth 
century, it would not stay that way for long. Reinvigorated after 
1796 by the arrival of French armies, dueling would once again become 
a regular although infrequent occurrence among Italians: a compelling 
force that had to be taken into consideration by those aspiring to elite 
status in the topsy-turvy world of first Napoleonic and then Restora-
tion society. The duel would find constant reinforcement in the popu-
lar culture of the day as Romanticism and market forces sent artists 
burrowing into a mythical past of medieval chivalry to bring forth a 
barrage of positive dueling images in prose, poetry, and song. Before 
Italy’s unification, Verdi alone produced six operas containing duels of 
various sorts.1 Advertised in the real world by spectacular or notorious 
encounters, many of which were tied to early Italian nationalism, duel-
ing gradually won over the allegiance of a new generation of men who 
would embrace the sword as a symbol of their manhood, their free-
dom, and their patriotism. The duel became linked with the Risorgi-
mento, in terms of both its heroes and its tactics, and it would plant 
seeds of chivalry that would blossom and proliferate once the country 
had come into its own. At the same time, the return of the duel would 
be obvious in the attending number of treatises, projects, and laws, all 
 1. The operas include Oberto (1839), Ernani (1844), Luisa Miller (1849), Stiffellio (1850), 
Il Trovatore (1854), and Aroldo (1857). 
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of which bemoaned its influence and aimed at its eradication. In con-
trast, important people began to assert the difficulties of legislating 
against such a deeply rooted set of beliefs, suggesting instead that the 
duel had a positive role to play in modern Italian society. In sum, the 
rhythm of public commentary on the dueling compulsion accelerated 
through the period, setting the stage for what would become a torrent 
of debate following unification.
The Rearmament of Honor in Italy: 
Napoleon and the Restoration
The duel of honor would return to Italy from France where it had 
thrived since the sixteenth century and where it had remained thor-
oughly entrenched in the French army even after the Revolution. 
From 1796 to 1815, the French military in one way or another was 
actively engaged on the Italian peninsula, and the code duello came as 
part of the package. Internal politics of the different states were con-
stantly subordinated to the grand designs of first the Republic and 
then the Empire, and the army served as both the goal and the means 
of the reorganization of Italian society. Accordingly, the French actively 
recruited Italian elites, established military academies, created legions 
of honor, and, above all, introduced conscription as each region fell 
under their power. Exact numbers are lacking of how many Italians 
eventually served under the auspices of the Empire, but by 1812, the 
Kingdom of Italy—which included one-third of the peninsula’s popu-
lation—had some 60,000 soldiers commanded by over 3,000 officers, 
most of whom were of Italian extraction.3 Just as important, however, 
was the subtext of inferiority that underlay French attitudes toward 
their Italian brothers-in-arms, who were seen as lacking masculinity 
and courage.4 This went double for elites since, with the notable excep-
tion of the Piedmontese, centuries of misrule had purportedly allowed 
them to degenerate into a parasitic class of do-nothing pacifists who 
had been emasculated by their priests with the connivance of their 
mothers. Time and again these assumptions would rise to the surface, 
and the Italians would react to defend themselves according to the 
rules of honor recently relearned from their allies. In short, the French 
 2. For a full treatment of this topic see Hughes 2001.
 3. Della Peruta 1991, 27. 
 4. Broers 2001, 258.
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brought tens of thousands of Italians into a military machine dominated 
by the dueling code and then gave them something to fight about.
 Consequently, memoirs from the period refer time and again to 
affairs of honor conducted between French and Italian officers (the lat-
ter including important Risorgimento figures such as Carlo Filangieri 
and Gugliemo Pepe), and many specifically mention the overweening 
attitude of the French toward the Italians as a major contributing fac-
tor.5 Worse than French haughtiness, however, were the accusations of 
cowardice or ineptitude, which figured in their general prejudice against 
Italians as lacking virility or martial mettle.6 Yet the memoirs also record 
many duels among Italian officers from all parts of the peninsula that 
demonstrate how quickly and completely the dueling ethic had been 
assimilated as they became swept up in the military cyclone of French 
expansion. Consider the career of Costante Ferrari, a Grenadier from 
Lombardy, who over time fought a Polish sergeant, a French Dragoon, a 
Milanese cavalryman, and a Bolognese Scout.7 His experience affirmed 
a report from Giuseppe De Lorenzo, a captain from Naples who had 
himself been wounded in a duel with a French officer. Having been 
assigned after the battle of Marengo to a special battalion of Italian vol-
unteers in Pavia, he wrote that duels had become a daily ritual: “There 
is such a martial—or more accurately—a brutal spirit within our bat-
talion that everyday without exception my comrades haul themselves 
off into the countryside to fight duels among themselves or with some 
French or Cisalpine soldier with whom they have had even the slightest 
controversy [ . . . ].”8 Given that both De Lorenzo and Ferrari came from 
middle-class backgrounds, their stories suggest that the officer corps 
provided an avenue to increased status, but one that had to be protected 
by occasional recourse to the duel. Tapping deep-rooted institutional 
traditions of chivalry, Italians who rose to leadership in the polyglot and 
polyclass armies of the Empire could now defend their honor with alac-
rity and courage, and in so doing announce their arrival as elite mem-
bers of a new society in the making. Moreover, at least some officers 
who returned to civilian life carried their chivalric concepts of honor 
 5. Filangieri 1902, 62–68; Ulloa 1876, 27–31; Pepe 1847, 206, 311; Zucchi 1861, 9, 
15, 28, 34. For an extraordinary mass duel in Spain between French and Italian soldiers see 
Vigeant 1883, 51–65.
 6. For the most famous example see Filangieri 1902, 62–68. Also see Ulloa 1876, 27–
31. 
 7. Ferrari 1942, 12–13, 114, 21–22; for a Piedmontese/Neapolitan duel see Pignatelli 
1927, vol. 1, viii–xix.
 8. De Lorenzo 1999, 113.
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with them. Such was clearly indicated in a papal police report dated 
December 30, 1819. It seems that two noblemen in Gubbio shared 
a romantic interest in the same lady, and their rivalry had eventually 
prompted a clamorous duel in which both were injured. According to 
the police, however, the immediate catalyst of the encounter had been 
a disagreement during dinner over the “duels which they had fought 
under the past government when they were soldiers.”9
 But what of the lasting effect on Italian society? The growing fre-
quency and alarmist tone of antidueling literature during the Restora-
tion forcefully indicated that something fundamental had changed.10 
For instance, in 1827 Giacomo Bossi published a pamphlet in Torino 
decrying the fact that the duel had returned to favor in Italy. For three 
centuries after its condemnation by prince and church alike, the duel 
had been confined to “the repugnant boasting of quarrelsome bullies,” 
but now that had all changed. Instead, “[t]he criminality of the duel is 
no longer held to be self evident by most men.” Popularized and legal-
ized in France and England, the “deadly plague,” the “deplorable insan-
ity,” was spreading “like a contagious disease” to Italy, and Bossi felt it 
his solemn duty to lay out the arguments against it.11 His opinions were 
shared by a Roman commentator, Ferdinando Malvica, who in 1826 
wrote that in current times “the mania of duels grows beyond measure 
and renders the people deaf to the voices of reason.”12
 Bossi and Malvica would be joined during the next decade by other 
antidueling authors such as Luca Marcucci (1836), who maintained that 
support for the duel had become like a massive rock rolling downhill, 
almost unstoppable in its momentum, or Antonio Cagnano (1837), who 
complained the compulsion to duel had “conquered the highest classes 
of society.”13 Moreover, this later literature (nine treatises between 1835 
and 1839) was different from that of the 1820s, which had aimed at 
swaying the literate public against the duel through entreaty, exhorta-
tion, and an appeal to sentiment. In contrast, the new treatises, although 
obviously not short on moral and religious references, unanimously 
focused on legislation and the need to create criminal sanctions that 
 9. ASR, Direzione Generale di Polizia, 1820, Protocollo Ordinario, Busta 49, Title 6, 
Fascicolo 49, #1708.
 10. Actually one of the most important critics was Alessandro Manzoni, whose justifiably 
famous novel, I promessi sposi, was written in the 1820s and is full of antidueling messages. For 
more analysis see Hughes 2001, 43–44.
 11. Bossi 1827, 2–4.
 12. Malvica 1826, 6. 
 13. Marcucci 1836, 291, 302, 306; Cagnano 1837, 29, 42.
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were both appropriate and effective in the fight against the duel.14 Nor 
would their voices go unheeded. The Neapolitan government promul-
gated a harsh antidueling law in July of 1838, while other Italian states 
devoted substantial technical deliberation to the duel as they worked to 
overhaul their criminal codes.15 Obviously, the power of the state had 
to be brought to bear on what was perceived as a growing problem of 
public order.
 The states were all, however, facing a protean and pernicious oppo-
nent. While some blamed the bad example of military men and oth-
ers the general degradation of elite morality, new cultural factors were 
operating during the Restoration to spread the dueling compulsion. 
Thus Pesaro-Maurogonato, a law student writing his dissertation on the 
problem of the duel in 1838, complained that the practice of dueling 
vaunted no famous champion or philosopher whom he could attempt to 
confound directly. Instead, he wrote, “[i]nfinite is the number of writers 
who write about the duel with a levity particular to those minds which, 
incapable of thinking for themselves, blindly follow the prejudices of 
public opinion [ . . . ].” He was particularly displeased with the authors 
of comedies and romances who “never miss the opportunity to present 
the duel in its most noble aspect and always present it as a valid, reason-
able, and necessary reparation of every insult.”16 His lament reflected 
the growth of Romanticism, whose appeal to Italy’s literate classes was 
evident in the success of poets such as Alfieri, Leopardi, and Foscolo.
 Particularly important was the invocation of medieval society, and 
Sir Walter Scott’s novels, loaded with duels and chivalry alike, were 
enormously popular in Italy. Such was the interest in these topics that 
Melzi in 1838 created a specialized bibliography of over 800 chivalric 
novels and poems that had been printed earlier in Italy, primarily in the 
sixteenth century.17 Likewise, Italian authors, such as Giovan Battista 
Bazzoni, Tommaso Grossi, and Silvio Pellico, offered their own home-
grown historical romances to feed the expanding market for medieval 
gallantry. They were all clearly eclipsed, however, by Massimo d’Azeglio, 
whose novel Ettore Fieramosca rediscovered and celebrated the triumph 
of Italian knights over their French counterparts in a duel that had 
 14. Besides the aforementioned Marcucci and Cagnano these included in chronological 
order Puoti 1835; Rizzi 1836; anonymous 1837; Pateale 1837; Carrillo 1837; Costi 1839; 
Pesaro-Maurogonato 1839.
 15. Fozzi and Passano 2000, 254–64. 
 16. Pesaro-Maurogonato 1839, 142.
 17. Melzi 1838. 
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occurred at Barletta in 1503.18 Combining historical reality, moving 
presentation, and praise of Italian military prowess, Fieramosca was an 
instant success upon its publication in 1833 and helped feed the grow-
ing alliance between dueling and national pride in Italy. Music became 
equally entranced with such motifs. Starting with Oberto in 1839, Verdi 
would lace his operas with chivalric encounters, and both Rossini and 
Donizetti used duels and challenges from past ages as dramatic devices. 
We will return to some of this material in discussing the duel’s special 
relationship to the Risorgimento, but the present point is that during 
the Restoration, Italian elites were engulfed in images of the duel on 
stage and in print, often within a glorified medieval context.
 All the more potent then were real-life examples of duels fought 
for the right reason at the right time. Unquestionably the most impor-
tant of these burst upon the scene in 1826 after the French author 
Alphonse de Lamartine published a poem containing a number of lines 
highly insulting to Italians. Weak, obsequious, fawning, and treacherous, 
they had, he said, betrayed the majesty and courage of their Roman past 
and now fought only from behind and in the dark. These were fight-
ing words, and Lamartine, who was with the French Legation in Flor-
ence, soon found himself facing Gabriele Pepe, a Neapolitan soldier and 
writer who had sought refuge in Tuscany after serving two harsh years 
of imprisonment imposed by the restored Bourbon regime for his 
participation in the recent revolution. In order to avoid Tuscan censors, 
who hoped to avoid a diplomatic flap with the French, Pepe slipped a 
backhanded barb against Lamartine as being both weak and cowardly 
in an analytical article devoted to Dante. Lamartine asked for a personal 
meeting to try to solve the matter peacefully, but Pepe had no inten-
tion of letting that happen. Instead, he received Lamartine at home, and 
his description of the event, written some weeks later, reveals volumes 
about his intentions in the affair.
I received him with all possible courtesy, just as our written corre-
spondence had been genteel and courteous. [ . . . ] I wanted to use and 
exaggerate the forms of chivalry. I was dealing with a Frenchman who 
had depicted the Italians as assassins capable only of treacherously using 
a dagger in the night. It was thus necessary to demonstrate with facts 
that the Italians are more chivalrous than the French. Moreover, the Flo-
rentines, who shared my estimation of events, were carefully watching 
 18. On the original incident see Russo 1993.
	 Risorgimento	del	Duello—Duello	del	Risorgimento	 /	 
to see in what ways I would carry out the part of Champion of Italy. 
And since we Neapolitans, because of past military events, do not have 
a good reputation, I was simultaneously stimulated by both Italian and 
patriotic [Neapolitan] feelings.19
Here then was a chance to prove that the Italians were as “civilized” 
as the French, to counteract the image of the perfidious stiletto in the 
shadows, and finally to redeem the martial valor of his countrymen. 
Pepe blatantly promoted this “chivalric project” throughout the rest 
of the affair with a series of gentlemanly gestures, such as accepting 
French seconds as his own, using a shorter rapier, and binding Lamar-
tine’s wounded arm with his own handkerchief after he had bested him 
in the action.20
 It would be difficult to overestimate the importance and impact of 
Pepe’s example for dueling in Restoration Italy. It had, in many ways, 
been a “perfect” duel. Above all, it had been a public event from start to 
finish, with Lamartine’s poetic attack being countered by Pepe’s literary 
retort, leading to a duel that was broadcast throughout the peninsula. 
The evidence of insult was easily available in print to all, and the injury 
had transcended personal rancor to reach questions of national charac-
ter. Also, it had ended well. Not only had Pepe proven himself “more 
chivalrous” than the Frenchman, not only had he wounded the foreigner 
“in the hand which had offended,” but Lamartine had almost immedi-
ately issued an “explanation” of his previous poetic faux pas.21 Thus the 
triumph was complete: Italian honor had been defended, restored, and 
celebrated. In fact Pepe immediately became a hero of the first order, 
and Antonio Ranieri reported that he was “the most venerated, the 
most adored of the exiles” to whom “all the Italians, all the foreigners 
who were in Florence knelt down. . . .”22 Similar enthusiasm emanated 
from the rest of Italy. He received letters of congratulation from Milan, 
Bologna, Rome, and, of course, Naples, and he intimated to his brother 
that he could not believe how quickly word of the duel had spread.23
 All in all, the Pepe-Lamartine affair proved a formidable force in 
promoting the dueling ethic. Carlo Troya in a letter to Pepe excoriated 
 19. Quoted in Pepe 1980, vol. 1, 400.
 20.  Lamartine’s later account was different, but Pepe’s description quickly became the 
Italian version. See Jannone 1912, 56–57.
 21. Quoted in Jannone 1912, 69.
 22. Quoted in Lucianelli 1994, 98.
 23. Pepe 1980, vol. 1, 399. For more detail see Hughes 2001, 45–50.
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the few critics of the encounter as poltroons, donkeys, and rogues. He 
fantasized picking up a stick and punishing such “mercantantuci” (gross 
merchants) and “dottori degli stivali” (base hacks) until they repented their 
weakness.24 In this regard, although his duel fell clearly into the Napole-
onic tradition of Italian soldiers fighting with their French critics, Pepe 
had now set a public precedent on a grand scale. In fact, he had created 
a paradigm that could allow almost any duel between an Italian and a 
foreigner to be read as an analogue of national struggle. Thus in March 
of 1833, when a tiff during Mardi Gras between a group of Imperial 
officers and a Milanese engineer led to a duel that left one of the offi-
cers dead, it was interpreted as a political event as much as a personal 
one, leading to the arrest of a number of liberal sympathizers.25
 Despite the popularity and influence of the Pepe-Lamartine affair, 
we should be wary of overestimating the frequency with which duels 
actually occurred during the Restoration period. While contempo-
raries often bemoaned the growing number of encounters, we must 
keep their earlier frame of reference in perspective and understand that 
any increase in a phenomenon that had previously been almost nonex-
istent was bound to make a major impression. Lacking any consistent 
statistical record or even a free press to report duels as they occurred, 
quantitative analysis is impossible, and we are left with subjective esti-
mates based on anecdote and diatribe. Even then the picture is not 
particularly consistent and appears to have been heavily dependent on 
one’s location on the peninsula. In the Papal States there seems to have 
been a spate of duels shortly after the Restoration, but it faded quickly. 
According to Pesaro-Maurogonato, who was writing in 1839, the realm 
of Il Papa Re saw very few duels, and Rome virtually none, except for 
the odd encounter among foreigners.26 This general paucity for the 
Papal States would continue, and a statistical report of crimes commit-
ted in the papal provinces of Civitavecchia, Frosinone, Roma, Velletri, 
and Viterbo between 1854 and 1863 reported only one duel for the 
entire period, and it included a foreigner.27
 In contrast, Naples reportedly saw a number of duels, both before and 
after the law of 1838, and one military commentator in 1848 described 
the duel as “not a rare occurrence.”28 Piedmont probably led the pack, a 
 24. Jannone 1912, 64.
 25. Gelli 1992, 55–64.
 26. Pesaro-Maurogonato 1839, 123.
 27. ASR, Miscellanea di Statistica, Busta 42, Fascicolo 1863, note attached to “Tavola IIIa, 
dei duelli in ordine a ciascuna provincia.” 
 28. Bianco 1848, 22. 
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result of its continuous practice of the duel from the sixteenth century 
and its proximity to France. Pesaro-Maurogonato actually claimed in 
1839 that the duel in the Kingdom of Sardegna was “very rare,” but 
he then proceeded to describe how officers and students fought “over 
arguments arising from dances, dinners and rivalries of romance,” how 
soldiers were drummed from the corps if they refused a challenge, and 
how the borghesi went to the border to fight without interference from 
the government.29 This would indicate that dueling was hardly as “rare” 
in Piedmont as he previously suggested, and we see this confirmed in 
a letter of 1846 from Massimo d’Azeglio to Luisa Blondel in which he 
referred to an ongoing vertenza between Enrico Mayer and the novelist 
F. D. Guerrazzi: “I was sorry about the Mayer affair. On the other hand, 
one has to take the world as it is and you can’t remake it, and if do 
not want to fight you should not put yourself in such circumstances.”30 
Clearly, he was here referring to the duel as an event that was neither 
foreign nor uncommon.
 Whatever the exact frequency of duels in the various regions, we 
can ascertain that the Restoration saw the reintroduction of the dueling 
ethic into Italian public life.31 Although probably still more prominent 
among military men, many examples began to appear of duels that 
included members of both the nobility and the bourgeoisie. More-
over, critics and jurists generally spoke of the duel as a practice in the 
ascendancy rather than one fading away, and their own growing com-
mentary only confirmed their analysis. On the other hand, actual duels 
were not a common event and paled in comparison to what came later, 
after unification, when people spoke frankly of a “duellomania” which 
prompted a duel a day. Thus Paolo Fambri, himself an avid duelist, 
would look back from the 1870s and claim, “Today’s duel, especially 
here in Italy, is contemporary rather than modern, and so true is this 
that the first half of the present century saw not a tenth, but what tenth!, 
not a hundredth of today’s duels.”32 This quantum increase after unity 
had various causes, but one of the most obvious and important was the 
bond forged between dueling and patriotism as Italy went through the 
process of becoming a nation.
 29. Pesaro-Maurogonato 1839, 123.
 30. D’Azeglio 1987, vol. 3, 202.
 31. Carrillo (1837, 33) caught the ambiguity in 1837, when he referred to dueling as a 
custom but then added, “if in fact a few scarce encounters permit us to speak of custom.” 
 32. ACS, Carte Fambri Busta 21, Fascicolo 18. 
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Dueling and the Risorgimento
Recalling the duel between Gabriele Pepe and Alphonse Lamartine, 
one can see how quickly and easily dueling could become a symbol of 
national struggle and regeneration. That connection would be gradu-
ally reinforced as personalities and politics mixed to create icons of 
Italian identity, some of whom would fight well-publicized duels. A 
number of early military heroes of the Risorgimento, including Pig-
natelli, Filangieri, and Gugliemo Pepe, had participated in affairs of 
honor under the French, and their stories became part of the lore of 
the movement. Gugliemo Pepe (no relation to Gabriele) also described 
in his memoirs a duel he fought in 1823 with General Carrascosa, who 
challenged him over their conflicted participation in the Revolution of 
1820 in Naples. According to Pepe, his fellow exile Carrascosa wanted 
to demonstrate a new-found fealty to the restored absolutist regime by 
insulting and hopefully defeating a champion of the erstwhile constitu-
tional government. Carrascosa tracked down Pepe in England and sent 
him an insulting letter reviling the Carbonari and any form of political 
conspiracy. They fought with sabers, and in short order Pepe severely 
wounded Carrascosa in the shoulder, effectively ending the duel. Pepe 
wrote, “In that moment I forgot the problems he had caused our coun-
try, and, remembering the days when we had fought together under 
Murat against the Austrians as well as his brave actions at the battle of 
Castel di Sangro, I embraced him. By nature and sentiment, I ignore 
personalities, and hold as enemies only despotism and those foreigners 
who oppose our independence.”33
 The critical aspect of this one-sided narrative is how well it fit into 
the political context surrounding the publication date of Pepe’s mem-
oirs: 1847, a time of turmoil, hope, and fervor, which focused in large 
part on the search for an Italian identity. Pepe, the constitutional patriot, 
acted with both bravery and chivalry in the face of a former comrade’s 
supposed apostasy to the cause. Having proven their mutual courage, 
and with their differences canceled out by blood, they embraced in 
testament to past battles fought together against Italy’s enemies: liter-
ally brothers in arms. Nor did the morality play end there. The duel, 
at least in Pepe’s view, promoted a change of heart in Carrascosa, who 
dropped his alleged plans of submission to tyranny and pledged his 
sword to the cause of liberalism. For his part in the duel, Pepe received 
 33. Pepe 1847, vol. 2, 174–79.
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and published a letter from La Fayette praising his “patriotic and gener-
ous combat” which he saw as “an explication of the past, as useful for 
the cause as honorable for you.”34
 Although there was probably no direct connection, one finds many 
of Pepe’s main themes in two treatises on the duel which came out 
shortly after the establishment of constitutional government in Naples 
in 1848. Written by a lawyer, Emilio Pascale, and a soldier, Captain 
N. A. Bianco, these two judicial tracts differed substantially from prior 
commentary on the duel in Italy. Taking advantage of the new free-
dom of speech, they attacked the legislation created by Ferdinand II in 
1838 as being harsh and inefficient. Given the severity of the penalties, 
very few duelists had been brought to justice, while “we know that 
there have been duels whenever there has been need of them.”35 More 
at issue, however, they both heartily defended the duel as a practice with 
practical advantages that should not be taken lightly. Like other com-
mentators on the issue, they argued that the duel arose from the inabil-
ity of the law to protect honor from insult. But their slant was far more 
positive than previous tracts, and they affirmed the right of the duel to 
exist, in part because many aspects of personal honor were beyond the 
reach of the courts. One could and should stiffen laws against calumny 
and injury, but other offenses would remain to be adjudicated by public 
opinion through the duel. Besides, the duel did no real damage to soci-
ety because it was a free choice on the part of the participants, and this 
same mutual complicity also made it almost impossible to prosecute.
 Even more important, however, they argued that the duel could 
be a positive force in society. It provided an ameliorative function in 
demanding good behavior from people; it taught and enforced man-
ners; it was, in fact, “a great school of civilization.”36 The counterpart 
to this didactic force was the duel’s demonstration of courage and good 
actions in the face of evil and abject forces. To punish an honest man 
who had defended his honor according to the code is, he claimed, not 
only unjust, but it also “heartens the mean-spirited, it feeds the coward-
ice of scoundrels, and it encourages those who would disturb the peace 
of families and the honor of citizens.”37 How could the law equate a 
man who defends his honor to the murderers, traitors, parricides, and 
other human trash who got dragged to the scaffold? Such a dichotomy 
 34. Ibid., 178–79.
 35. Pascale 1848, 36.
 36. Ibid., 34, Bianco 1848, 18.
 37. Pascale 1848, 31.
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between honorable and dishonorable crimes perhaps reflected an anxi-
ety among men of substance and education, who in the turmoil of 
1848 were looking to distinguish themselves through the mechanisms 
of chivalry from the vulgar and rambunctious masses as the political 
landscape offered greater opportunity as well as greater danger.
 Be that as it may, neither Pascale nor Bianco went so far as to con-
done the duel outright, and each in his way offered some palliative con-
demnation to offset his obvious enthusiasm for the practice. In the same 
vein, each asked that the law against the duel be completely revised 
rather than abolished outright. But the fervor of their language belied 
their hesitations. Pascale spoke of the duel as a “baptism” designed to 
wipe away any mark of dishonor from an honorable man.38 Bianco 
went even further, offering the duel as a mystical moment that dispelled 
cowardice and bound men together almost as brothers: “After the fight, 
with their ire laid aside, they embrace each other, and if blood is shed, 
they offer the gestures of the most heartfelt cordiality. It is a beautiful 
metamorphosis in truth, a magic effect, poetic in its excellence, which 
refines behavior.”39 So important was this transfiguration, simultane-
ously religious and autoerotic in nature, that Bianco saved his greatest 
disdain, and any real punishment, for men who fought a second duel 
with each other, having gone through the “beautiful metamorphosis” 
of honorable combat. They had betrayed the magic moment and thus 
deserved no leniency.
 The attitude and language of Pepe, Pascale, and Bianco betrayed 
a growing tendency not merely to tolerate or accept the duel but to 
promote its precepts as a positive force in Italian society. This attitude 
resonated with a general manifestation of the concepts of chivalry and 
honor as a cornerstone of Italian nationalist thought in the first half of 
the century. The importance of such ideas has been deftly revealed by 
Alberto Banti in a work aimed at discerning the cultural and literary 
fonts of Italian identity and unity. Rejecting both economic and social 
causes of the unification movement as secondary, Banti maintains that 
early Italian nationalists were inspired primarily by the literature they 
read. Specifically, he points to a “canon” of novels, plays, and operas 
produced between 1803 and 1848 that created a powerful mythology 
of patriotic tropes built on “family-ties, sanctity, and honor.” Naturally, 
with regard to the duel, honor was the most important of these, and 
 38. Ibid., 32.
 39. Bianco 1848, 18–19.
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Banti demonstrates how patriots could read the resurgence of Italy as 
an ongoing chivalric challenge designed to redeem the disgraced honor 
of the land and its people.40 Dueling thus offered a symbolic means of 
reasserting Italy’s military valor, but even more important was its tie to 
the chivalrous act, rife through the literature, of defending the purity 
of Italian women. This image was easily transferred into defending the 
honor of Italia as a woman, which, as Banti effectively demonstrates, was 
a common poetic and pictorial means of reifying the new nation. Given 
this cultural baggage, he sees the many duels portrayed in the patriotic 
canon as expanding the individual notion of honor to a nationalized 
sense of honor. Likewise, the nationalist canon was full of duels that 
took place in the medieval past and that recalled a world of grand 
and selfless gestures attractive to romantic tastes. Celebrating the duel-
ing heroes of yesteryear, the canon helped reinforce an ideal chivalric 
stereotype, which could then be linked to the ideal of Italian regen-
eration.41 In our search for why the duel increased in legitimacy and 
frequency during the Restoration (although such a search is not Banti’s 
goal), this literature provides an important piece of the puzzle. If the 
code of chivalry promoted national sentiment, the poets of patriotism 
championed the dueling ethic across the peninsula.
 Other aspects of the nationalist literature studied by Banti reinforce 
this point, although he perhaps underplays them because of his stress 
on chivalry being linked to women’s honor. For instance, he comments 
on the importance of references to “blood” as a constant in the canon 
literature, both as a biological determinant of Italian identity, the purity 
of which had to be defended, and as a totemic parallel to the redeeming 
sacrifice of Christ.42 Obviously the image of blood was a crucial aspect 
of the dueling ritual, not only in the need to have blood flow to end 
an affair but also in the common references to a “baptism” by blood 
(an image reinforced by the use of the term padrino, or “godfather,” 
to indicate a duelist’s second) and the frequent assertion that “blood 
washes honor clean.”43 And both of these maxims reinforced the con-
nection between the duel and Christian sanctity, which is Banti’s third 
prepolitical constant of the Italian psyche. 
 Finally, the patriotic literature virtually teems with images of the 
sword as an instrument of redemption. Thus in the Battle di Legnano, 
 40. Banti 2000, 93, 139. 
 41. Ibid., 67, 84–85, 105, 140–41, 147, 183, 185.
 42. Ibid., 62, 73.
 43. For example, Nievo 1973, vol. 2, 783. 
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which recounts the Lombard League’s medieval triumph over the Ger-
manic Empire, Cammarano has the chorus exhorting, “Long live Italy 
strong and united / With sword and with thought! / May this soil 
which was our cradle / Be the tomb of the foreigner.”44 And Man-
zoni in his poem Marzo 1821 celebrates the conspirator patriots: “They 
swore: stronger for that oath / And found fraternal response in other 
regions, / Sharpening their swords in the shadows / Now they lift them 
to shine in the sun.”45 Alfieri was even more explicit in his image of the 
sword as a tool for reclaiming lost honor.
He heard injurious and audacious words
With which the wicked can wound the good;
Nor law has he to help him counter.
Now it is only the sword which
Offers a healing potion
Which calms the valorous and silences the rabble.46
 These references reflected to a certain extent the search through the 
Risorgimento for the “sword of Italy,” a mythical military leader fore-
shadowed first in Machiavelli’s The Prince and then in Napoleon, who 
would redeem the Italian nation and who would eventually become 
identified by propagandists with both Victor Emmanuel II and Giuseppe 
Garibaldi. Hence, Marco Minghetti described Victor Emmanuel in 
1848 as being a knight of the Middle Ages, who was determined “to 
not put down his sword as long as a single Austrian remains in Italy.”47 
On the other end of the political spectrum, Giuseppe Mazzini report-
edly kept in his possession a cavalry saber upon which were inscribed 
the words, “The fate of Italy is in the sword.”48 Likewise, Garibaldi, in 
a lifetime replete with portraits, was consistently portrayed with a saber 
in full view. Symbolically, the sword very clearly carried heavy meaning 
for Italian elites, well beyond any phallic interpretations one might wish 
to engage in, and it is not surprising that, as we shall see, the vast major-
ity of duels in nineteenth-century Italy would be fought with the saber, 
a sword more of the soldier than of the gentleman.49 In fact the saber 
 44. Banti 2000, 58.
 45. Ibid., 57; also see the passage from Verdi’s “All’armi” quoted on p. 136.
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later became seen in its management as a uniquely Italian weapon, or, 
as one commentator claimed, “the true national glory.”50 It hardly seems 
a coincidence then that the future statesman Giovanni Visconti Venosta 
described in his memoirs how the patriotic young men of Lombardy 
would hold meetings in a fencing hall, where they could practice their 
swordsmanship and plan for the resurgence of Italy.51
 This emphasis on the sword reinforces the point that early national-
ism in Italy was often married to the remilitarization of its people and 
especially its youth.52 We see this as early as 1815 with Murat’s call for 
Italian unity at Rimini in which he exhorted Italy’s young men to 
return to the martial virtues of ancient Rome and learn to fight anew 
against the country’s oppressors.53 The underlying assumption of such 
propaganda was that Italians had once known how to fight—indeed 
they had ruled the known world—but they had lost both their will and 
their prowess. That assumption fit into the evolution of a larger political 
discourse on the Italian character that was heavily inflected by issues of 
gender. Silvana Patriarca has stressed the importance of understanding 
that negative foreign stereotypes of the Italians (which we have already 
seen at the heart of many duels) were critical to the way in which Italy’s 
patriots came to “imagine” their own country and their countrymen. 
Analyzing the primary tropes and metaphors of the Risorgimento’s 
most important theorists, she reveals how they simultaneously internal-
ized and utilized past portrayals of the Italians as indolent and feminine 
as they created and promoted a reactive political agenda of revirilization 
of the people. Significantly, their concern was primarily for the upper 
classes who were portrayed as lazy, impotent, undisciplined, and sexu-
ally lax: a result of a soft and unmasculine education. These idle dan-
dies found their past embodiment in the image of eighteenth-century 
cicisbeismo, which was portrayed by Gioberti as “legal and privileged 
adultery,” a system so dissipated and disorderly that in its acceptance, 
according to Sismonde de Sismondi, “Italians ceased to be men.”54
 Although Italian nationalists embraced the stereotypes as valid, they 
generally agreed on the fact that the “emasculation” of Italy’s men had 
its obvious reference to Italy’s virility. Certainly there is no need to search for subtext when 
Marcucci (1836, 317) referred to Italian swords being drawn from their vaginas rather than 
their scabbards.
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nothing to do with climate or biology but was instead perceived as 
the result of historical forces: specifically, oppression of foreign occupa-
tion, tyrannical absolutism, and—for some—the Counter-Reformation 
Church. Italians had become servile under despotism, and the unequal 
power relations of servility had engendered among Italian men a com-
bination of cowardice, dissimulation, and cunning that was also com-
mon to women who suffered the parallel subjugation of men. The good 
news was, of course, that what history had wrought could be undone 
by political enterprise. What exactly that action should be depended 
on the ideological proclivities of the patriots, but as Patriarca shows, 
democrats and moderates alike advocated martial action, be it (respec-
tively) guerrilla insurrection or conventional warfare, as a means of 
recasting the national character in a more masculine mold. They like-
wise had in common an overriding belief in sacrificial blood, be it in the 
streets of revolution or on the battlefields of war, as a necessary source 
of moral redemption. Moreover, informed and committed individuals 
could work toward that public redemption by practicing private virtue 
in their everyday lives, especially with regard to the proper behavior 
of one’s family members. Women were expected to retreat to hearth 
and home, while primacy was placed on sexual conformity. If cicisbeismo 
had become the icon of Italian dissolution, then marital rectitude was 
the moral solution that could help reinvigorate the manliness of Italy’s 
upper classes and eventually the country.55
 Such analysis deepens our understanding of the duel’s symbiotic 
relationship with the Risorgimento. Having in large part accepted the 
external critiques of Italy’s elites, the patriotic enterprise from its incep-
tion sought ways to inject virile education into both the public and the 
private sphere. The duel, which offered the public defense of private 
honor, was a potent vehicle to help in that project. It offered a personal 
example of manly prowess and courage, complete with the attending 
symbolism of a baptism of blood, that could appeal to moderates and 
democrats alike. It advertised an internalization of martial values and a 
willingness to bear arms, hopefully with some talent, in the face of per-
ceived insult. It was a perfect foil to the embarrassing and lasting image 
of cicisbeismo, for it showed Italian men active and ready to defend their 
rights over their women, just as they would defend their other rights 
as well. Finally, it belied the tradition that married Italian “servility” to 
feminine dissembling and cowardice by proving that Italian men not 
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only spoke the truth but also were willing to risk their lives in support 
of their words. All told, the chivalric action of a few could be seen as 
inculcating a masculine sense of self into the entire nation, no matter 
how it might be defined by its prophets. And this multifaceted symbol-
ism became all the more important when the mass efforts of revolution 
and war, which had been variously vaunted as regenerative tools in the 
1840s, came a cropper in the failures of 1848 and 1849.
A Conspiracy of Duels in Lombardy
The practical results of those failures for the culture of chivalry appeared 
clearly in the 1850s, commonly called the “decade of preparation,” as the 
duel became a self-conscious means of continuing the national struggle, 
particularly in Lombardy. As Visconti Venosta recalled in his memoirs: 
“The thought of duels kept our youthful fantasies burning. Dueling 
with Austrian officers seemed a patriotic duty; it was individual combat 
substituted for the war we were unable to fight; and it was certainly a 
means of keeping alive that continual tension of soul and that moral 
battle which were our force.”56 The inspiration for these patriotic duels 
may have come from a fatal incident in 1850 when Luigi della Porta, 
a young Milanese nobleman and a student of mathematics at Pavia, 
accidentally trod on the spur of an Austrian officer by the name of 
Petrus. The latter threatened della Porta with a whip for his clumsiness, 
and della Porta later accosted him in the theater, provoking a challenge 
to a duel. Although della Porta had fought in the campaigns of 1848 
and 1849, he was, alas, no fencer, and he made the mistake of choosing 
sabers, a weapon the Austrian handled with great skill. Fighting in the 
Austrian barracks, Petrus quickly dealt della Porta a heavy blow to the 
chest from which he died a few hours later. The event shocked Milanese 
society, and many traveled to Pavia to hear Visconti Venosta’s brother, 
Emilio, offer a stirring eulogy at della Porta’s funeral.57
 With the stage set by this unfortunate example, future and frequent 
duels between “citizens and officers” took on a more pointedly politi-
cal purpose. According to Visconti Venosta, after the clashes of 1848– 
49 the Milanesi totally ostracized the Austrians in a more or less coordi-
nated plan of silent but effective protest. Socially isolated in general, and 
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specifically shunned by the high society with which they naturally iden-
tified, Austrian officers often resorted to hot words and hasty actions as 
tensions mounted. For their part, Milan’s elite youth always acted cor-
rectly but ensured that no insult went unanswered and that each vertenza 
was pushed to its logical conclusion. Moreover, at the end of each duel, 
the Italians were polite to a fault, but they generally refused any form 
of comradely reconciliation that might be misconstrued as social or 
political acceptance. Exactly how many such duels actually occurred is 
unclear. Barbiera mentions at least six of them by name in his book on 
the patriotic circle of Countess Maffei, and Visconti Venosta certainly 
implied in his memoirs that it had not been a rare event.58
 Leaving quantity for quality, the best example of such a “patriotic” 
encounter remains an account written by Manfredo Camperio of a duel 
he fought in 1856 with Baron Schönhals, a captain in the Austrian army. 
Camperio had been one of the most strident anti-Austrian agitators 
in Milan prior to and during the revolution of 1848, and it is hardly 
surprising to find him engaged in the “dueling campaign” of the 1850s. 
The opportunity presented itself when Schönhals accepted an invitation 
from his landlord, Baron Ciani, to a ball in honor of Camperio’s return 
from a trip to the South Pacific, where he had traveled after the failure 
of the revolution. Baron Ciani, who was Camperio’s uncle, had assumed 
that the Austrian would not attend in uniform, and when Schönhals 
showed up in full regalia with medals galore, he brought the party to a 
screeching halt. A number of the ladies declared that they would prefer 
to leave rather than support the presence of such a blatant reminder of 
their country’s humiliation. Camperio saved the day by taking Schönhals 
aside and asking him to leave so as to allow the festivities to continue. 
When the Austrian understood the problem, he responded that he was 
only wearing the uniform of their Emperor. “Do you wish to dishonor 
it?” To which Camperio replied politely, “It’s not actually a question 
of honor, but we all here do not admit that this is the uniform of our 
Emperor, but rather the uniform of the Austrian army of occupation, 
which we hope will not stay long in our country.”59 Although shocked 
at the man’s audacity, Schönhals agreed to withdraw, but only after they 
had exchanged visiting cards in preparation for a duel.
 58. Aside from the duel of della Porta, Barbiera includes those of Carcano, Fadini, Battaglia, 
Viola, Càroli, and Camperio; 179–80. Manfredo Camperio, in a letter written later to Visconti 
Venosta, adds to these Ropolo and Mancini, which would make at least eight. Visconti Venosta, 
1906, 344.
 59. Ibid., 344–35. 
	 Risorgimento	del	Duello—Duello	del	Risorgimento	 /	 
 At this point the public/private nature of such a political action 
came to the fore. Camperio feared that his action might be reported to 
the authorities, and indeed Schönfals had proceeded with his wife to 
a second social engagement, a reception being held by Hungarian Gen-
eral Giulay, who would soon take over military control of the city from 
the aging General Radetsky. Apprised of the damage done to the pres-
tige of the Austrian army’s uniform, to say nothing of the Emperor, 
Giulay dispatched a squadron of hussars to surround Baron Ciani’s house 
and prevent Camperio’s escape, an act that no doubt finally ended the 
party. Meanwhile, Camperio had fled the area and, being warned that 
the police were looking for him, managed to escape the city disguised 
as a peasant. He then crossed over the border into Piedmont where he 
could stay with friends. However, the intercession of the police and the 
military had no bearing on the affair as a personal matter between the 
two men. Before leaving the party, Camperio had asked Carlo Prinetti 
(later a senator of the realm) and Emilio Dandolo to act as his seconds 
in the upcoming encounter with Schönhals. They kept in contact with 
their friend and soon arranged a duel just inside the Lombard territory, 
because the Austrian officers were not allowed to cross the border with 
Piedmont.60 The two adversaries fought with sabers and agreed to end 
the combat after both had been slightly wounded in the head. Camp-
erio later recalled that he agreed to shake Schönhal’s hand afterwards 
because “I had nothing against him personally but only against his uni-
form.”61 Camperio subsequently returned to Piedmont, joined the army 
against the Austrians in 1859, and later served as a deputy in the Italian 
parliament: another Risorgimento hero who had served the cause on 
the field of honor.
 This deliberate use of the duel as a weapon of propaganda and provo-
cation was not restricted to Austrian officers. It was also employed against 
Italians who might fraternize with “the enemy.” This became particu-
larly important after the Emperor, in hopes of being able to win back 
the affections of the populace, sent his brother, Archduke Maximillian, 
to become governor of Lombardy/Venetia in 1857. Glib, intelligent, and 
well-meaning, the Archduke exerted his considerable charms on Milan’s 
upper echelons, while offering a number of important reforms, includ-
ing a political amnesty. There was consequently real fear that he might 
be able, in Visconti Venosta’s words, “to open a breach in the rigid and 
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0	 /	 Chapter	I
disciplined patriotism which had hitherto held fast.” In order to fore-
stall this threat, something “clamorous” was necessary, so one evening 
over cigars, Visconti Venosta and his well-heeled compatriots hit upon 
a strategy to force a duel on anyone willing to socialize at the court of 
the Archduke: “The idea was accepted with enthusiasm; this bravado 
seemed beautiful to us, and in fact it indicated the temperature of our 
heads and of the times in which we lived. That evening we separated 
with our heads hot with schemes and duels.” This was no idle comment, 
and shortly after helping hatch this conspiracy of honor, Visconti Veno-
sta found himself participating as a second to Alfonso Carcano (who was 
in on the plan) in a pistol duel aimed at Marchese Luigi d’Adda, who 
had become too friendly with the Archduke because of their mutual 
love of horses. D’Adda and Carcano faced off, fired on command, and 
relaxed as the bullets went astray. The pistols were reloaded, but the 
seconds agreed that given the political nature of the offense, it would 
be absurd to continue the duel. The affair soon became the talk of the 
town, but the police were unable to prosecute because the principals all 
agreed to deny any involvement.62
 If publicity for patriotic solidarity was the goal, Visconti Venosta and 
his friends managed to achieve it by using a personal social compul-
sion that went beyond mere politics. This worked as well in the duels 
against Austrian officers, who had to fight because of the equal social 
status of their challengers.63 The principle of parity, implicit in having 
one’s challenge honored by an opponent, is critical in understanding the 
attraction of the duel as a tool of Italian regeneration. We see the same 
mechanism in the common appearance of dueling terms in the nation-
alist literature. Thus the revolutionary Settembrini would talk about 
how the people had challenged the king to a duel during the French 
revolution and how Palermo had offered a “cartello di sfida” to Naples in 
1848.64 Such language automatically raised the level of the challenger 
to that of the challenged, offering a sort of self-promotion backed up 
by knowledge of the rules of chivalry and the willingness to shed blood 
in their observance. The particular success of this strategy, which clearly 
underlay the “dueling conspiracy” of Lombardy, was totally confirmed 
by what would become one of the most intriguing patriotic events of 
the Risorgimento.
 The stage would be set by Cavour’s intrigues aimed at drawing 
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Austria into a war with Piedmont and France. As his plans unfolded 
in early 1859, tensions in Milan mounted to the breaking point. On 
January 29, La Scala offered a production of Bellini’s Norma, an opera 
well-known for its bellicose libretto. In the first three rows behind the 
orchestra sat the Austrian officers of the city, while their commander, 
General Giulay, and his entourage surveyed the scene from one of the 
boxes. The air, according to Barbiera’s reconstruction, was “heavy with 
storm.”
On the stage, druids, bards, and warriors intoned the impetuous chorus 
of war: “War! War!” And then the Italians in the audience jumped to 
their feet yelling: “War! War!” and clapped their hands. “War! War!” they 
yelled from the loggia and from the pit. Standing erect in their boxes, 
the women emotionally waved their white handkerchiefs. The Austrian 
officers for a moment were dumbfounded: but all of a sudden they too 
jumped to their feet, clapped their hands, and began chanting “War! 
War!” General Giulay, also standing, revealed his saber a handsbreadth 
in its scabbard, and then furiously beat it on the floor. And the other 
officers, all impassioned, beat their sabers on the floor with an air of chal-
lenge (sfida). “Blood! Blood!” called the chorus from the stage. “Blood! 
Blood!” responded the crowd still clapping their hands.65
What better evidence that the duel had become the signifier of lib-
eration, with the ritual challenge of a partly drawn saber and then the 
collective sounding of swords upon the floor clearly serving notice that 
Italian honor had been validated and that the Austrians were ready to 
redeem en masse the insults and isolation of the last decade? What bet-
ter spectacle of the tie between chivalry and nationalism? And what 
better proof of the assertion made years later by the antidueling author 
Luigi Dossena that the duel drew much of its postunitary popularity 
from the martial courage that had been released during the drive for 
independence and its confusion with ideas of personal honor?66
 We have to look more closely, however, to understand the full psy-
chological and didactic impact of these many patriotic duels. Not only 
were the young champions proudly manifesting their national status, 
but they were equally demonstrating their bravery, their sangfroid, and 
their skill with arms in front of foreigners. In short, they were directly 
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combating the unfortunate image of the artistic, poltroonish Italian 
who, if he should even bother, would protect his honor through hired 
assassins and a dagger in the dark. By the same token, each of these 
events became an advertisement for the duel as an appropriate means 
of settling personal disputes while simultaneously legitimizing it as an 
intrinsic step in the creation of Italy as a free nation. Yet by Visconti 
Venosta’s own admission, the details of the code of honor were all a bit 
new to him and his friends. Like Pepe in 1826, they wanted to be par-
ticularly assiduous in their observance of the rules of chivalry because 
it assured their equality as gentlemen with the Austrian officers and 
protected them from any possible “abuses” on the field of honor. They 
had to show their command of the ritual as part of their moral author-
ity. But in order to learn those rules, they had to turn to sources outside 
of Italy: “Thus among us youths who were preparing to act as swash- 
bucklers (spadaccini) there circulated a French dueling code, which was 
said to be very authoritative, and with which we resolved all of the cases 
with a precision and security that seemed indisputable.”67 While it is 
important to note that the Italians had to revert to a French manual, fur-
ther proof that the duel had returned to Italy via Napoleon, the larger 
point is that these almost pro forma duels between patriots and officers 
served as a training ground, complete with a foreign textbook, for the 
proliferation of the dueling ethic among Italy’s future elites. Indeed, the 
names in these accounts are something of a Who’s Who of the Lombard 
elites who soon came to share power in the young country of Italy, and 
their experiences in the 1850s would inform attitudes toward honor and 
the duel after the Austrians were long gone.
The Duel in Piedmont
While the Lombards were hacking away at Austrian officers, the Pied-
montese were developing a different, albeit equally important, politi-
cal impetus to the dueling ethic. Here the catalyst was the survival of 
the Statuto, or constitution, following the upheavals of 1848 and 1849. 
Under the guidance of Victor Emanuale II, the Kingdom of Sardegna 
had managed to maintain both a functioning parliament and a relatively 
free press: a unique achievement that contrasted well with the absolutist 
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regimes reemerging in the other Italian states. The resulting freedom 
of discourse, however, often breached the boundaries of honorable eti-
quette, and already in 1850 Nassau Senior reported that a number of 
political duels had occurred.68 This was reflected in the press as well, 
and an antidueling article in the daily L’Italia, also in 1850, complained 
that journalists from at least four major newspapers across the politi-
cal spectrum had resorted to the field of honor to settle their differ-
ences.69 Unquestionably, the most important of these various disputes 
occurred in April of that year between Count Camillo Cavour, future 
prime minister of united Italy, and Enrico Avigdor, scion of a wealthy 
Jewish banking family from Nice. Serving as deputies in the subalpine 
parliament, the two had come to loggerheads over free trade issues, and 
Cavour’s newspaper, Il Risorgimento, had run a highly critical account of 
Avigdor’s position. Avigdor responded in kind in his paper, the Voix de 
l’Italie, with the intention of provoking Cavour to a duel. Cavour rose 
to the bait, later recalling to Émile de la Rüe, “I am no swashbuckler, 
but there are provocations, which, even when they come from far below, 
cannot remain unpunished.”70 One assumes that Cavour’s comment that 
the insult had come from “très bas” referred to Avigdor’s non-noble sta-
tus or, more likely, his Jewish heritage. Either way, the fact that Cavour 
proceeded with the encounter, despite the disparity in their positions, 
epitomized and advertised the role of the duel as a mechanism of social 
equality within the new political matrix of parliamentary liberalism. 
Whether it was the fact that Avigdor was a deputy or that he owned 
a newspaper, he had reached the critical point of being able to call 
out a nobleman with long roots in Piedmont’s aristocracy. His success 
in doing so bespoke the brave new world of chivalry and palaver that 
attended the expansion of political power and influence in the post-
1848 period.
 Conscious or not of this significance, Cavour played his part in the 
drama and offered the appropriate challenge. The two fought a blood-
less pistol duel at 20 paces and declared their reciprocal honor satisfied. 
According to Cavour’s second, Michelangelo Castelli, the future prime 
minister had taken the matter very seriously and even declared to Avig-
dor afterwards that he had made no attempt to miss him.71 Nonethe-
less, the two published a mutually agreed-upon account of the affair in 
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their respective newspapers, explaining that Avigdor’s previous words 
had been aimed at Cavour’s ideas as a politician and not his personal 
qualities as a man. Such a blatant and public declaration of an illegal act 
could hardly be overlooked by the authorities, and the attorney general 
of Turin requested that the parliament rescind the duelists’ immunity 
and allow him to proceed with a criminal prosecution. In a decision 
that would have a lasting effect well beyond the life of the subalpine 
parliament, the deputies appointed a commission to study the question 
and then accepted without discussion its decision not to proceed against 
the duelists.72 Given Cavour’s growing stature in Piedmontese politics 
and considering his upcoming role in the unification process, this carte 
blanche on the part of the parliament set a legal precedent that virtu-
ally wedded the dueling ethic to liberal politics through the upcoming 
decades.
 It is worth wondering if the alacrity with which parliamentarians 
in Piedmont picked up the dueling habit had anything to do with the 
area’s proximity to and affinity for French culture. Italians were well 
aware that the French favored the duel as a means of settling political 
disputes, and in 1839 Pesaro Maurogonato ranked France as the top 
dueling country in Europe—a result, he suggested, of the July Revolu-
tion.73 With easy access to France and a general ability to speak French, 
Piedmontese political elites may well have found a ready-made model, 
including the need to duel, for what it meant to be an honorable pub-
lic figure in a liberal parliamentary world.74 One might parenthetically 
note in this regard that Avigdor had recently spent a good deal of time 
in Paris, and his home base of Nice was an obvious conduit of French 
customs across the border. Combined with Piedmont’s long tradition of 
military dueling, which remained more or less unbroken, such a model 
would have been a compelling and ready reference for action as Pied-
mont evolved into a viable parliamentary monarchy.
 Be that as it may, the dueling ethic found a comfortable corner 
in Piedmont in the 1850s, and the aforementioned legislative largesse 
that was afforded Cavour and Avigdor soon found its counterpart in 
the regular courts. A landmark judicial decision came in October 1853, 
effectively clearing the legal path for the development of the duel on 
a grander scale. The case in question came from a frivolous but lethal 
duel that occurred in July of that year in Nice between a young officer, 
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Lieutenant Luigi Bottoni, and his long-time acquaintance, Gioacchino 
Airaudi, a lawyer. The two had bumped into each other downtown on 
a summer evening, and Airaudi had inquired if Bottoni knew whether 
people still gambled in a Bistro which was close at hand. Bottoni, who 
was reputed to have a weakness for games of chance, took the question 
as a suggestion that he was an inveterate denizen of such establishments. 
His injudicious response initiated a spiral of fractious words that ended 
with a challenge and its acceptance. Given the levity of the cause, the 
seconds worked overtime to find a mutually acceptable exit from the 
vertenza, but as word spread, popular sentiment worked against them. 
Although it was eventually agreed that they would fight with pistols 
at the relatively safe distance of 30 paces, Bottoni’s bullet still found 
Airaudi’s chest and killed him.
 The deadly outcome of such a minor misunderstanding created 
something of a stir and prompted the government to try to set an exam-
ple for the future. Bottoni was given a very heavy sentence of 30 years in 
the galleys, but it was cut to 15 years by the appeals court. This sentence 
still seemed excessive to the army, which had been forced against its will 
to drum Bottoni out of the corps, and a vociferous public campaign 
soon induced the king to grant him a pardon.75 Even more at issue was 
the fate of the seconds. Although the courts had declared them not 
guilty and planned to set them free, the public prosecutor demanded 
that the case be revisited on the grounds that, as seconds, they had 
been complicit in Airaudi’s homicide. He therefore ignored the court’s 
decision and blocked their release from jail. This conflict between two 
branches of the judiciary created substantial controversy and brought to 
the fore the critical question of the culpability of seconds in the criminal 
code. The 1839 Albertine Code did not specifically mention seconds 
or padrini in its articles, but it condemned anyone “who participated in 
anyway in the proposal or acceptance of a challenge, or who expressed 
disparagement of anyone who has attempted to avoid such proposal or 
acceptance” to 10 years’ relegation. Now the justice department wanted 
to equate any participation in a duel, whether as a second or even as an 
attending physician, with such complicity and open the way for their 
prosecution. This was no secondary squabble, because it would have 
struck at the very essence of the duel, which demanded the interces-
sion of supposedly neutral third parties in the honorable settlement of 
disputes. Moreover, the willingness of the government to overturn the 
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decisions of its own court indicated a new resolve in the desire to bring 
the duel under control.
 The case was argued for the five defendants (four padrini and the 
physician) by P.S. Mancini, one of the bright lights of Neapolitan juris-
prudence who had fled to Piedmont after the Revolution of 1848. 
Mancini had already made his mark in two earlier dueling cases in Pied-
mont and was generally regarded as an expert in the field. He would go 
on to become the foremost jurist of united Italy and would serve in a 
variety of cabinet offices across many administrations, which made his 
defense of duelists during the Risorgimento particularly relevant with 
regard to the spread of the practice after unity. That defense would 
also become especially poignant because, in 1875, his own son would 
become involved in one of Italy’s most notorious fatal duels in which 
he killed his best friend for having an affair with his wife. That was all 
far in the future in 1853, but Mancini was well aware that the Bottoni-
Airaudi case was going to set precedent for years to come, which is 
why he agreed to have his arguments immediately published for general 
consumption. Mancini’s defense consisted of two parts. First, the men 
involved had done all they could to bring about a peaceful settlement 
to the vertenza, and, failing that, they had acted to reduce the amount 
of bloodshed that might result. They had encouraged Airaudi to adopt 
swords over pistols. When he balked at that, they had pushed the dis-
tance of fire to 30 paces, and they had even chosen the tallest member 
of the group to measure out the longest distance. True, in the final analy-
sis, these measures had failed, but the accused could hardly be described 
as promoting a bloodthirsty end to the affair.
 These details no doubt carried considerable weight, but his second 
and more interesting line of argument focused directly on the sui generis 
nature of the duel itself and the special relationship of seconds to that 
definition. The duel, according to Mancini, occupied a privileged place 
between the law and personal conscience. It repaired slights that were 
beyond the regular tribunals and brought “under the aegis of its protection 
all that is most delicate, and I would say most modest in honor; [ . . . ].”76 
Because of this moral function, the duel represented a dangerous and 
indomitable adversary that had to be treated with respect and care. Its 
power within society determined that it could not be easily eradicated, 
and in the meantime it was important to control it as much as possible. 
This was the role reserved for the padrini. They attempted to reconcile 
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the parties, they enforced the rules, and “they conserve for the duel its 
real character and prohibit it from being converted into murder; their 
presence is a guarantee of loyalty and a safeguard for the social order, 
which it protects from further disruptions.” Consequently, to punish the 
seconds was to risk losing this moderating influence and thus encour-
age both the number and the severity of the duels. For this reason, in 
contrast to the other law codes of the peninsula, the Sardinia Code of 
1839 had refused to specifically punish the padrini. And in this sagacious 
clemency it had served as an example for other codes in Europe, includ-
ing those of Spain, Saxony, Baden, and the Netherlands.77
 But there was more to Mancini’s argument than an enlightened 
defense of the social fabric. It had a political side as well, for the duel 
was the arbiter and defender of honor, and the nation needed honor:
. . . the sentiment of honor is the same vital principle of human conven-
tions, it is that which inspires the noblest actions, it is one of the living 
forces that regulates the social order, and thus it promotes civilization, it 
improves moral life, and it consolidates political liberty.
 If therefore it is important to stop the distortion of this sentiment, it 
is no less important to maintain its dominance in people’s hearts, and its 
legitimate and salutary influence on our customs.
 Thus for a long time a need [for honor] grew in this country, where 
courage is the glorious tradition of a splendid military history, where it 
can become the first of the virtues and the first of necessities for the 
future needs of the common fatherland and for the destinies of those 
who belong to it.78
Obviously, if Piedmont were going to lead the regeneration of Italy, it 
had to inspire its people to sacrifice and action and not allow itself to be 
pulled down into the crass materialism of the age. Great deeds lay ahead, 
and now was not the time to “extinguish the delicate susceptibilities of 
honor, to dry up the spring from which pour forth courage and con-
tempt of life.” Such was the attitude of Mancini—future minister of 
education and of justice for united Italy—and his oratory did not fall on 
deaf ears. The appeals court voted unanimously to release the prisoners 
and uphold the principle that acting as seconds in a duel constituted 
legitimate, and perhaps even noble, behavior.
 77. Ibid., 31, 38–39.
 78. Ibid., 58.
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 This positive attitude toward the duel within the civilian courts 
reinforced an important pronouncement made by military leaders just 
the year before. It had long been assumed that officers who refused to 
duel were not worthy of their rank and should quit the service, but 
this actually became official policy May 25, 1852, albeit in an indirect 
way. According to articles 2–7 of the internal regulations of the Stato 
Maggiore, any officer who failed to defend his honor was subject to 
expulsion from the officer corps.79 It is important to note here that no 
specific mention of the duel was contained in the regulations, but it was 
assumed at the time, and by subsequent generations of officers, that such 
a failure was in reference to the dictates of the dueling compulsion. Nor 
were the articles an idle threat, as was immediately demonstrated by 
the case of Francesco Faà di Bruno, scion of a noble family from Ales-
sandria who had followed his father’s and brother’s footsteps into the 
Piedmontese military. In 1853, Faà found himself suffering an insult 
from another officer, and because of his deep religious convictions he 
refused to issue a challenge in response or allow any of his friends to 
take his place. Facing recrimination and expulsion for his lack of action, 
Faà opted to follow his conscience and quit the service, but not without 
publishing a forceful tract entitled Manuale del soldato cristiano, which 
unequivocally condemned the duel as a false and sinful test of either 
honor or courage.80 Why exactly the Piedmontese chose 1852 to lend 
de jure support to a de facto practice is unclear, but it is worth pondering 
whether it was not in reaction to the double defeat at the hands of Austria 
in 1848 and 1849.81 Rebuffed in their attempts to redeem Italian honor 
and independence, it was perhaps thought necessary to at least protect 
the Piedmontese uniform from any hint of cowardice or weakness.82
 As if placing the final seal of approval on the chivalric ethic, Pied-
mont’s new criminal code of 1859, which would soon become the 
law of the land for most of the new Kingdom of Italy, greatly reduced 
the penalties applied to dueling. What more positive message to men 
of honor than to reduce the minimum sentence for homicide in a 
duel from 15 years of hard labor to only one, and even this could be 
converted to a rather comfortable internal exile somewhere in the 
 79. A copy of the text is in Rivista penale, Sept.–Oct. 1884, vol. 20, 242.
 80. Faà di Bruno 1854, 5–10; Messori 1998, 89–90; cf. Brachet Contol 1977, 41–43.
 81. Another possibility might be the attitude of the new King Victor Emmanuel II of 
Savoy, who once described the bonheur he obtained from securing the release of an officer from 
prison for having participated in a duel. La Marmora 1881, vol. 1, 192. 
 82. On the need to redeem the prestige of the Piedmontese army after the defeats of 
Custoza and Novara see Whittam 1977, 45–48. 
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realm.83 All in all then, both the political and the legislative stages were set 
for the triumph of the dueling compulsion as Piedmont came to share, 
or rather impose, its laws and assumptions on the rest of the country. 
Following the failures of 1848 and 1849, Italian exiles had come from 
all over to partake of the freedoms afforded by the Savoyard monarchy 
and to work toward unity and independence. At the same time, how-
ever, these future leaders of the new Italy would be imbibing the elixir 
of Piedmont’s chivalric traditions, and its heady effects would become 
readily apparent as they returned to their homes in triumph.
A Transitional Figure: Paolo Fambri
As an antidote to this perhaps overly Piedmontese interpretation, it seems 
fitting to end this chapter by focusing on Paolo Fambri, a Venetian who 
came to symbolize the power of the dueling mystique in united Italy. A 
huge man, he was famous for having broken into a Venetian prison dur-
ing the Revolution of 1848 and carried the republican leader, Nicolo 
Tommaseo, on his shoulders into Piazza San Marco, where he presented 
him with a bar personally ripped from his cell door. It was a dramatic 
gesture, worthy of remembering, and one which stamped Fambri as 
daring, patriotic, and bellicose. There is no scholarly biography of Fam-
bri, so one has to be careful in accepting the mythology that grew up 
around his exploits.84 Yet it was just the mythic quality of Fambri’s life 
that made him so popular and helped confer a mantle of authority on 
his shoulders with regard to the duel in Italy. Son of a pottery merchant, 
he was born in 1827 and began fencing at the age of ten at a military 
reform school after being expelled from a series of regular schools for 
unruliness. He claimed in his autobiography that he had fought two 
duels before he was fourteen (one when he was eleven!), a result per-
haps of his precocious size and famous temper.85 His relationship with 
the Austrian military ended before it began when he became embroiled 
in Risorgimento politics in the 1840s. He fought valiantly during the 
lengthy defense of the Venetian republic in 1849, eventually becoming 
an officer in the artillery. With the failure of the revolution, he became 
an engineering student at Padua but was twice expelled for his political 
 83. Title 10, Heading 1, Section 7, Article, 589. Regno di Sardegna 1859, 177–79.
 84. There is a short piece in DRN, vol. 3, 33–34.
 85. The autobiography was dictated to his second wife, Rita Levi, in the early 1890s and 
is with his papers at ACS, Carte Fambri, Busta 28, Fasciolo 27, SottoFascicolo 1. 
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rabble-rousing. He was eventually forced to emigrate in 1858 to Pied-
mont in order to avoid arrest. In short, Fambri had all his cards in order 
as a man who had served the cause of Italian nationalism and suffered 
for his efforts.
 Fambri made his fame as a duelist just as Italy was being forged as 
a country. He joined the Piedmontese military and rose to become an 
officer in the infantry during the campaign of 1859 against Austria. 
Demobilized after the treaty of Villafranca, he started a newspaper in 
Bologna, where his outlandish behavior (including one duel and an 
almost-fatal fencing accident) prompted Pinelli, temporary minister of 
war for the Romagne, to specifically request Fambri’s recall to his old 
regiment in Ferrara. Made a captain in the engineering corps, he moved 
first to Alessandria and then Torino, and in each city he claimed to 
have fought a duel, one with serious consequences for his opponent. 
This seems to have had little effect on his career, and in 1861 he was 
appointed under General Pozzi to an important defense commission, for 
which he wrote the first of what would be a lifelong string of reports 
and articles on Italy’s military preparedness.86 However, his temper and 
pride finally caught up with him. In a rather amazing admission in 
his unpublished autobiography, he described how while on an official 
tour of the South he had set Palermo on its ear by striking down, one 
assumes with his saber, a “capo maffioso [sic]” who had insulted a fellow 
officer while they were walking down via Toledo. He then refused to 
put himself under barracks confinement, as ordered by his commander, 
arguing that he had to maintain the dignity of the corps, “wandering 
through Palermo challenging the vendettas of the mafia.”87 Backed by 
other officers, Fambri was allowed to parade through the city in a show 
of defiance toward local reaction to the event.88 He was then kicked out 
of the city by General Calderini, and, having returned to Torino with 
his compatriots, he was given two months’ confinement in the Fenes-
trelle fortress. According to Fambri, however, the minister of war not 
only suspended his sentence but offered him words of commendation 
in the process.89
 86. Fambri rose from Sottotenente in July of 1859 to Captain in January, 1861! AST, 
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 Nevertheless, Fambri chafed under the strictures of military life, and 
in 1864, after some of his articles on Italy’s defense were criticized by 
his superiors, he quit the army to dedicate himself to journalism. Mov-
ing to Naples, he took over a newspaper, La Patria, and again found 
himself embroiled in furious debate with his political opponents. This 
led him into an “extreme” (ad oltranza) duel with Giorgio Asproni, a 
deputy of the left, who had referred to him as a paid assassin (sicario) 
in L’Italia del popolo. The duel began with pistols and was to continue 
with swords if no one was injured. In fact, the pistol exchange had no 
effect, but before switching to swords, Asproni’s seconds interceded to 
say that Asproni had read a testimonial by Tommaseo, whom Fambri 
had rescued in 1848, and this had convinced him that his opponent 
was truly an honorable man. Fambri’s seconds accepted the explanation 
and declared the duel over. Peace was made, and, according to Fambri’s 
autobiography, they all became from that moment “the most sincere and 
cordial friends . . . even in the middle of the most provocative political 
arguments.”
 Fambri’s prestige only increased with time as his legislative and 
literary production kept him constantly in the public eye. He wrote 
successful comedies for the stage, served as a deputy in parliament for 
four terms, and served on the boards of various cultural societies in the 
Veneto. He published frequently on hydraulic engineering and kept up 
a steady stream of articles and books on military issues, including con-
scription, naval defense, and training techniques. In all of this, Fambri 
provided a perfect portrait of the transition of the dueling ethic from 
the revolutionary gestures of the Risorgimento to the more stable par-
liamentary liberalism of united Italy. Hero, soldier, politico, mathemati-
cian, philosopher, and journalist, he combined all the romantic aspects 
of the age with a certain hardheaded approach to issues of economics, 
engineering, and national defense. He wrote adventure stories while 
defending the army’s budget and remained a constant and flamboy-
ant participant in public life from one end of the new country to the 
other.
 And he fought duels—36 of them by 1868, according to one author 
who claimed to know him well.90 With such credentials he symbolized 
the new Italian gentleman: daring, caring, and literate. Fambri consoli-
dated this position in 1869 with the publication of a lengthy tome, La 
disciplinary action.
 90. Gabelli 1869, 5. 
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giurisprudenza del duello, in which he offered an impassioned apology for 
the duel as a civilizing mechanism for a country in need of civility. As 
we shall see, it would become the foundation document of those who 
defended the duel in the great national debate that evolved over the 
next four decades. Combined with other articles in favor of the prac-
tice, Fambri became one of the major arbiters of honor in Italy, whose 
office, according to one admirer, became a sort of Mecca where pilgrims 
sought chivalric advice.91 Yet Fambri also represented the exclusivity of 
the duel as it emerged in the newly united country. The literary nature 
of his fame underlined the literate nature of the code of chivalry. It was 
a code, not just as a set of rules but also as a cipher that the uninitiated 
could not comprehend, and in a country that suffered 70% illiteracy, 
those who might aspire to Fambri’s notions of honor were already small 
in number. The fact that he had apparently cut down a Sicilian citizen 
in the streets of Palermo with little reason and even less remorse seems 
to have had no impact on his career. In retrospect it speaks volumes 
about both the new regime and the “gentlemen” who created it, to say 
nothing of the genesis of the “Southern Question.” Chivalry and honor 
were for the new elites, the men who would run the country according 
to liberal rules and modern precepts. The rest of the country, devoid of 
honor and the immunity to defend it, would have to be brought along 
as best as possible.
 91. Mariotii 1897.
he PaSSiOnS and images of the nationalist struggle helped revive 
the duel as a guarantor of honor among many Italian elites. That 
stimulus would become even more pronounced as the nation of Italy 
actually emerged between 1859 and 1870, a period marked by war, 
revolution, and constant controversy over both the form and the con-
tent of the new country. In this crucible of conflict, republicans and 
monarchists, moderates and radicals, regular and irregular soldiers, all 
worked as much against each other as they did together in trying to 
determine the course of unification. The resulting friction of men oper-
ating at cross-purposes toward an often-shifting goal made clashes of 
honor as inevitable as they were numerous. Italy would consequently be 
born in a baptism of honorable blood as its citizenry sorted themselves 
out in the new and protean political arrangements taking shape under 
the aegis of La Patria. Witness the following portrait, offered in 1864 by 
Emilio de Dominicis, a bureaucrat in Piedmont’s ministry of war:
It is astonishing how in the midst of the nineteenth century, and in 
times of liberty and increasing civility, the mania for dueling, which 
replaces reason with brute force, instead of slackening has degenerated 
into a rage. In fact, if ever there was an epoch in which the frequency 
of these acts became legendary it is precisely the present. There is not 
a newspaper nor a periodical in whose reading you do not encounter 
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a similar fact unattended by boasting and outcry. And what is truly 
saddening is that those, who because of their refinement in knowledge 
or doctrine, or because of their eminent social position, should be the 
first in the great work of eradicating the prejudice, instead compete to 
reinforce and guarantee it through their example.
De Dominicis’s amazement at the explosion of dueling among Italy’s 
best and brightest would be echoed five years later by Captain Giuseppe 
Scaglione, a prosecuting attorney in the Italian army, who in 1869 
defined dueling as a “cancerous, incurable plague on society.” Paolo 
Fambri, whose fame as a duelist we have already examined, affirmed 
that some 3,000 duels had occurred in the first seven years of the coun-
try’s existence. Other commentators estimated that in the 1860s, Italy 
saw at least one duel a day, which would actually amount to a sur-
prisingly accurate confirmation of Fambri’s assertion. More important 
in the long run, however, was that this “plague” did not abate after 
Italy’s first tumultuous decade. On the contrary, as the Risorgimento 
ended and the country settled down to the more mundane matters of 
economics, education, and justice, the duel remained an everyday part 
of Italian life. Indeed, it would consistently prove one of the most con-
tentious and difficult issues facing legislators, politicians, and moralists as 
they attempted to build a society based on the rule of law and equality 
before that law.
 The present chapter seeks to understand the unprecedented increase 
in dueling after 1860 and to explain its continuity as a dominant theme 
of Italian society throughout the liberal period. It concentrates on 
those aspects of the chivalric revival that were tied into the evolu-
tion and assertion of Italy as a new nation on the European scene. 
This evolution entailed the final forging of the boundaries and institu-
tions of the Italian state between 1860 and 1870, a difficult period rife 
with contradictions and conflicts that found in the code duello a manly 
means of seeking common ground and at least temporary reconcili-
ation. Critical in this creative process was the role of the new Italian 
military, built primarily on Piedmontese traditions, which would offer 
practical examples of the dueling ethic in every corner of the country. 
Italy’s officers would remain a constant source of chivalric combat as 
 1. De Dominicis 1864, 5.
 2. Scaglione 1869, 5. 
 3. Fambri 1869, 13.
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legislators, commanders, and even judges assumed that an effective army 
was an honorable army, careful to suffer no slight that might weaken 
its own projection of prowess. Equally important was official and unof-
ficial support of Italy’s fencing establishment which evolved through 
the latter decades of the nineteenth century to become a source of 
national pride and prestige. Clubs, academies, and salles d’armes offered 
techniques and tournaments for the consumption of the new elite, all 
the while instilling gentlemanly precepts that insisted on strict adher-
ence to the rules of the dueling code. Finally, those precepts became 
increasingly tied to Italy’s need to find some psychological compensa-
tion for the failure of the liberal regime to make good on the primacy 
promised by Risorgimento propagandists, who had so facilely asserted 
that great power status would automatically follow unity. Whatever the 
performance of the country as a whole and however little there was to 
celebrate in traditional terms of glory, no one could doubt the courage 
and virility of men who individually were willing to face death on a 
daily basis in the name of honor.
A Difficult Decade of Honor and Unity
Italian unification was not a pretty process. The efforts of Cavour and 
the National Society in the 1850s had managed to focus patriotic ener-
gies on the twin goals of unity and independence under Piedmontese 
leadership, while postponing other major issues such as a new constitu-
tion, regional autonomy, and popular suffrage for later consideration. 
Despite this orchestrated effort, however, the pieces of the Italian puzzle 
did not fall together nicely as they would in Germany, where Bismarck 
overwhelmed both internal and external opposition with the successes 
of the Prussian army. Instead, in 1859 Cavour and the Piedmontese 
military were forced to rely on France to help take Lombardy, and then 
watched in frustration as the Veneto remained in the grip of Austria 
after Napoleon III abandoned their alliance. Meanwhile, they had to 
wait while bloodless revolutions in Parma, Modena, Tuscany, and the 
Romagna could be slowly and diplomatically transformed into outright 
annexations to the expanding Kingdom of Sardegna. Worst of all, they 
had to play catch-up after Garibaldi’s Redshirts, most of whom had 
republican or Mazzinian sympathies, startled the world by conquer-
ing first Sicily and then the rest of the Kingdom of Naples. Although 
Garibaldi managed to avoid civil war by offering this prize to Victor 
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Emanuel II, both the Veneto and Rome remained outside the fold of 
united Italy, which was formally created in April of 1861, and efforts 
to include them kept old divisions over goals and tactics simmering 
through the decade. Twice, in 1862 and 1867, Garibaldi would raise an 
irregular army designed to march on Rome, and twice he would run 
into resistance from the regular army acting on orders from the Italian 
government.
 All the while, republicans and democrats would have to come to 
terms with a liberal monarchy that they had helped to expand and 
strengthen, while their hero Mazzini remained under the shadow of a 
death sentence issued by a united Italy he had inspired but refused to 
acknowledge. This was the stuff of controversy, and the personal and 
political animosities that it generated guaranteed that the men who 
built the new country would have plenty to fight about. It was also the 
stuff of glory. Acts of courage and audacity abounded; risks were taken 
and rewarded; heroes arose and cowards retreated as martial prowess was 
tested in a variety of venues. It was all larger than life and seemed to 
vindicate the Romantic portrait so eloquently painted by the patriotic 
literati of the preunitary world. Italy had found its sword in the hands 
of the Re Galantuomo, Vittorio Emmanuele II, and the hero of two con-
tinents, Garibaldi, and both were portrayed as acting courageously and 
chivalrously in the face of adversity. Combining the very real political 
tensions of the moment with the martial aura of their achievements, 
Italy’s leaders would embrace the duel as a natural and laudable ritual 
of affirmation and healing.
 Nowhere was this clearer than in relations between military men. 
The conflicts of unification brought an unprecedented number of Ital-
ians into uniform, but not always in a disciplined or organized way. 
Old armies, and especially that of the Kingdom of Naples, had to be 
absorbed into the Piedmontese military machine while a newly victo-
rious army of revolutionary warriors had to be dealt with. Volunteers, 
patriotic deserters, civic militias, and regular troops swarmed over the 
landscape and naturally created confusion in terms of chain of com-
mand, precedence of honor, and equivalence of grades. Sometimes, in 
the early stages of the process, it was just hard to tell who was who, 
and bruised honor and crossed swords sometimes resulted. We find 
such a case nicely described in a broadside that appeared on the walls 
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of Turin in September of 1861. The author was Carmello Agnetta, a 
Neapolitan revolutionary who had been living in exile in Paris until 
May 1860 when he was called on by the National Society to aid the 
cause. Arriving in Turin he was granted the rank of captain and asked 
to escort a large shipment of munitions to Sicily to bolster Garibaldi’s 
efforts. Eventually arriving in Palermo and waiting for the general to 
review his men, he was ordered by Nino Bixio, Garibaldi’s second in 
command, to lead a burial detail. Agnetta replied that he was sorry, 
but he did not know from whom he was taking orders. In response, 
Bixio slapped him across the face. Agnetta pulled out his sword to retal-
iate but was restrained by onlookers while Bixio disappeared. Informed 
of the insult by Agnetta, Garibaldi agreed to help him seek out the 
unknown perpetrator. One can imagine the general’s surprise when 
they suddenly ran into Bixio, who pulled out his revolver as Agnetta 
sought to throw his visiting card in his face. Garibaldi immediately 
ordered Bixio to put himself under barracks arrest, and he later informed 
Agnetta, who had demanded a duel, that he would have to postpone his 
desire for satisfaction until after the campaign—a judgment confirmed 
by a hastily convened tribunal of honor of high ranking officers.
 Having achieved the rank of major during the ensuing conflict, 
Agnetta eventually returned to Turin after the Neapolitan surrender 
and immediately sent his seconds to challenge his adversary who was 
in Genova. Bixio tried to avoid the issue by accusing Agnetta of having 
lived off the earnings of a prostitute in Alessandria, an action that would 
have disqualified him as a gentleman. It was this charge that prompted 
Agnetta to go public with his broadside, and he denounced Bixio’s 
accusations as those of a coward who had lost his will to fight after 
becoming a hero. He added that Bixio was a liar and calumniatore, thus 
rounding out the traditional circle of insults leading to combat. Bixio 
could hardly ignore this public snub—in which Agnetta offered wit-
nesses against the countercharges of unbecoming conduct—and even-
tually agreed to fight, despite the fact that his wife was in the last stages 
of pregnancy. They met November 17, 1861, in a saber duel that left 
Bixio’s right hand permanently crippled. Despite the heat of the affair, 
they were reconciled by the encounter, and, shortly afterwards, Bixio 
used his influence to help Agnetta, who joined Italy’s prefectoral corps 
and eventually became subprefect of Massa Carrara.
 6. IRA, Busta 722 6/1; “Una riparazione d’onore.” 
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 The affair of Bixio and Agnetta brings to the fore how the mud-
dling of military authority engendered by the upheavals of the Risor-
gimento could lead to increased dueling. As rank became more fluid 
and boundaries blurred, chivalrous actions were needed to reestablish 
status. On the individual level, the affair demonstrated the lengths to 
which a man like Agnetta, anxious to affirm his position in Italian soci-
ety, would go to remove any taint of dishonor. More important, how-
ever, the very public nature of the preliminaries offered a showcase of 
the dueling ethic and tied issues of honor to some of the most impor-
tant names of the moment. Bixio and especially Garibaldi were heroes 
of unparalleled popularity, and their participation in matters of chiv-
alry naturally advertised and legitimized the code of honor throughout 
the new country. Garibaldi was reportedly an opponent of the duel, 
yet he had to acquiesce in the calling of a tribunal of honor and in 
affording Agnetta a later opportunity for satisfaction. This ambiguity 
was later manifested in his Romantic novel, Clelia, published in 1870, 
which sported a telling discussion on the issue prior to his de rigueur 
portrayal of a traditional duel with all the trimmings.
What the devil shall I say about the duel? I was always of the opinion 
that it was shameful to not understand each other without killing each 
other, but on the other hand is it up to us—helots of the tyrants of the 
earth, pariah of Europe—to preach both individual and general peace? 
Up to us to forgive outrageous insult! Up to us, so insulted by all! Up 
to us to whom it is prohibited to walk on our own land or proclaim our 
own glory!? Up to us, whose rights, whose conscience, whose honor 
are trampled on by the most vile dross of our nation!? Up to us—who 
in order to live, to be considered, to be protected—have to prostitute 
ourselves!? Forget it! (Via!) No duels when we are established, well gov-
erned, and when we enjoy our rights both at home and abroad—but 
in the face of arrogance, arbitrariness, and privilege—no! one cannot 
plead for peace.0
Obviously, according to Garibaldi, the Italians had much to prove. True, 
he suggested, the duel should be condemned, but as long as Italy had 
to suffer the shame of occupation, as long as Italy was weak and dis-
honored, all insults had to be answered on the point of a sword. On 
 8. For example, Gelli 1928, 332–33. 
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the other hand, the duel was fratricidal, and Clelia contains a lengthy 
speech by an aging Gondolier who chastises the impending duelists 
for shedding Italian blood between themselves rather than among La 
Patria’s enemies. These pleas go unheeded, and the protagonist, a young 
Garabaldino, although sorely wounded in the neck, shoots his oppo-
nent, a Roman aristocrat, through the heart. Returning to his theme of 
fratricide, Garibaldi concludes the scene with the Vatican, Italy’s most 
entrenched enemy, smiling “that infernal smile with which it celebrates 
whenever a holocaust of blood shed by the dagger of discord bathes 
this unhappy land.—And who spills that Italian blood? An Italian hand, 
consecrated to the redemption of our country.” Like many other Ital-
ians then, he was torn between the need to assert the country’s virile 
and honorable image while simultaneously lamenting the bloodshed 
demanded by the ritual of regeneration. Yet it bears noting, as his read-
ers no doubt did, that when push came to shove his Garabaldino not 
only fought, but he fought bravely and well.
 If Garibaldi had qualms about dueling, many of his followers did 
not, and in the transition years the Garibaldini found ample oppor-
tunity to exercise both their honor and their sabers. Having acquired 
half of the country for the House of Savoy, they felt entitled to respect, 
remuneration, and preferment in a new national army. Instead, they 
received little real support, and in the creation of the Italian army they 
were often passed over in favor of soldiers from the old regimes, a 
double insult which—except for Piedmont, of course—rewarded those 
who had opposed the making of Italy. On the flip side, the Pied-
montese army often regarded the Garibaldini as undisciplined upstarts 
who had managed to parlay participation in a revolution into rapid 
promotion which they now wanted confirmed without benefit of real 
military training. Whatever the justice of the two positions, it was a 
situation bound to create tensions between men who were either sol-
diers or saw themselves as such, and the ensuing friction—compounded 
by Garibaldi’s renewed recruitment of irregulars for further nationalist 
adventures in 1862 and 1867—led to some notorious duels. Follow-
ing the clash of the Garibaldini and regular troops at Aspromente in 
August of 1862, a Sicilian baron, Turillo di San Malato, who had been 
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by the great general’s side after he was wounded in the ankle, so thor-
oughly insulted the new Italian army in his newspaper, Caprera, that 
he was challenged by no fewer than 13 officers. The baron, who was 
considered one of the best fencers in Italy, went on to severely wound 
Captain Eusebio, who enjoyed the honor of representing his comrades 
in the collective affront. Such tensions continued, and the Gazzetta 
di Milano carried a story on June 23, 1863, relating how an ex-captain 
Fazari of the Redshirts had insulted a certain colonel, Dessa, under the 
porticos of the Po in Turin. They had fought a duel on the Swiss border 
in which Nino Bixio, now a deputy in parliament, had acted as one of 
Dessa’s seconds.
 These incidents, however, paled in comparison to the exploits of 
the Garabaldino Antonio Riboli, who fought three duels in 1861 for 
the sake of the honor of the Redshirts and their revolutionary leader. 
The story began in Parma when an aristocratic lieutenant of the Pied-
montese cavalry defenestrated some dinnerware bearing a likeness of 
Garibaldi, and his regimental compatriots followed suit. The incident 
raised a furor among the general’s followers, who collectively felt the 
insult inflicted on the face of their duce, and there was fear of violence 
between the contending groups. An answer arose in Riboli, who had 
served as a lieutenant in Garibaldi’s cavalry and was currently waiting 
to hear his professional fate in Mondovì, and who now took the liberty 
of sending a sfida through official channels to the entire offending regi-
ment. This was a gesture worthy of a response, and it quickly led to 
three encounters (two saber and one pistol) with three noble officers, 
one of whom (the Count di Salasco) was seriously wounded. The noto-
riety of the affairs soon prompted Riboli to seek a safer judicial climate 
across the border in Switzerland, where he was joined by a number of 
the other participants. They were soon allowed to return, and Riboli, 
who had become acquainted with some of his antagonists during their 
shared exile, was actually invited to become part of the regiment that 
he had so publicly challenged. The ministry of war had other ideas, 
however, and Riboli was eventually attached to another unit.
 Nevertheless, the offer had been made, and it was in keeping with 
the general theme of reconciliation that permeated the entire narrative. 
Indeed, Giuseppe Abba’s account, written years later, stressed the healing 
properties of the duel on two different levels. First, he commented on 
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the obvious social disparity of the principals. Riboli was a commoner, 
whose bravery, ability, and love of Italy allowed him to compete with 
dukes and counts on a level playing field. No better statement could be 
made regarding the honor accorded to the new men who had helped 
to make Italy alongside the traditional ruling classes. Second, Riboli’s 
duels had brought symbolic resolution to the rift between regular 
and irregular soldiers, between the Redshirt and the official uniform, 
between the revolution and the monarchy. The Garabaldino had been 
worthy of the challenge, the noble officers of Piedmont had recog-
nized his validity both as a man and as a soldier, and a bond of blood 
had dispelled previous differences. Whatever actual role Riboli’s duels 
played in the creation of a truly national army, the retelling of them was 
bound to keep the ethic of honor alive and well in the minds of Italians 
through the following decades.
 Meanwhile, similar narratives were unfolding in the more overtly 
political sphere. Here, dueling would abound, as previously opposing 
forces and ideologies came to live together under the same institutional 
roof. A relatively free press and liberal parliament, which had previously 
existed only in Piedmont—and then only since 1848—suddenly gave 
vent to all manner of political opinion which earlier would have been 
the subject of investigation, censorship, or punishment. Within these 
new showplaces of debate, personal differences abounded, harsh words 
were exchanged, and honor was offended. Worse, the very real issues 
of how and when to finish the process of unification made the first 
years of discourse particularly nasty as radicals and moderates fought 
hard for their programs and often stretched the bounds of civility and, 
occasionally, legality. Garibaldi himself was dragged into two chivalric 
challenges, both with Piedmontese generals, over recriminations fol-
lowing a stillborn expedition to the Trentino in early 1862, and the 
duels were avoided only after the direct intervention of the king. 
At the same time, each group was hypersensitive about its legitimate 
place in the new scheme of things, and each assiduously defended itself 
against any slight or insult that might demean its respective importance 
as equal actors in the public eye. This combination of sensitivity and 
controlled conflict helped fuel the “explosion” of dueling activity that 
swept through Italy during the first few years of unification.0
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 The democrats seemed especially prickly about perceived injuries to 
their reputation or that of their leaders, a result, perhaps, of their sub-
ordinate position in the new scheme of things. Consider, for example, 
the vertenza that arose between the novelist and democratic patriot, 
Francesco Domencio Guerrazzi, and General Agostino Luigi Pettiti, 
the current minister of war, in June of 1862. Petitti had insulted Guer-
razzi during a parliamentary debate on June 10 by saying that his words 
were “base” and “vile,” and Guerazzzi had responded in kind in a Flo-
rentine newspaper. A challenge was issued and accepted by Guerrazzi, 
who immediately wrote to Agostino Bertani and Antonio Mordini, 
both noted republicans, asking them to be his seconds. They accepted 
the charge but warned Guerrazzi in no uncertain terms that they would 
have no truck with a negotiated settlement. Guerrazzi then suggested 
to them that he would like to submit the case to a court of honor to 
assure that he would have the choice of weapons, for compared to his 
military antagonist he had little experience in such matters. In the face 
of these instructions, Mordini and Bertani now abandoned him, and 
their rejection letter spoke directly to the larger political issues at hand: 
“After your acceptance of the sfida, we only saw one way possible, 
that is fight first and discuss later. And gladly we would have assisted you 
as much on account of that friendship that binds us as for the necessity 
of our party to show that we do not fear the overbearing insolence or 
the provocations of our political adversaries.” Here we clearly see how 
Guerrazzi’s private honor had become a stalking horse for members of 
the radical party, and his hesitation regarding the proposed combat was 
seen as something of a betrayal on the part of his compatriots. “Fight 
first and discuss later” was a handy shorthand for the bellicose spirit of 
the times, and it fit the democratic model of Garibaldi and his follow-
ers as they geared up for new, irregular adventures in the face of official 
caution on the part of Italy’s ruling moderates. As a frame of context, 
only a month after Mordini and Bertani had balked at Guerrazzi’s trepi-
dations, Garibaldi launched his ill-fated march of volunteers on Rome 
from Sicily, which ended at Aspromonte in an unfortunate and divisive 
skirmish with regular Italian troops.
 Similar democratic sensibilities can be found in the actions of Baron 
Giovanni Nicotera, a republican firebrand who had reluctantly accepted 
the monarchy and who was elected to parliament in June 1861. In 
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October of that year, with controversy swirling in Naples around anni-
versary celebrations of Garibaldi’s entrance into the city, Petruccelli 
della Gattina published an article declaring that the general’s moment 
in history was over and denouncing any popular demonstrations on 
his behalf as fetishistic and idolatrous. In response, a group of demo-
cratic leaders gathered together to choose by lot who would have the 
honor of fighting Petruccelli for insulting their hero, and Nicotera drew 
the short straw. Petruccelli was doing archival research for the novelist 
Alexander Dumas when Nicotera found him and offered his challenge. 
At first Petrucelli refused the sfida, but he reacted quickly after Nicotera 
slapped him twice across the face. Dumas offered his services as one 
of Petrucelli’s seconds, and arrangements were made to tie a saber to 
Nicotera’s hand so that he could fight despite a permanent injury to 
his fingers incurred during Carlo Pisacane’s ill-fated democratic insur-
rection of 1857. This disadvantage notwithstanding, he managed to 
wound his opponent in both the head and the arm, at which point the 
duel was declared to be finished. According to the English writer Jes-
sie White Mario, who was in Naples at the time and whose husband 
Alberto had originally been involved in the vertenza, this was Nicotera’s 
second duel of the year. It was soon followed by another affair in June 
of 1863 occasioned by the publication in La Nazione of a highly critical 
article on Mazzini. Such swashbuckling might have been viewed as 
over-the-top, except for the reputation and stature of a man like Nico-
tera who was a genuine hero of the revolution, wounded in patriotic 
rebellion and long incarcerated in the dankest of Neapolitan prisons. 
This was a nobleman and a patriot who had paid his debt to unifica-
tion in time and in blood, and his righteous outrage and chivalric atti-
tude further legitimized the code duello as an intrinsic part of the new 
political ethos. Like other democrats-turned-monarchists, he would go 
on to become an important statesman in liberal Italy, serving twice as 
minister of the interior, and he could be counted on to back up his 
words with his sword whenever the occasion arose.
 Returning to the big picture, it is obvious that the political passions 
and opportunities unleashed in 1860 by the success of the Garibaldini 
and the Party of Action in the south created a period of extraordi-
nary tension and often recrimination among the victorious forces of 
nationalism. Republicans often felt betrayed by the rapid absorption of 
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the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and the postponement of acquisition 
of Rome as the capital of Italy, while their moderate opponents saw 
them as dangerous both to the current successes toward unification 
as well as to the Piedmontese army and monarchy. The resulting rift 
between political elites—who all more or less believed in parliamentary 
procedure, a free press, and a common goal of unity—created an atmo-
sphere that was rife with emotion and anger, but also held in check 
by a general acceptance of the current regime. The literary myths and 
romantic images that helped inspire Italian patriotism were by defini-
tion holistic, inclusive, and bereft of any grasp of the very real differ-
ences obtaining in the different parts of the country.26 When, in fact, 
political factions began the very real struggle of dealing with young 
Italy’s many problems, it seemed a betrayal of that fraternal concord 
which had been central to much of the previous propaganda. The duel 
flourished in this climate of controlled antagonism, allowing political 
opponents of extreme views to cover themselves in honor, assert their 
brotherhood as Italians, and maintain a martial image of virile men 
who at heart understood one another’s motivations and assumptions. 
Even when vertenze did not result in combat, the protocols of challenge, 
negotiation, and satisfaction offered an alternative venue of pacific con-
flict bound by rules that stressed commonalities rather than differences 
among the participants. This emphasis on masculine commonalities 
helps explain the passion with which both moderates and republicans 
embraced the dueling code: it reverted back to the chivalric ethos of 
Risorgimento propaganda and allowed Italians of different parties to 
affirm their mythopoetic connections through a national dialogue of 
honor and blood.
 Such was obvious in one of the most significant duels of this tumul-
tuous decade. It came in the wake of Garibaldi’s failure at Aspromonte 
in 1862, which led to charges of betrayal on one hand and treason on 
the other. The ensuing reciprocal recriminations brought down the gov-
ernment of the left/center prime minister, Urbano Rattazzi, in Decem-
ber of 1862. Rattazzi had eventually been replaced as prime minister 
by Marco Minghetti, a staunch right/center deputy from Bologna who 
had been one of Cavour’s ablest allies. An important political figure, he 
had already served Piedmont as minister of foreign affairs and minister 
of the interior. On June 18, 1863, Rattazzi and Minghetti wrangled in 
parliament over religious policy, among other issues, and Rattazzi cast 
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aspersions on Minghetti’s preunitary service as a counselor to Pius IX, 
now an inveterate enemy of unified Italy. He further insisted that Min-
ghetti was fickle in his allegiances and had even sought a cabinet post in 
Rattazzi’s left-leaning government during its last few months of tenure 
until he saw it was doomed to failure. This was too much, and the hall 
broke into pandemonium as Minghetti defended his record as an Ital-
ian patriot and gave the lie—“È falsissimo!”—to the charge of switching 
parties.
 A duel was arranged, and the two men fought with sabers in Turin 
on June 21, only three days after their exchange in parliament. The 
written account or verbale, signed by the presiding seconds, sharply 
delineated the dynamics involved in the encounter: “The undersigned 
declare on their honor: that the honorable Rattazzi and Minghetti, in 
this morning’s encounter with sabers both conducted themselves as 
one would expect of people of their elevated character: that during 
the three assaults, which both men sustained with maximum resolve 
and sangfroid, the honorable Rattazzi was lightly wounded in the right 
arm.” Once again, we have a “perfect” duel. Rattazzi’s wound, which 
ended the conflict, was a minor detail in the greater game of both men 
demonstrating their courage in the face of immanent danger. In so 
doing, they were only manifesting the natural superiority of their “ele-
vated character” which set them apart as leaders of a young and vibrant 
country. The verbale further stated that their shared service both in 
the past and in the future now dictated that they put aside their differ-
ences and declare their delicate sensibilities reciprocally satisfied.
 So much for personal and political reconciliation, but for the new 
Italy this event was an extraordinary advertisement for the duel. It 
had involved the current prime minister and his immediate predeces-
sor fighting with swords over words in parliament—an act as illegal as 
it was honorable. The other attributes of the combatants only polished 
the image of what it meant to be a gentleman in the new order of 
things. Minghetti came from one of Bologna’s non-noble patrici-
ate families, a man of wide learning and great experience and a lead-
ing commentator on social, economic, and political issues. A leader 
of the moderates who pushed the Risorgimento agenda in the Papal 
States, he would go on to become one of Italy’s leading statesmen dur-
ing the reign of the historic right. Rattazzi, on the other hand, was a 
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successful lawyer who had served in various Piedmontese cabinets dur-
ing the 1850s and represented those democrats willing to back Cavour’s 
monarchical approach to unification. Significantly, he had penned, as 
part of his revision of the Albertine Code in 1859, the new law that 
had greatly reduced the penalties for those convicted of dueling. Like 
Minghetti, he would continue to hold high office in Italian govern-
ment, and he would become prime minister again for a short while 
in 1867. The seconds who assisted with the duel also exemplified a 
broad spectrum of talent, success, and social background. They included 
General Enrico Cialdini, a double hero of the Risorgimento and argu-
ably the most renowned soldier in Italy’s regular army; Sebastiano Tec-
chio, an accomplished lawyer who had served as royal commissioner 
of the newly annexed territories in 1859 and who would eventually 
become an appeals court justice and president of Italy’s senate; and 
Prince Rinaldo Simonetti, a fierce patriot who had fought in 1848, 
helped organize Garibaldi’s expedition to Sicily, and fostered national-
ist associations such as the Italian Society for Target Shooting. Like his 
compatriots in the duel, he had been appointed to the newly expanded 
senate in 1861.
 This mini-prosopography reveals the double-edged importance of 
Minghetti and Rattazzi’s duel. On one hand, it was a high-profile sanc-
tion of the duel by people who mattered, a point raised by the Gazzetta 
di Milano which complained that the encounter in Turin had set a bad 
example for the rest of the country. The diarist Enrico Bottrigari 
reported from Bologna that the duel was on everyone’s lips, and the 
day afterwards many distinguished visitors had stopped by Minghetti’s 
house and left their visiting cards: obvious approbation of the prime 
minister’s chivalric gesture by his constituency.0 On the other hand, 
the very rank and influence of Minghetti, Rattazzi, and their associ-
ates meant that they could guarantee dueling’s immunity from judicial 
prosecution as they exercised their prerogatives in the army, the courts, 
and the parliament. They not only practiced the duel; they also assured 
its protection from their own laws and thus promulgated the unoffi-
cial chivalric code as being both parallel and equal to the official legal 
code. This paradox was not lost on the new regime’s opponents, such 
as the pro-papal paper L’Eco which aptly argued: “While they pretend 
to make Italy great and render her civil, every day they put themselves 
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in the arms of a barbaric custom of those very Middle Ages that the 
revolutionaries would like to cancel from history. People who create 
laws every day abandon themselves to the rationale of the sword and of 
the lead ball and for civility they want to wash their hands in blood.” 
Predictably, the newspaper called for the arrest and trial of Minghetti 
and Rattazzi, knowing full well that Italy’s officials had maintained a 
studied silence on this flagrant violation of current law. Even Bottrigari, 
who was a dedicated disciple of Minghetti and his party, bemoaned the 
poor example set by the highest elected official in the land and sug-
gested that he should have at least postponed the combat until after he 
had left the cabinet.
 The combination of such examples on the part of both radical 
and moderate politicians, and the obvious immunity afforded those 
who fought according to the rules of chivalry, helped to make the 
duel a common occurrence during Italy’s first decade of existence. 
One can see this dynamic at work in the police files of Bologna for 
the year 1869. On February 14, the Carabinieri informed the prefect 
that a duel had recently occurred between a captain of the Grenadiers 
and a lieutenant of the Bersaglieri over words exchanged at a recent 
dance held by the Felsinea society. Despite the difference in their ranks 
and the fact that the captain had been seriously wounded in the arm, 
the prefect passed the report into the archives without further ado. 
A few weeks later, the police delegate of Pianoro actually apologized 
to the prefect for bringing to his attention a duel fought between two 
lieutenants of the Bersaglieri, but he excused his communication by 
stating that it was his duty to report all events in the area assigned to 
him. One of the officers had been wounded slightly, but since there 
had been no public scandal and no further discord, he was sure the 
military would take the matter no further. The prefect concurred and 
buried the report in the archives. A similar attitude was taken toward 
an incident reported by the Carabinieri on September 1. A lawyer, 
Aristide Venturini, and a landowner, Ernesto Bordoni, had fought with 
sabers just outside the city gates over a newspaper article critical of one 
of Venturini’s friends. Both had been lightly wounded in the arm, and 
 31. In L’Eco, July 26, 1863.
 32. Bottrigari 1961, vol. 3, 310.
 33. For example, ibid., vol. 4, 40. One notes that Bottrigari’s memoirs did not begin to 
mention duels in Bologna until after unification.
 34. ASB, Prefettura, 1869, Busta 153, report of Feb. 14, 1869, #12.
 35. Ibid., report of March 27, 1869, #15 Riservato.
	 /	 Chapter	II
once again the prefect simply passed the case into the archives without 
any further action.
 Such official nonchalance is all the more striking because earlier in 
the year, Bologna had been rocked by a fatal duel between two of its 
more prominent young men: Marchese Giovanni Giuseppe Mazzacorati 
and Marchese Francesco Pizzardi. Having developed a mutual grudge 
based on old family tensions and certain financial matters, they agreed 
to fight with rifled pistols at short range. They met on the morning of 
February 28 on a rural holding of the Minghetti family, and in rapid 
order Mazzacorati fell dead with a bullet in his head and Pizzardi left 
for exile in Switzerland. According to the Monitore, all of Bologna was 
shocked by Mazzacorati’s death—he had fought bravely under Garib-
aldi in the recent war against Austria—yet, as witnessed by the previous 
examples, the incident had done nothing either to curb the penchant 
for dueling among the city’s elites or to prompt the authorities to inter-
vene in a determined manner.
 All in all, as the first 10 years of unity ended, the dueling ethic had 
become the norm rather than the exception, “the order of the day,” 
as one newspaper put it, among soldiers and civilians alike. Its pan- 
Italian nature was aptly illustrated by a case in December 1869 involv-
ing Marco Besso, a mild-mannered agent of the Venetian Assicurazioni 
Generali who was running the company’s office in Messina, Sicily. He 
had fired an incompetent clerk named Guglielmi who had reacted by 
physically insulting him (probably with a slap or kick) in the street. 
Gugliemi was a former Garibaldino, and Besso felt compelled to chal-
lenge him to a duel, as opposed, perhaps, to taking him to court. Bereft 
of any experience with a sword, Besso engaged a fencing master for 24 
hours and managed to come out of the ordeal with a light wound to 
the arm. Besso recounted the affair with surprise that he, being “paci-
fistic by temperament and choice,” should have found himself with 
a saber in hand, and that he had nevertheless faced the prospect with 
complete nonchalance. Overall, it seems to have been a positive experi-
ence in which he had “formally learned to stand my ground,” although 
he admitted that it would prove to be his first and last encounter. Nev-
ertheless, that a businessman devoid of military training would “measure 
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himself ” so casually over the consequences of a routine business matter 
not only showed how rituals of honor might be employed to defend 
personal interest, in this case Guglielmi’s, but also clearly demonstrated 
the currency carried by the dueling code for certain groups in the young 
kingdom. It had become, in the words of contemporaries, a “plague”: a 
trope that implied not only dueling’s widespread destruction and dev-
astating scope but also its unstoppable nature and its disease-like power 
which allowed it to pass from infected hosts to uninfected victims. By 
the time the country was finally united in 1870 with the acquisition of 
Rome, the duel seemed to have grown into a general infestation of elite 
society rather than a manifestation of individual human agency.0
Officers as Gentlemen
The pattern of elite behavior toward the duel established during the 
decade of unification would continue up through the fascist period. It 
would do so not just because of cultural inertia—that is, because the 
chivalric assumptions of the Risorgimento automatically dominated 
the actions of the postunitary period—but also because many of the 
same forces that had inspired the rise of the dueling ethic would retain 
their influence as the country matured. Particularly important in this 
regard were the expansion and proliferation of the Italian military as 
one of the country’s key institutions, and the heavy contribution of 
Italy’s officers to the much-lamented “plague” is correspondingly obvi-
ous and consistent in the available quantitative evidence. According to 
statistics compiled by Gelli (which will be more thoroughly discussed 
in the next chapter), some 3,593 military men fought in duels between 
1888 and 1917—an average of over 120 duels a year. The relative 
importance of that figure becomes clear if one looks at another set of 
Gelli’s statistics (see table 4 in chapter III) which reveals the professions 
of known duelists between 1888 and 1895. Out of a total of 2,069 
men who fought during that period, some 702 or about 34% belonged 
to some branch of the military. This figure was generally confirmed 
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in another, overlapping, sample taken between 1890 and 1899 in which 
Gelli found that out of 1,065 duels, 289 (27%) occurred between sol-
diers, 153 (14%) included both soldiers and civilians, and another 623 
(59%) involved just civilians. Despite the preponderance of civilians 
in the raw numbers, Gelli rightly pointed out that because there were 
only about 18,000 men in Italy’s officer corps at the time, the per capita 
proportion of military men in duels was consequently extremely high. 
This estimate was especially accurate if one considers Gelli’s attending 
assertion that officers—with the presumed aid of the military establish-
ment—actively sought to hide their duels compared to the intrinsically 
more public affairs of journalists and politicians. Thus one dueling 
code, written specifically for officers in 1898, recommended that among 
military men, only duels in which one of the participants was actually 
killed needed to be reported to the regular judiciary. Even with such 
stratagems in play, however, both the quantitative and the qualitative 
evidence supports the image of Italian officers as being punctilious, 
even pugnacious, in defending their honor.
 The frequency of vertenze and duels involving Italy’s officer corps 
owed much to the overwhelming hegemony of the Piedmontese 
army, although it no doubt received an extra boost from the absorp-
tion of many Neapolitan officers, whose taste for chivalric combat had 
been awakened during the Napoleonic period and who had much to 
prove after their humiliating defeats by Garibaldi’s irregulars in 1860. 
Piedmont, however, had maintained a continuous tradition of dueling 
from the Renaissance compared to the other pre-unitary states, and it 
had been particularly prevalent among the officer corps. The political 
ferment of the “decade of preparation” in the 1850s had reinforced 
this tradition, connecting dynastic military honor to national politi-
cal honor while influencing the army of exiles who had escaped to 
Piedmont after the ill-starred adventures of 1848–49. With the suc-
cessful war against Austria in 1859 and the co-optation of Garibaldi’s 
victories in the south, Piedmont’s army gained enormous prestige as an 
instrument of unification and, equally important, inherited the practi-
cal task of creating a new national army. For much of the country, this 
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institution would be created from whole cloth, because, with the 
exception of Naples and Tuscany, the pre-unitary states had depended 
on foreign rather than indigenous troops. The idea of a citizen army, 
and the universal conscription that fed it, were innovations designed 
to nationalize the masses, reduce regional or local loyalties, and forge 
an institution capable of both external defense and internal order. This 
new army was a radical, and often undesirable, shift for many Italians 
as young men were uprooted from their homes to serve in other areas 
of the country and as a uniform military presence projected the power 
of the government throughout the land. In this sense Piero del Negro 
has argued that in varying degrees Piedmont “militarized” the rest of 
Italy and, of course, did so in its own likeness and image, including the 
penchant of its officers to duel.
 The main enforcer of such “Piedmontization” was General Man-
fredo Fanti, who adopted the practice of simply numbering additional 
units as an extension of Piedmont’s original army when different areas 
were annexed to the realm.0 As this new/old army of Italy emerged, 
he pushed a system of mixed brigades recruited from different regions 
to assure a pan-Italian identity but with the Piedmontese still clearly in 
the majority, especially among the higher ranks. Even by the end of the 
century, over one-fourth of the highest officers in the Stato Maggiore 
were still of Piedmontese extraction, and Piedmont’s dialect ruled as 
the argot of the army in general. From its very inception then, Italy’s 
officer corps was infused with a tradition of dueling that was directly 
linked to the creation of the country under the auspices of the Savo-
yard monarchy. The continued liveliness of that tradition among the 
top officers of the realm, including the king, is probably best illustrated 
by the career of General Achille Angelini, author of one of Italy’s most 
prestigious dueling codes. Born in Vicenza in 1812, he became an offi-
cer in the Austrian cavalry but then immediately joined the Piedmon-
tese army with the revolution of 1848. Having fought in the campaigns 
of 1848 and 1849, he gained the rank of captain and became an instruc-
tor at the military riding academy at Pinerolo. It was here, in 1850, that 
he was accused, along with his fellow Lombard officers, of profiteering 
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on feed for the horses. Having traced the source of the rumor to a 
Sardinian lieutenant, he called his accuser out and during the resulting 
duel killed him with a saber blow. Perhaps unhappy over the disparity 
in the men’s ranks, the military tribunal of Turin sentenced Angelini 
to five years in prison and a fine of 500 lire. However, only four days 
after the sentence, the king offered him a pardon that reduced the pen-
alty to six months’ confinement, vacated the fine, and allowed him to 
return to active service with his rank of captain intact.
 Popular and well-connected, he rose quickly through the ranks and 
by the early 1860s had become both a major general and an aide-de-
camp to Victor Emmanuel II. In the latter position he became known 
as the “cavalier without fear,” willing to meet the slightest offense 
against the monarchy with sword in hand. His friend and biographer, 
Countess Adamoli-Castiglioni, claimed that he fought some 25 duels 
in his eight years of personal service to the king—although modesty 
led him to acknowledge only six or seven of them. His military career 
ended abruptly, however, when, having been appointed a high com-
mand in Sardinia, his notorious temper got the best of him. Having 
fallen in love with a young woman in Caglieri, he ran afoul of her 
brother who resented his attentions and slapped him in public. Mad-
dened by this insult to himself and his uniform, Angelini whipped out 
a blade from a sword cane he habitually carried and stabbed the young 
man in the side, almost killing him. The general was eventually absolved 
of wrong-doing in the courts, but the notoriety of the case forced his 
early retirement, with full pension, from the army. Nevertheless, Ange-
lini remained a symbol of military honor and an active promoter of 
the chivalric ethic up until his death in 1889. According to one French 
newspaper, he participated in at least 70 duels as either a combatant 
or a padrino, a number the good countess thought shy a few. His duel-
ing code, published in 1882, was considered by many to be the most 
authoritative in Italy, and his long association with the king seemed to 
lend a royal imprimatur to its precepts. Certainly, his many encoun-
ters while under the direct command of Victor Emmanuel II could 
only feed the notion that Italian officers were expected to defend their 
honor with alacrity and enthusiasm.
 The official translation of that notion was resoundingly obvious in 
the new regime’s refusal to include dueling as a crime in the military 
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penal code. While murder, theft, and brawling (rissa) were all pun-
ished with severe sanctions, the rubric duello did not even appear in the 
code’s index. Instead, dueling was relegated to the military’s disciplin-
ary regulations regarding insubordination (articles 27–30) and was seen 
as a violation only if it occurred between men of differing rank. The 
message was clear that as long as challenges and duels did not transgress 
the logical priorities of military efficiency—specifically discipline and 
the chain of command—then they were seen as acceptable behavior. 
On the other hand, the disciplinary code immediately specified in arti-
cle 31 that these provisions did not protect military duelists from the 
civilian law code—an obvious gesture to the equal rule of law, but one 
consistently violated in principle and practice because most military 
duels were intentionally kept within the disciplinary confines of the 
command structure. Consequently, when in 1881 Eugenio de Rossi 
put a fellow second lieutenant in the hospital for three months with a 
saber slash from a duel inspired by a practical joke, he was given only 
eight days in the brig and forced to pay 50 lire for a dinner of recon-
ciliation, with no negative impact on his career and no mention to the 
criminal courts. When de Rossi later fought a second duel with similar 
results, this time as a major in 1907, he apparently received no punish-
ment whatsoever and within a year of the encounter was promoted 
to lieutenant colonel! Even more striking, Lieutenant Pietro Cingia 
dueled with and killed a nobleman in 1887 and a lawyer/journalist in 
1891, but he still made captain by the time he had killed a third man 
and severely scarred a fourth in 1898. Cases involving insubordination 
were treated more harshly, but courts could also be lenient depending 
on the circumstances.0 In 1863, for instance, the Military Tribunal of 
Turin gave one captain two years in prison for simply putting his hand 
on his sword—a ritual challenge—and calling his major a vile coward 
who was afraid to fight a duel, but the same year it virtually absolved a 
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sergeant for wounding his superior in a real duel. The difference in the 
two cases arose from the fact that the sergeant had issued his challenge 
in a civil and private manner and the cause of the affair had been per-
sonal and unrelated to the service. Even if an officer were convicted 
of gross insubordination for dueling across the boundaries of rank, he 
could always hope for a royal pardon, as happened in a famous case in 
1861 when a Risorgimento hero, Major Stanislao Becchi, fought with 
and wounded a colonel who he felt had damaged his career out of per-
sonal malice.
 In contrast to the military’s relative silence on dueling as a crime, the 
ministry of war reputedly offered up the occasional circular designed to 
limit the practice, but often as not they reinforced rather than lamented 
dueling’s legitimacy, such as when one stated that officers were specifi-
cally prohibited from dueling on military property. Even more impor-
tant, however, the military embraced other regulations that transparently 
promoted the practice, albeit in an indirect manner. One has to wonder 
if it were purely accidental that, closely following the articles linking 
dueling and insubordination, the disciplinary code waxed eloquently 
on the military’s need for esprit de corps, the basis of which rested on 
honor. 
§35. Therefore, every soldier will regard the reputation and honor of his 
corps as if it were his own reputation and honor: [ . . . ].
§36. Whenever some soldier unfortunately fails in his honor, the opin-
ion of his companions will be quick to condemn him and to reject any 
solidarity with his mistake.
Such exhortation only reinforced the Piedmontese law of May 1852 
(mentioned in the previous chapter) prescribing that an officer who 
failed to defend his honor appropriately would be deprived of his 
commission and cashiered from the corps. This critical sanction had 
been automatically adopted by the new Italian army and would remain 
throughout the liberal and fascist periods the legal justification, used 
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time and again in court, to seek exoneration for officers who faced the 
double bind between the code of honor and the code of law. That 
this code was more than merely rhetoric was evidenced as late as 1922, 
when a lieutenant was cashiered by a consiglio di disciplina for refusing to 
fight a duel with a fellow officer because of religious scruples. For all 
its significance and impact, however, it is important to note that in the 
law of May 1852, as in the subsequent permutations of the disciplinary 
code, all chivalric references remained in the theoretical realm of honor. 
No regulation ever explicitly promoted or demanded dueling per se, for 
doing so would have put the military establishment in direct confronta-
tion with the law of the land as signed by the sovereign. The official 
and public face of the Italian military did not much discuss dueling; it 
was just something officers were expected to do.
 This expectation existed in large part because they were defend-
ing not only their own private honor as officers but also the honor of 
their regiment, of their uniform, and, by extension, of their country. 
Failure to respond to an insult when a man was in uniform both sug-
gested individual cowardice and bordered on treason to the patria.0 It 
followed that officers were particularly sensitive to offenses involving 
vie di fatto, such as shoving or slapping, because such acts physically 
besmirched the dignity of their uniform. To not react immediately 
and violently—preferably with a blow from the saber that symbolized 
their rank and occupation—constituted dereliction of duty. Tellingly, 
when King Umberto I barely escaped an assassin’s dagger in 1897, his 
only regret was that he had not “inflicted summary punishment” on the 
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perpetrator with the saber normally at his side. Indeed, the saber—
which was the only part of an officer’s uniform provided gratis by 
the government—forged a totemic link to the chivalric tradition that 
clearly marked an officer as a gentleman, with all the attendant obliga-
tions that such a designation demanded. The conscious nature of the 
connection was revealed by Eugenio de Rossi in 1913 when, having 
recently taken command of the 12th Bersaglieri Regiment in Milan, he 
administered the oath of allegiance to a freshly arrived group of second 
lieutenants:
Thus when the first of the lieutenants called up to swear gave me the 
saber that I would return to him after the oath, I explained that this 
was the survival of the ceremony for consecrating a knight, and that 
therefore they should consider themselves as such and that from that 
moment they were obligated to strictly observe the laws of honor if 
they wished to remain worthy of the rank of officer. I explained that 
returning the naked saber was the symbol of authority that the nation 
conferred upon them over the other citizens compelled by the law to 
military service: [ . . . ].
This credo of sword and nobility naturally had its practical side, and 
when the army set up a competition in 1881 to choose its official 
fencing style, it demanded that the winning entry include instructions 
on how to fight a proper duel and be inspired by “the most elevated 
maxims of perfect chivalry.” Officers thus learned to fence in part so 
that they could duel effectively in terms of both protocol and prac-
tice. In addition, they were expected to automatically offer their help 
as representatives and seconds in vertenze involving their comrades, 
even if they did not know them personally, because all officers were 
assumed to be perfect gentlemen. Such was the strength of this cus-
tom that in 1884 the minister of war, General Ferrero, castigated two 
officers who had refused to represent one of their brethren in an affair 
of honor.
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 Honor, then, was the backbone of the army, and the duel was its 
guardian, as was clearly illustrated in the maxims of General Niccola 
Marselli whose 1889 treatise, La vita del reggimento, was a favorite within 
the officer corps: “[I]t is a fact that the duel in the army must be judged 
with rather different criteria than those that can predominate in regular 
society. The army is a chivalrous society, in which the point-of-honor 
or touchiness, if you want, must be more alive, and the reparation [of 
honor] with weapons must have a larger field of action.”0 Amour propre 
and a heightened sense of honor were critical to an officer’s character, 
and one had to be careful not to stifle youthful vitality with overly 
punctilious regulation. These opinions enjoyed authority as well as 
popularity. As a teacher of military history at the War College in Turin, 
general secretary of the ministry of war, and director of both the Rivista 
militare italiana and Italia Militare, Marselli was something of a “spiritual 
father” of the Italian army during the liberal period. As such he simul-
taneously articulated and promulgated the military’s unique identity 
with the precepts of honor and chivalry.
 As part of that identity, Marselli also stressed the duel’s relationship 
to courage, which was taken as being second nature to an officer. Not 
the slightest hint of fear or hesitation could be shown in the face of a 
perceived affront, for it indicated a total unsuitability to the profession. 
Thus, he argued, the complete eradication of the duel from the mili-
tary was neither possible nor desirable, because its proof of courage was 
inherent to the calling. Fear was not an option, and it was better to 
overreact than risk any possible doubt as to one’s willingness to fight. 
All such precepts went beyond a personal sense of physical prowess in 
the clash of arms on the battlefield. Rather, an officer had to be ready 
to make life-and-death decisions without hesitation. Qualms in the face 
of enemy fire or over the shedding of blood were “womanly” character 
flaws that might mean disaster for comrades and country alike. Cour-
age, according to General Zucchi in 1861, was the most “virile of vir-
tues,” and in addition to upholding personal and corporate honor, the 
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duel offered an opportunity for officers to test their mettle under the 
threat of death. This institutional function became more important as 
Italy entered into a long period of peace after 1866 and the duel came 
to be seen as a substitute theater of bravery.
 This primacy of honor and courage in the thinking of Italy’s mili-
tary leaders was a theme with long roots, and John Whittam has pointed 
out that when the first academies were created in the 1850s, the pre-
vailing sentiment was “[t]he thing of ultimate effect is character—not 
intellect.” The concept was clearly reiterated and tied to the chivalric 
tradition by General Achille Angelini, who in the wake of the disastrous 
war of 1866 called for a moral reform in the education of Italy’s sol-
diers. Discipline, he maintained, was important for times of peace, but 
for war one needed other motive forces, specifically the point of honor 
and the love of king, country, and corps. That the duel was an impera-
tive piece of this moral universe was obvious to Angelini: “An officer 
only lives by honor, he must not be insulted by anyone with impunity, 
otherwise we would have stable flies dressed as officers, who at the first 
critical moment would demonstrate, with severe shame for the army, 
the smallness of their characters and the baseness of their feelings.”0 
Not surprisingly, Angelini proposed the legalization of the duel among 
Italy’s officers and the establishment of a tribunal of honor to limit and 
sanction the conflicts.
 In the same vein, Marselli’s defense of the duel reflected his concern 
that the élan vitale and virile action of Italy’s officers might be eroded by 
the pedagogical trends and technological needs of the modern military, 
to say nothing of the general “softness” of modern society. Excessive 
intellectual work, he claimed, “arrests physical development and low-
ers moral energy,” while the real goal of the army was to form a “man 
of action.” Regimental traditions of honor and heroic examples from 
history had to be employed to enhance a militant, almost unthink-
ing, spirit of action and sacrifice, all the while channeling the resulting 
ardor and ferocity within the bonds of discipline and respect. The “true 
soldier” according to Marselli, was a citizen who “loves danger, disdains 
death and stoically resists pain while carrying out his duties with dis-
cipline and modesty.” Hypersensitive to issues of honor, real officers 
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were instinctively inclined to violence and undeterred by the physical 
consequences of immediate action.
 This aspect of the military’s attitude toward the duel was clearly 
presented by Edoardo de Amicis’s short story “A Bunch of Flowers” 
which appeared in his 1868 collection of anecdotes, Military Life in Italy: 
Sketches. The story includes a description of a duel—recounted in the 
drawing room of a fashionable lady—that occurs a few years after uni-
fication. Nursing a recent wound, a young officer explains that during 
carnival celebrations on the Corso or Main Street, he had overheard a 
man criticize one of the soldiers maintaining order during the festivi-
ties for being oppressive and brutal—a natural result, he added, of the 
soldier’s “education.” Confronted by the young officer as to what he 
meant by such a reference, the man insolently replied, “the military 
education.” In reaction to this generic insult, the officer found himself 
in the grip of an uncontrollable and blinding impulse: “I neither saw 
him, the crowd, nor the corso, and I do not recollect what I said or he 
replied; I only remember that the following morning I returned home 
with a wounded hand, and my friends said that that gentleman had 
his left cheek laid open. That is all.” The hostess to whom the officer 
relates this story reacts with what de Amicis characterizes as “a genuine 
woman’s question”: 
—But why did you provoke him? Would it not have been better to have 
pretended not to hear?
To which the officer and an accompanying friend burst out laughing 
and, when queried as to why, he explains his compulsion to duel:
—Listen my lady, . . . . Supposing (which could not be the case) that I 
ought to have pretended that I did not hear, how could I have done so 
when my blood was boiling and my head in a ferment? Do you suppose 
I knew what I was doing at that moment? . . . 
 —The people all around had heard, . . . . The insult was one that 
touched the whole army, and those words were a lie; then just on that 
occasion the lie was a calumny, the tone of voice in which the calumny 
had been uttered sounded like a provocation; then the man, as I after-
ward learned (and it could not have been otherwise, because these are 
words which reveal a man’s soul), was nothing but a . . . .
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De Amicis leaves us to wonder who or what this “nothing” man might 
be, but there is little doubt as to the supposed psychological power of 
honor over an officer.
 That power operates on a variety of levels within his story. On 
the surface, the insult to the army, the classic invocations of mendacity 
and calumny, and the public nature of the confrontation, all reflect the 
stock precepts of the dueling script. Likewise, the woman’s comments 
and the gentle yet scornful dismissal they inspire make clear that mat-
ters of honor are for “real” men who understand them instinctively, 
while women and lesser men might take the easier path of not hear-
ing the insult: a reference to the classic “orecchie di mercante,” or ears of 
a merchant, in which servility and venality take precedence over honor. 
Digging deeper, however, we find as well a subtle yet powerful image 
of the warrior “furioso”—a man gone blind in a moment of blood 
lust—who is saved from savage violence in a civilian setting only by 
the automatic controls supplied by the dueling ritual. By implication 
the Italian soldier is dangerous and active, ready to fight and sacrifice 
all in the name of honor, yet disciplined and able to obey the dictates 
of a higher authority, in this case the strictures of chivalry. The duel 
thus becomes an analogue and a practicum of the battlefield populated 
by perfect soldiers. And yet, like the official policy of the Italian military 
itself—which refused to condemn or comment on the practice—the 
story offers no details of the duel: it skips the moment of illicit action 
and thus subliminally avoids the contradiction of the protectors of the 
state violating the state’s own juridical monopoly of violence.
 Similar revelations would be important in the works of any author, 
but de Amicis was much more than a simple writer of stories. As an 
editor of L’Italia Militare, the official propaganda publication of the 
ministry of war, he was and is still generally regarded as one of the 
most reliable interpreters of the collective psychology of Italy’s offi-
cer corps. Ultimately normative as well as descriptive, de Amicis’s 
Sketches spread the military ethic of service and honor through the 
literate classes of Italy, with the definitive edition enjoying 58 print-
ings between 1880 and 1922! According to military historian Piero del 
Negro, it became a livres de fond for Italy’s youth and by the turn of the 
century had been adopted as standard reading throughout the national 
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school system. Talented, romantic, and engaging, de Amicis appealed 
to emotions rather than reason and helped assure that the assumptions 
of the dueling ethic were to be regarded as “automatic” among Italy’s 
officers, both by themselves and by others.
 Beyond the conscious ideals of honor, courage, militancy, and cama-
raderie, the dueling code also reinforced the social gulf that separated 
the officers from the rank and file. Italy’s conscription laws offered a 
variety of mechanisms designed to allow middle- and upper-class men 
to buy exemption from service, and in consequence the majority of the 
regular soldiers included peasants and urban workers, who were gener-
ally regarded by elites as belonging to the infimo ceto, that is, men bereft 
of honor. The protection of honor among the officers according to the 
dueling code added a moral dimension to a social fact and was perhaps 
seen as a means of reinforcing obedience among men who generally 
could neither read nor write. In this world, duty and discipline were 
for soldiers, while honor and glory were for officers, and this view, of 
course, paralleled the perceived image of society beyond the barracks. 
The bridge between these two groups in the military was formed by 
the noncommissioned officers who had administrative powers within 
their units but were not entitled to any sort of field command. Theirs 
was an ambiguous position at the bottom end of the honor totem pole, 
and, even if they managed to climb into the commissioned ranks, they 
were generally discriminated against. It was reportedly official policy 
that they could not rise above the grade of captain no matter what their 
talents. This fact perhaps explains the large number of duelists (134, or 
27%) listed as noncommissioned officers in a sample Gelli put together 
of 491 soldiers who fought between 1890 and 1894 (see table 1). 
Bestriding the nick point between soldier and officer, it made sense 
that sergeants and sergeant majors would have been anxious to ascertain 
their rights to honor and satisfaction.00
 Similar institutional dynamics would help account for the rather star-
tling preponderance of duelists among Italy’s lieutenants. Combining 
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the two grades of sottotenente and tenente, they constituted some 56% 
of Gelli’s entire sample. One could blame such an imbalance on either 
youthful exuberance or demographic distribution, but one could also 
suggest that a duel was a means of “making one’s bones” in the mili-
tary—a proof of both courage and honor that would aid a young offi-
cer’s career. Such was the opinion of the sociologist Lino Ferriani who 
affirmed that “it is a rooted opinion that a young brilliant officer must 
begin military life with at least a duel or two. He needs a ‘baptism of 
blood’ no more and no less than in medieval times.”0 One might argue 
as well that some young officers needed to duel not only as a rite de pas-
sage or a steppingstone to advancement but also as a means of confirm-
ing their arrival into a more exclusive social sphere. Joining the officer 
corps was a rapid and effective tool of social mobility, particularly for 
middle-class youths, and a duel among “equals” could assuage the angst 
of those less than sure of their claim to gentlemanly status.0
 Whatever the distribution of combat across the ranks, however, the 
compulsion to duel was a daunting force in Italy’s military. Combin-
ing the individual pressures of social and institutional identity with the 
corporate traditions of a professional mystique, few could resist its dic-
tates. Moreover, the opinion that for Italy’s officers, dueling was natural, 
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Table 1
Military participants in reported duels arranged by rank, 1890–94
Participant Number
Undetermined 2
Soldiers 2
Cadets 4
Noncommissioned officers 134
Second lieutenants 73
First lieutenants 205
Captains 61
Majors and colonels 9
Generals 1
Total 491
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inevitable, and even desirable enjoyed considerable currency beyond the 
confines of the military establishment. The Anti-dueling League of Italy, 
created in 1903, reportedly would not allow officers to join because, 
presumably, it put them in an impossible position vis-à-vis their own 
institution.0 On stage, Paolo Ferrari ended his 1868 drama, Il duello 
(which is examined more fully in another chapter), with two encoun-
ters, one of which is fatal. Counter to legal logic, the military man who 
has killed his opponent outright is let off the hook by the authorities, 
while the civilian participants of the relatively bloodless duel are to be 
punished by the law. The attending bailiff explains this discrepancy by 
simply claiming that duels are mandatory for officers: “An officer is 
expulsed from the army if he does not fight!” he says. “What can you 
do!”0 That this was not merely literary license was clear from a num-
ber of court cases that began with lower-level judges refusing to indict 
or convict duelists from the military.0 For instance, in Asti in 1889, the 
pretore decided not to move against two lieutenants (who had readily 
admitted fighting a duel) because of “that serious moral compulsion 
that deprives them of liberty of action.”0
 Official support for the defense of a corporate compulsion was per-
haps most obvious when in 1884 the public prosecutor of Florence, 
Prampolini, argued that officers simply could not be treated the same 
way as ordinary citizens when it came to affairs of honor, not only 
because the regimental councils of discipline had consistently cashiered 
officers who refused to fight but also because those dismissals had been 
steadfastly ratified by the ministry of war. Prampolini, however, went 
well beyond a simple reiteration of the corporate compulsion argument. 
True, an officer had no choice, but there was an intrinsic tie between 
dueling and the warrior spirit. That is why armies throughout Europe 
had long embraced the precepts of the code of honor, and that is why 
neither the French revolutionaries nor Napoleon had legislated against 
its bloody outcomes: they had not wanted to weaken the fighting fiber 
of the nation. Prampolini held up as well the example of Prussia, which 
had gone even further and installed official courts of honor, thus rec-
ognizing the legitimacy of dueling among officers out of respect for its 
army. Prussia, of course, had become the darling of the Italian military 
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after its spectacular successes in 1866 and 1870, and his comparison 
implied that if Italy were going to run with the big dogs of modern 
nationhood, some sacrifice of equality would have to be made on the 
altar of legal impunity. Philosophers fight badly, he quoted one of Napo-
leon III’s ministers as saying, and giving up life for honor was the soul 
of the military life. He did not ask a carte blanche for officers, for doing 
so would have violated the essential equality of the law, but judges had 
to ask themselves on a case-by-case basis how the principles of justice 
might best be served when one considered the special relationship that 
existed between punctilious chivalry and a successful military.0
 Despite such debates within the judiciary itself, the higher courts 
often refused to adopt the argument that an officer’s need to defend 
his honor was beyond his control, although they tended to leniency 
in punishments.0 Consequently, officers consistently complained that 
they were in an impossible position, caught between their corporate 
compulsion to fight and the dictates of the law. As a military lawyer, 
Captain Giuseppe Scaglione, put it in 1869, the demands of chivalry 
put an officer “in a labyrinth” and “[on] an obscure and difficult path” 
wending between his various obligations of honor and obedience.0 
Nor were such laments limited to military men. Civilian opponents 
of the duel would consistently use the glaring inconsistency of having 
the defenders of the state being forced to break the rules of the state 
in the name of honor as proof of the chivalric code’s inherent illogic. 
The high command, of course, was not unaware of the difficulty. There 
were repeated attempts to resolve the issue as part of a general reform 
of the military penal code, but legislative alacrity was not liberal Italy’s 
strong suit, and the long-awaited amendment languished in a perpetual 
state of preparation. A compromise solution would be attempted with 
the creation of military courts of honor after the turn of the century, 
but their story fits more coherently into a later chapter.
 Hence we arrive at the more general question of the effect of the 
military’s dueling compulsion on the rest of elite society. In the most 
practical terms, the expansion of the army through the liberal period 
and particularly the creation of large territorial reserves after 1870 natu-
rally increased the number of civilians who had been officers or who 
still had auxiliary status.0 Both provided a constant leavening of men 
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 108. See the Asti case, just discussed, in Rivista penale 1889, vol. 30, 57. 
 109. Scaglione 1869, 23.
 110. Whittam 1977, 108–9; Ceva 1999, 88–98.
	 Honor	and	the	Nation	 /	 
who might infuse the military’s hypersensitive pretensions of honor 
back into Italy’s upper and middle classes from which the majority were 
increasingly recruited. Moreover, the military could still put institu-
tional pressure on a retired officer if he were perceived as not meeting 
his obligations as a gentleman. On a more abstract level, commenta-
tors such as F. Ranzi argued that Italy’s civilian elites naturally looked 
to the military in matters of arms and honor, and he urged his fellow 
officers to consider carefully the portentous example they were setting 
as they weighed whether or not to fight for their individual satisfac-
tion. Others suggested that because officers offered the most obvious 
model of sensitive honor and martial spirit, if the government could get 
them to stop dueling, the rest of society would follow suit. Moreover, 
as long as military men felt that it was their right and privilege to duel, 
the rest of civil society would be dragged along into the fray, trying to 
maintain their own status. Such was the opinion of the jurist Arturo 
Bruchi, who warned in 1890, “As long as a civilian citizen sees officers 
who fight he will never understand why he cannot and must not have 
recourse to the duel as well.”
 More generally, one must stress the importance of the military 
establishment at the national level, including how it might act to rein-
force the chivalric ideal. From the very beginning, army officers were 
engaged in Italy’s parliamentary politics, providing a constant stream of 
senators, deputies, and councilors for the new country, including three 
prime ministers (La Marmora, Menabrea, and Pelloux). Not only did 
such participation provide them high-profile status within the nation, 
but it also assured that their special relationship to the code of honor 
would be constantly represented and protected within the highest cir-
cles of power. There was also the close tie between the military and the 
Italian monarchy. That special relationship had long roots going back 
to the creation of the Kingdom of Sardinia itself, when the House of 
Savoy had managed to utilize its small but strategically important army 
to play for territory and status among the great powers of the day. Like-
wise, it was the Piedmontese army that had been largely responsible 
for creating Italy under the aegis of Victor Emmanuel II, and he was 
portrayed as heir to a lineage of warrior kings who stood in contrast to 
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to the ministry of war; Per l’onore: note e documenti di una vertenza, Milano, Lombardi, 1895. 
 112.  Ranzi 1897, 20.
 113. Bruchi 1890, 444–45.
 114. Ceva 1999, 65.
	 /	 Chapter	II
the pusillanimous princes of the other preunitary states. The success-
ful projection of this soldierly self-image was eventually enshrined in 
the immodest monument erected to his memory in the heart of Rome, 
where he still sits aside his massive bronze charger, saber by his side.
 Patriotism in Italy was thus officially married to the military valor of 
the king, who could be considered not only the re galantuomo (honest king) 
but also the re cavalleresco (chivalrous king). The monarchy was a criti-
cal rallying institution of post-Risorgimento society, capable of generat-
ing interclass solidarity among elites, and its dynastic traditions offered 
an important point of reference. According to Bollati, the monarchy was 
guarantor of the army and internal order, but “it gave another gift to 
the nation, that of a stylized political/ethical image that expressed itself 
in a feudal and chivalrous revival of considerable amplitude.” Mean-
while, the ascendancy of the royal court as the focus of high society— 
first in Turin, then in Florence, and finally in Rome—advertised Pied-
mont’s traditions to the rest of elite society, which became embarrass-
ingly brazen in its search for chivalric titles. Significantly, those titles 
such as Cavaliere or Commendatore were subject to revocation if a 
man failed to defend his honor properly. Overall, then, the military 
pretensions of the House of Savoy naturally promoted the general cul-
ture of honor among Italy’s elites, especially since there was always the 
reasonable hope that, when blade met flesh and the judiciary chose to 
prosecute, the king would intervene and pardon the honorable partici-
pants.0 
Swords and Their Masters
Monarchical and military pretensions also reinforced the tie between 
fencing and dueling in Italy. As one unpacks the official images of Italy’s 
kings, swords and sabers leap immediately to the fore. Victor Emmanuel 
II was usually portrayed in his dress uniform complete with saber, often 
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with his hand resting comfortably on the hilt. The same was true for 
Umberto I, his son and heir, whose official portraits in the Risorgimento 
museums of both Rome and Turin show him with saber downward 
directly in front of his crotch, an easy pose to hold for a painter but also 
one loaded with pointed phallic power. Such projections reemphasize 
the totemic function of the sword for patriotic Italians and bring to 
mind the aforementioned role of the saber in the ritual of inducting 
second lieutenants into their regiments. Further illustration is obvious 
in the extraordinary melding of officers and swords that adorned the 
cover of an Italian fencing manual from 1864 (image 1), the center of 
which holds a temporally distant image of medieval combat under the 
flying ensign of the House of Savoy. Not surprisingly, when the Count 
of Turin left as the dynasty’s representative to Paris to fight the Prince 
of Orleans for Italy’s good name after the disastrous defeat of Adua 
in 1896—a case examined in detail later in this chapter—his seconds 
rejected an offer to use pistols, claiming that the adversaries, because 
they belonged to two ancient sovereign families of warriors, would 
naturally use the sword as their weapon, while the pistol was “devoted 
for the use of betrayed husbands.” Blades, not bullets, were what dis-
tinguished truly noble warriors, a theme oft repeated in united Italy’s 
many dueling manuals.
 This helps in part explain the extraordinary imbalance in the weap-
ons used in duels in Italy as revealed in statistics collected by Gelli 
between 1879 and 1899, which are demonstrated in chart 1. They 
clearly indicate that, of the duels fought during those years (and one 
assumes during the rest of the liberal period), the overwhelming major-
ity, or some 93%, were fought with either swords or sabers, the latter 
alone accounting for almost 90%.
 Such a preponderance of the blade in these encounters reflected 
a mutually reinforcing relationship between the duel and the art of 
fencing. The preference of the sword as Italy’s weapon of honor may 
have begun in the patriotic and military clashes of the Risorgimento, 
but the culture of fencing as it evolved and expanded helped feed the 
tradition and keep its adepts ready to prove themselves. According to 
Fambri, fencing was the “mother of chivalry,” and Blengini, who wrote 
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both a fencing and a dueling manual in the 1860s, claimed, “The fenc-
ing school must serve primarily the legitimate defense of the individual 
and the reparation of honor.”125 On the other hand, dueling was in 
large part the raison d’être of fencing in early united Italy. As previously 
noted, when the ministry of war declared a competition in September 
of 1882 to create a uniform national system of instruction for officers in 
both sword and saber techniques, the entrants were expected to include 
a section on the best way to conduct a duel.126 Even after the turn of 
the century, some analysts derided, while others celebrated, the fact that 
fencing in Italy was still dominated by the psychology and techniques 
of the terreno as opposed to more modern conceptions of exercise and 
sport.127
 125. Fambri quoted in Morelli 1904, 33; Blengini 1864, 16; also see Brunetti 1914, 85.
 126. Parise 1897, 11; Arista 1884, 16, 19–20. 
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Reported duels in Italy arranged by weapon, 1879–99
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 Yet fencing as a sport benefited in Italy from these bloody begin-
nings. As men sought to prepare themselves for “measurement” on 
the field of honor, the attending proliferation and expansion of salles 
des armes had the effect of inculcating the chivalric ethic into future 
generations of upper- and middle-class Italians, thus ensuring an ever- 
expanding clientele for fencing clubs, societies, and academies, where 
exercise, camaraderie, and enjoyment became the order of the day. This 
in turn helped promote the popularity of competitive fencing, both 
professional and amateur, as a spectator sport. By the turn of the cen-
tury, fencing demonstrations and matches had become elegant affairs, 
held in stylish venues and even accompanied by musical entertain-
ment and ballroom dancing. Dueling and fencing thus reinforced 
each other in a variety of ways that would eventually lead to Italy’s 
reemergence as a leader in modern fencing techniques and texts. Suf-
fice it to say, perhaps, that during the Restoration, Italy produced only 
three fencing treatises of note, whereas 12 appeared between 1860 and 
the First World War. Nor were these treatises known only in Italy. 
Luigi Barbasetti’s 1898 book on saber fencing was published in Ger-
man before appearing in Italian.0 Barbasetti himself was invited to 
Vienna to oversee the Austrian military’s fencing program, just as Italo 
Santelli went to Budapest and Giuseppe Magrini went to London to 
teach the latest techniques in saber, which was regarded as Italy’s spe-
cial weapon. Overall, by the turn of the century, Italians could take 
patriotic pride that their country had come to rival France as an inter-
national fencing powerhouse, both in the demand for its masters and in 
the achievements of its champions. Fencing, nationalism, and dueling 
became bound up in a self-reinforcing nexus of honor that consistently 
primed ritual combat with blood drawn by blades.
 As mentioned, the military played a key role in this equation by 
officially promoting the growth of the fencing establishment in Italy. 
Immediately after unification, officers were expected to obtain fenc-
ing instruction as best they could from local academies and experts. 
However, that expectation changed dramatically with the unfortunate 
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war of 1866 against Austria. Following the humiliating defeats of Cus-
toza and Lissa, Italy embarked on a massive restructuring of its army, and 
one of the earliest reforms was to provide each regiment with its own 
fencing equipment and master of arms. The purpose of this measure, 
introduced in 1868 by the new minister of war, Bertolé-Viale, seems 
to have been to engender confidence, honor, and “fiber” among Italy’s 
officers, whose lack of “character” had been cited by those seeking 
explanations for the military’s poor performance. Likewise, officer 
morale was dangerously low as a wave of “self-castigation” swept the 
country, and reinforcing the “most virile exercise” of fencing could be 
seen as means of boosting the various regiments’ self-esteem. The 
plan apparently originated with the aforementioned General Angelini, 
fencing expert and duelist par excellence, who published a set of reforms 
in 1867 designed in large part to increase the sense of honor within 
the army and “inculcate in the officer those chivalric ideas that char-
acterize the officer corps of the best armies of Europe.” The army’s 
new commitment to fencing skills entailed a substantial investment 
in resources, and it also created an obvious need for trained instruc-
tors. Official schools for fencing masters were founded in Modena and 
Parma, but these schools were eventually absorbed by a new, larger 
school in Milan.
 It was a bitter debate over the techniques being taught in this new 
establishment that forced the defense ministry in 1882 to set up a 
nationwide competition to select an official fencing style. Ten treatises 
were submitted, and the prize went to a program that embraced the 
“classical” Neapolitan style, in part because of its verisimilitude to actual 
dueling combat, a factor specifically mentioned by Paolo Fambri who 
reported the results. The winner, Masiniello Parise, was an accom-
plished fencing master from Naples, whose family had suffered under 
the Bourbons for their patriotic politics, and he was given command of a 
new national academy of fencing masters in Rome. The existing school 
in Milan had to close its doors, and teachers throughout the army had 
40 days to adopt the new official style. The resulting controversy would 
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drag on throughout the rest of the century, but the key point is that 
following the defeat of 1866, the government had intervened and made 
fencing a national concern. Texts, techniques, and teachers were openly 
discussed and publicly funded, while the official academies, eventually 
concentrated in one Scuola Magistrale in the capital, continually cranked 
out instructors who would often end up selling their skills on the open 
market.
 Meanwhile, that market was growing as upper- and middle-class 
men sought to prepare themselves for the eventual possibility of having 
to defend their honor. In such a case one had to be ready to fight with 
only a few days’ notice, and it made sense that prior training offered the 
best guarantee of surviving such an encounter with minimal damage. 
This pressure was reinforced by etiquette books for men, which, along 
with details on proper dining and theater attendance, advised would-be 
gentlemen of their obligation to defend their honor, with the under-
standing that they would be able to do so when the time came.0 Not 
that everyone who fought a duel already knew what he was doing. 
Despite all the advice and prohibitions of the dueling “authorities” 
against postponing a duel in order to seek instruction, people did just 
that, and one fencing master from the 1930s related how desperate men 
would show up on his doorstep and beg to be prepared in a certain 
number of days. Correspondingly, one fencing expert complained 
that the reason Italy saw mostly saber duels after unity was that the saber 
was an easier weapon to manage in a short period of time compared 
to the rapier. But whether driven by short-term panic or long-term 
planning, such training took time and money, which naturally acted to 
maintain the exclusivity of those who could claim the rights of honor 
(this as opposed to the pistol which was seen as easy, egalitarian, and 
pedestrian). Besides engaging a private fencing master or attending his 
studio, a man could also join one of the fencing societies that arose in 
various cities and that combined expert instruction with conspicuous 
sociability. By 1889, Florence had two such societies, which exacted 
entrance fees of 10 lire and monthly dues of between 4 and 8 lire, sums 
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that made them accessible but still exclusive. Whichever path one 
chose, however, it all fed into the expansion of the fencing establish-
ment which increasingly combined sports, business, and dueling.
 There is, unfortunately, no systematic study of the spread of fencing 
schools across united Italy, but it is obvious from anecdotal evidence 
that they became increasingly popular through the century, and some 
rose from the most humble roots to national stature rather quickly. 
It is equally obvious that they actively promoted the cult of dueling, 
with fencing masters acting as something akin to high priests. Often 
assiduous in defense of their own honor, some were notoriously pugna-
cious, such as Agesilao Greco who once fought a duel with a man in 
Naples for throwing snail shells at two girls in a café. Characteristically, 
Agesilao’s last encounter occurred in 1927 when he was almost 60. 
Eugenio Pini, one of the best fencers of the liberal period, was also a 
famous bretailleur who specialized in fighting well-publicized duels with 
other experts over the merits of their techniques. Equally notorious 
was the aptly named Athos di San Malato whose exploits brought him 
fame as a modern-day musketeer. Having designed his own sword and 
developed a revolutionary style of fencing, he fought duels in France, 
Spain, Argentina, and Italy as an advertisement of his skill, bravery, and 
technical innovations. Such controversy helped inject energy into the 
world of competitive fencing and prompted one master to complain, 
“One struggles hard to persuade people that fencing is pure art and has 
nothing to do with the duel, and then here spring forth masters, who I 
would say almost unconsciously preach fencing of the terreno.”
 Besides leading by example, Italy’s masters saw themselves as uniquely 
qualified to set the rules and regulations of honorable combat for the 
new country. This assumption was most blatantly illustrated by the fact 
that of the 22 dueling codes published in Italy between 1860 and 1914, 
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no fewer than 13 were written by fencing masters.0 Of these chivalric 
“experts,” six also authored fencing books, including Masaniello Parise, 
who had won the military’s competition of 1882 and whose winning 
treatise has been called the “bible” of Italian fencers. Parise’s home 
institution, the National Fencing Academy in Naples, would eventually 
formalize this special relationship between fencing and chivalry by cre-
ating a Permanent Court of Honor for its members, and the Venetian 
Fencing Club would do the same under Paolo Fambri’s direction in 
1888. Giovanni Gandolfi, a fencing master from Turin, went so far as 
to suggest that the fencing schools of each major city should organize 
themselves into regional centers of chivalry which could provide juries 
of honor to potential duelists while organizing exhibition matches on 
the side. In Rome, the participants of the Grand National Fencing 
Tournament of 1889 nominated a commission to set up a National 
Congress of Chivalry which would create a pan-Italian dueling code. 
Although the commission failed to meet a second time, a similar 
tournament three years later helped sanction Iacopo Gelli’s recently 
published Codice cavalleresco Italiano by awarding him a gold medal of 
recognition. As late as 1913, the Italian Fencing Association—well-
known for its emphasis on fencing as sport rather than combat—felt 
compelled to offer yet another gold medal to Athos di San Malato for 
his Partita d’onore, a particularly bellicose code of honor that argued for 
the legalization of the duel in Italy. On a more practical note, one 
can assume that the many details regarding who should be able to duel 
and over what issues that filled the fencing masters’ various dueling 
manuals also permeated the lessons and attitudes that they provided 
their students on a daily basis. This was certainly the opinion of some 
Italian jurists who blamed the popularity of the fencing schools for 
promoting the practice.
 The fencing community, like the chivalric community, was pan- 
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Italian in nature, and it was likewise charged with nationalistic themes. 
Indeed the regeneration of Italian fencing came to be seen in and of 
itself as a political act.0 On one hand, this view was tied to military 
preparedness. One fencing hall in Padova in 1872 was opened with 
the proclamation, “‘We Italians must not forget that we were the best 
swordsmen in the world; but if we should do it again it will not be to 
succeed as captains of adventure, as in the Middle Ages, or to go as mas-
ters of arms to the courts of Europe, but we will have prepared so many 
individual forces that we will feel them multiplied by the hundreds on 
that day that the patria needs them.’” On the other hand, prowess 
in swordplay could be an advertisement of Italy’s new virile place in 
the world. Accordingly, Cesare Enrichetti, future head of one of the 
military’s fencing schools and coauthor of united Italy’s first dueling 
code (1863), lamented in the introduction of an 1871 fencing manual 
that Italian fencing was still in sad shape because the country’s youth 
had been consciously prohibited from the martial arts by the tyrants 
of the preunitary regimes. They had instead been forced against their 
will to engage in silly games and “vile effeminacies.” With the country 
having shrugged off the yoke of oppression, the new regime had con-
sciously chosen to return fencing to its rightful place of honor, and his 
fervent hope was that his fencing manual would help move Italy back 
to its previous glory as maestro di armi to the world. That this expertise 
included dueling as well was made obvious when Enrichetti began the 
next paragraph by emphasizing the advantage of studying fencing as 
a means of bringing courage and sang-froid to the field of honor. 
 By the turn of the century, Enrichetti’s nationalist fencing aspira-
tions were well on the road to being realized. The Italian saber and its 
attending techniques were growing in popularity throughout Europe 
and South America, with Italian teachers correspondingly in demand. 
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Italians were winning international competitions in all three weapons 
(saber, rapier, and foil), including two gold and two silver medals at the 
1900 Olympic Games, and Italian masters were holding their own in 
a series of exhibition grudge matches with the French. Occasionally, 
however, such friendly rivalry turned nasty, prompting duels designed 
to defend both national and individual pride. In 1902, four fencing 
masters—two Italian and two French—defended their respective schools 
in a double duel in Nice, which was proclaimed in the Italian parliament 
as a new “sfida di Barletta.” Attended by reporters and photographers, 
these bouts offered a titillating combination of patriotism and blood-
sport, which guaranteed circulation for the periodicals, fame for the 
contestants, and patriotic legitimacy for the chivalric ethic. Unafraid 
and sensible to insult, Italians thus fought with swords to maintain their 
respect in the world of sport and the world of honorable men.
Virility, Honor, and Nationalism
In 1863 Enrichetti and another of Italy’s most famous fencing masters, 
A. Marchionni, published the new country’s first dueling code in Flor-
ence. While their book, Norme sui duelli, did not fare very well com-
pared to rival codes over the coming years, it did contain a passionate 
conclusion that tied together many of the themes already current in 
this study.
In a time in which bellicose tendencies are dominating and in which 
every citizen of Italy is, or is becoming, a soldier, we thought it more 
than necessary to fill a void and bring to light some theories that prove 
how noble is the art of fencing, and what means must be adopted 
in order to impede or diminish the shedding of blood, and do so in 
such a way that every duel can proceed with all fairness and all justice  
possible.
 We are no longer a weak and inert people. Recently emerging 
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from gigantic battles we are preparing ourselves for the next fight and 
the final redemption. In our august and adored King we have the first 
soldier of Italy. It is necessary then to be ready for everything, to know 
the laws that form the basis of affairs of honor, to have force to oppose 
force, rights to oppose rights, and not appear inferior in anything to the 
foreigner.
The king, the sword, and the wars of liberation all figure prominently in 
this proclamation of national honor, but equally obvious is the idea that 
dueling as a practice symbolized for these two swordsmen the overcom-
ing of past weakness on the part of Italy’s people. Paolo Fambri, in his 
lengthy defense of the duel in 1869, struck a similar note, saying that 
Italians had to duel so that foreigners could not return home to report 
that Italians had no fiber and “that in our salons, in our theaters and 
clubs the best of gentlemen meet each other, insult each other and then 
leave as if nothing had happened.” For Fambri, knowing the laws of 
chivalry and applying them bravely, forthrightly, and reasonably would 
somehow raise the country into equality with the rest of Europe.
 In the same manner, dueling also continued, albeit in an individual 
way, the drama and heroism of the Risorgimento itself. As Italian poli-
ticians settled into the often banal business of running a large country, 
the duel offered an exciting though temporary return to the dash and 
élan of the revolutionary period. It also allowed those same politicians 
to virilely combat the evolving image of parliament as a den of inef-
ficient, venal poltroons who cared only for their own special inter-
ests. Chivalric bravado was particularly important for members of the 
left, whose romantic republicanism had had to give way to moderate 
compromise with the monarchy and who now had to make the dif-
ficult shift, to paraphrase Carducci, from the poetry of revolution to the 
prose of administration. The party of Garibaldi and Mazzini had been 
the “party of action,” and somehow that energy had to be channeled 
into the framework of parliamentary palaver and reasoned, some might 
say picayune, negotiation. Such a transformation was aided by infusing 
public discourse with a passion of conviction and a potential of conflict 
that occasionally forced politicians and journalists to take armed action 
once again in defense of their ideals. The duel thus attracted opposite 
poles of the political spectrum by offering chivalry and tradition to 
monarchical purists and dangerous deeds to radical democrats.
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 One might further argue that as Italy remained a small fish in the big 
pond of European diplomacy, and as its military failed to function effi-
ciently, much less gloriously, the duel offered an individual antidote to 
possible accusations of a lack of martial spirit or courage at the national 
level. In fact, the 1860s had failed in many ways to meet the tumescent 
expectations of Italian patriots. Double defeat—on land at Custoza and 
on sea at Lissa—had marked the war against Austria in 1866, and failure 
to support Garibaldi against the French at Mentana in 1867 had led 
the radical Achille Bizzoni to accuse the government of “dragging the 
nation’s honor in the mud.” The same spirit affected the poet Giosue 
Carducci, who (after the lackluster taking of Rome in September 1870) 
closed a funerary ode to the patriot Giovanni Cairoli with the lines, 
“Sad news I bring you: our fatherland is cowardly.”0 Even a stalwart 
military man like General Eugenio de Rossi, whose allegiance to the 
monarchy was unimpeachable, complained in his memoirs that Ital-
ians were generally held to be “pusillanimous” by the other nations of 
Europe. The duel naturally thrived in such an atmosphere, because 
against these accusations of collective cowardice the Italians could offer 
the almost daily spectacle of men risking their lives in defense of their 
personal honor.
 Unfortunately, Italian adventures abroad made these issues all the 
more sensitive. Italy came away from the Treaty of Berlin in 1875 with 
“clean but empty hands” and then saw France carry away the prize of 
Tunisia, an area of assumed Italian influence, in 1882. Nor did it help 
matters when Bismarck quipped that “Italy had a big appetite but small 
teeth” during a trip to Vienna. Worse, it seemed to be true as Italy blun-
dered into colonial expansion without proper preparation or capable 
leadership. A bloody and embarrassing loss to native forces in Africa 
at Dogali in 1887 brought no end of recrimination tinged with inferi-
ority compared to other European exploits. The nationalist “prophet” 
Alfredo Oriani attempted to assuage the humiliation of Dogali by 
claiming that the 500 soldiers killed had sacrificed themselves as heroes 
to redeem Italy’s long history of military defeats reaching back to the 
revolutions of 1821, 1831, 1848, and the war against Austria in 1866. 
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Yet Dogali weighed on the national conscience, and, combined with 
an even worse defeat at Adua in 1896, exacerbated a sense that Italy 
faced a crisis of virility as it entered into the Darwinian “struggle for 
life,” a phrase that became increasingly common through the rest of the 
century and beyond.
 How this inferiority played out in chivalric terms was already read-
ily apparent during debate over the revision of the criminal code in 
1875. Digging into the details of the dueling law, Senator Angioletti 
argued that legislators should be careful in penalizing the provocatore 
more than the provocato, because sometimes public opinion demanded 
that a person act provocatively. Suppose, he said, that an Italian finds 
himself among foreigners who insult the patria, the government, or 
the king. Is he not duty bound to react, and if the person continues his 
insults, does he not have the duty to challenge him to a duel? And if he 
kills him, then, according to the law under consideration, he might get 
three to four years in jail—and did this not seem too much for a man 
who was defending his country’s honor? Similar questions applied to 
discussion of whether Italians should be prosecuted for fighting duels 
outside their own country. Such a provision, it was suggested, would 
hamper Italians abroad where they might need to defend their honor—
or more specifically the honor of the patria. “A thousand circumstances 
can occur,” claimed another senator, “a thousand occasions, of which 
it is perhaps more prudent to remain silent, in which an Italian must 
either issue a challenge or resort to vie di fatto in order to reclaim our 
dignity. At least in the face of foreigners let us show ourselves to be 
chivalrous.” In other words, Italians expected to encounter disdainful 
barbs from contemptuous foreigners when they traveled, and they had 
to feel free to react without hesitation, even with a slap or a shove, in 
order to force the issue into the ritualized arena of combat. To do less 
would only reinforce the stereotype of national weakness. It does not 
seem superfluous to point out that the dueling sections of the result-
ing criminal code of 1889 in fact contained various hedges concerning 
penalties for “provokers” of duels and made no mention at all of Italian 
duelists abroad.
 Fighting haughty foreigners was obvious in its nationalist overtones, 
but fighting fellow Italians was important as well, for it inculcated and 
projected a virile stance toward life that left no doubt as to the “fiber” of 
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Italy’s elites. Not surprisingly, it was Paolo Fambri who best articulated 
this attitude, and he wrote in 1869 that the country needed the duel 
to combat the image abroad of Italian cowardice and to deal with the 
sad fact that many Italians were indeed poltroonish in their behavior. 
Chivalry forced men to assert themselves, and the elites had to use it 
both to distinguish themselves from the pusillanimous mass of Italians 
and simultaneously to lead them by example to a more evolved and 
braver society. Making Italy was one thing, but making Italians that were 
worthy of the effort was another, and he offered the duel as an anti-
dote to the disappointment attached to the first decade of unification. 
Fambri was well aware that the dueling “plague” had only begun after 
unification, and thus it stood as something particularly Italian; to defend 
it was almost a patriotic act that stood in defiance of the individual and 
national cowardice of the past.
 Fambri’s arguments lost none of their energy as the heroic moments 
of unification faded into the past and as it appeared that Italy was in 
danger of slipping from resurgence into degeneration. In 1888, one 
year after Dogali, Fambri warned the Italian Press Association that the 
spirit of struggle inherent in the duel had served Italy well and had to 
be respected if the momentum were to be maintained:
Fifty years ago the duel did not exist in Italy, or almost not. [ . . . ] It 
was an age in which the highest [aspects] of man, fierceness and dignity, 
had been brought low; pitiable was he who was content with it. Ubi 
solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant. Not even peace, indolence one should 
say. The Greeks had a beautiful and efficacious word to indicate such a 
state of consciousness: anandria, deficiency of virility. At that point the 
country suffered from anandria; and I guarantee that slaughter in any 
measure is better.
Through the martial spirit intrinsic to the duel, Italians constantly 
manifested their will to defend their private honor and, by extension, 
to defend their country’s honor. True, said Fambri, the Italians had 
become touchy about their honor, perhaps even overly sensitive—but 
better this virile and aggressive approach to one’s dignity than a pol-
troonish lack of patriotic energy. Woe, he warned, to those who would 
suggest that it was better to avoid trouble rather than assert one’s man-
hood. “Do you prefer a society with only ordinary and busybodyish 
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(pettegola) sensitivities and without any virile sensibility? In that case I 
tell you that you will not find in the deepest depths of some black tor-
rent the mud comparable to the human mud that would derive from 
such a state of things.” Such images implied almost a biological threat 
and suggested that Italy’s men had to promote and protect the pride of 
their masculinity or else all of society could slip into the androgynous 
mud of sexual confusion.
 Fambri’s fears revealed the continuing and evolving concern with 
virility among the Italians as the high-blown hopes of Italy acting, if 
not as the civilizing “Third Rome” of the Mazzinian or Giobertian 
paradigms, at least as a great power, faded in comparison with other 
European states. There is certainly no mistaking the fixation of the emi-
nent economist Leone Carpi on the issue when in 1878 he praised the 
Piedmontese aristocracy and ruling house for being “among the most 
virile of Europe,” but then harshly condemned the rest of Italy’s elites 
for failing to bring the country the economic progress that it deserved 
and needed. His analysis of this stagnation however, focused much 
more on character and moral fiber than production or trade data. He 
criticized the non-Piedmontese aristocrats whom he saw as corrupted 
by the church, manipulated by their women, and dedicated to leisure. 
The bourgeoisie, instead of acting like an entrepreneurial middle class, 
dedicated itself to seeking sinecures and milking the expanding bureau-
cracy, with no stomach for the risks and energy needed to create a truly 
productive economy. Like Fambri, he worried that Italy’s elites were 
sinking into poltrooneria and small-minded self-interest. The antidote 
he offered was to inculcate in the youth a sentiment of individual and 
national dignity—“the sentiment of that Italian I, civis Romanus sum, 
the only thing capable of transforming a conglomeration of men into 
a virile people.” Like a tocsin he hammered this adjective through his 
book: virile works, virile proposals, virile education, virile economics. 
He called on the aristocrats to break their enervating ties to the clergy 
and redeem themselves with exercises, especially those with weapons, 
which “ennoble the soul and reinvigorate the body.” He further stressed 
that they should embrace military service and thus restore nobility to its 
real roots—the sword. For the bourgeoisie, he also recommended gym-
nastics, swimming, fencing, and target practice, for they were intrinsic 
to the physical and spiritual health of the nation, in large part because 
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they inspired “that point-of-honor and that respect for personal dig-
nity” which the Italians so sorely needed.0
 Like Fambri, Carpi had a historical perspective, and he recalled with 
sadness the “bitter and famous apostrophe” of Italy serving as a whore-
house for its Spanish conquerors: “Ah Italy servant of a sad hostel / Not 
a woman of the provinces but of the bordello.” He further invoked the 
image of the old eighteenth-century aristocracy which had failed to 
properly defend female honor and allowed the institution of cicisbeismo 
to weaken the rule of husbands and the sanctity of the family. Only 
Piedmont had maintained its military dignity, and, tellingly, only Pied-
montese men had maintained their personal honor with the openness 
of the sword rather than with indifference or perfidious treachery:
And I have mightily grieved of it [cicisbeismo], though the strength of 
soul that is inseparable from military habits and education is a powerful 
antidote against this evil custom erected as a system and repugnant to 
every sentiment of honor. Nor could I more objectively and concisely 
state my thought than Baretti when he said “The piedmontese decide 
their questions with the sword and not the dagger.” And the sword and 
the dagger have their counterparts under a thousand other forms in order to 
characterize the magnanimity or the baseness of purposes in the social 
life of peoples [Carpi’s emphasis].
The combination of images here is forceful in delimiting Carpi’s fears 
and hopes for Italy. Individual honor is taken as an analogue of national 
honor throughout his discourse, and the sword, be it of the army or of 
the duelist, offered the antidote to sexual corruption, cowardly revenge, 
and a “thousand other” problems.
 Unfortunately, he asserted, those failures of preunitary society con-
tinued to plague the new country: “one cannot pretend,” he lamented, 
“that the Italian people have a character, a masculine type through which 
it renders itself distinguished and respected among other peoples.” The 
Italians had banded together during the Risorgimento to create the 
“masculine act” of unity, but many had fallen back into their previ-
ous indolence and did not sufficiently respect themselves and hence 
were not respected by others. While other countries virilely collected 
colonies in Africa and elsewhere, the Italians let their productive people 
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be siphoned off by emigration, a critical failure on the competitive 
world stage. Such a weak showing would not do. Italy’s elites had to 
regenerate themselves, harden themselves to “male deeds,” and embrace 
Montalembert’s adage that the only life worth living is the virile life, 
full of danger and perpetual effort.
 Carpi’s concerns and assumptions were hardly the isolated musings 
of a hypercritical economist; rather, they harmonized with a growing 
chorus of gendered criticism that portrayed united Italy as effeminate 
and weak and that arose from some of the most energetic and influential 
writers of the time. The intellectual godfather of this “cultural despair” 
was the poet Giosuè Carducci, whose popularity was undisputed, and 
perhaps unmatched, in the post-Risorgimento era. His disillusion with 
the “prosaic” and materialistic Italy that seemed so at odds with the 
heroic vision and actions of Mazzini and Garibaldi, to say nothing 
of the past glories of Rome, found increasingly shrill interpreters in 
Angelo Sommaruga, Edoardo Scarfoglio, Pietro Sbarbaro, Alfredo Ori-
ani, and Gabrielle d’Annunzio, all of whom combined trenchant and 
sometimes outlandish diatribes against Italy’s leading politicians with 
the marketing strategies of modern journalism. An engendered imag-
ery of lost virility continued to punctuate this discourse, and Carducci 
would talk about the “emasculation” of Italy since the sixteenth century 
and the need to reinvigorate the “old Italian people” made up of “friars, 
brigands, ciceroni and cicisbei.” Sbarbaro would attack the parliament 
as being the seat of “uterine” government, and Scarfoglio would later 
refer to colonial disaster in Africa as a venereal disease infecting the 
body politic.
 Anxieties over Italy’s strength and masculinity were mirrored in 
the growth of the physical fitness movement in united Italy. Focus-
ing primarily on the teaching of gymnastic exercises inspired by Ger-
man examples, the movement began under the influence of a Swiss 
instructor, Rudolfo Obermann, who was brought to Turin in the 1830s 
to train members of the Piedmontese artillery corps. Immediately fol-
lowing unity, the new government embarked on a plan to introduce 
Obermann’s gymnastics to some schools in Italy, and Turin became the 
epicenter for the training and certification of instructors throughout 
the country. The obvious relationship between the growing success of 
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the gymnastics movement and that of the patriotic push for unification 
and independence—both of which emanated from Piedmont—was 
not lost on later commentators, and the minister of education, Emilio 
Broglio, wrote to the prefect of Turin in 1869, “From his free country 
Obermann brought to Italy the art which is only for free men; and 
familiarizing the Italians with virile exercises of the body he preceded 
and almost divined the times of our redemption, conquered through the 
virtues of intelligence and through the force of souls and arms (mem-
bra).” Liberty and virility thus walked hand in hand, and Broglio’s 
comment echoed what would become a growing emphasis in united 
Italy to effect a “virile education” as indispensable to the creation of a 
dynamic and respected country.
 But what did they mean by “virility,” and how was it to be taught? 
On one hand, it clearly implied inherent sexual prowess and an active 
regenerative capacity. On the other hand, it more specifically focused on 
the physical aspects of what George Mosse has identified as the West-
ern stereotype of male beauty (lithe, powerful, and proportioned bod-
ies radiating restraint and self-control) which developed from classical 
models in the last half of the eighteenth century. “Virile education” 
was, however, also very much about character, which became cotermi-
nous with the physical attributes of the ideal male as was made clear by 
Italy’s minister of education, Francesco de Sanctis, in an address deliv-
ered at the University of Naples in 1872: “Remake the blood, reconsti-
tute the fiber, increase anew the living force, is the motto not only of 
medicine but also of pedagogy, not only of history, but of art, raise again 
the vital forces, retemper [men’s] characters and with the sentiment of 
force regenerate moral courage, sincerity, initiative, discipline, the virile 
man and therefore the free man.” Strength, endurance, virtue, and 
courage all emanated from the disciplined conditioning of mind and 
body together.
 Yet these traits only fed into the larger organizing principle of a 
“virile education” which was preparation for successful combat. Truly 
virile men were dangerous men, men anxious to fight well when the 
time came. Fencing, javelin practice, target shooting, riding: these were 
considered the most virile exercises, but they had to be undergirded by 
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the general fitness and fiber (a favorite word of the period) of Italy’s 
youth. Consequently, the whole slant of Italy’s physical fitness programs, 
no matter how fierce the debates may have been over specific tech-
niques or organizational details, was informed by a desire to produce 
an effective military machine for the state.0 In this search to inculcate 
Italy’s young men with a spirito militare aimed specifically at “warrior 
regeneration,” it is hardly surprising that the army, the government, and 
society in general were overwhelmingly indulgent toward the aggres-
sive agenda of the dueling code which manifested the elites’ own viril-
ity. Italy might long for a virile education for its youth, but surely part 
of that education was already happening in the almost daily clash of 
swords of men unafraid to risk lives and laws to protect their honor.
 Other remedies for Italian “decadence” also overlapped with the 
dueling ethos, particularly in the continuing images of sacrificial blood, 
which had become common patriotic currency during the Risorgi-
mento period. Thus the populist deputy Rocco de Zerbi demanded 
in 1882 that a “bath of blood” was necessary to invigorate the Ital-
ians, and Francesco Crispi was applauded in parliament for exhorting a 
“baptism of blood” prior to the war of 1866. The radical democrat 
Felice Cavallotti, who would die fighting his thirty-third duel in 1898, 
would later echo Crispi, calling for a “bloody baptism” to wash away 
the sins of Italy’s poor military record and the insult of Dogali. Such 
invective paralleled the belief that much of Italy’s unification—in 1859, 
1866, and 1870—had been achieved too easily or with the help of for-
eigners and that not enough Italian blood had been shed to truly bind 
the nation into a patriotic community. Combining social Darwinism 
and fanciful aesthetics, the radical nationalist Oriani exalted war and 
blood as Italy’s only answer to weakness: “War is an inevitable form 
of struggle for existence, and blood will always be the best warm rain 
for great ideas.” Redeeming blood, mortal dangers, and unflinching 
strength in the face of insult: these were also the tropes of the dueling 
field, and not only would they promote the chivalric ethic of honor, 
but, as we shall see later, they would also make it difficult for Italian 
legislators to pass or enforce laws against the practice.
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A Perfect Patriotic Affair
The apotheosis of the virile duel which would conflate many of the 
metaphors of national and individual honor came in August 1897 when 
the Piedmontese Count of Turin fought the French Prince of Orleans 
in reaction to Italy’s stunning defeat the previous year by the Ethiopians 
at Adua. Underfunded and overencouraged by the government, Gen-
eral Baratieri blundered into an untenable position against Ethiopian 
emperor Menelik’s vastly superior forces. Some 4,000 Italian troops 
were killed and another 1,500 taken prisoner on March 1, 1896, in one 
of the greatest losses of a European army to native forces on record. 
Coming less than 10 years after the humiliation of Dogali, the shock 
of Adua to the self-esteem of Italy’s elites, and particularly of its literate 
young men, would be difficult to overstate. Nino Valeri in his memoirs, 
wrote: “It is almost incalculable the influence that event had on the 
mental formation of our generation.” Enrico Corradini attributed his 
conversion to radical nationalism to the African defeat and would later 
use it as a literary platform upon which to chastise the liberal govern-
ment and exhort imperialist adventures. Giovanni Papini remem-
bered Florence after Adua as being in mourning and described how “I 
a precocious Italian adolescent felt in me almost the responsibility and 
the remorse of that shameful defeat of my fatherland. What could I do 
to expiate it? What could I do to restore honor to my nation?”
 Many other Italians were asking themselves the same question, and 
it did not help that some in the European press chastised their coun-
try for cowardice and incompetence on the world stage. One such 
attack came from Prince Henri d’Orleans, scion of an ex-royal house of 
France and foreign correspondent to the Parisian daily Le Figaro, who, 
in a series of articles dispatched from Ethiopia, portrayed Italy’s soldiers 
as lacking the spirit and grit necessary to deal with the Africans. The 
prominence of the newspaper, the status of the reporter, and the repeti-
tion of the charges all demanded action. Various challenges were issued 
to the prince, but the one that took precedence came from the Count 
of Turin, a young but prominent member of the House of Savoy and 
an officer in the Italian cavalry. Having alerted King Umberto I of his 
intentions and having taken the resulting royal silence as approval, the 
count and his seconds proceeded to Paris on August 12, 1897. After 
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intense negotiations over weapons and conditions, the duel occurred 
early on the morning of the 15th in the Bois des Maréchaux just out-
side the city. Fought with rapiers rather than sabers, the combat contin-
ued for 26 minutes (with both sides drawing minor blood) when the 
count lunged to deal a deep thrust to the prince’s abdomen. Following 
examination by the doctors, he was declared to be in a clear state of 
inferiority, and the duel was halted. In the end, the prince was able to 
stand and offer his hand to the count, who accepted the ritual act of 
reconciliation.
 As with the famous Lamartine-Pepe duel of 1826, Italian honor 
had been redeemed with blood in the face of a French insult, and once 
again the official account of the affair offers an important window into 
the manipulative mechanisms of the dueling ethic. The Italian report 
of the encounter, which was written by the count’s seconds, was a 
masterpiece of chivalric one-upmanship. The French were portrayed as 
having hesitated throughout the negotiations, and only the constant and 
forthright pressure of the Italians had brought them to task. Meanwhile, 
the Italians proved themselves consummate gentlemen. They knew the 
rules of the game better than their opponents and referred to both 
French and Italian dueling manuals to bring their points home. They 
proved more generous, and, having established the count’s rights as the 
offended party, they gave way on the choice of arms, allowing the duel 
to proceed with the épée rather than the saber, which they considered 
Italy’s national weapon. Finally, it was made absolutely clear that after 
the duel it was the Frenchman who had sought reconciliation, for the 
inverse would have impugned the seriousness of the original offense. 
Throughout, the report shows the legalistic and punctilious care taken 
in each phase and in each phrase of the negotiations. The men involved 
felt that they were writing for posterity, and they knew that Italian dig-
nity was at stake in a variety of ways.
 And they were right. Italy’s newspapers rejoiced in the count’s 
“triumph” which not only rebuffed the insults of the French but also 
helped take some of the sting out of Adua as well. Extrapolating from 
the individual to the national, it was manifest that Italians would defend 
their honor, had the knowledge and courage to do so, and, when it 
came down to it, gave the French a lesson with their own weapon. 
According to one report Italy erupted in joy at the news. “National 
sentiment vibrated with one throb. [ . . . ] And the people applauded 
 197. Vertenza fra S.A.R. 1969. 
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with an ardor so profound, so universal, so conscious, as is rarely seen 
in our country [ . . . ].” An exhaustive account appeared in various 
papers, and the Illustrazione italiana offered up a double-page drawing 
of the prince as he was stabbed in the bowels (image 2).
 Naturally, this event and its attendant publicity spoke quite well of 
the duel as well as the nation, and advocates thereafter could point to 
the count’s encounter as an example of how certain situations simply 
could not be dealt with in any other way. Opponents of the duel, on 
the other hand, had to work overtime to combat such a popular adver-
tisement for the practice. Some socialists, for instance, emphasized the 
purely aristocratic nature of the encounter, portraying it as an affair of 
the House of Savoy rather than of the people, brought on by an arro-
gant and ill-favored foreign policy. Others, such as Gianni Casati at an 
antidueling conference in 1911, readily accepted the appropriateness, 
and the popularity, of the event: “It is a duel that we Italians can be 
proud of, and that moves not only those who love the fatherland, but 
the whole civil world. . . .” He then turned to the purpose at hand by 
 198. “Per il duello,” March 13, 1898, no author cited, BNCR Duello C.7.I bis. 1.
 199. Casati 1914, 19–20.
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Illustrazione italiana, duel of the Count of Turin in 1897
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stating that the exalted nature of the count’s encounter clearly placed 
the everyday duels of Italy in a negative light because, in contrast, they 
arose from “a false and unjust concept of honor.” The less-than-happy 
logic of this approach only served to underline how the “Prince’s duel” 
had galvanized popular opinion and reaffirmed the matrix of connec-
tions between chivalry and nationalism.
 Those connections reflected the frustrations of men who had hoped 
to overcome images of weakness, effeminacy, and cowardice dating 
back to the eighteenth century. Frequent dueling and superior fenc-
ing cast an honorable gauntlet in the face of those unfortunate tradi-
tions, just as they provided an edifying prod to those “poltroons” who 
seemed to perpetuate them. Meanwhile, the “miracle” of unification 
had appeared to offer a virile national response to past failings, and 
hopes had run high that Italy would take its place among the great 
nations of the world. Consequently, in the 1870s, a rational economist 
like Leone Carpi could call for “masculine” actions overseas to make 
way for Italian colonists; but the plan had backfired, and first Dogali 
and then Adua had called into question the country’s prowess. Insulted 
by the accusation of being less than European—for even tiny Belgium 
knew how to handle the Africans—the Italians had needed honorable 
blood, extracted with a sword, according to the rules, by a gallant sol-
dier, and from a worthy opponent, to help wash the stain away. 

n 1864 The antidueling author Jacopo Nicoletti expressed his shock 
over the growth of the duel since unification: “But in these recent 
times the mania of the duel is resurgent, and the abuse spreads like a 
flood. Even today we are constrained to recognize that we have this 
iniquitous means to define questions of offended honor as a principle 
of social affirmation. . . . Thus the student, the literato, the officer, the 
nobles, the deputies, and the representatives of the nation and the gov-
ernment, the ministers, all fight in turn and thus give proof of them-
selves.”1 Nicoletti’s list of participants and his definition of the duel as a 
guarantor of social relations take us beyond the patriotic impulses of 
honor examined in the previous chapter to see how dueling was crucial 
in identifying and affirming the new ruling class of Italy. The duel thus 
owed much of its vivacity and continuity to the fact that it provided a 
variety of political and social functions inherent to the arrival of a lib-
eral, constitutional regime on the peninsula. Free speech, parliamentary 
debate, and relatively relaxed press laws created new forms of inter-
change with which Italians had had little social or legal experience. In 
this new public sphere, the code of chivalry offered a means of adjudi-
cating disputes that might result from the often acrimonious exchanges 
between journalists and politicians. It further reinforced in a reciprocal 
fashion the highly personal nature of politics in liberal Italy, where 
 1. Nicoletti 1864, 26.
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individual power brokers rather than organized parties came to domi-
nate the scene. Within Italy’s evolving social structure, the duel acted as 
a touchstone of “gentlemanly” status, not only standing as the final 
arbiter of honor but also proving that a man had the “right stuff ” in 
terms of education, sensibility, and courage. Looking at the available 
statistics and other sources regarding who dueled and why, one can 
appreciate how the practice aided in the creation, legitimization, and 
empowerment of a new elite that self-consciously set itself apart from 
the rest of society by using exclusive chivalric concepts of honor and its 
defense. If dueling had been useful in creating the new Italy, it was 
equally important in creating the new Italians, or at least those who 
counted in society.
Quantifying the “Plague”
Any systematic study of dueling in Italy must begin with the work of 
Iacopo Gelli, a Tuscan journalist who eventually became the country’s 
primary authority on the practice. Gelli began his quantitative analysis 
of the duel at the request of Luigi Bodio, head of Italy’s official statistics 
bureau. Because challenges and swords had continued to fly through 
the 1870s with no sign of abatement, Bodio felt that the time had come 
to study the problem in a scientific fashion, and he offered the job to 
Gelli, who already had a reputation as an expert on both fencing and 
the lore of chivalry. Gelli collected data of various sorts from 1879 up 
through 1925, and his results provide a substantial numerical portrait of 
Italian dueling through and beyond the life of the liberal regime.
 But how good are Gelli’s statistics? Naturally they are limited by 
the problems inherent in the quantification of illicit activities and, in 
particular, the “dark figure” of unreported crime which always haunts 
the cliometrician. Moreover, dueling provides special difficulties in that 
the perpetrators were often the elites of the land whose power and 
position would tend to discourage the authorities from prosecution. 
In other words, formal police and court records can tell us little of 
what was happening on the ground. Gelli himself was aware of the 
problem of under-reporting, and, as previously noted, he felt that mili-
tary duels were particularly difficult to track down because the offi-
cers involved preferred to keep such matters out of the public eye.2 
 2. Gelli 1901A, 4.
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Likewise, as Robert Nye has suggested for France, duels dealing with 
highly personal family matters or the honor of women were often sur-
rounded in secrecy so as to protect the privacy of the principals. Indeed, 
Nye would suggest that, given such problems, duels in France were 
seriously under-reported, and, although an “expert” such as the French 
criminologist Gabriel Tarde could find only about 60 duels a year in 
the 1880s, the real number probably ranged between 200 and 300.3 As 
with most crime then, one must accept that, even at their very best, 
statistics reflect more the visibility than the reality of dueling.
 But there are reasons to believe that Gelli’s statistics do at least offer 
a consistent portrait of that visibility. First, he approached their collec-
tion with a certain amount of methodological rigor. Either he or one 
of his associates would systematically scan Italy’s major newspapers for 
evidence of duels, and, upon finding such evidence (or hearing from 
rumor or some other source), he would send off a printed questionnaire 
to a contact in the area to be completed and (he hoped) returned. This 
technique was more effective than one might initially think because, in 
general, dueling was a semipublic practice. Defined as a crime, it was 
naturally hidden from the authorities, yet the concept of individual 
honor involved the opinion of others and was consequently dependent 
on the community’s knowledge of one’s willingness to fight—a willing-
ness best validated by the reporting of duels through the “public voice” 
or even in print. The very fact that in order to have a “legal” duel there 
had to be a requisite number of “witnesses” (seconds, physicians, and 
the like) virtually guaranteed some form of public knowledge. Gelli was 
also aware of some of the pitfalls of data collection, and he was careful 
to take note of changing laws and jurisdictions that might create report-
ing errors. Finally, we have an independent check on Gelli’s numbers 
by the forensic psychologist Lino Ferriani. Like Gelli, he attempted to 
put together a compendium of duels based on newspaper accounts and 
private reports. He carried out this study for 10 years, between 1886 
and 1895, but his results indicate that although his data were in the 
same ballpark as Gelli’s, Gelli had a more efficient system of collection. 
Thus Gelli found 1,682 duels during the sample years in contrast to 
the 1,052 discovered by Ferriani.4 All in all, the quality of Gelli’s sta-
tistics was such that Bodio felt it safe to include them in Italy’s official 
Statistica delle cause delle morti published by his office in 1891.
 3. Nye 1993, 185. 
 4.  Ferriani 1897, 434–35.
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 Unfortunately, whatever rigor Gelli may have used to collect his 
statistics, their publication can only be called erratic, a result perhaps 
of his economic need as a journalist to spread his material across a 
variety of articles rather than produce a single, definitive piece. Also, 
he published his findings more or less as they changed from year to 
year, often appending them to other publications about dueling. Con-
sequently, one must deal with different sets of data, which, although 
usually consistent among themselves, do not always cover all variables 
for the entire period. Moreover, Gelli was not above making simple 
mistakes in calculation, and occasionally his published figures simply 
do not add up they way they should. In sum, Gelli’s statistics are hardly 
perfect—nor given the “dark figure” could they be—but they do open 
a number of quantitative windows that allow us to look at the causes, 
participants, and outcomes of most reported duels, and thus they pro-
vide important insights into why dueling found such a comfortable 
niche in the political and social ethos of liberal Italy.
 In his best run of material, Gelli analyzed 3,513 duels which 
occurred between 1879 and 1895.5 As revealed in table 2, the majority 
of these duels took place in the 1880s, and on average there were 269 
reported duels a year.6 Although this figure falls somewhat short of the 
“duel a day” claims of observers in the 1860s and 1870s, it still seems 
very high. If for fun one were to apply Robert Nye’s aforementioned 
formula from France, it would suggest that Italy actually saw about 900 
duels a year, which really would have constituted an epidemic. What-
ever the case, aside from the generally high number of reported duels, 
Gelli’s statistics also demonstrate a noticeable drop after 1890 which was 
apparently linked to the adoption of the new Zanardelli Penal Code 
of 1889. The code, which levied harsher penalties against duelists and 
their seconds, took effect in 1890 and is carefully discussed in chap-
ter VI. Nevertheless, even with the decline of the 1890s, it is easy to 
see why people considered dueling a very real problem, especially if 
one considers that for every duel fought a large number were avoided 
through various forms of mediation. It would have been difficult for 
a “gentleman” to ignore the possibility that he too might someday be 
caught up in one of these chivalric disputes or vertenze and called on to 
defend his honor.
 5. Gelli n.d., Statistiche. Also on his statistics see Hughes 1998, 80n12.
 6. Appendix A from Gelli n.d., 9.
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Table 2
Reported duels in Italy, 1879–95
Year Number Year Number
1879 203a 1888 269
1880 282 1889 132b
1881 271 1890 177
1882 268 1891 138
1883 259 1892 122
1884 287 1893 146
1885 261 1894 98
1886 249 1895 73a
1887 278
 aRepresents only six months.
 bRepresents only five months.
Journalism and Politics
But why so many vertenze and hence so many duels? We have already 
noted the primacy of the military in answering that question, but Gelli’s 
statistics suggest as well that the advent of liberal politics and a free press 
had a lot to do with it. Breaking down his reported duels by “motive,” 
as seen in table 3, he found that journalistic polemics constituted by far 
the largest catalyst of duels, and politics followed in third place, with 
unspecified oral arguments falling in between. Indeed, over one-third 
(34%) of all duels fought between 1879 and 1889 were over insults pub-
lished in newspapers. In addition, Gelli’s numbers, as shown in table 4, 
demonstrate that journalists ranked as the most likely people to fight 
duels except for members of the military.
 Gelli’s conclusions were supported by other voices, such as Ferriani, 
who in 1897 commented, “The journalist theoretically combats the 
duel, but he is the first to provoke it or accept it as soon as the occasion 
 7.  It is perhaps superfluous to add that such disputes might well have contained ele-
ments of either politics or journalism. Thus Gelli (n.d.) listed some 97 more causes than duels 
because in some cases he felt it necessary to place a single incident into two categories. 
 8. Ibid., 11. For confirmation on a limited sample see the statistics section of the Rivista 
penale 1885 (vols. 22, 140, 276, 280, 502). 
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presents itself.”9 Dueling, in fact, very quickly became an intrinsic part 
of Italy’s early print culture, to the extent that some editors felt that a 
newspaper had not really “arrived” until it was “baptized in blood” by 
a duel.10 Paolo Fambri charged in 1869 that a paper he knew of kept a 
professional swordsman or spadaccino on retainer just to defend its arti-
cles.11 One editor, Gaston Banti, later claimed that he paid his journalists 
for defending the paper in duels and that there seemed to be an increase 
in duels toward the end of the month, when their salaries began to run 
thin. This was the same Gaston Banti who put a fencing runway in his 
newspaper offices to keep his men fit for such duty.12 Likewise, the Press 
Association of Rome had its own sala d’armi in the 1920s, complete 
with professional instructors.13
 This obvious overlap between pen and sword can be explained in 
part by the dramatic nature of dueling itself. Chivalric controversy could 
provide copy for weeks, as it did regarding the deadly duel between 
Cesare Parrini and Eugenio DeWitt in 1884. The cause of the duel had 
 9. Ferriani 1897, 431. 
 10. Cesana 1874, 141–60. 
 11. Fambri 1869, 132.
 12. Santini 1989, 22, 25. 
 13. Mancini 1986, 212.
Table 3
Reported duels in Italy arranged by motive, 1879–95
Motive Number
Journalism 1,125
Oral dispute without specific cause 875
Politics 431
Insults and scuffles 392
Matters of intimacy 279
Unknown causes 242
Physical aggression 184
Gambling 36
Religion 31
Private interests (money?) 14
Hunting 1
Total 3,610
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been journalistic in nature, with Parrini reporting unflattering news 
about DeWitt in an article concerning a local trial. DeWitt tracked Par-
rini down, slapped him in the face, and eventually killed him in a saber 
duel. Carlo Pancrazi, editor of the Gazzetta d’Italia which had pub-
lished the original offending story, took umbrage at these events and 
Table 4
Participants in reported duels arranged by profession, 1888–95
Profession Number
Members of the military 702
Journalists 425
Lawyers and notaries 246
Profession unknown 133
Students 117
Property owners* and independently wealthy 110
Politicians (excluding senators) 107
Engineers 34
Professors 32
Merchants 29
Medical doctors 27
Fencing masters 24
Clerks in public administration 19
Bankers 18
Judges 8
Actors 6
Diplomats 5
Industrialists 4
Workers 4
Music teachers 3
Private clerks 3
Accountants 3
Senators 2
Pensioners 2
Other 6
Total 2,069
 *Capitalisti
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accused DeWitt of cheating during the duel: an offense tantamount to 
homicide. Charges of murder and countercharges of calumny mounted 
in the press over the fairness of the duel, eventually leading the padrini 
involved in the encounter to attack Pancrazi in a rival paper: “The 
Gazzetta d’Italia published an untruthful, calumnious, and cowardly 
article today. We will not respond to signor Pancrazi, who is the author; 
he is only worth being spit in the face; prison would be infected by his 
presence.”14 Inflammatory and exciting, such obvious sensationalism led 
one exasperated criminal prosecutor in 1877 to accuse the quotidian 
press as being both the “promoter and procuress” of the duel.15 In vari-
ous ways, then, journalists used vertenze and duels to create their own 
piquant news for an ever-appreciative audience, which could flatter 
itself for being “in the know” regarding both the game of chivalry and 
its present-day paladins.
 And paladins of the press there were aplenty, as certain newspapers, 
editors, and journalists became notorious for their chivalrous exploits. 
Achille Bizzoni, for instance, was a Lombard democrat who founded 
Il Gazzettino Rosa with Felice Cavallotti in 1867 and who claimed to 
have fought some 50 duels in defense of his articles, including two in 
one day!16 Another battling journalist was Giacomo Belcredi, a cor-
respondent of the Tribuna, who reportedly fought his twenty-fourth 
duel in Rome in 1892.17 Equally assiduous in defending his words was 
Ferruccio Macola, editor of the Gazzetta di Venezia. He would become 
famous for killing Cavallotti, head of the radical left (and veteran of 
over 30 duels), in an encounter in 1898, but Macola had fought plenty 
of times prior to that.18 Such was Macola’s faith in the dueling code 
that when a vertenza between himself and some students was derailed 
by the publication of a new antidueling tract in 1894, he publicly 
insulted the author, Filippo Abignente, to such an extent that Abig-
nente was forced to fight despite his recent condemnation of the prac-
tice.19 For the sake of veracity one must wonder whether we should 
take the large number of duels claimed by such characters as Bizzoni, 
Belcredi, and Macola at face value, but the actual tally is perhaps less 
 14. Relevant documents are in Gelli 1992, 177–94.
 15. “Duello Selmi/Sciacca,” Gazzetta d’Italia, Nov. 7, 1877, 3.
 16. DRN, vol. 2, 308. 
 17. Gelli 1928, 203n1. 
 18. He almost crossed swords with Paolo Fambri. See ACS, Carte Fambri, Busta 21, 
Fascicolo 19, Cantelli/Tiepolo to Fambri, July 7, 1891.
 19. Gelli 1928, 208–9.
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important than the need to assert them as part of their public persona 
as men of the press.
 Certainly, the dueling imperative ran much deeper among journal-
ists than a simple scramble for notoriety and subscriptions. Rather, it 
was connected to the very nature of the journalistic profession. The 
“truth-claims” intrinsic to the journalistic enterprise automatically put 
the authors of conflicting accounts of events, accusations, or even statis-
tics into an antagonistic position which called into question their recip-
rocal veracity. Such truth-claims went to the heart of the traditional 
dueling etiquette which had relied on “giving the lie” as the defining 
moment leading to challenge. In many cases, either one side or the 
other simply had to be wrong, and unless care was taken to soften the 
language of confrontation, it was natural that articles on even the most 
innocuous subjects could ultimately lead to a vertenza or even a duel.
 Yet such care was often in short supply because editors realized that 
controversy, innuendo, and sarcasm added spice to their copy, and they 
did not hesitate to push the limits of taste and manners in their search 
for a larger readership. In other cases, journalists simply lost their tem-
pers and resorted to epithets which begged a chivalrous response. Thus 
in 1872 Ernesto Teodoro Moneta—editor of the Milanese daily Il Secolo 
and later winner of the 1907 Nobel Peace Prize—found himself calling 
Carlo Righetti, director of the Cronaca Grigia, a lurida canaglia (filthy 
scoundrel) and rettile schifoso (repugnant reptile) for impugning the 
courage and veracity of his newspaper.20 In these exchanges, the duel 
was seen first as a palliative and second as a remedy for such invective. 
Thus Enrico Bottrigari, a Bolognese lawyer who generally condemned 
the duel, could sing its praises in 1870 because it helped control “the 
abuse of the press to vilify everybody and torture people’s reputations” 
which had become “shamefully established of recent.”21 With the arrival 
of constitutional government, journalists might say pretty much what 
they wanted to about private individuals, but they also might have to 
answer with sword in hand and life at risk.22
 These problems were exacerbated by Italy’s lack of effective libel 
laws, a result perhaps of the country’s long history of strict press con-
trols. Under the absolutist regimes there had been little need to adju-
dicate printed insult or calumny because virtually nothing reached 
the public without first passing through the finely knit filter of the 
 20. MRM Library, “Agli Onorevoli Membri del Giurì d’Onore,” Aug. 3, 1872.
 21. Bottrigari, vol. 4, 129. For related details see 40, 43, and 222.
 22. Murialdi 1996, 46.
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government censor. After unity, judicial recourse to libel was further 
hampered because newspapers by law had to have an editore gerente, a 
person who in theory was responsible for any legal infractions, but who 
in practice often became something of a straw dog, designed to divert 
attention and action away from those actually setting editorial policy 
or composing articles.23 One famous example occurred when Giovanni 
Nicotera sued the Gazzetta d’Italia for libel in 1877. Seeking to derail 
Nicotera’s political career (he had recently held the post of minister of 
the interior), the newspaper published an “autobiography” that falsely 
attacked his credentials as a hero of the Risorgimento. Nicotera report-
edly spent a lot of money on a lengthy trial that did not always turn to 
his credit. In the end he managed to win the case, but the penalty fell 
not on the director of the Gazzetta, Carlo Pancrazi, who had arranged 
publication of the libelous document, but rather on Sebastiano Vis-
conti, the editore gerente, who was essentially innocent in the matter. As 
an ultimate irony, Nicotera agreed to spend even more money helping 
Visconti, whose family was suffering while he was in prison for a crime 
he did not commit.24
 Uninhibited by the law, journalistic prose was also often inflam-
matory because Italian newspapermen had little experience, especially 
in the 1860s and 1870s, in dealing with their new-found freedom, 
and it was always easier to err on the side of sensation and allegation 
rather than caution. Paolo Ferrari, a playwright who had participated 
in numerous vertenze, recalled that in the late 1860s, “[t]o every free 
citizen it could happen to wake up in the morning and find oneself 
esteemed on one of the [newspaper] pages as a thief, a spy, a ruffian, or 
some other qualification. And so duels here and duels there. Oh what 
a life it was.”25 Time did not, however, improve matters a whole lot, 
and in 1897 the sociologist Ferriani referred to libelists as Italy’s new 
bandits. “Today the brigand wears different clothes, speaks another lan-
guage: gloved hands do not handle a weapon that can kill with a blow, 
but the weapon of the pen which brings down the enemy slowly, killing 
his reputation.”26 With personal attacks nasty and frequent, and judicial 
alternatives expensive and clumsy, men were forced to fight in order 
to clear their reputations; and refusing to demand an “explanation” or 
 23. For example, Ferriani 1897, 437.
 24. “I duelli politici del nostro tempo,” La Folla, June 29, 1902, 24. Gelli 1928, 98–99; 
White Mario 1894, 103–20.
 25. Ferrari 1928 (1868), “Cenni storici.”
 26. Ferriani 1897, 295.
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“satisfaction” for such slights was tantamount to admitting either guilt 
or cowardice. In consequence, as we shall see later, few of the debates 
that raged over dueling through the liberal period would fail to include 
some impassioned call for more practical laws regarding both libel and 
defamation.
 Unbridled in their speech, journalists also had much to prove regard-
ing their place in the new scheme of things. Journalism, in fact, was a 
relatively new occupation, at least on the scale to which it grew imme-
diately after unification. Newspapers had multiplied rapidly with the 
arrival of liberal institutions, and the period 1858–73 saw the number 
of periodicals jump from 278 to 555: a 100% increase in only 15 years, 
with a corresponding growth in those engaged in the profession.27 In 
this world of expanding public communications, the honor and pres-
tige conferred by the dueling code were particularly precious to Italy’s 
journalists, who often fit what might be called the minimal criteria of 
gentlemen—literacy and white-collar employment—but whose income 
and status were not particularly high. Public esteem for newspapermen 
did not gain a great deal from the advent of unity, largely because they 
quickly became so dependent on external funding to make ends meet.28 
Illiteracy rates of over 75% greatly reduced the potential market for the 
many newspapers that had sprung up during the first decade of unifi-
cation, and consequently their primary means of survival was to seek 
subventions from government organs, political factions, or individuals 
with special interests.29 Such attachments did little for the general repu-
tation of newspapermen, and Ruggero Bonghi, editor of the Persever-
anza, would complain, “It is absurd to suppose that one can remain an 
honest man while doing the job of a journalist. The more miserable the 
salary, the more he is disposed and constrained to sell himself and re-
sell himself.”30 This venality reportedly extended to underhanded acts 
of blackmail in which an editor would threaten publication of some 
unfortunate fact or scurrilous semifiction in hopes of extorting money 
in exchange for silence. Even if they avoided such obvious iniquities, 
editors were reportedly willing to spread rumors, stir up trouble, and 
cast aspersions, all for the sake of generating interest in their pages.31
 27. Murialdi 1996, 54, 70. 
 28. Barbèra 1930, 412.
 29. For example, Castronovo 1973, 81.
 30. Murialdi 1996, 64. 
 31. Barbèra 1930, 409–11, 296–97. For a later example of editorial blackmail see Toeplitz 
1963, 168–69.
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 So much greater, then, was the need for journalists to be ready 
to defend their honor against any besmirching of their veracity or 
honesty, because many tended to have an inflated view of their role 
in society, perceiving themselves as intellectuals and literati working 
out grand ideas rather than simply reporting events of importance or 
interest to their constituents. Not unjustly, Italy’s newspapermen con-
sidered themselves as part of a literary continuum that placed them in 
the same group, if not at the same level, as Italy’s poets, playwrights, 
and philosophers, who did indeed often contribute articles to their 
favorite periodicals.32 Giuseppe Prezzolini, for instance, would assert in 
1909 that three-quarters of all Italy’s literary criticism appeared in its 
newspapers.33 Consequently, Carducci, Croce, d’Annunzio, and other 
literati carried out their intellectual and aesthetic debates in a print 
environment that occasionally meant having to take sword in hand to 
defend one’s view. Meanwhile, in the light of Risorgmento liberal-
ism, newspapermen offered an image of paladins of the press, constant 
symbols of the advent of a new political arrangement which allowed 
free discussion and promoted dissent, albeit within a limited range. 
One combative journalist, Attilio Valentini, who would eventually die 
in a duel in Buenos Aires, reportedly defined journalism as “a school, 
a mission, and, above all, a tribunal in which there reign courage and 
sincerity.”34 Fine words, but, in contrast, journalists were often per-
ceived as always ready to print gossip, innuendo, or propaganda for a 
price. The tension between these two opposing images made journal-
ists highly susceptible to the dueling ethic in that it promised a means 
of legitimizing their words as worthy of note and at the same time 
reinforced their identity as gentlemen, despite the prejudices surround-
ing their profession.
 Nothing so effectively demonstrated the underlying connections 
between journalism and chivalry as the founding in August 1877 of 
the Press Association of Italy in Rome. Its inspiration came from the 
perceived need to establish a permanent jury of honor capable of adju-
dicating vertenze among its members and thus reducing the number of 
duels between them. The catalyst for its creation was a rather nasty duel 
precipitated by an article in the semisatirical newspaper La Fanfulla. 
The article had made fun of a deputy, Augusto Pierantoni, for beating 
the bushes in his search for a district to represent. Pierantoni, a highly 
 32. Murialdi 1996, 79–80, 103. 
 33. “Caccia all’uomo,” La Voce, June 3, 1909, 101.
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successful lawyer with a healthy ego, did not find the references humor-
ous and defended his honor by slapping the author, Fedele Albanese, in 
public. A duel ensued a few days later in which Albanese was wounded 
in the arm. Pierantoni’s overweening response to a rather innocuous 
comment, well within the conventions of the Fanfulla’s jocular style, 
galvanized the parliamentary press corps. They protested to the quaestor 
of Rome as well as the president of the Camera, Francesco Crispi, that 
such actions represented a hindrance to the freedom of the press in its 
ability to report honestly on individuals in the public sphere.35 Protest 
aside, they also got organized. On May 20—only four days after the 
duel in question—some 60 editors and reporters from Rome’s various 
newspapers gathered together in the offices of Il Diritto and voted to 
establish a jury of honor “with the express and well-determined goal 
of protecting the public interest with the morality and dignity of the 
Press.”36 A committee of seven members (including one foreign journal-
ist) was appointed to draw up guidelines for such an institution. By the 
time the committee offered its recommendations in August, however, 
the project had expanded considerably, and its rapid evolution from a 
simple jury of honor into a general press association (which is still in 
existence) reveals reams about the problems, conceits, and aspirations of 
Italy’s journalists.
 While the new organization would still be very involved in adjudi-
cating vertenze between members, its main focus was now to bolster the 
self-esteem of journalists as professionals and build respect in the eyes of 
the public. The committee’s report affirmed: “Certainly no one has it in 
mind to limit the full independence and absolute liberty of the opin-
ions of each newspaper and of each party. But in the field of courtesy 
and aid the Press also must have its obligations and its amour propre 
and it is for these obligations and for this amour propre that we wish 
to provide [ . . . ].”37 This reference to “courtesy and aid” was not an 
abstract one, because along with a jury of honor the association would 
also act as a mutual aid society, providing funds for those members who 
risked destitution because of unemployment, disability, or old age. The 
new plan thus affirmed the precarious—and notorious—financial posi-
tion of Italy’s journalists and offered a dignified and communal means 
for their support. Simultaneously, however, it affirmed the honor and 
dignity of all journalists as bona fide gentlemen who deserved each 
 35. Pesci 1907, 487–89.
 36. Associazione della Stampa 1877, 3–4. 
 37. Ibid., 9.
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other’s high regard and that of the general public. They thus took as 
their motto “loyalty and honest manliness (galantuomismo).”38
 As for affairs of honor, the association went beyond the original 
concept of a jury and created a court of honor consisting of 20 active 
members to be elected at regular intervals. The court’s goal was clear-
cut: “to prevent insolent impositions (soverchierie) and to give a good 
example limiting duels and withdrawing personal questions from agita-
tion and from individual arbiters.” In order for this to occur, all mem-
bers of the Association agreed to bring their personal disputes of honor 
before the court, which would then appoint five of its “jurors” to hear 
the case. The members also promised, on pain of expulsion, to not 
fight duels among themselves without first requesting such a jury; they 
could also call on the court for consultation in vertenze involving non-
members. Likewise, anyone could bring disputes to the court if he 
felt he had been unjustly treated in print by a participating journalist. 
Journalists who continually used insulting language or who engaged in 
character assassination regarding other writers would be warned, then 
censured, and eventually condemned by this court with a correspond-
ing notice in all of Italy’s newspapers.
 The interlocking themes of professional prestige and personal honor 
for Italy’s press corps resounded mightily in the selection of the first 
members of this newly established court of honor. The president, or 
more precisely the head judge, was Benedetto Cairoli, and the associa-
tion would have been hard-pressed to find a more eloquent choice to 
exalt the new court’s credentials and connections. Cairoli was a hero 
of the Risorgimento, a Garibaldino who was wounded at Palermo in 
1860 and who had gone on to political success as a leading member 
of the historic left. Elected as a deputy in 1860, Cairoli remained a 
member of parliament until his death in 1889, and in his lifetime he 
served as minister of the interior, minister of justice, and three times 
(between 1878 and 1881) as prime minister. In November of 1878, he 
was awarded the Gold Medal of Military Valor for taking a bullet in 
the hip as he threw himself between King Umberto I and a would-
be assassin during a royal visit to Naples.39 In short, he was everything 
the association needed to sanction the resolution of its members’ dis-
putes and then provide legitimacy to those remaining affairs which 
could be resolved only with the shedding of honorable blood. Hardly 
less impressive were his compatriots on the court. They included the 
 38. Ibid., 17. 
 39. DRN, vol. 2, 472–75.
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ubiquitous Paolo Fambri, as well as an admiral, a count, a professor, a 
senator, and five deputies (including Silvio Spaventa, one of the coun-
try’s foremost administrators) and Luigi Zanardelli, future prime minis-
ter and architect of the unified Italian Law Code of 1889.40
 This stellar cast of dignitaries on the court of honor pointed up 
the extraordinary role that the chivalric ethic had come to play in the 
new liberal regime, and their participation undoubtedly reinforced the 
viability of the dueling mystique in the eyes of their fellow citizens 
and legitimized its special importance among Italy’s journalists. More-
over, the presence of so many polished politicians and estimable jurists 
emphasized the “legal” nature of the new institution, which took itself 
quite seriously in matters of protocol, procedure, and, of course, adher-
ence to the code of honor as a parallel system of judicial authority. 
Conversely, their own self-importance could only gain from their pro-
motion to be the arbiters of honor for so many of Italy’s public fig-
ures who looked to them to protect their rights as “gentlemen.” Why 
exactly the court failed to function very effectively (or so it seems from 
Gelli’s statistics) remains a mystery because its archive still remains to be 
found. For all we know, it may have solved a majority of vertenze before 
they could draw blood.
 Be that as it may, the composition of the association’s court of honor 
once again underscored the inextricable tangle of ties between politics 
and the press in the new nation. A free press had been part and parcel of 
the battle of liberalism against the ancien régime. Consequently, journal-
ism was bound to liberal politics both in a formal and an informal sense. 
To comment and criticize in print had previously been political acts 
because doing so defied the traditions of censorship inherent to abso-
lute rule. To publish freely was, in and of itself, an informal exercise of 
newly acquired political power. More formally, the press represented 
the many voices that had emerged from the Risorgimento charged with 
all the zeal of the different factions which had created the new Italy as 
much in mutual opposition as in mutual cooperation. Combined with 
economic necessity, which forced editors to seek extramural funding, 
the press was thoroughly in thrall to politics, and vice versa. Such a sys-
tem was naturally exacerbated by the personal nature of Italian politics 
and the lack of formal political organizations to coordinate and mediate 
policies—all of which prompted Antonio Gramsci’s oft-quoted truism 
that instead of parties Italy had newspapers.41
 40. For a complete list see Pesci 1907, 490.
 41. Cited in Castronovo 1973, 76.
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Politics as Reputation
Partisan newspapers, however, were only the most obvious manifestation 
of a general political ethos in which character, prestige, and reputation 
were the organizing principles of power. The advent of representative 
government greatly enhanced the connection between one’s private 
and public persona, and the code duello automatically became the arbi-
ter of personal relations in the new parliament. Already in May 1864, 
when the minister of war felt he had to comment on increased duel-
ing among the military, he affirmed, “As for duels, it is a topic that I 
don’t know how to discuss in this Chamber, because every direction 
I look I find duelists.”42 Certainly a duel could benefit a deputy by 
affirming both his position as a man of honor and the strength of his 
convictions, to say nothing of gaining easy and sensational access to 
the press, which dutifully reported such encounters. In fact, it became 
expected for deputies to duel, and, as we shall see later, Felice Caval-
lotti, head of the parliamentary “historic left,” died in 1898 fighting his 
thirty-third such encounter.43
 But the roots of political dueling went deeper than press reports 
or grandstanding. Rather, they were embedded in the evolution of the 
liberal regime itself. Prior to unification, few Italian elites had had much 
experience with parliamentary politics, and except for Piedmont after 
1848 the idea of a “loyal opposition” had been tantamount to treason 
under the old regimes. Especially in a public forum, urbane discourse 
and polite disagreement are social skills that evolve, and Italy’s early 
Camera dei deputati was known for its rough-and-tumble debates in 
which deputies spoke “without hair on their tongues,” as the Italians say. 
“Madman,” “imbecile,” “bawd,” “beast,” and “pigs” were just some of 
the epithets thrown around by deputies as they dealt with the nation’s 
problems, and they could raise the level of personal animosity to fight-
ing pitch.44 As late as 1910, a bitter yelling match broke out in parlia-
ment during which the republican deputy Eugenio Chiesa excoriated 
the undersecretary of defense, General Prudente, for refusing to answer 
questions about a possible sex and espionage scandal involving a fel-
low officer. In the face of Prudente’s silence, Chiesa cut loose with “It 
is a shame. You protect spies. Shame on you. You should not hold that 
position.” The president of the Consiglio, Giuseppe Marcora, yelled at 
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Chiesa to come to order and added for good measure, “You are an ass, 
an ass.” Uncowed, Chiesa continued to rant about prostitutes and spies 
and called Prudente “face of a drunk.” Despite a temporary recess to 
let tempers cool, more insults ensued (with Chiesa accusing the army 
of being packed with “generals of the Merry Widow”) which later led 
to blows being exchanged in the antechamber. All of this, of course, 
remained to be settled out in a gentlemanly fashion, and Chiesa ended 
up in a Gordian knot of five overlapping vertenze, two of which ended 
in duels.45
 We must be careful, however, in seeing these outbursts as irrational 
or purely the result of unrestrained emotions and prickly pettifogging. 
On the contrary, the basis for such truculence lay in the constant mesh-
ing of public and private identities in an open arena of debate, where 
disagreement over facts or issues naturally impugned the veracity and 
character of one’s opponents. The division between the political and 
the personal had scarcely developed in Italy, and the lines were blurred 
even more by the very nature of the Risorgimento itself which had 
been carried out by a small number of elites led by romantic personali-
ties such as Mazzini, Cavour, and Garibaldi. Indeed, a number of sena-
tors and deputies had made their political bones in the revolutionary 
upheavals of unification when violent and even illegal action had been 
a backhanded virtue. Political passion could be regarded as a positive 
attribute of the new system, even if it entailed offending one’s fellow 
lawmakers. The oft-mentioned Cavallotti, as head of the radical left, 
argued at one point that harsh words were necessary in Parliament as an 
antidote to the pacifism and servility of the preunitary past. Censured 
by the president for calling other members of the chamber perfidious 
and venal, he retorted: “History, honorable president, teaches that those 
parliaments where the exuberance of life became tempestuous never 
caused the decadence of institutions, but those parliaments where ser-
vility dominated, were those stigmatized by ugly epithets and marked 
by the politics of decadence.”46 In addition, as we have seen, the heroic 
exploits of 1859 and 1860 had given way to acrimonious and armed 
confrontation over how to complete the unification process. The final 
solution, which made Rome the new capital in 1870, threw large num-
bers of elites (and especially the ultra-Catholic nobility) into intransi-
gent opposition. In consequence, Italian politics consisted of a muddy 
 45. CDS, March 5, 7, 9, and 10, 1. Avanti, March 5, 1.
 46. Galante Garrone 1976, 576.
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middle of powerful personages with extremists on both the left and the 
right who fundamentally disagreed with the system itself. This environ-
ment was hardly fertile ground for consensus, and the duel reflected in 
its stylized violence the heat of Italy’s early political discord. Indeed, the 
pugnacity of debate and the bellicose response of punctilious honor 
were part and parcel of a society coming to grips with the daunting task 
of building a nation based on liberal principles.
 In order to understand this process better, we can turn to Joanne 
Freeman’s analysis of how honor and dueling were intrinsic to the poli-
tics of postrevolutionary America. As in Italy, the question of treating 
and dealing with political enemies and allies created consternation as 
the new country faced an uncertain future. Unable to trust past pat-
terns of provenance or partisanship, American elites relied on personal 
character and reputation as a means of orienting themselves and their 
actions. Gentlemanly honor provided a traditional moral compass by 
which to navigate these new politics, and the code duello set forth ritu-
als and boundaries to regulate the combat inherent to the “chaos of 
national public life.” Such rules were clearly necessary because, in this 
highly personalized political struggle, opponents often attacked each 
other’s probity, reliability, and veracity as much as their policies. Conse-
quently, politicians resorted to gossip, innuendo, and rumor in order to 
discredit their enemies and support their allies.47 They engaged as well in 
a constant “paper war,” which utilized broadsides, pamphlets, newspaper 
articles, published memoirs, and private letters carefully designed to 
either besmirch or defend individual statesmen.48 Despite the seemingly 
petty issues sometimes at hand, these interchanges went to the heart of 
the politics of reputation and hence must be understood as actual arbi-
ters of power. Unanswered gossip or ignored slights in the press could 
weaken a man’s position and eventually ruin his career. All of these traits 
ran parallel to Italy’s postunitary political culture. Historians may find 
it tempting to trivialize the overly personal, pettifogging, and irascible 
nature of much of the discourse and polemics of this culture, not realiz-
ing how important these issues were to the political process of the day.
 Consider, for instance, the 1886 case of lawyer Carlo Panettoni and 
Commendatore Ranieri Simonelli, both of Pisa. In the wake of electoral 
defeat in May of that year, Panattoni had heard that Simonelli, who ran 
on the same ticket, had publicly accused him of having betrayed the 
 47. Freeman 2001, xvii, xx, 62–104.
 48. Ibid., 105–58.
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party. Panettoni confirmed Simonelli’s “slander” with three witnesses, 
and he immediately sent his representatives to open a vertenza. The 
rapidity of his response was important because any delay might be mis-
interpreted as moral hesitation or, worse, physical cowardice. Simonelli 
replied via his representatives that “he accepted the challenge uncondi-
tionally” but then demanded the choice of weapons. This demand was 
at odds, according to Panettone’s representatives, with chivalric practice 
because their man, as the offended party, maintained that prerogative. 
When Simonelli’s representatives persisted in this presumption, Panat-
toni “posted” him by publishing the documents of the vertenza in a pam-
phlet at his own expense, including quotations from dueling authorities 
such as Angelini and Gelli to back up his position. The chivalric niceties 
here are less important than the extraordinarily public nature of the 
affair. The negotiations gradually dragged various people into the fray, 
and it soon became the talk of the town. Eventually, newspaper articles 
in Pisa and Florence questioned whether the original offending words 
had even been spoken. In reaction, Panettoni published a lengthy pam-
phlet that included three affidavits attesting to his original charges. We 
do not know whether or how Simonelli responded, but the case shows 
how important the game of honor was to a politician.49 By pushing 
the affair, Panettoni had redeemed any doubt about his character—he 
was ready to fight and maybe die over a few words spoken against him. 
When his opponent seemed to balk at such combat, he threw the moral 
force of dueling experts in his face, thus affirming his own position 
as a true gentleman. Following defeat at the polls, he had managed to 
grasp a personal victory in the public arena by affirming his courage, 
demonstrating his lawyerly grasp of the rules of honor, and attacking his 
detractors as unworthy.
 Such chivalric skirmishing often remained relegated to paper, but 
it could quickly turn bloody. In 1883, for instance, Giovanni Nicotera 
was having a tough battle during his bid for reelection in the college 
of Salerno. During the campaign, a vitriolic pamphlet written by Cal-
abritto dei Tirreni accused Nicotera of having used his time in office 
as minister of the interior (1876–77) to enrich himself. The pam-
phlet failed in its efforts to defame Nicotera, and he won the election. 
However, returning to parliament, he soon learned that the “libelous” 
author had been rewarded by the government with a knighthood and 
 49. Details with Panettoni’s bias in Questione d’Onore: Panettoni-Simonelli, Pisa: Valenti 
1886 (copy in MRM).
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his father had received a cushy sinecure in Catania. Storming through 
the parliament building, he cursed the current prime minister, Agos- 
tino Depretis, whom he blamed for this calculated attack on his char-
acter, and lamented Depretis’s advanced age of 78 which blocked the 
avenue of honor. He stumbled instead on the Honorable Francesco 
Lovito, a fellow deputy currently serving as secretary general of the 
ministry of the interior and a man who proved to be in the wrong 
place at the wrong time. Fixating on Lovito as the source of his woes, 
Nicotera unleashed his fury, proclaiming, “Massaro (farmer), vigliacco 
(coward), pecoraro (sheepherder)! I will not lay my hand on your face for 
fear of sullying myself, but I will spit on you, I will spit on you!” and 
he proceeded to do just that. Turning completely pale at these insults, 
Lovito managed to control himself and immediately sent his representa-
tives to arrange satisfaction.
 Both men were attended by fellow deputies at the duel. The arrange-
ments had, in fact, been made in the restaurant of the parliament build-
ing, and it was determined that the fight would be with sabers and 
would continue until one of the men was seriously incapacitated—thus 
eliminating the palliative of primo sangue. Bare-chested, the duelists faced 
each other and were reminded by the direttore of the rules incumbent on 
them as gentlemen. The fight began, and on the first assault Nicotera 
wounded Lovito in the arm. The direttore commanded the men to drop 
the points of their swords, which Nicotera did, but Lovito, for what-
ever reason, continued the combat and slashed Nicotera severely across 
the face. This was a serious breech of the rules, and Nicotera reacted 
with understandable anger. Screaming “cowardly assassin,” he came after 
Lovito, who—in another breech of etiquette—grabbed his opponent’s 
saber by the blade, severely cutting his hand. He then stumbled or 
fainted and had to be protected from the furious Nicotera by the padrini. 
Order was soon restored, the men were patched up by the attending 
physicians, and they returned to town for further medical help. The 
padrini from both sides quickly put together a verbale di scontro in which 
they condemned Lovito for his failure to obey the laws of chivalry and 
generally deplored the irregularity of the encounter. According to Gelli, 
Lovito never completely recovered his reputation as a gentleman, and 
the duel damaged his political career.50
 The Nicotera/Lovito duel combined many of the elements of the 
politics of reputation. It began during an election and was inspired by 
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a published pamphlet, one of the most powerful weapons in the arsenal 
of paper combat. Rumor and innuendo surrounded the provenance and 
intentions of the pamphlet, and Nicotera attacked not the main suspect 
in the affair but a man closely associated with him. He insulted him 
publicly in the parliament building in such a way as to assure a duel and 
then used the rules of the game to discredit him. Lovito would probably 
have been fine had he managed to control himself during the com-
bat—a critical aspect of the dueling ritual—but his failure to act in a 
gentlemanly fashion worked to his disadvantage and possibly kept him 
from higher office. Rather than take the libelist to court, which would 
have entailed substantial expense and possibly an unfortunate outcome, 
Nicotera had gone to the public arena of honor to restore his name and 
attack his enemies. This was all seen as appropriate by parliament, and 
when asked by the judiciary to proceed against the duelists—who were 
in clear violation of the law—the deputies voted overwhelmingly to 
maintain their immunity from prosecution.51
 Thus duels or potential duels were used to arbitrate disputes engen-
dered by political discourse, but they could also be timed in a tactical 
fashion—sometimes before or after critical elections or votes—toward 
specific goals. At the same time, it is important to understand that, despite 
the political purposes of their affairs, the combatants never lost their 
sense of real personal injury. It was this very tension of public and private 
that, for Freeman, explains the role of the duel in the American political 
system that was in flux between “deference and democracy” and was as 
yet bereft of the stability and anonymity offered by disciplined politi-
cal parties. Affairs of honor in America offered “a grammar of politi-
cal combat that politicians recognized and manipulated as a means of 
conducting politics in the early republic.”52 This “grammar” would have 
been very familiar to the elites of united Italy, where the weakness of 
formal parties and the dominance of key personalities were prominent 
features of parliamentary life all the way up to the advent of fascism.
 In the early decades after unity, these patterns of power were due 
primarily to Italy’s restricted franchise which limited voting rights to 
an exclusive group of men coming from a limited social sphere. This 
included literate men over age 25 who paid over 40 lire in direct taxes, 
as well as certain professional groups including notaries, civil servants, 
professors, surveyors, pharmacists, physicians, and veterinarians. All in all, 
 51.  “I duelli politici del nostro tempo,” in La Folla, June 29, 1902, 24. Also see White 
Mario 1894, 201–3.
 52. Freeman 1996, 293.
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this amounted to only about 8% of the male population of age and 2% 
of all Italians.53 In 1870 only 529,000 men had the right to vote, and, 
as a result, in some constituencies active politics were the prerogative of 
only a few hundred people.54 Even then many of the franchised did not 
vote or participate, especially “intransigent” Catholics who took seri-
ously Pius IX’s refusal to recognize the Kingdom of Italy and his dictum 
“neither elector nor elected be.” Politicians and voters constituted a 
very small group indeed, thus weakening larger and more formal efforts 
at organization which might have helped depersonalize political issues.
 Reputation and image were critical, then, in bolstering one’s prestige 
among the local electorate, while the proven ability to secure advan-
tages for the province from the central government became the key 
measure of political success.55 These “pork barrel” priorities were exac-
erbated by Italy’s prefectoral system which gave the central government 
extraordinary power in provincial affairs and allowed for the creation 
of majorities by pandering to the interests of local elites. Thus, despite 
its centralized bureaucracy, Italian political life was intensely tied to pro-
vincial patterns of privilege allocation.56 The key to this system was 
personal contact within the parliament and the administration, while 
networks of friends and clients assured both acclaim at home and 
influence in the capital. There was, as we have seen, partisanship aplenty, 
but after unity was achieved in 1870, Left and Right became handy 
but fuzzy terms of categorization in a rapidly mutating political matrix 
where friendship, ideology, and interest all blurred together.57 In this 
small world, where one’s personal and political identities were indistin-
guishable, the code of honor helped set boundaries for just how aggres-
sive men could be in their political struggles.
 Given this situation, logic would dictate that when more-formal 
mechanisms and organizations of political action had developed, the 
duel would lose much of its efficacy. But this is exactly what did not 
happen in Italy, as Luigi Luzzatti complained in 1874:
In Italy political parties in the true sense do not exist as one under-
stands them in the great constitutional countries. . . . Unfortunately . . . 
we define ourselves through personal loves and rancors, and, God forbid, 
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also regional [loves and rancors]; [or] through revolutionary or royalist 
origins, and too often our parliaments screech with individual fights; too 
little do the calm and grand controversies of thought shine there.58
Even with the rise of greater electoral participation, Italian political life 
remained intensely personal and maintained all the assumptions and 
rituals of its early turbulent years. Indeed, rather than develop disci-
plined parties, the anonymity of which would have blunted the personal 
asperity of debate, Italy’s leaders came to elucidate and embrace the 
system known as trasformismo, thus further muddying the already murky 
currents of liberal politics. In some ways, trasformismo, as it was labeled by 
prime minister Agostino Depretis in 1882, simply recognized a system 
already in operation by which prime ministers sought support from 
a wide spectrum of politicians and attempted to “transform” previous 
opponents into allies by offering a variety of posts, perks, and favors. 
Depretis, however, not only named this system of constantly mutating 
alliances; he also sanctioned it, claiming what was generally seen as a 
political vice to actually be a political virtue capable of assuring parlia-
mentary majorities and providing better government.
 The positive and negative effects of trasformismo have often been 
debated, but there seems little doubt as to its effect on the style of Italian 
politics and its integral ties to the code of honor and dueling.59 Above 
all it blocked the development of parties which would have helped 
depersonalize political struggle. Combined with the continuing intran-
sigence of Catholic elites, who might have offered a loyal conservative 
opposition had they participated in government, trasformismo led to a 
series of “parliamentary dictatorships” that reinforced the tradition of 
individual power brokers in the liberal regime, creating what Galante 
Garrone has called a system of “persone e personalismi.”60 Rising to the 
top, prestigious and authoritative notables created “combinations” of cli-
ents who jockeyed for influence and favors. Transformism thus obscured 
political differences and sanctioned shifting alliances as new rivals were 
co-opted into the established patterns of patronage. Yesterday’s friend 
might be tomorrow’s foe, creating just the kind of personal insecurity 
and political tension that would lead to frequent vertenze and occasional 
duels. On the other hand, as clientelism and patronage became the pol- 
itical coin of the realm, they often broached the threshold of legality. 
 58. Quoted in Banti 1996, 44
 59. On trasformismo in general see Bollati 1983, IX–XVIII. 
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Crispi, who eventually became one of the major notables himself, would 
complain that when there was an important vote on the floor, parlia-
ment became pandemonium, a market of “subsidies, decorations, canals, 
bridges, streets, everything” as the government sought support.61 Such 
constant barter easily led to reciprocal charges of malfeasance and cor-
ruption among opponents, who then often resorted to vertenze to sort 
matters out in the public eye.
 In this environment a politician had to constantly be on his guard 
to protect his reputation as a man of honor, for failure to do so meant a 
decline in the personal influence which determined one’s career. Such a 
system explains as well the constant overlap of honor and politics with 
journalism, for newspapers gave voice to individual politicians or their 
factions, and it was in their columns of print that much of the bickering, 
innuendo, and mudslinging took place. A man had to challenge every 
charge in order to maintain his credibility, and it was easy to slip into 
a spiral of invective that would force an affair to clear the air. These 
dynamics of honor swept across the political spectrum from conserva-
tive to socialist alike, although one senses that radical republicans, such 
as Bizzoni and Cavallotti, may have been the most ready to bring out 
the swords. Nor did just deputies duel. Provincial counselors, town 
councilmen, and other local officials had to be wary of their reputations 
as well, and all of this created a positive portrait of honorable disputa-
tion that naturally served as a model, or at least an excuse, for the rest 
of civil society. Significantly, the elites most immune to the sirens of 
chivalry were the intransigent Catholics, but they were generally pro-
hibited from participating in the political process by the papacy, which 
refused to even recognize the new country. Their abstention in both 
spheres—honor and politics—only emphasized the integral identity that 
tied the dueling ethic to the evolution of Italy as a sovereign state.
Defining the “Civil Class”
The frequency of the duel among journalists, politicians, and officers 
reveals only the most obvious aspect of how the culture of honor helped 
define and legitimize Italy’s elites following unification. As revealed 
by Gelli’s statistics, many other people from different professions felt that 
it was their prerogative to demand and receive armed satisfaction. In 
 61. Quoted in Montanelli 1973, 181.
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fact, some 40% of the duelists listed by Gelli came from categories other 
than the aforementioned top three (soldiers, journalists, and politicians), 
including lawyers and notaries (12%); students (6%); capitalists and the 
independently wealthy (5%); engineers, professors, merchants, and phy-
sicians (6%); fencing masters, public clerks, bankers, judges, actors, diplo-
mats, industrialists, workers, music teachers, private clerks, accountants, 
senators, and pensioners (5%). Taken together, these categories rather 
effectively indicate that the dueling ethic went deeper than political 
skirmishing or military posturing. Rather, it provided a general and 
critical component of the social/psychological matrix of Italy’s new 
“bourgeois” society.
 One uses this term with some trepidation. Just as Medieval and 
Renaissance Italy have always eluded categorization as “feudal,” so too 
has the term borghese been fraught with difficulties when applied to 
nineteenth-century Italy. The Risorgimento has often been portrayed 
as a bourgeois revolution in that it enshrined notions of private prop-
erty and brought forth an individualistic/liberal political ethos in the 
place of the juridically confirmed corporate systems of the old regimes. 
Consequently, both the term and the concept of borghese are commonly 
applied and accepted in Italy’s historical literature. On the other hand, 
as Raffaele Romanelli has pointed out, just what constituted Italy’s bor-
ghesia and what made it borghese has been a constant problem for Italian 
historians, especially given the centrality of the term to ideological and 
political debate in both the past and the present. Originally conceived in 
terms of political economy, it implied a dichotomy between conserva-
tive landed aristocrats and innovative capitalistic urbanites, with the lat-
ter portrayed as the forces of modernity. Such a definition, however, has 
consistently foundered on the fact that many of Italy’s noble landown-
ers led the charge in pushing for both economic and political change, 
while wealthy commoners often owned considerable amounts of land, 
remained chiefly agricultural in their interests, and generally failed to 
fit the model of a capitalist entrepreneurial class.62 This muddle was 
compounded by the importance of an “educational” bourgeoisie, whose 
titles as physicians, professors, and lawyers assured their consideration as 
part of the new ruling elite, a fact attested to by their specific inclusion 
in the electoral franchise of first Piedmont and then Italy even if they 
failed to meet the strict property requirements.63
 62. Banti 1996, 65–97.
 63. In general see Romanelli 1991. 
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 This confusing contrast between theory and reality has led Marco 
Meriggi to argue that Italy had multiple borghesie rather than a single 
borghesia and that at the time people were more concerned about being 
considered members of the ceto civile. For a man, one’s place was defined 
by an “auto-perception” of oneself “in terms of an adhesion to certain 
rules of civilization, rather than the enjoyment of a definitive social 
and professional collation.” Having good food and wine on a daily basis, 
being able to hire a servant in the home, marrying a woman of “some 
culture”—all constituted, along with the right to vote, a “metaphor of 
living civilly” which marked one’s status as a person who counted.64 By 
definition this group was not a static one, yet it viewed itself as exclu-
sive despite the lack of precise criteria of who might actually belong. As 
Banti has argued, the boundaries of elite status were fluid in both time 
and space and served as the “object of a daily social construction on the 
part of whoever wanted to distinguish themselves from the others.”65 
Consequently, as the country developed economically and institution-
ally, greater numbers of people would eventually gain the education 
or finances to qualify for elite status, but they also had to act as part of 
the “moral and cultural milieu.” It was in this normative comportment 
that the code duello would come to play a dominant role in united Italy 
as men affirmed their right to be considered part of this select group. 
In fact, the code offered an almost ready-made nationwide notion of 
masculinity and respectability that could transcend the differing regional 
and professional backgrounds of the recently empowered “bourgeois” 
elites.66
 The political aspects of this process were particularly important. 
The unification of Italy created a new political structure in a surpris-
ingly short period of time. Although the electoral law of 1861, which 
was based on that of 1848, has rightly been noted for its exclusivity 
compared to the overall population, it also suddenly enfranchised a 
diverse group of people, many of whom had not previously held politi-
cal power and who were unknown to each other at the national level. 
In doing so, it endowed a new set of elites with “full citizen” status 
which made them legally equal among themselves, whatever differ-
ences of profession or region might separate them, while setting them 
 64. Meriggi 1996, 74.
 65. Banti 1996, viii.
 66. As one prefect complained about a deadly duel in his jurisdiction, “[U]n qualsiasi 
mascalzone ben vestito crede lecito di affermarsi gentiluomo” (“[A]ny well-dressed rascal 
believes justified in calling himself a gentleman”); Nasalli Rocca 1946, 112.
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off from the rest of society. Hence the Italian constitution destroyed the 
old juridical notion of aristocracy by birth but created a new, juridically 
sanctioned elite based on the “money or brains” necessary to qual-
ify for the suffrage. However, because the “natural” criterion of birth 
had been set aside, the new elite was rife with its own intrinsic, albeit 
porous, hierarchies and strata that ranged over a considerable social and 
financial topography.67 In consequence, a wealthy urban proprietor, a 
landed aristocrat, a prominent commercial lawyer, a hardscrabble petti-
fogger, a poorly remunerated judge, and a just-comfortable professor all 
qualified for elite status. Within this world of legal equality, however, 
social distinctions and ranks had to be constantly asserted, maintained, 
and rejected, especially through exclusionary membership in the explo-
sion of clubs and associations that proliferated through Italy after uni-
fication.
 Given the differences and tensions between the various borghesie 
included in the ceto civile, to say nothing of the almost automatic inclu-
sion of the old line nobility, symbolic modes of reinforcement were 
obviously critical in forging individual identities, especially for those 
who had just barely made it over the threshold of “full citizenship” 
or those who aspired to such elevation in the near future. Such social 
symbolism was particularly important for men whose income was not 
particularly high but whose pretensions were fed by their cultural or 
professional accomplishments, such as many lawyers or, as we have seen, 
most journalists. Their need was all the greater because of the con-
siderable ambiguity at the bottom of the middle class where clerks, 
teachers, surveyors, and the like might see their education and white- 
collar status as sufficient to membership in the growing elite.68 In fact, 
one senses that the real target of the excluding function of the duel was 
not so much the popular masses, who were automatically considered 
to be without a refined sense of honor, but rather this liminal group of 
literate yet “servile” men who might be tempted to assume the mantle 
of a gentleman. Given the prevailing precepts of chivalry, such an asser-
tion would necessarily need blood to back it up, and it was assumed that 
men who had “ears of a merchant,” that is, a willingness to ignore slights 
for the sake of gain, would balk at such a challenge. And such distinction 
became all the more pressing after the electoral law of 1882 opened the 
suffrage and its attending status to all literate men, a requirement that 
 67. Luigia Caglioti 1996, 141; Banti 1996, 115–37.
 68. On aspirations of the lower middle classes, see Lyttleton 1991, 232–33.
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still excluded some 70% of the active male population. In the face of 
these social and political pressures, the culture of honor, enforced by 
ritualized violence, provided just such a symbolic identity and helped 
men of the ceto civile affirm their equal status as “gentlemen,” recognize 
and affirm new members in the group, and distinguish themselves from 
the rest of society.
 At the top end of the scale, vertenze and duels allowed these new 
elites to test their metal, both literal and figurative, against members 
of the aristocracy. While dueling could directly enhance the career of 
a journalist or politician, it could also indirectly legitimize any gentle-
man’s social status as being on a level with counts and barons. Although 
juridical differences of birth were eliminated by the Piedmontese con-
stitution of 1848, and consequently also that of Italy in 1861, the pres-
ence and mystique of the nobility continued to carry great weight after 
unification. While some nobles had followed their preunitary rulers into 
obscurity, and others had followed Pius IX into Catholic intransigence, 
their absence in public life had been more than compensated for by 
the advent of a national court organized around the king, the extended 
use of Piedmont’s “service” aristocracy during the period of transi-
tion, and the gradual acceptance of the new regime by an expanding 
“liberal” nobility. Aristocrats were thus consistently over-represented in 
parliament, in the cabinet, in the diplomatic corps, and in certain sec-
tors of the army, although the imbalance shrank throughout the liberal 
period.69 If, as Carpi argued in the 1870s, the tendency of the “middle 
class” was “to make disappear, or at least compensate the difference with 
the rich and noble classes,” then chivalric honor and its defense offered 
an excellent mechanism for doing so.70 The potential of the duel in this 
regard was probably best demonstrated by Gelli’s punctilious refusal to 
categorize differences of birth as opposed to profession in his statistics. 
“Noble” did not appear among his categories of participants, nor did 
he bother to set the aristocracy apart when distinguishing between mil-
itary and bourgeois duels. This approach made perfect sense for Gelli, 
the son of a coppersmith who made his living by writing, but it also 
reflected the equalizing function of the duel for the upper strata of Ital-
ian society.
 Nor could the nobility do much about it, trapped as they were by 
their own adherence to the chivalric code. As one Piedmontese marquis 
 69. Cardoza 1997, 64–88. 
 70. Carpi 1878, 129–30.
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wrote in his memoirs, “One fought among the signori, that is among 
recognized and accredited members of the only social category which 
then ‘counted’: officers and people living off rents. Sometimes, however, 
it was necessary to fight with professionals or politicians [who were] 
obviously not signori: or even with parliamentarians of the left. . . .”71 
Those who refused to fight such social inferiors, he continued, would 
be accused of cowardice and hence be socially disqualified. Not sur-
prisingly then, “mixed” vertenze and duels abounded throughout the 
liberal period. For instance, examining the participants listed in Gelli’s 
1899 book Duelli mortali, which included noble titles along with the 
names of the participants, 21% or six of the twenty-nine fatal duels 
recorded between 1860 and 1899 in Italy matched commoners against 
aristocrats. Such social homogenization becomes even more obvious 
when one considers the many “mixed” representatives and padrini who 
attended these and other encounters.72 In the final analysis then, accord-
ing to the “liberal” rules of the new ceto civile, the status of “gentle-
man”—which automatically subsumed the titled nobility—was at least 
in part a matter of auto-definition and depended on a man’s willingness 
to know and embrace the rituals of chivalry and, if necessary, to risk his 
life to protect his honor.73
Creating a Spiritual Aristocracy: 
Honesty, Courage, and Courtesy
These social dynamics were perfectly clear to most practitioners and 
defenders of the duel. Paolo Fambri, who generally shunned the terms 
“aristocracy” and “nobility” in his writings, argued in 1869 that the 
relatively recent resurgence of the codice duello had created a new class 
of gentlemen who had helped promote a new civil society.74 Some 20 
years later, and reprising his role as a mathematician, he would reaffirm 
this assertion and offer a clever social calculus explaining the historical 
necessity of honor as a means of identifying new elites: “Gentleman-
liness = honesty x courtesy x courage.” Note well, he added “that the 
sign is that of multiplication not addition; and the reason is this: that 
 71. Marchese Mario Incisa della Rocchetta, Impressioni e ricordi di ‘altri tempi,’ typescript in 
possession of the family. Thanks to Anthony Cardoza for sharing this document.
 72. Gelli 1992, 122–86.
 73. Gelli 1894, 3, 6.
 74. Fambri 1869, 32.
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if any of the three factors is reduced to zero it destroys gentlemanli- 
ness.”75 The man who could put together this combination naturally 
demanded respect for his position, and he had to be willing to show 
both his courtesy and his courage in dealing with his social equals.
 Honesty, however, was the critical first component of this equa-
tion, as befit a society anxious to excel in liberal self-governance, open 
politics, and free-market capitalism. Actions that might disqualify a man 
included usury, theft, fraud, and cheating at cards, to say nothing of per-
jury. In fact, the alter-ego of honesty was veracity. Speaking the truth 
was the touchstone of a true gentleman, just as “giving the lie” had 
always been the most definitive step toward the field of honor since 
the duel’s Renaissance genesis. Nowhere was the value of truth-telling 
better illustrated than in a letter written in 1886 by the soon-to-be 
famous social scientist Vilfredo Pareto regarding a rumor in circula-
tion that he did not share the same family lineage as the Marquis of 
Pareto. The purveyor of this gossip turned out to be a friend of his, 
Count Carlo Alessandri, and Pareto immediately sent his representatives 
to demand armed satisfaction. “Finally,” he wrote to a friend, “I found 
the one who is responsible for the infamous calumnies said against me 
years ago in Pistoia and I will not let him escape me. I want to fight in 
any way.” Aside from preparing to duel, however, Pareto also took sub-
stantial pains to secure evidence, both verbal and written, of his proper 
“civil state,” that is, as a legitimate member of the Genovese nobility. 
What made his efforts in this direction so interesting was his assurance 
to Ubaldino Peruzzi that it was not the issue of being connected to the 
marquis that counted but rather the need to prove that he had made no 
false assertions in this regard: “It is ridiculous that I, a democrat, would 
fight over the title Marquis for which I don’t give a dried fig! But that 
is not what’s in play, if it were I would let it go, but my veracity, that’s 
something else again.”76
 Despite their disdain for past caste distinctions, such sentiments 
clearly fit an image of a new nobility beyond birth, not just of talent 
but also of temperament, and it was this same image that prompted 
Italy’s most prestigious philosopher, Benedetto Croce, to characterize 
Italy’s early ruling elites as “a spiritual aristocracy of upright and loyal 
gentlemen . . . a permanent source of moral and political education.”77 
The attending icon of this spiritual aristocracy was the medieval knight, 
 75. Fambri 1888C, 1.
 76. Letter of Sept. 22, 1886, in Busimo 1977, 793–94.
 77. Croce 1963, 5.
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whose symbolic devices often appeared in both fencing and dueling 
manuals. Such references could be subtle, as when Costantino Cacchi-
one attached knightly spurs to the simple blazon adorning his Scherma e 
codice per duello of 1895; or they could be more blatant, as evidenced by 
the lance, helmet, shield, and heraldic trumpet (complete with the cross 
of Savoy) appearing on the cover of Masaniello Parise’s Trattato teorico-
pratico della scherma of 1884.78 Many of these same devices are obvious 
in a 1902 print celebrating the military’s official fencing academy in 
Rome, although the presence of the swashbuckling Musketeer offers 
an extra layer of anachronism to the mixture (see image 3).79 However, 
it was one of Italy’s most prestigious codes, written by General Achille 
Angelini, whose career we have traced in the previous chapter, that 
pulled out all the stops (see image 4). Here the General’s illustrator has 
gone beyond the symbols of helmet, lance, and heraldic trumpet to 
actually personify a peacock-plumed knight on horseback, complete 
with his own herald, whose trumpet proudly sports the she-wolf on 
the ensign of Rome, thus tying the capital city to a host of Savoyard 
crosses and eagles. The latter symbols cleverly underline the pan-Italian 
nature of chivalry while liminally suggesting royal, if not state, approval. 
Such iconography directly linked Italy’s gentiluomini to ancient attributes 
of knighthood—courage, loyalty, and gallantry—while simultaneously 
recalling ancient rituals of individual combat that reinforced the duel 
as the touchstone of elite status.
 As a young man, Croce himself became caught up in the oblige of 
this new noblesse when he fought a duel in April 1895 against one of 
his own friends, Duke Riccardo Carafa d’Andria, and the circumstances 
of the affair clearly reinforce Fambri’s aforementioned equation link-
ing physical courage and personal prestige in liberal Italy. Croce asked 
Carafa to represent him in a vertenza over an article he had written 
criticizing the sad state of Italian literature. However, given the rarified 
nature of the “insults,” the negotiators decided that no duel need ensue. 
Unfortunately, Carafa let it be known that the reason he had proffered 
the olive branch was that he feared that Croce’s lack of experience in 
the martial arts, combined with a gimpy leg from an old injury, might 
ultimately prove dangerous in a duel. This unintended insult was too 
much for Croce, who wrote a letter angrily chastising his maladroit 
representative for automatically assuming both weakness and cowardice 
 78. For another example see Ristori 1872, cover.
 79. Print kindly provided by Claudio Mancini. Also see the cover of Iviglia 1907, a vade 
mecum for military cadets.
Image 3 
Postcard (1902) from Italy’s official fencing academy in Rome
Image 4
Cover of Achille Angelini’s 1888 dueling manual
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on his part. Carafa had no choice at this point but to challenge Croce 
and then try, as an expert fencer and seasoned duelist, to do him as 
little damage as possible. The participants in the actual duel constituted 
a virtual advertisement for the pretensions of the new “aristocracy,” 
with the commoner Croce and his two borghesi seconds facing off against 
the good duke and no fewer than two princes.80 In the end, Croce was 
lightly wounded, despite (or maybe because of) a brave effort to take 
some fencing lessons, but he described the event in what can only be 
called affectionate terms: “at dawn, in a beautiful villa of Portici, I had 
the pleasure of seeing my friend Carafa as my enemy and receiving 
from him a gentile little wound on the cheek: which was a natural 
thing on the part of an old cavalry officer toward a litterato aspiring to 
be a philosopher.”81 The journalistic antagonism in this case had obvi-
ously ceded primacy to the greater issue of mental and physical mettle, 
and once Croce’s blood had stained his cheek, he and Carafa resumed 
their previous amity. He had stood his ground and ritually declared his 
equality with an aristocratic cavalry officer in terms of bravery if not 
swordsmanship.
 As we have seen for officers, the importance of courage permeated 
the code duello at a variety of levels. First, one had to respond to even a 
hint of insult with alacrity. Failure to act within 24 hours implied either 
cowardice or a lack of regard for one’s own honor—both equally dev-
astating to one’s standing as a gentleman. For this reason, a dated copy 
of all correspondence regarding a vertenza had to be scrupulously main-
tained so as to be able to prove the timing of one’s actions. Having 
arrived on the field of honor, it was critical to demonstrate resolve, 
calm, and sang-froid. A man had to stand his ground in the face of his 
opponent’s bullet or saber without any sign of fear or misgiving. While 
it was obviously better to emerge from a duel unscathed, the crucial 
issue was not who won but that both men had faced danger undaunted 
in defense of their honor. As one pundit put it, “Winner or loser matters 
little, from the baptism of blood and fire comes the baptism of honor.”82 
It is important to note that courage for a gentleman was not thought 
to be learned, acquired, or intermittent. It was natural, essential, and 
constant. Consequently, once a man’s courage had failed him, either in 
the preliminaries or in the execution of an affair of honor, he was held 
to have demonstrated his true nature and to have disqualified himself 
 80. Artieri 1957, 133–39.
 81. Quoted in Nicolini 1962, 158–59. 
 82.  Di Menza e Vella 1875, 2.
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from demanding or offering satisfaction in the future. True courage was 
never really gained or lost; it was simply part of being a real man.83
 Fambri’s gentlemanly attributes of honesty and courage might apply, 
at least in theory, across a broad social spectrum. In contrast, however, 
his concept of cortesia was naturally more exclusive precisely because it 
had to be learned. Decorum, bearing, and style came with exposure to 
and “embodiment” of prevailing elite norms, and being a gentleman 
required knowing how to behave correctly in polite society. This defi-
nition was and still is manifest in the Italians’ use of the term educazione, 
which does not relate to matters academic (generally categorized as istru-
zione) but refers instead to social savoir faire. Good table manners, proper 
personal comportment (e.g., covering one’s mouth during a yawn or 
when using a toothpick) and civil behavior toward others, all added up 
to make a person educato. Conversely, maleducato was one of the most 
serious epithets that could be directed at a gentleman. The need to learn 
and internalize such standardized behavior on the part of Italian elites, 
and especially those newly arrived to the ceto civile, was reflected in the 
extraordinary growth of etiquette manuals and self-improvement books 
during the nineteenth century, particularly after unity.84
 Courtesy for a gentleman, however, went well beyond how to hold 
one’s fork or handle a handkerchief. Chivalrous sensitivity to what was 
proper and improper in mixed company reflected a dichotomy of gender 
identities which was tied to growing middle-class concerns of respect-
ability.85 Men had to know how to treat ladies as befit their distinct 
nature and protected (not to say subordinate) status. Equally important, 
however, was how courtesy helped regulate behavior among men them-
selves, both in traditional public areas such as theaters and cafes and in 
the fast-growing number of clubs and associations which offered semi-
public spaces of male-only culture. These male-only domains derived 
their original impetus from the fact that the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries saw the advent of increasingly gendered views of 
reality and society which radically altered notions of masculinity and 
femininity. This change has been variously attributed to a mania for 
biological categorization during the Enlightenment, to the propagation 
of a “male aesthetic” from classical Greek models, and to the fact that 
middle-class men worked more and more outside of the home and 
 83. For pan-European aspects of “courage” see Nye 1995, 74.
 84. Botteri 1999, 188–89. Lyttleton (1991, 232) suggests that the main market was 
probably the lower middle classes.
 85. In general see Mosse 1985.
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needed a refuge of domestic security to escape the pressures of early cap-
italism.86 It was also tied to the evolution of liberalism which embraced 
an ideology of “separate spheres” that relegated upper- and middle-
class women to the privacy of the home while their male counterparts 
handled the public arena of work and politics.87 In Italy the institutional 
analogue of this socially and sexually exclusive public realm was the 
comfortable world of men’s clubs and associations, which had evolved 
right along with liberal politics and which Meriggi has argued acted as 
a “gymnasium of civil education” where men learned to respect them-
selves as they respected others, normalizing useful regulatory behaviors 
while enhancing their social status.88 In the end, men who could handle 
themselves and their associations effectively felt that they could just as 
readily be trusted with public power.
 The associative movement in Italy was clearly connected to the con-
temporaneous proliferation of the dueling ethic through the peninsula 
after unity. Above all, the clubs and societies offered “extra-familia” all-
male enclaves of sociability, which were theoretically open to all, but 
both exclusive and hierarchical in practice.89 To meet the financial and 
personal requisites of entry was in and of itself an honor and confirmed 
one’s position in the ceto civile as a gentleman, especially for non-noble 
elites who now entered a social geography (although not always the 
same spaces) that had generically been dominated by aristocrats and 
rentiers.90 Within the associations, and especially in the recreational clubs 
based on the English model, men could meet and socialize in a mascu-
line world clearly distinct from the old salon tradition which had been 
within a family setting and had allowed for the active participation of 
women. The new approach, which almost universally excluded women, 
reflected, according to Raffaele Romanelli, “the affirmation of a mod-
ern bourgeois society, individualistic and egalitarian, and therefore virile 
and politicized.”91 It was within this virile, political ethos, where men 
could read newspapers, drink coffee, play cards, and gamble, that the 
masculinity of chivalric honor was constantly reinforced among Italy’s 
new elites.92 For a man to fail to defend his status as a gentleman against 
 86. Mosse 1996; Tosh 1999, 11–26.
 87. Clark 1995, 2.
 88. Meriggi 1992, 95–101.
 89. Romanelli 1994, 814.
 90. Meriggi 1992, 137.
 91. Romanelli 1994, 820.
 92. On the importance of social clubs in the transmission of notions of honor in France 
see Nye 2000.
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insult or injury meant almost sure expulsion from whatever club or 
circle to which he had managed to gain access: a symbolic shaming that 
would reverberate through all of his social relations.
 Beyond membership, however, behavior within the clubs and circles 
was equally important in reinforcing the code of honor.93 Punctilious 
rules abounded designed to maintain a calm and dignified atmosphere 
which reflected well on the members. Feet were to be kept off the 
furniture, umbrellas should be placed just so, and newspapers should be 
replaced on their racks. Inspectors were assigned from the membership 
on a rotating basis to assure compliance with such regulations, and it 
was assumed that rules of play would be scrupulously observed and all 
gambling debts would be acquitted immediately.94 Equal within the 
confines of the club, members should treat each other with the utmost 
respect, and conflicts should be adjudicated quickly and quietly with-
out recourse to bravado or brouhaha. The boundaries of such polite 
behavior, however, were ultimately policed by the mechanisms of honor, 
which offered a controlled and ritualized response for a gentleman who 
felt he had not been granted due respect. In this case a vertenza might 
allow representatives to sort out a solution, or, if not, a duel would act 
to restore both men’s honor without either having to admit fault.95 This 
was the lovely logic of the system: it allowed a redress of grievances 
without either man having to act in an obsequious or culpable way, all 
the while asserting the privileged identity of the group as a whole.
 The emphasis on equality and self-control among gentlemen in the 
club setting reinforced parallel compulsions throughout the entire ceto 
civile. By demanding equal treatment within a self-proclaimed elite, gen-
tlemen set themselves apart from the rest of society as a group. But given 
the highly stratified and competitive nature of that group, men had to be 
on constant guard against slights and insults that might impinge on their 
honor and lead to derogation. A heightened sense of honor resulted, for 
which one might risk life and limb over the most trivial offenses such as 
staring too long into a man’s eyes, reading his newspaper without per-
mission, or failing to return his greeting on the street. Angelini, grand 
doyen of Italy’s dueling community, talked about a true gentleman hav-
ing a refined “chivalrous instinct” that would force him to react to an 
 93. For example, ACS, Biblioteca,“Vertenza Conte Ivan de Vargas Machuca—Principe 
Altieri, Roma: Columbo, 1930, 4.
 94. Romanelli 1994, 832–34.
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insult without thought of the consequences.96 This distinction explains 
the frequent use of the word squisitissimo—an adjective which implied 
taste, discrimination, and excellence—to describe not only proper 
behavior but also proper feelings regarding honor.97 Such definitions 
did not automatically exclude any groups or classes in society, but they 
did imply education, etiquette, and social contacts that were far beyond 
the reach of most Italian men. In the final analysis, a gentleman was a 
man willing to fight a duel over personal honor according to the regu-
lations laid out by other gentlemen. There was a certain egalitarianism 
in this definition, but it worked primarily for the upper-middle classes 
and had its obvious limits at the bottom, especially since a duel could 
be an expensive proposition, including fees for the doctors, gifts for the 
seconds, and—in a pinch—money for emergency fencing lessons.98
 Once on the field of honor, one had to demonstrate the same self-
control expected of a gentleman in all of his affairs. This implied cour-
age, of course, in the face of immediate danger, but it also meant that 
one had internalized the rules of the game and could play accordingly. 
Advantage should never be pushed unfairly, strict attention should be 
paid to the presiding director, and a touch should never be celebrated just 
as a wound should never be lamented. Losing control of one’s emotions 
or actions during combat was infinitely worse than being wounded and 
could bar a man from requesting satisfaction in the future. It could also 
open him up to heavy legal sanctions, because failure to abide by the 
rules meant that the lenient penalties reserved for proper duelists gave 
way to the full weight of the criminal code.
 For instance, in 1889 an ex-deputato, Giuseppe Bonajuto, was fight-
ing a saber duel with a lawyer, Enrico Fongi, over a mutually insulting 
exchange of letters, when he was stabbed in the chest. The director of 
combat called “Alt” and Fongi began to obey, but Bonajuto grabbed the 
offending blade with his left hand and drove his own sword deep into 
Fongi’s neck, an action that narrowly missed killing the man. The padrini 
of both parties were shocked by such an egregious infringement of the 
regulations, and they published a scathing denunciation of Bonajuto in 
the newspapers. More to the point, the procuratore del re indicted Bonajuto 
for attempted murder. Evidence was collected from all the participants, 
and Bonajuto’s lawyer was able to substantiate that his client was hard 
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of hearing and thus might not have heard the command to stop. The 
court consequently dropped the homicide charge but still convicted 
Bonajuto for personal assault and sentenced him to 18 months in jail 
plus disqualification from public office—the latter being a punishment 
reserved only for dishonorable crimes. In stark contrast, Fongi, who had 
followed the rules of chivalry, got off with only 16 days in jail, despite 
the fact that he had wounded Bonajuto first.99 Such was the legal and 
social power inherent in the dueling code, the details of which were 
supposed to be second nature to true gentlemen.100 Consequently, the 
best notice that could appear in a newspaper regarding a duel was that 
both men had acquitted themselves as “perfect” gentlemen and that 
they had mutually affirmed and reconciled their honor. Graphic, almost 
scientific, descriptions of what wounds were received were included as 
well, but they were designed to demonstrate that the flow of blood had 
sanctioned the end of the conflict rather than designate a winner. Sang-
froid mixed with real blood was what really counted.
Respectability, Self-Control, and Countertypes
At heart, the defining element of both courtesy and courage for the ceto 
civile was self-control, and this control necessarily extended to a gen-
tleman’s family. George Mosse has argued, along with others, that the 
early nineteenth century saw an increase in concern over respectability 
in both sexual and domestic matters. He attributes the new emphasis 
to a variety of factors, including the rise of Pietism and Evangelicalism, 
a romantic longing for the supposed moral purity of the Middle Ages, 
and the need for people to find stability in a rapidly changing world. 
Respectability also lent itself handily to the forces of nationalism which 
used a dichotomy of normal and abnormal sexuality to direct men’s 
“lower passions” to higher patriotic purposes and emphasized the solid 
family as a surrogate for the nation.101 As previously noted, the protec-
tion of women’s purity and sensibilities became a defining trope of the 
nationalist movement during the Risorgimento, and the pressure toward 
social and sexual conformity only increased as Italy sought its place as a 
 99. Rivista penale 1899, vol. 50, 122–23.
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“real” nation in Europe and the world.102 Thus Menet Genty has pointed 
out that the Italian theater consistently pushed an extremely prud-
ish stereotype for women, especially when compared to their French 
counterparts.103 Increasingly relegated to the private sphere of the home, 
elite women in public spaces were expected to be accompanied by a 
man and screened from coarse or rude behavior.104 Conversely, women 
had to watch their own language, especially in public, because chivalry 
dictated that a husband be prepared to fight over any offensive words 
on the part of his wife.105
 Even more important, a gentleman had to assure the sexual disci-
pline of the female members of his household. Daughters were expected 
to remain chaste until marriage, and wives to remain faithful to their 
husbands. Women’s honor tended to be unidimensionally sexual and 
derived its importance by reflecting on the men in the family. Illicit sex-
ual relations went beyond propriety and sentiment to issues of property, 
inheritance, and marriage strategies, and so carried a special economic 
weight that could render them all the more devastating to a man’s status 
as a gentleman.106 A wife’s honor, according to one dueling advocate, was 
a gentleman’s “first and inestimable treasure, which surpasses the worth 
of his own life.”107 If a man were violated in this most sacrosanct notion 
of respectability, he automatically had to challenge and fight the seducer 
who had trespassed against him or else he would remain ostracized and 
ridiculed. As we shall later see in the discussion of the debate over the 
duel, proponents of the chivalric ethic would effectively argue that there 
was simply no other recourse in these matters. They struck at the heart 
of a man’s domestic world and were too private to take to any other 
forum of adjudication. On the contrary, there could be no negotiation, 
no explanation, and no satisfaction granted in such cases—blood had to 
flow in order to redeem the honor of the talamo, or marriage bed.
 As befit the gravity of sexual relations, duels stemming from such 
matters of family intimacy were generally reported to be more danger-
ous in their consequences. One journalist, for instance, recounted that 
a certain Baron Compagna, famous for his bellicose, not to say blood-
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 103. Menet Genty 1989, 271. 
 104. On the associational life of women especially in Naples see Luigia Caglioti 1996, 
137–50. 
 105. For example, Corte d’Onore Permanente Firenze, “Lodo vertenza Vaccari-Gatti,” 
Firenze: Ricci, 1926, 36–37. BNR, Levi.
 106. On legal aspects of “family discipline” see Rizzo 2004. 
 107. Modugno 1880, 50.
	 A	Plague	of	Duels	(0–)	 /	 
thirsty, approach to directing duels, was brought in to assure the severity 
of those encounters pertaining to the heart.108 There is, unfortunately, no 
reliable quantitative method to determine the greater risk involved in 
such affairs because Gelli never cross-referenced his statistics on causes 
of duels with those on the physical damages incurred, which are dis-
cussed below. However, if one examines the 29 fatal duels listed between 
1860 and 1899 in Gelli’s book Duelli mortali del XIX secolo, eight or 
28% arose from cause intime, or affairs of the heart. This number stands 
in contrast to only 8% of duels (279 out of 3,610) arising from such 
causes as reported in Gelli’s general statistics and suggests that indeed 
the emotions tied to adultery or family honor tended to make matters 
more serious. On the other hand, the 21 fatal duels not associated with 
intimacy also do not justify the idea that other types of duels were nec-
essarily without their dangers.
 Whatever the case, the difficulties of dealing with adultery without 
recourse to the duel were amply illustrated by the case of Vilfredo Pareto, 
who in 1901 suffered the indignity of having his wife, Alessandrina Bak-
ounine, run off with his cook while he was away in France. Already a 
respected professor of political economy at the University of Lausanne, 
Pareto was saddened and embarrassed by the loss of his wife, but he was 
positively mortified by the social status of her lover. “One cannot fight 
a duel with one’s own cook,” he complained to Maffeo Pantaleoni, and 
this unfortunate chivalric fact threw him into a quandary as to how to 
proceed. Unable to defend his honor in the standard way and anxious 
to protect his finances against any claim by “the lover of my ex-cook,” 
he would have to resort to the courts, which would incur both expense 
and scandal. Such was his concern for the latter that he considered 
moving to the border town of Domo d’Ossola for a couple of months 
and thus avoid the notoriety that a trial might provoke in Florence, his 
legal residence in Italy. These issues may have been less galling if he 
had been able to fight his offender, but the servile status of the cook—
especially a man in his own service—forbade such recourse. The social 
implication was that the cook had no honor to defend, and to challenge 
him would have put Pareto’s own status as a gentleman in question.109
 Pareto’s dilemma points to the general insensitivity of Italian elites to 
conceptions of lower-class honor. Workers and peasants provided ready 
countertypes against which gentlemen could compare themselves and 
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their actions.110 This reaction was partly due to the poverty and illiteracy 
of Italy’s working classes, 62% of which were still engaged in tilling the 
soil in 1881, a figure that would change little by the turn of the cen-
tury.111 From today’s standpoint it is difficult to fathom just how abject 
conditions were among many Italian workers and peasants during the 
nineteenth century, and in some areas unification brought even more 
misery rather than less. Often hungry, ill-clothed, and poorly housed, 
the masses, most of whom spoke only local dialect rather than Italian, 
seemed to stand totally at odds with the sensibilities and niceties of 
honor common to the urban upper and middle classes. Although there 
was a strong literary/political tradition of portraying the peasantry and 
rural life as sources of healthy, unspoiled “energy” for the new coun-
try, it was counterbalanced by an underlying fear of the popolo minuto 
who lived unfortunate and unruly lives, constantly threatening the 
good order of society.112 Suffice it to say that in a monumental treatise 
on crime published in 1870, Italy’s foremost police authority, Giovanni 
Bolis, generically described workers as a “dangerous class” along with 
prostitutes, pimps, and thieves.113 Such a designation was then given a 
patina of positivistic legitimacy by Lombroso, who created “scientific” 
subcategories of delinquency that included most of the population.114
 There seemed little hope of raising the bulk of this volgo up to the 
standards of polite society, and Botteri has shown how even etiquette 
manuals written for the popolo were actually aimed at the lower middle 
classes and not the popolaccio, that is, not the “mob, the rabble, the vile 
multitude, the poor people, the low people, the bestial, filthy people,” 
to which one of her authors referred.115 One might have added facchini as 
well, in reference to Italy’s ubiquitous urban porters and carters, whose 
rough manners were so notorious that applying the term to a gentleman 
would have brought an immediate demand for satisfaction. There was 
also a particular disrespect attached to peasants, which we have already 
seen in the remarks of Giovanni Nicotera when he was attempting to 
insult a political rival. For him, “farmer” and “sheepherder” were epithets 
synonymous with vigliacco or coward, implying baseness of spirit as well 
as of work.116 And this came from a Mazzinian democrat proud of his 
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revolutionary credentials. Plebes of the infimo ceto (lower class) were por-
trayed as insensitive to insult, and one of Italy’s most influential dueling 
manuals maintained that neither peasants nor artisans felt any dishonor 
in being slapped in the face.117 Although Italy’s gentlemen might be 
willing to grant a certain cavalleria rusticana to the working classes (e.g., 
mitigating penalties for crimes of passion), they regarded honor and the 
duel as a defining feature and obvious prerogative of “civil” society, quite 
beyond the comprehension of the volgo or general populace.118 As one 
positivist deputy proclaimed in parliament in 1898, the duel “occurs for 
reasons of an elevated moral order, that is for offenses of such a high 
level that the volgo cannot feel them.” He reiterated the point later in the 
speech: “The common people do not have the duel because they do not 
arrive at the high sensibility to have it.”119
 As with the other attributes of a gentleman, the fundamental issue 
here was one of self-control. In a sort of chivalrous sleight of hand, 
the fact that plebeians settled their personal differences without benefit 
of refined rituals was blamed on their robust passions, quick irritabil-
ity, and lack of emotional restraint.0 They also used the wrong tools! 
Constant contrast was made between the violent and uncontrolled pas-
sions of working men, who fought on a moment’s notice with their 
hands or knives, as opposed to the calm adjudication and respectable 
rituals of dueling gentlemen and their refined weapons. Thus a dis-
tinction between the plebeian knife and the civil-class sword was a 
recurring theme among those defending the dueling ethic. Consider, 
for instance, the assertion of Cesare Alberto Blengini di San Grato, a 
fencing master who published a dueling code in 1868: “The common 
people and lowly plebes will perhaps use their fists or a club; they will 
also use a knife; but all of these—even if used without faithlessness, 
without treachery, without surprise behind one’s back, are weapons of 
a scoundrel, worse than an assassin, from whom an educated man flees 
as he flees from tolerating his own shame.” As the crude peasant or 
the rough worker offered a countertype to the cultured gentleman, so, 
conversely, did the sword stand in contrast to the work-a-day knife, used 
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for a variety of manual tasks, and the perfidious dagger, a corrupt and 
sordid weapon, the very nature of which prevented its use for noble 
purposes.
 Although some writers and poets of the period talked about the 
importance of knife fighting as a key to a man’s status among the lower 
classes, legislators, jurists, and chivalric commentators generally portrayed 
such conflict as outside the bounds of “real” honor. This assumption on 
the part of Italy’s liberal leaders came out in the continuous debate 
regarding the duel’s legal status that began shortly after unification. Deal-
ing with fine distinctions of definition and punishment, the discussion 
often focused on whether there was something fundamentally different 
between a duel between gentlemen and a lower-class street fight or rissa. 
This was a sore point for Italy’s liberals because the new country would 
rather quickly gain a “sad primacy” for having the highest murder rate 
in Europe, a result of frequent and deadly knife fights among the lower 
classes.124 The tension formed part of the cultural baggage of Italy’s lib-
eral leaders as they wrestled with how to square lenient treatment of the 
duel with heavy penalties for plebian risse. Thus one legislative commis-
sion in 1870 argued that it was important to avoid that those accused of 
“crimes committed during a duel be equated with vulgar assassins.”125
 The basic difference, as another commission would argue in 1875, 
was one of deferred gratification and rational self-control. “The rissa is 
an impetuous event, an event in which passion plays a greater role than 
reason; the duel in contrast is a mediated event, an event preorganized 
with mature counsel; it is an event regulated by customs so that it is 
almost elevated to the level of an institution.”126 Carrara, one of Italy’s 
greatest legal commentators, put it another way: “In the rissa there oper-
ates a concept of disdain: in the duel there operates a concept of honor, 
of common danger, and of reciprocal consensus.”127 Crivellari, who 
studied the problem more closely than anyone else, offered a parallel 
argument, which at least took into account the attributes of educazione: 
“Among people of the other [lower] class, one responds to a terrible 
insult with the impetuousness of anger, with a knife blow that kills the 
adversary; no other objective do they have than to offend the offender 
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in life and limb. Among people civilized by education the need runs 
in the opposite direction; one lets anger disappear, one sends a written 
challenge.”128 This emphasis on self-control helps explain as well the 
fixation that Italian gentlemen had on the seriousness of physical con-
tact in prompting duels. Vie di fatto, such as slapping, hitting, or kicking, 
were among the most serious insults and often beyond the repair of any 
chivalric negotiations that might occur among the representatives in an 
affair. To strike someone was to lose control of one’s temper and one’s 
body, just as to suffer such a slight without immediate reaction implied 
subservient status. A duel was doubly necessary in this case as much to 
resurrect and reinforce the offending gentleman’s assertions of equanim-
ity, far from the brawling images of the savage plebes, as it was to assuage 
the aggrieved honor of the injured party.
 The issue of self-control went to another common assumption about 
lower-class quarrels, which was that the participants were quite often 
portrayed as drunk.129 Consider Crivellari’s reaction to a court decision 
in Florence which threatened to loosen the rules as to what constituted 
a “legal” duel.
I cite an example: an argument breaks out between two peasants (villani) 
in a pub: the one says to the other: come outside with me, take your 
knife out of your pocket and to this [the knife] we will entrust our for-
tune. The adversary accepts; the two knives are the same; the two exit; 
the one is before the other; they fight; they wound each other. Accord-
ing to the maxim of the Florentine court, this would be nothing more 
and nothing less than a duel. But if those French gentlemen who over 
past centuries fought while scorning the severe edicts of their Kings; if 
those Italian gentlemen, who went down to the closed field to sustain 
the fatherland’s honor, could take off their winding sheets, they would 
rise up out of the sepulchre and make heard their voice, oh! Without 
doubt they would find a word of reproach against a modern jurispru-
dence which with its judgement wants to confuse them with drunken 
peasants, who of chivalrous procedure know not even the name.130
Here Crivellari’s image of drunk peasants underlines the lower classes’ 
lack of control over their drinking habits while placing them in stark 
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contrast to Italy’s sober patriotic gentlemen, an effect enhanced by his 
choice of the term villano for “peasant,” with its implications of ill-
breeding and boorishness, rather than the more neutral contadino. By 
conflating issues of class, comportment, and nationalism, Crivellari 
unconsciously leads us through the underlying logic that connected 
chivalry and Italy’s ceto civile. Only men who could truly control their 
emotions and their bodies were fit to rule the nation.
 Women, of course, were automatically excluded from this definition, 
and they offered another handy, albeit more complex, countertype to 
the true gentleman. The complexity arose from the fact that upper- 
and middle-class women could, unlike peasants and workers, eventually 
understand notions of chivalry and even participate in their regenera-
tion. But women’s nature was often portrayed as being antithetical to 
the dueling code: their unrestrained emotions and maternal instincts 
supposedly balked at the courage and risk necessary to the defense of 
honor. Consequently, a number of cautionary tales in the dueling lit-
erature describe the need for women to be brought away from their 
natural pacifist tendencies and to be educated to the social necessity of 
embracing the code duello for their sons and husbands.131
 The best example of this theme is undoubtedly contained in Fran-
cesco Garzes’ play Bianca D’Oria, published in 1892. The central char-
acter, Bianca, the daughter of Duke Fabrizio d’Oria, is betrothed to a 
dashing young marquis and ex-cavalry officer, Giorgio d’Arbia, whom 
she loves desperately. When, during a fox hunt, Bianca is secretly 
accosted and violently kissed by a family friend, Count Maurizio di 
Sangro, she reluctantly relates the incident to Giorgio. He immediately 
declares his intention to kill or be killed in a duel with Maurizio, but 
Bianca says she loves him too much and cannot bear the thought of los-
ing him. She suggests escaping, to which Giorgio retorts, “Would you 
have me a coward?” She responds:
I love you. I am a poor girl who knows nothing of life; but I understand 
through instinct that which is grand and generous. I know that you 
men have inexorable laws; I know that to these laws you are obligated 
to sacrifice mind, heart, passion, life.—And yet, to the man who says he 
loves me, I ask a terrible trial; but a secure one. Put my love up against 
the prejudices, the laws, the customs, and habits. I will recompense you 
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for the sacrifice you make for me, and in my affection you will find such 
sweetness to make you forget past bitterness.132
When Giorgio still balks, she swears on her mother’s memory that if 
he fights Maurizio, she will never marry him. This drastic oath has the 
desired effect, and he promises to hold his peace even if insulted, but he 
bluntly warns Bianca that she will come to regret her actions.
 Sure enough, Giorgio is unable to control his anger and imme-
diately confronts Maurizio who publicly threatens him with a horse-
whip. Caught up in his promise to Bianca, Giorgio cannot respond 
appropriately to this “extremely grave insult” and even has to reject an 
on-the-spot offer from a friend to be his padrino. Everything goes down-
hill from there. Rumors soon circulate about his personal courage and, 
worse, about Bianca’s own chastity. Giorgio’s club begins procedures 
to have him expulsed for conduct unbecoming a gentleman, and his 
closest friend—the Marquis Giuliano Riva—has to fight a derivative 
duel with a mutual acquaintance in defense of Giorgio’s good name. 
Bianca observes all of this with increasing concern and indeed begins 
to doubt her actions as well as Giorgio’s character. “But if I did badly, 
why then did he capitulate [to me] accepting that which he should 
not have accepted? Was I mistaken in imposing myself on a man, or 
was he wrong in having obeyed a young lady [fanciulla]?” She also finds 
herself in a double bind: She cannot tell anyone that Giorgio’s lack of 
action comes from his promise to her, because this would portray him 
as being under the thumb of his fiancée and hence add “the ridiculous 
to cowardice. . . .”133 Thus as the play progresses, public impressions are 
becoming increasingly important to the heroine.
 Meanwhile, Maurizio, who had originally insulted her, comes to 
tell her that he is leaving forever, but that he appreciates her discre-
tion regarding the “incident.” He adds that he feels Giorgio, who has 
shared that discretion, to be a true gentleman. She soon shares this mes-
sage with Giorgio, who mysteriously departs immediately upon hearing 
it. Shortly thereafter she is informed that there has been an accident 
with a pistol and Maurizio has been killed. All of this sets up the final 
scene in which Bianca and Giorgio are to sign their wedding con-
tract. Guests are scarce because Giorgio’s supposed cowardice has soiled 
the family’s reputation. By this point, Bianca’s feelings for Giorgio have 
 132. Garzes 1892, 50.
 133. Ibid., 140.
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deteriorated to the point that she scorns his celebratory gift of flowers. 
She confides to a friend that she does not love him but will go through 
with the ceremony because everything is actually her fault—she forced 
him to prove his love by dishonoring himself. At the last minute she 
receives a posthumous note from Maurizio which leads her to believe 
that he truly loved her and that his death was no accident but a suicide 
caused by his remorse for having insulted her.
 Somehow this seems to change everything: her vile assailant turns 
out be noble and her betrothed a coward who could not stand up to 
her own girlish dictates. She approaches the table to sign the marriage 
contract, but when she is handed the pen, she can’t go through with it; 
she throws the pen to the side and shouts, “No, No!” She then explains 
to Giorgio:
I should have lied, I know; but in the supreme moment my soul rebelled. 
That which you should have done, I have done. You are a man, used to 
fighting. It was up to you to let me know that which you can concede 
to passion without dishonoring yourself. You should have broken your 
promise to me. It would have given me great pain at first, but great pride 
in you afterwards. You should have shown me that in love there is all the 
savage poetry of life.134
She then relates that in the confrontation between the two men, it had 
been Maurizio who had taken honorable action in suicide. She cannot 
marry a man she does not respect.
 But there are revelations still to come! Giorgio publicly declares that 
Bianca has been doubly deceived and that he actually killed Maurizio 
in a legitimate duel. The “accident” had been invented to cover the 
crime of chivalry, and the “suicide” was her own misunderstanding of 
Maurizio’s note. Bianca falls to her knees knowing now that Giorgio 
had been right all along. But he stops her and says she deserves to stand 
on her own two feet, for she had learned her lesson on her own: “If 
you had not seen in yourself that slow and ferocious reaction, it would 
have been I Giorgio d’Arbia who would no longer marry Bianca 
d’Oria.” Hearing that she has successfully passed this unknown ordeal 
of honor, she collapses in his arms, and the curtain falls.
 Bianca’s collapse at the dramatic denouement signifies her ultimate 
reliance on her man, but it also further underlines the overall impor-
 134. Ibid., 148.
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tance of self-control in the chivalric equation. As countertypes, women, 
workers, and peasants all lacked this essential ingredient in one way or 
another, and this lack impinged not only on the mechanisms of honor 
but also on the political criteria of rationality and judgment. Power 
should be allocated only to those capable of controlling their feelings, 
their bodies, and, of course, their words. As recently pointed out by 
Madeleine Hurd, this theme was common in liberal regimes. Refining 
Habermas’s ideas on the bourgeois public sphere, Hurd examines how 
manners, mores, and masculinity became critically important markers 
in the new ethos of liberalism which stressed probity, openness, and 
rationality as hallmarks of discussion and action. Liberal public debate 
was supposed to be universally inclusive, but, of course, it was not: it 
ringed itself with defenses to exclude various groups who were seen as 
unfit for political discourse. Thus “those unable to govern their passions 
or themselves—criminals, women, children, cult members, paupers, 
drunkards,—remained suspect.”135 Public discussion among “rational” 
people became an essential part of sovereignty which was now invested 
in a “transparent” state, the actions of which were constantly under 
public scrutiny. Newspapers, political associations, demonstrations, and 
speeches all became part of the public sphere of power relations. In con-
sequence, participants in this system had to demonstrate good manners, 
which assured reasonable debate and discourse, while maintaining a new 
“public masculinity” that stressed responsibility, respectability, sobriety, 
and a concern for one’s family.
 Hurd’s desire in delineating the rules of liberal manhood is to dis-
cuss how workers and socialists tried to break into the system with 
a “sort of hyperrespectability, a demonstrative and public display of 
manly self-discipline,” but her analysis applies handily to the impor-
tance of the dueling code among Italy’s elites. First, the duel was used 
to police behavior within public debate, either oral or written. If one 
transcended the boundaries of propriety—especially with one’s com-
ments—a duel (or simply a vertenza) might ensue that would restore the 
balance of honor. On the other hand, the very nature of the duel with 
its own legislation and rules aided in the process of creating civility, but 
more important it allowed members of the ceto civile to demonstrate 
a reasoned composure which they felt set them off from the rest of 
society. Understanding and embracing the code of chivalry allowed a 
restricted number of new men to join the political and social elite while 
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protecting their privileged identity (and the right to vote) from the 
masses as well as from their own women.136
Legal and Physical Impunity
The social and political functions, both direct and indirect, of dueling in 
Italy were enhanced by the fact that men of honor actually faced little 
real danger from either the law or the sword. As previously suggested, 
the Piedmontese Criminal Code of 1859, which was quickly adopted 
throughout united Italy (with the exception of Tuscany), was notori-
ously lenient with regard to the duel compared to those of the other 
preunitary regimes, some of which still prescribed the death penalty for 
the simple act of crossing swords. Even compared to the earlier Pied-
montese Code of 1839, the 1859 law substantially reduced sanctions for 
convicted duelists. It set the minimum penalty for homicide in a duel at 
one year in prison instead of three, abandoned automatic exclusion from 
public office as a penalty, and allowed the transmutation of hard labor to 
simple confinement depending on the circumstances. Whereas seriously 
wounding an opponent in 1839 could bring seven years of hard labor, 
in 1859 the maximum was set at two years. All in all, then, the 1859 
code represented a more positive attitude toward the duel, which, one 
might suggest, reflected once again the integral relationship of the chi-
valric ethic and Piedmont’s leadership in the unitary movement. And 
even with these lighter penalties at hand, judges and juries alike seldom 
sentenced duelists to anywhere near the maximums allowed.
 Take, for instance, the case of Pier Alberto Selmi, a provincial admin-
istrator in Milazzo, Sicily, who killed one of his acquaintances, Salvatore 
Sciacca, in a saber duel in 1877. Their vertenza had started innocently 
enough in a swimming pool in the town of Patti, where Sciacca could 
not restrain himself from splashing and dunking Selmi, who repeatedly 
asked and then demanded that he halt his aquatic jests. Harsh words 
ensued, and Sciacca took the affair to the next level by slapping Selmi, 
who immediately challenged him to a duel. Because the local police 
got wind of the dust-up, actual combat had to be postponed for over a 
month, but the men eventually managed to fight outside Milazzo, and 
Sciacca died almost instantaneously from a wound to the chest. The 
 136. As I have argued elsewhere, one group for whom the rituals of chivalry seemed 
particularly important was Italy’s Jews as they sought to take advantage of the opportunities of 
equality offered by the new liberal Italy. See Hughes 2005B, 27–29. 
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prosecutor, after a spirited denunciation of dueling as an “arbitrary 
enemy of order,” asked that Selmi and his seconds be given one year’s 
imprisonment, the minimum penalty for homicide in a duel. The tribu-
nal, however, felt differently. The seconds were completely exonerated, 
and Selmi suffered only three months confino, or urban confinement, 
plus court costs of 51 lire.137 For less deadly combat, penalties became 
almost risible, especially after it was established by the courts that in a 
duel that occasioned a wound, only the wounding party was subject to 
sanction. The actual crime of dueling could thus be applied to the prin-
ciples only if no one was wounded—a rare case indeed given the “first 
blood” rules of the ritual under the liberal regime.138
 If the provocation to duel was powerful enough, all penalties could be 
avoided even if one of the principles died as a result. Such was the case 
when Eugenio Mancini, son of P. S. Mancini, killed his wife’s lover (who 
was also his best friend) in a pistol duel in 1875, a case so notorious and 
romantic that the offending spouse went on to write a successful novel 
about it.139 Yet such clemency was not necessarily restricted to affairs of 
the heart. In one of the most sensational cases of the period, in which the 
lawyer Eugenio de Witt killed the professor and journalist Cesare Par-
rini in 1884 for supposedly slanderous accusations made against him 
in print, de Witt was absolved by the jury because the charges had so 
inveighed against his reputation that he had had “no liberty of election” 
in choosing to duel.140 Courts could be surprisingly liberal in deciding 
what constituted such compelling circumstances, as was illustrated in 
1882 by a young fellow who was completely exonerated for killing a 
man in a duel because he had been “horribly and bloodily” provoked 
when his opponent had called him “scoundrel” (canaglia) to his face.141
 All of these decisions fit the general pattern of legal action against 
duelists, which was consistently sparse and lenient in its execution. Fozzi 
and Da Passano have found, for instance, that the number of cases actu-
ally brought to trial reflected only a small portion of the duels known 
to have occurred.142 Extending their quantitative analysis, as shown in 
 137. “Tribunali: Il duello Selmi-Sciacca” in Gazzetta d’Italia, Nov. 7, 1877, 3. 
 138. For example, “Ferito/Feritore,” Rivista penale 1883, vol. 17, 44–45. The Zanardelli 
code attempted to close this loophole by making the duel a crime against the administration 
of justice as opposed to one against persons.
 139. The wife was Evelina Kattermol, and the novel Princess Lara; see Gelli 1992, 148–
50.
 140. Gelli 1928, 191–93.
 141. Scherma italiana, #13, July 15, 1891, 1.
 142. Fozzi and Da Passano 2000, 291.
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table 5, on average, prior to the new provisions of the Zanardelli Code 
of 1890 (which will be discussed later), a duelist had roughly a one in 
ten chance (10.29%) of facing a tribunal for his actions. With the sterner 
penalties in force, after 1890 this rose closer to a two in ten chance 
(17.43%), but it should be pointed out that the actual number of pros-
ecutions did not rise, and the rate change was due primarily to a smaller 
number of reported duels.
 Nor did going to trial necessarily entail punishment. Excuses could 
be found, motives could be probed, and, if one were convicted, prosecu-
tors and judges tended toward minimum penalties or even less. In one of 
his many works on dueling, Gelli gave an overview of sentences handed 
out for dueling from 1891 to 1893, and almost all ranged between three 
to ten days confinement, with a few fines along the way.143 Moreover, 
 143. The longest sentence was five months, which went to a municipal clerk who had 
Table 5
Reported dueling offenses taken to trial, 1880–95
Year Duels Trials Percent
1880 282 23 8
1881 271 28 10
1882 268 24 9
1883 259 38 15
1884 287 37 13
1885 261 35 13
1886 249 9 3
1887 278 — —
1888 269 — —
1889 132a — —
1890 177 20 11
1891 138 25 18
1892 122 32 26
1893 145 26 18
1894 98 — —
1895 73b 17 14
 aReported at 5 months.
 bReported at 6 months.
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one gets the sense that even paltry convictions were routinely appealed 
and often led to lesser punishments.144
 The very fact, however, that so few duelists came to trial, despite the 
open reporting of their exploits in the local and national press, suggests 
that the legal establishment had a difficult time dealing with a crime 
which seemed so much in tune with public sentiment, including that of 
its own members. There is no way to deduce exactly which duels came 
to be prosecuted or why. The temptation is to suggest that duels involv-
ing serious injury, death, or extraordinary circumstances were more 
likely to end up before the courts, but a quick glance at the cases listed 
for 1885 in the juridical statistics of the Rivista penale demonstrates that 
others showed up in greater number. Of the 35 duels brought to trial 
that year, only five resulted in death or serious wounds, while the rest 
involved wounds, light injuries, or even “scratches.” It is probably safe to 
say that duels ending in death always came under investigation, but for 
the rest, prosecutorial caprice seems to have dictated who ended up in 
court.145
 If duelists had little to fear from the law, the same was relatively 
true of their opponents, because, quite frankly, Italian duels were simply 
not terribly dangerous. According to Gelli, in the 3,918 duels reported 
between 1879 and 1899, only 20, or substantially less than 1%, actually 
ended in death.146 Likewise, of the 5,090 wounds received in these duels, 
only 1,475 (29%) were considered “grave” or worse. The others were 
judged as light (2,026) or very light (1,589). These results were driven by 
a variety of mechanisms. First and foremost was the choice of weapons. 
As indicated in the previous chapter, almost 90% of Italian duels were 
fought with sabers, the sharpened blade of which caused lighter wounds 
more quickly than the single, more lethal point of an épée. Incidentally, 
as medical science progressed, the blades were sterilized just before the 
encounter to avoid possible infection. Second, surrounding the conflict 
were many rules which were designed to keep the duelists at absolute 
parity in terms of position and stamina and which purposefully worked 
to keep the opponents from getting seriously hurt. Should a duelist fall, 
trip, or drop his sword, the action was suspended so as to let him regain 
both balance and composure. It was also said that certain directors of 
duels could be engaged who were particularly proficient at limiting the 
killed a lieutenant in a pistol duel in Messina. Gelli 1894, 16–20. 
 144. See, for instance, Cavalleria 1889, 39.
 145. “Statistica,” Rivista penale 1885, vol. 22, 140, 276, 280, 401, 503. 
 146. Gelli 1901A, 11.
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damage done to the duelists: a handy resource in those vertenze arising 
more from social conformity than from personal wrath.147
 Doctors were always on hand to ensure minimal complications from 
wounds and also to judge whether parity was being maintained in a 
physical sense. Doctors could even override the wishes of the combat-
ants and, in the case of a seemingly debilitating wound, could refuse to 
countenance further fighting—thus leaving the rest of the participants 
to face the higher penalties of an “illegal duel” should they continue 
the encounter.148 Because it did not generally matter who won the duel, 
there was seldom a need to go beyond “first blood” to satisfy either 
society or the participants. In fact, the perfect Italian duel was probably 
typified by the frontispiece of Blengini’s 1869 dueling code in which 
two men gladly shook hands while one had his left arm bandaged by 
the attending physician (see image 7 in chapter VI). This is not to belit-
tle the courage of men who risked their appendages if not their lives 
in the pursuit of honor, but it does make their willingness to take on a 
duel over seemingly trivial matters more understandable. In short, the 
prestige, position, and publicity to be gained from a duel greatly out-
weighed its risks, whereas to refuse a challenge could ruin a man’s social 
and even professional life.
A Geography of Honor in Italy
The intimate relationship between Italy’s elite political culture and its 
code of honor clearly emerges when one attempts to gage geographic 
differences in the frequency of duels. Luckily, Gelli’s statistics allow for 
such an analysis, although only for the period between 1887 and 1895. 
His approach in this endeavor was rather straightforward: he simply col-
lected the number of duels reported province by province and listed 
the results year by year in alphabetical order without any attempt at 
aggregate analysis.149 To make the numbers more approachable for my 
study, it seemed best to consolidate the years into a single figure for each 
province and then rank them starting with the highest number of total 
duels. I then separated the numbers into the three regional groups of 
 147. For example, Colonel Albertini, in Mancini 1986, 212.
 148. For example, Toeplitz 1963, 168–76.
 149. Gelli n.d., 16–17. For 1895 he provided figures only for the first semester. He also 
made a couple of errors in addition which resulted in two of his totals being different than the 
sum of the parts. I have used the raw data to recalculate the totals.
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North, Center, and South for comparison, a relatively easy task, with the 
exception of two provinces, Bologna and Forlì, whose placement has 
been debated by Italian social and administrative historians. In contrast 
to the current vogue of placing these two provinces in the North, I 
decided to leave them in the Center so as not to skew the total num-
ber of provinces for each region. Unfortunately, however, Bologna had 
the fifth largest number of duels in all of Italy, and so this decision had 
a substantial impact on the final results. Consequently, for purposes of 
contrast, the results have been calculated and displayed according to 
both definitions, with bracketed figures referring to Bologna and Forlì 
as being in the North.
 The reason for dividing the data into these three regional groups 
derived from my original hypothesis, which was that there might be 
less dueling in the South of Italy because of its stronger traditions of 
family vendetta and blood-feud, which would seem to contradict the 
individualized notions of honor connected with the dueling ritual. At 
first glance, this assumption would appear correct, as is demonstrated 
in table 6 which reports the frequency of reported duels in each of the 
three regions, as well as those which occurred abroad.
 The data would suggest that dueling was indeed lower in the South 
than in the other two areas, with only 24% of the total duels occurring 
in that region. This pattern holds true even if we account for the num-
ber of provinces in each area, with the South accounting for only 9.6 
duels per province as opposed to 16.9 for the Center and 15.4 for the 
North. Likewise, among the 15 provinces that have the fewest number 
of duels (see table 7), the South figures prominently, with 9 provinces at 
Table 6
Reported duels arranged by region, 1887–95
Region
Total 
Number
Percent
Number of 
Provinces
Duels per 
Province
North 415 (479) 43 (50) 27 (29) 15.4 (16.5)
Center 305 (241) 32 (25) 18 (16) 16.9 (15.1)
South 230 24 24 9.6
Foreign 11 1 — —
Total 961 100 69 (69) —
 Note: Only the first semester of 1895 was counted.
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the lower end of the scale compared to 5 for the Center and 1 for the 
North. This tendency, as illustrated in table 8, still holds true even when 
the figures are adjusted for population in the various regions, with the 
South having a ratio of 2.15 duels per 100,000 people versus 4.97 for 
the Center and 3.45 for the North. Naturally, the figures for the Center 
and the North would be different if Bologna and Forlì were counted 
in the latter. Given these results, one could fairly argue that dueling was 
less commonly practiced in the South of Italy, and one might suggest 
that the difference depended on the persistence of older forms of social 
consciousness which demanded a collective response to dishonor and 
thus tended to lead to long-term vendetta rather than the focused indi-
vidualized rituals of the duel.150
 However, such a conclusion is seriously weakened by other aspects of 
the data. First, three southern provinces (Messina, Napoli, and Catania) 
 150. See, for instance, Muir 1993, 247–72.
Table 7
Fifteen provinces with the lowest number of reported duels, 1887–95
Province Region
Number of 
Duels
Campobasso South 0
Ascoli-Piceno South 0
Arezzo Center 0
Teramo Center 1
Siena Center 1
Sassari South 1
Potenza South 1
Cosenza South 1
Caltanisetta South 1
Cagliari South 1
Trapani South 2
Salerno South 2
Padova North 2
Massa Carrara Center 2
Chieti Center 2
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had a relatively large number of duels and appear among the top 10 
provinces listed in table 9, with Palermo closely following as number 11. 
Indeed, when adjusted for population, as is done in table 10, Messina 
with 10.3 per 100,000 comes very close to a tie with Bologna, with 
10.4 per 100,000 for the number 2 position for all of Italy. On the 
other hand, a number of Northern and Central provinces demonstrated 
rather low frequencies of dueling, with 13 provinces or 29% reporting 
an average of 1 duel or less per year.
 Considering these results, it is clear that any regional stereotype of 
honor is too clumsy to accurately account for the distribution of duel-
ing in Italy, and thus alternative explanations are in order. Looking at 
the data from a fresh perspective, one might argue that one of the key 
variables has to do with urban and rural percentages of the popula-
tion. Dueling tended to be an urban phenomenon, and one would like 
to know just how many people in each province lived in large cities. 
Unfortunately, such demographic precision for every province would 
require prohibitive endeavor and may, in fact, be impossible. However, 
it should be obvious from table 9 that, in terms of raw numbers, the 
provinces with the greatest number of duels tended to be those with 
large, dominant cities. In fact, one is struck by the number of preunitary 
capitals among the top 10 provinces of table 10, and this becomes even 
more evident if one considers Genova, Bologna, and Palermo (number 
11), all of which had a history of being independent political capitals 
at one time or another. These considerations would seem to empha-
size the important political role that dueling played during the liberal 
period, a role that fits the major theme of this work quite handily. But 
the point here is social in the sense that those cities with politically 
Table 8
Percentage of reported duels per 100,000 population, 1887–95
Region
Total 
Number
Percent Population
Duels per 
Population
North 415 (479) 43 (50) 12,013,889 3.45 (3.99)
Center 305 (241) 32 (25) 6,142,974 4.97 (3.92)
South 230 24 10,698,677 2.15
Foreign 11 1    — —
Total 961 100 28,855,540 3.33
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active urban elites were more likely to demonstrate substantially higher 
rates of dueling, at least in raw numbers, than other areas.151
 Yet the picture changes somewhat when we examine table 10, which 
demonstrates the 15 provinces with the highest number of duels when 
adjusted by population. One has to wonder why Livorno, Messina, Porto 
Maurizio, Grosseto, and Catania have such high percentages of duel-
ing per 100,000 when compared to other provinces. Did it have to do 
with the fact that four of the five were seaports, or was it perhaps the 
effect of large military garrisons in these areas? As already noted, officers 
tended to be over-represented among those participating in duels, and 
thus a large army or navy base could skew the normal distribution of a 
province—especially perhaps by bringing in people who were foreign 
to local customs and who were thus more likely to cross the lines of 
accepted etiquette. A combination of factors might also be involved. 
 151. One also has to consider the possibility of a bias in Gelli’s reporting system, which was 
based primarily on newspapers. More politically active towns might have had a wider press 
arena for such reporting.
Table 9
Fifteen provinces with the highest frequency of reported duels, 1887–95
Province Region
Number of 
Duels
Milano North 100
Roma Center 85
Genova North 78
Firenze Center 49
Bologna Center 48
Messina South 48
Napoli South 46
Livorno Center 40
Torino North 40
Catania South 36
Palermo South 20
Alessandria North 16
Forli Center 16
Verona North 14
Pavia North 14
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Livorno, after 1885, had Italy’s sole naval academy, but it was also famous 
for its fencing academy and masters, and one wonders if they were not 
as important in creating a demand for technical dueling skills as they 
were in offering a supply of them. Consider, for instance, the descrip-
tion of the city’s most famous fencing master, Eugenio Pini, who was 
vaunted as exemplifying “the fighting character of whoever wants to 
be considered a good livornese, intolerant of tyranny and ready to match 
up with audacity, which sometimes seems like impudence to whoever 
tries to impose himself on others.”152 This was an attitude designed to 
elicit confrontation, and it is perhaps not insignificant that one of the 
very last recorded duels in Italy took place in Livorno.153
 Just as interesting are the cases of provinces where one might expect 
to have more duels. Padova, for instance, had a famous university which, 
 152. Quoted in Gelli 1927, 83. 
 153. See Santini 1985, 121–52. 
Table 10
Fifteen provinces with the highest number of reported duels per 100,000 
population, 1887–95
Province Region
Duels per 100,000 
Population
Livorno Center 33.0
Bologna Center 10.4
Messina South 10.3
Genova North 9.9
Roma Center 9.8
Milano North 8.9
Porto Maurizio North 7.2
Grosseto Center 6.7
Catania South 6.4
Forli Center 6.3
Firenze Center 6.1
Ancona Center 4.7
Napoli South 4.6
Piacenza North 4.3
Pisa Center 4.2
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as a training ground of elites, might be expected to generate a number 
of duels. However, as can be seen in table 11 it reported only two in 
five years and thus had one of the lowest rates in Italy.154 Was there 
some other cultural variable, perhaps the strength of the Catholic 
movement—which was critical both of liberal politics and dueling—
that worked against the practice, or was it just the accidental effect of 
random variation?
 Such questions lie beyond the reach of the present work, but the 
statistics taken as a whole still obviously allow some reasonably secure 
assertions. First, dueling was a pan-Italian phenomenon. Although the 
South had fewer reported duels in both real and adjusted terms, it still 
accounted for almost one-fourth of the total number. This fact clearly 
 154. In fact, Italian students tended not to duel with the same alacrity as their German 
counterparts. See Laven 1992. 
Table 11
Fifteen provinces with the lowest number of reported duels per 100,000 
population, 1887–95
Province Region
Duels per 100,000 
Population
Campobasso South 0
Ascoli-Piceno South 0
Arezzo Center 0
Potenza South 0.18
Cosenza South 0.21
Cagliari South 0.23
Salerno South 0.34
Caltanisetta South 0.37
Teramo Center 0.38
Sassari South 0.38
Siena Center 0.48
Padova North 0.50
Avellino South 0.50
Chieti Center 0.56
Trapani South 0.70
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indicates the weakness of any global cultural model when speaking of 
either the South or the North and suggests that other variables, such 
as the presence of large cities or military bases, were probably more 
important in determining levels of dueling. That the dueling “mania” 
of united Italy was not restricted to a single region of the country says 
something about the creation and communication of a distinctly Italian 
political culture in the decades after unification. The “cult of honor” 
clearly provided a common ground of understanding for Italian elites 
which could help bridge regional and provincial differences. Those 
areas with the greatest political activity and concomitant journalistic 
debate naturally led the pack. On the other hand, we can see that 
although widespread, the distribution of dueling in Italy was anything 
but balanced. Indeed, the top 10 provinces (or 15%) listed in table 9 
accounted for 570 of the reported duels, or almost 60%. Thus in cer-
tain towns, such as Bologna, Milan, or Livorno, a “gentleman” might 
have faced the possibility of getting caught up in a duel on a daily 
basis, while in Padova, Arezzo, or Cagliari it may have been an issue of 
less concern. Nevertheless, the widespread acclaim accorded by various 
newspapers to the many duels occurring through the period suggests 
that it would have been difficult as a member of the ceto civile or at least 
the reading public to have ignored the very real pressure of the code of 
honor.
An Ideal Duelist: Felice Cavallotti
It seems fitting to conclude this chapter with a minibiography of Felice 
Cavallotti who acted as both archetype and advertisement for the duel 
during the liberal period and who died during his thirty-third encoun-
ter in 1898.155 Born to a humble clerk in Milan, Cavallotti got caught 
up in the student politics of the day and became a fervent Italian patriot. 
Overwhelmed by the charisma of Giuseppe Garibaldi, he lied about 
his age in order to join the second wave of volunteers leaving for Sic-
ily in June of 1860 and saw action at Milazzo, where his commander 
was killed at his side by a musket ball. His experience as a Redshirt 
confirmed his democratic affinities and influenced his style of politics 
which stressed action over caution and courage over compromise.156 
 155. One journalist put the number at 39 duels. Lega 1930, 330.
 156. Galante Garrone 1976, 19–36, 43–60, 87. 
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Asked later in the century to define his political philosophy, he replied 
simply that he was, and had always been, a Garibaldino.157
 It was, however, his literary abilities that determined his success in 
life and his influence in Italy. These talents came to the fore with his 
“War Hymn,” written en route to Sicily, which became an unofficial 
anthem of Garibaldi’s expedition. Other patriotic poetry would follow, 
and eventually he would garner the title of Italy’s “bard of democracy.” 
He wrote a number of successful plays (often based on patriotic themes) 
which, although he was never wealthy, allowed him to indulge his pas-
sion of journalism.158 Eventually he became coeditor of Milan’s Il gaz-
zettino rosa with Achille Bizzoni, another firebrand of democracy, and 
they became famous for their unbridled language and biting satire, as 
well as their willingness to back up their words with their swords. On 
one occasion Cavallotti challenged the entire directorship of the pres-
tigious Felsineo club in Bologna, because they had removed one of his 
books of poetry, which had proven offensive to a member, from their 
library. He took on the first three of 21 directors in consecutive duels, 
but a wound put an early end to the escapade.159 Like many of his con-
temporaries, he justified the duel as a useful, albeit illegal, tool for soci-
ety because it allowed for the quick and cordial reconciliation of “those 
disputes and questions that through another route would go on forever, 
becoming poisonous and leaving behind them a sad aftereffect of new 
disputes and rancors and profound irreconcilable hatreds.”160 Neverthe-
less, according to his biographer Galante Garrone, Cavallotti’s love of the 
duel went beyond any excuse that it was a necessary evil; rather, it fit his 
personality, combining courage, militancy, and a love of public display. 
Not that he was particularly proficient at it; hampered as he was by short 
stature, bad eyesight, and a surprising lack of training. Nevertheless, by 
1880 he had already fought some 20 duels, many of which had ended 
with his blood rather than that of his opponent on the ground.161
 Impetuous, impulsive, and committed to the cause of republican-
ism, his unrelenting, sometimes scurrilous, criticisms of the monarchy 
and the “historic right” often prompted sequestration of his articles 
and occasionally landed him in jail—all of which only enhanced his 
 157. Avanti, March 8, 1898, 1. 
 158. He was never well off. At one point he published a couple of books on dancing for 
young gentlemen to make ends meet. Galante Garrone 1976, 200.
 159. Ibid., 455–56.
 160. Letter of Feb. 12, 1888, in Cavalleria 1889, 19–24. Cavallotti dramatized his support of 
the duel in the stage play Agatodemon published in 1889. 
 161. Galante Garrone 1976, 174–75, 381–86, 391. 
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popularity on the radical left. Such dramatic confrontations with the 
law became less frequent after the taking of Rome in 1870, and he 
eventually agreed to serve in the national parliament in 1873. Having 
come to uneasy terms with the monarchy, however, Cavallotti lost nei-
ther his fire-eating rhetoric nor his petulant attitude. On the contrary: 
having compromised on the issue of the monarchy, he was almost duty- 
bound to maintain a fierce and unaccommodating independence vis-à-
vis the ruling majority, including the historic Left after 1876. Unafraid 
of losing office, he constantly berated other politicians for their lack of 
probity, their willingness to trade conscience for votes, and their utiliza-
tion of high-handed techniques in manipulating elections. His behavior 
and rhetoric added up to a recipe for chivalrous combat, as he consis-
tently had to prove that, in accepting his seat in parliament, he had lost 
none of the “combative vigor” of the Garibaldian moment. His many 
vertenze and duels enhanced his public presence as an extraordinary man 
of courage and conviction, all the while maintaining his reputation as 
a man of the people who literally “fought” to expand the electorate, 
promote civil liberties, and assure the rights of workers.
 His battling spirit and many duels made him as well an analogue for 
a vigorous and vibrant Italy, an Italy of action and élan. Ironically, Count 
Ferruccio Macola, the man who would kill him in a duel 14 years later, 
praised him in 1884 as a model for the youth of the nation: “I admire 
you because of your strong character, which stands out in these times 
of weakness, in this effeminate and queer epoch, that destroys the fiber 
of our youth, that obscures their ideals, that slackens the love of the 
fatherland in their hearts.”162 His radical intransigence and his Garibal-
dian romanticism no doubt contributed to this portrait, but it was his 
chivalrous gallantry, his constant willingness to face death for the sake 
of his convictions, which kept the image of patriotic virility alive in a 
political environment that had necessarily shifted from the heroic to the 
prosaic.
 For all his panache and prestige, however, it was his spectacular death 
while fighting a duel with Macola that secured his place in history. The 
events leading up to the tragedy were hardly extraordinary; rather, they 
almost mundanely fit the pattern of political duels established after unity. 
Macola, a fellow deputy and newspaper editor, had idolized Cavallotti 
as a young man, but he had become increasingly conservative during 
the turbulent 1890s. Having first backed the authoritarian government 
 162. Quoted in ibid., 708.
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of Francesco Crispi, whom Cavallotti despised for betraying his Garib-
aldian roots, Macola aligned himself with those calling for the curtail-
ment of civil liberties in order to deal with the growing power of the 
socialist and anarchist “menace.” Such, in itself would have put Macola 
at odds with the “bard of democracy,” but he hoped to use his personal 
acquaintance with Cavallotti to boost his own prestige, and he sug-
gested in a series of articles that, in private, Cavallotti had confided his 
support for such draconian measures. Cavallotti consistently repudiated 
these claims, and when Macola wrote him an angry letter accusing him 
of malfeasance, Cavallotti published a response calling him “a profes-
sional liar.”163
 This assured a bitter vertenza, and during the negotiations Macola 
reportedly demanded use of the guantone—a large glove designed to 
raise the risk of serious injury by protecting the fencer’s arm. Cavallot-
ti’s representatives protested the guantone, not least because it favored 
Macola’s longer reach. However, knowing that Cavallotti wanted to 
end the affair quickly and that he would reject any condition that 
might even hint at trepidation, they eventually agreed to the condi-
tions of combat. With the preliminaries out of the way, the duelists met 
with their respective entourages outside Rome in the villa of Countess 
Cellere on the afternoon of March 4, 1898. Macola was younger, taller, 
and the better fencer, but it was Cavallotti’s own impetuousness that 
would prove fatal. Charging with his usual sound and fury, he quickly 
managed to impale himself on his opponent’s sword, which entered his 
mouth and cut the carotid artery at the back of his throat. He died in 
minutes suffocating on his own blood.
 Cavallotti’s final duel was a perfect microcosm of Italy’s politics of 
the sword. Both of the duelists and all of their seconds were deputies in 
parliament. The duel was hosted at the villa of Countess Cellere who 
oversaw all of the physical preparations and seemed to put an aristo-
cratic stamp on the proceedings. At least three of the participants were 
also journalists, and the root cause of the conflict had come from a 
series of published charges and countercharges. Moreover, those charges 
had resulted from the personal political rapport between Macola and 
Cavallotti as Italy once again went through political realignment during 
the turbulent decade of the 1890s. With the fall of Crispi after Adowa 
and the ongoing instability occasioned by the rise of the socialists, the 
violence of the anarchists, and the repressive tactics of the government, 
 163. Other factors contributing to the duel can be found in Lega 1930, 326–29.
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previous arrangements of power were in play. Cavallotti’s prestige on 
the extreme left made him an arbiter of possible solutions. Overstep-
ping the bounds of presumption in his efforts to effect such a solution 
through public pressure, Macola ran afoul of Cavallotti’s personal sensi-
bilities and brought the matter to a point of honor. In fact, some would 
later say that he intentionally provoked the duel and then demanded 
possibly lethal conditions in the hopes of getting Cavallotti out of the 
way.164
 Such a conspiracy seems highly unlikely, especially considering what 
happened to Macola after the encounter. Contrary to popular percep-
tion, the Italian parliament did not offer him immunity, and he was 
prosecuted for murder during a duel.165 In part, the government’s deci-
sion derived simply from the notoriety of the encounter as well as from 
Cavallotti’s prominence as a political figure and friend of the people. 
Enormous public mourning attended his death, and crowds of weeping 
peasants and workers lined up early to pay homage to him as the train 
carried his body from Rome to Milan.166 Nor did Macola’s reputa-
tion fare well at the trial. Witnesses testified as to the manner in which 
he had provoked Cavallotti beyond normal limits, while “experts” in 
chivalry were brought in to comment on the legitimacy of the vertenza 
and especially on Macola’s insistence on using the danger-inducing 
guantone, despite the early protests of Cavallotti’s representatives. Found 
guilty, he was originally sentenced to 13 months in prison but then 
managed on appeal to get a reduction to 7 months.167 While the sen-
tence fit the general pattern of leniency in Italy—after all he had killed 
a man and had been portrayed as the aggressor—the real penalty came 
from public opinion and his own conscience. Generally shunned by his 
fellow deputies, he never fully recovered from the traumatic event or its 
aftermath. Although he managed to remain in parliament, he eventu-
ally killed himself on August 18, 1910.168 Much like Aaron Burr who 
killed Alexander Hamilton in 1804, he had, whether by design or by 
accident, broken the unspoken rules of political dueling. Killing one’s 
opponent upset the balance of honor, it implied subterfuge, and it ran 
counter to the many safeguards designed to keep affairs bloody but not 
 164. See Premuti 1924.
 165. Rivista penale 1898, vol. 47, 625.
 166. For a report on such a scene in Grossetto see La Risveglia quadrimestrale di varia umanità, 
nn7–8/Maggio–Agosto 2001/Settembre–Dicembre 2001, ARCHIVIO. 
 167. Rivista penale 1899, vol. 49, 558.
 168. Lega 1930, 338.
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lethal. The many political purposes of the duel were best served when 
both combatants lived to tell the tale.
 Thus Felice Cavallotti stands as the apotheosis of Italian dueling. 
Born into the petit bourgeois, he combined patriotism and talent to be- 
come one of the leading lights of the liberal period, and he died duel-
ing with a member of the nobility. A convinced democrat and republi-
can, he saw no paradox between his populist notions of power and his 
chivalrous assumptions of honor. In challenging Aldo Aldini to a duel 
for insulting his poetry, he celebrated the “maxim that every citizen is 
the first and best custodian of his own honor.”169 The key word here 
is perhaps “citizen,” for it held out hope to each Italian that he could 
become an active member of the ceto civile and thus could share in 
the personal empowerment offered by the dueling code. Unafraid of 
titles, honors, and pedigrees, Cavallotti once simultaneously challenged 
a prince, a count, and a commendatore for insults to his artistry, and all 
three accepted his invitation to combat. The son of a nobody, who 
lived much of his life on the edge of poverty, he used his abilities, his 
brio, and his sword to carve a prominent place in the politics of united 
Italy and died surrounded by fellow deputies in the drawing room of 
a countess. A massive demonstration of shock and grief followed his 
demise, and Turati, head of the socialist party, eulogized him as not just 
a man, but as “a generation of men, and of that which in it was beauti-
ful, exalted, proud.”170 Such was his stature that when he died by the 
sword, a wave of indignation rose up against the duel which, as we shall 
see in chapter VI, set in motion new forces that would seek to undercut 
the chivalric axioms that had dominated his worldview.171
 169. Galante Garrone 1976, 456.
 170. Quoted in ibid., 723. 
 171. See Vassallo 1918, 112–18.
efOre digging too deeply into the protracted debate that sur-
rounded the duel in liberal Italy, one must examine the elaborate 
complex of codes, juries, and courts that began to grow around the 
practice after unification. This was an ongoing project that would last 
well into the fascist period, and the constant renewal of such regulation 
testified to both the pretensions and the apprehensions of the chivalric 
community. On the one hand, the production of new dueling manuals 
and the well-publicized operation of juries of honor testified to the 
vibrancy and constancy of the dueling ethic in Italian society. They 
further provided the framework for a parallel code of privileged justice 
that worked to enhance the influence and stature of its adherents. Real 
gentlemen were held to have special sensibilities of honor, and it only 
made sense (at least to them) that there should be pan-Italian mecha-
nisms to recognize and regulate their needs and deeds. On the other 
hand, the large number of competing dueling manuals and the persis-
tent demand for better-organized and more-formal institutions of 
honor betrayed an underlying uncertainty as to the efficacy and the 
legitimacy of the whole chivalric enterprise. Gentlemen might be gen-
tlemen, but they needed a great deal of help validating each other and 
disciplining themselves as they wrangled over their honor.
 On a practical level, the dueling manuals and courts of honor prom-
ised solutions to a variety of problems arising around the ritual. Some 
of these dealt with the mechanics of how, when, and where one should 
Institutions of Honor
and the Search for Legal Sanction
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seek satisfaction. But the overarching issues were about the “why” and 
above all the “who” of honorable combat, and these questions derived 
from the open-ended nature of the ceto civile. If a willingness to fight 
duels in a proper fashion helped determine the definition of a gentle-
man, what was to stop some unprincipled character from using the code 
of honor to cover his less-than-savory background or dishonest actions? 
This problem was compounded by the powerful social/psychological 
compulsion to duel that weighed on members of polite society. An 
unscrupulous but talented swordsman, or spadaccino, could use his mar-
tial abilities to blackmail or extort patronage from victims who, because 
of the dictates of honor, could not refuse to do battle if he challenged 
or insulted them. Interestingly, some of the most dramatic examples of 
such abuses of honor came from Paolo Fambri’s lengthy 1869 defense of 
the duel, La giurisprudenza del duello. In one case, he recounted how an 
enterprising fencing expert cleverly provoked a young man into chal-
lenging him after a gambling session and then demanded a large sum of 
money from his mother in order to allow himself to be lightly wounded 
instead of killing her son. Naturally, Fambri decried this “brigandage 
in white gloves,” but with his usual brio he claimed he could make a list 
of 150 paladins who would gladly hire out their sword for a thousand 
lire. Even nonexperts, according to Fambri, could use the dueling com-
pulsion for improper purposes, with professors being challenged for 
giving bad grades or bankers called out for refusing loans to bad credit 
risks.1 Both proponents and opponents of the duel talked about such 
abuses but, of course, with completely different purposes. For oppo-
nents it was patently obvious that they demonstrated the moral bank-
ruptcy of dueling in general, while proponents argued that they made 
the creation of efficient courts of honor imperative so as to bring them 
under control.
 This chapter looks at the chivalric community’s attempts to regulate 
itself as the dueling ethic came to dominate the new country. It exam-
ines the various dueling manuals that appeared after unity and explains 
why one of them, Iacopo Gelli’s 1892 Codice cavalleresco italiano, so thor-
oughly prevailed over its many competitors. Specifically, it argues that 
Gelli came to dominate the scene because, along with other factors, he 
understood the need to make his code part of a larger matrix of chi-
valric justice, which allowed gentlemen greater leeway in settling their 
vertenze while mimicking the style and authority of the regular legal 
 1. Fambri 1869, 5–7, 120–26, 132–35. 
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system. Such efforts, then, fit into a conscious campaign to force the 
state to recognize the special dictates of elite honor, even though such 
a move ran counter to the basic principles of the liberal regime. In the 
end, the long battle to win government sanction for the courts of honor 
reflected a fundamental desire to gain greater legitimacy for the chival-
ric ethic, all the while coming to grips with the unsettling paradox that 
Italy’s elites owed allegiance to two codes of comportment that were at 
heart mutually exclusive: one legal and the other illegal. Italian gentle-
men certainly embraced the duel as a part of their personal and national 
identity, but they were not always at ease with the relationship or its 
consequences. Men of private honor and public order, they needed the 
“jurisprudence of the duel,” as Fambri correctly called it, to ease their 
consciences and to finesse the logic of their actions.
The Search for a National Dueling Code
One of the most obvious affirmations of the chivalric ethic in Italy was 
the continuous publication of dueling codes during the liberal regime. 
Between 1860 and 1914, some 22 such codes appeared, most written, 
as we have seen, by fencing masters but others penned by military men, 
lawyers, and journalists. Some of the codes were short pamphlets or 
appendices designed to enhance the sale of technical fencing manuals, 
but others were full-blown tomes running to hundreds of pages. What-
ever their length, however, the codes kept appearing and thus constantly 
reiterated to the male reading public that society expected them to “do 
the right thing,” and that they should know what they were about 
should the occasion arise. As a reviewer tellingly said of General Achille 
Angelini’s popular code, “it is indispensable for whoever belongs to the 
caste of gentlemen and for anyone who believes and can belong to it.”2 
The codes simultaneously reinforced the link between patriotism and 
chivalry because each in its own way maintained that it was the real 
Italian code which faithfully interpreted the traditions and customs of 
Italy in the face of foreign imports. Finally, and perhaps of greatest sig-
nificance, the codes consistently offered substantial legal legitimacy to 
what was technically a crime.3 According to this logic, dueling was no 
random act; rather, it had rules codified from time-honored consensus 
 2. From the Unione liberale di Terni, in Angelini 1888, 9. 
 3. See Morelli 1904, 254. 
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derived from ancient judicial practices. The fact that experts and their 
codes sometimes wrangled over the details only enhanced the illusion 
of a living jurisprudence that offered a parallel legal system to those 
men who qualified for its protection.
 That a specifically Italian code was necessary seemed obvious to 
all involved in the chivalric community. First of all, potential duelists 
needed a homegrown reference work that they could employ as a hedge 
against the Italian legal system. Unlike France, Italy’s penal codes of 
1859 and 1889 defined dueling as a crime in and of itself, but they 
also generously mitigated sentences against assault, mutilation, and mur-
der if these acts were committed during a “legal” duel. In consequence, 
murder usually carried a sentence of over 20 years’ imprisonment, but 
conviction of murder during a duel after 1889 brought a penalty of 
between only six months and five years in prison—and that constituted 
an increase compared to the old law of 1859.4 The trouble, of course, 
was how to determine whether such deeds had actually been com-
mitted during a “real” duel. Enter the dueling codes, which offered 
the combined authority of chivalric experts, adherence to which could 
assure duelists the much more lenient penalties attached to the practice.5 
Correct notification of a sfida, the presence of a doctor to care for the 
wounded, exact equality of weapons, proper preparation of the terreno, 
a carefully worded account of the combat signed by the padrini—all 
guaranteed the “legality” of this blatantly illegal act. Attention to such 
details became even more important after the code of 1889 spelled out 
very harsh punishments for people caught cheating during a duel.
 A dueling code was also seen as necessary to help stem the flood 
of duels that followed unity, or at least to limit their consequences. A 
book of rules governing affairs of honor, it was argued, would define 
who was allowed to duel and who was not. It would exempt certain 
people from having to fight, and it would prioritize offenses of honor 
so that people would avoid dueling over trivial matters. Likewise, it 
would set careful rules of protocol designed to eliminate the possibility 
that unscrupulous people would use duels as a form of extortion or for 
other dishonorable purposes. Especially important were strict rules for 
the actual conduct of the duel and the responsibilities of the seconds, 
which worked to make the encounters fairer and less bloody. Pistols 
could not be rifled and thus more accurate. Swords had to be of equal 
 4. Article 239 (1889) vs. article 589 (1859).
 5. For a courtroom example see Cavalleria 1889.
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length, and no advantage could be drawn from a broken weapon or an 
accidental fall. Each wound inflicted had to be examined by attending 
physicians and seconds to determine whether the combatants were still 
equal in their faculties and whether honor had been sufficiently served 
in balance of the damage done. In general, then, most dueling codes 
worked hard to protect the participants from excessive danger or pain, 
although there were a few later exceptions which are discussed below. 
A good dueling manual might even be a source of comfort and advice 
to some neophyte who inadvertently found both his honor and his life 
on the line. Finally, and perhaps of greatest importance, it was hoped 
that a code would provide the legislative basis for the juries and courts 
of honor that would attempt to adjudicate offenses between gentlemen 
and bring most encounters of honor to a peaceable resolution. Given 
the perceived need for a code and the well-heeled pool of potential 
duelists, there was a strong market force at work as well. The author 
who could pen the generally accepted code not only would accrue 
considerable honor, prestige, and status within Italian society but would 
also stand to make a substantial profit.
 Each of the competing codes naturally vaunted its special exper-
tise in settling affairs of honor as each sought to carve a niche in the 
growing opus of dueling lore and increase its own credence and audi-
ence. However, given the codes’ normative function, it is not surprising 
that they differed little in their basic precepts. They happily wrangled 
over whether the offeso (offended party) or the sfidato (challenged party) 
should be allowed the choice of weapons (most opted for the offeso); or 
whether a representative who had taken over from another representa-
tive in mid-vertenza had to honor the agreements already established 
by his predecessor; or whether one should wait 15 or 20 minutes for 
a tardy opponent on the field. Such issues were certainly considered 
important to the adherents of this new scienza cavalleresca. Yet for the 
most part, they represented minor tweakings of a system already set in 
place by the French, who in turn had built their own system on that of 
the Italian experts of the sixteenth century.
 If there was one serious difference among the codes, it was how 
much blood needed to flow for a “real” duel. Many authorities rejected 
frivolous “first blood” duels, and most felt that certain offenses, such 
as being slapped or having one’s woman meddled with, automatically 
demanded a duel ad oltranza, in which one of the participants had to 
be so badly wounded that he could not continue the combat. A few, 
however, argued that virtually all duels should end in serious bloodshed. 
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Such was the opinion of Luigi Barbasetti, whose Codice cavalleresco of 
1898 demanded that every vertenza be put before a jury of honor, and if 
it was deemed worthy of action the seconds should insist that the duel 
result in wounds so severe that one of the duelists be unable to stand 
on his feet. Putting real teeth in the dueling ethic would, he argued, 
eliminate the many “silly” duels which ended with a scratch and would 
discourage those who attempted to use the ritual for the wrong reasons. 
This would, of course, greatly reduce the number of duels in Italy, and 
Barbasetti justified his violent demands with the motto “one fights 
the duel with the duel itself.” Perhaps to avoid legal problems for his 
book, Barbasetti did waffle a bit, offering a gradation of offenses that 
might determine less serious conditions, but on the whole his code was 
aimed at making duels life-threatening occasions that truly tested men’s 
resolve and promised pain and suffering to at least one of the partici-
pants.6
 Barbasetti may have been influenced by the greater harshness of 
Germanic dueling practices, for he wrote his book in Vienna (where 
he taught fencing) and he dedicated it to a Prince of Thurn and Taxis. 
However, in Italy he represented a minority position on a spectrum 
of opinion that generally tended to keep duels less than deadly. His 
view did become increasingly popular after the turn of the century as 
dueling codes became more bloodthirsty. San di Malato Staiti (1913), 
Borgatti (1914), and especially Brunetti (1914) all excoriated the 
degrading influence of frivolous duels fought without danger, and they 
all argued for greater rigor in their execution. The reasons for this trend 
are unclear, but it may have been a testy reaction to a gradual decline 
in duels after 1890 (examined in the next chapter) or to the growing 
criticism of the practice on the part of the Socialists and Catholics. In 
Brunetti’s case (see chapter VI) it was clearly linked to a hypernationalist 
despair over the supposed feminization and weakening of Italian society. 
Whatever the case, none of Italy’s dueling codes, Barbasetti’s included, 
permitted the arrangement of a duel that could only end in ultimo 
sangue, or the death of one of the principles, for such encounters were 
considered both unchivalric and tantamount to either suicide or pre-
meditated homicide. Likewise, none of Italy’s codes, with the notable 
exception of Brunetti’s, claimed to actively promote the proliferation of 
dueling. Rather, they all portrayed themselves as working to discipline 
and limit an unstoppable activity demanded by society.
 6. Barbasetti 1898, 15, 21, 51–65.
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 With few actual differences in important details of challenge or 
combat, authors of dueling codes resorted to various gimmicks to try 
to attract a larger audience. One author offered a series of “do-it-your-
self ” photographic plates illustrating each stage of the duel, from arriv-
ing at the terreno to writing up the verbale.7 Another technique was 
to induce any number of officers, politicians, and masters of arms to 
affix their names at the end of the code as testament to the legitimacy 
and authority of its contents. One early author, Luigi de Rosis, offered 
83 such signatures in his code of 1868, including all 15 professors of 
the Neapolitan Fencing Society.8 He was clearly outdone, however, by 
Pasquale Cicirelli, who five years later offered a code signed by no fewer 
than 270 southern fencing masters.9 Another author, A. d’Amico Franz, 
had only 55 such signatories for his code of 1894, but they included 
12 parliamentary deputies, 5 titled aristocrats, and an honorary fencing 
master of the royal household.10 The idea was not just that these wor-
thies supported the author’s claims of expertise but that they pledged 
themselves to conduct their own affairs of honor according to his pre-
cepts. Having prestigious men in positions of power lead by example in 
their vertenze was obviously considered a powerful and, one might add, 
inexpensive form of advertising.
 Another weapon in the battle for popularity was the use of ornate 
and enticing book covers and frontispieces. Some, as we have seen, 
dripped with medieval icons of knights, swords, spurs, and lances. Oth-
ers, such as that of Blengini (see image 5), stressed the fraternal and 
bonding nature of the duel as a means of healing honorable disputes 
between true gentlemen.11 But the prize for creative (and sensational-
istic) artwork goes to Ernesto Salafia Maggio’s Codice cavalleresco nazio-
nale, which was published in Palermo in 1895. His cover (see image 
6) sported a bare-breasted Italia who is wearing a turreted crown 
and whose torso is twisted to titillating advantage as her right hand 
grasps a massive two-handed medieval sword, the phallic overtones of 
which need no explication. The blade carries the inscription, “don’t 
use (impugnar) me without reason,” a clear caveat that chivalric combat 
should not be entered lightly. In her left hand rests a caduceus, an ancient 
symbol of healing and a ready reference to the pacifying power of the 
 7. Salafia Maggio 1895.
 8. De Rosis 1868, 89–95.
 9. Cicirelli 1873, appendix 1.
 10. D’Amico 1894, 30–32.
 11. Blengini 1868.
Image 5
Cover of Cesare Alberto Blengini’s 1868 dueling manual
Image 6
Cover of Ernesto Salafia Maggio’s 1895 dueling manual
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duel among gentlemen. At her feet lies a motley pile of law books and 
dueling weapons, from the bottom of which there protrudes a two-
handed sword that is also very obviously a crucifix! Here the image is 
ambiguous. Is Salafia Maggio trying to suggest that his national code 
will finally cut through the current mess of chivalrous legislation? Or, 
more likely, does the image argue that both the law (as designated by 
the book Lex) and the church fall before the feet of Italian honor? Less 
obscure are the strength and the energy of Italia herself, whose swash-
buckling leather belt hangs just low enough to demonstrate her fertile 
female midriff while simultaneously creating an aura of virile combat. 
The whole enterprise succeeds in capturing the essential icons of Italy’s 
need for national honor while appealing to the sexual tastes and mar-
ket motivators of Italian males. Alas, the brilliance of Salafia Maggio’s 
artwork did him little good in the end, and his much-vaunted Codice 
would fail to capture the hearts and minds of Italy’s gentlemen.12
 That honor would eventually go to Iacopo Gelli, whose career as a 
chivalric statistician we have already examined, and his triumph tells us 
much about the evolution of the duel during the liberal period. First 
appearing in 1886, his Codice cavalleresco quickly became the standard 
handbook of “honorable” behavior, and by 1926, the year of its fif- 
teenth edition, it had sold over 55,000 copies and could be found in 
Austrian, Spanish, and Portuguese translations.13 Other editions would 
follow in 1932, 1935, and 1943, and a reprint of the 1926 version would 
appear in 1981 and 1990. In addition to guiding potential duelists, his 
book was used as expert testimony during criminal trials dealing with 
duels and was cited in published debates of gentlemen seeking to dis-
credit their adversaries with erudite arguments over points of honor.14 
In both 1933 and 1937 it was confirmed by the fascist Consiglio di 
Stato as the most authoritative guide to chivalric “legislation.”15 Gelli’s 
stature was no less impressive among the military, and already in 1901 
his book was off-handedly referred to by one jurist as the jus receptum of 
officers.16 In 1920 it was adopted by Italy’s War College and was recom-
mended to its students as basic reading, a policy also instituted at the 
 12. Salafia Maggio 1895. Cover illustration by S. Turati.
 13. Athos Gastone Banti, preface to Gelli 1926, xiv, xix. 
 14. For example, “Vertenza Fecia di Cossato-Chiesa,” in CDS, March 7, 1910, 1; and 
Procedimento penale contro Giulio Moroni e Rodolfo Terlizzi, Florence, Dec. 26, 1925, typescript, 
BNR, Levi (K.2.I.2), 2.
 15. Specific decisions cited in Gelli 1943, 243, 247.
 16. La Manna 1901, 9.
	 Institutions	of	Honor	 /	 
military’s official fencing academy in Rome.17 Despite an almost con-
stant stream of newly published dueling codes by rival experts, Gelli and 
his Codice maintained their position as the primary arbiters of honor in 
Italy, a fact bolstered by his tenure first as secretary and then president 
of Florence’s Corte permanente d’onore, which made decisions on cases 
from all over Italy. By 1920 Gelli claimed to have personally intervened 
in more than 4,000 vertenze, and by 1926 that number reportedly had 
risen to over 7,000.18
 But who was Iacopo Gelli that he could claim the right to adjudi-
cate matters of such public and private import for gentlemen, whether 
aristocrat or commoner, colonel or corporal? The answer is a provoca-
tive one because Gelli, at least in a sociological sense, was nobody: the 
son of a coppersmith from a small town in Tuscany whose active mili-
tary career stopped as a second lieutenant and who eventually came to 
make his living as a sports journalist. Thus besides writing on dueling, 
he also published books on stamp collecting, bocce ball, billiards, and 
how to write elegant letters. In the larger context of Italy’s search for 
a national code, it is important to understand how it is that such an 
unlikely character came to such prominence among Italy’s elites and 
why his Codice enjoyed so much success against so many contenders. 
His triumph reveals once again the legitimizing social functions pro-
vided by dueling in postunitary Italy, for no clearer example of “careers 
open to talent” can be found than Gelli’s own story, and it illustrates 
the intensely personal nature of power in Italy and how a person like 
Gelli could combine his abilities with his connections to gain status and 
honor on a national scale.
 Looking at Gelli’s competition, his success seems somewhat unlikely. 
As previously noted, some of the most prestigious fencers of the per- 
iod produced dueling manuals, as did some lawyers, who could vaunt 
their juridical training as necessary to sanction what was in effect a 
parallel code of law. Yet only two other codes managed to go beyond a 
single edition, and only one of these would offer Gelli any serious trou-
ble.19 This was the Codice cavalleresco Italiano of General Achille Angelini, 
which went through three printings between 1883 and 1888. Angelini’s 
code enjoyed a number of important advantages over its rivals. First, as 
 17. Comando della Scuola di Guerra, Norme riguardanti le vertenze cavalleresche ed i giurì 
d’onore, 1920. Typescript copy. BNR, Levi (O.9.I.2). On the Scuola Magistrale see Minuzzi 
1998, 112. 
 18. Gelli 1920, xx; and Gelli 1926, preface by Banti, xxii. 
 19. De Rosis’s code appeared in 1865, 1868, and 1869.
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we have seen, the author had been a high ranking officer in the Pied-
montese army with close ties to the royal family. He thus utilized the 
prestige of the military and the monarchy—both national institutions—
in order to create a specifically “Italian” code of honor that attempted 
to reconcile differences in dueling practices throughout the new coun-
try.20 Second, he not only was recognized as a formidable fencer but had 
been the head of the 1882 commission to choose an official fencing 
style for the instruction of Italy’s armed forces. Third, he had initiated 
and then presided over an important national conference that had met 
in the new capital, Florence, in May 1868, to discuss the creation of a 
nationwide system of courts of honor.21 Based on the proceedings of 
that commission (examined later in this chapter), Angelini could argue 
that he had received a sanction to write a national code, and when it 
appeared, it included the adherence and signatures of over 80 honorable 
gentlemen, most of whom were officers, aristocrats, or deputies.22 Thus 
Angelini could claim patriotism, expertise, and consensus for his code. 
In addition, he had plenty of field experience, including participation 
in over 70 vertenze and the rather rare distinction of having killed a man 
in a duel only to be pardoned by the king.23
 Why, then, did Gelli’s code come to dominate? One reason had to 
do with a fatal flaw in Angelini’s own assertion of communal author-
ity, which he claimed to be its greatest strength.24 Shortly after the 
general’s death in 1889, Paolo Fambri wrote a devastating article in 
La Venezia which maintained that although Angelini had consulted 
some of his prestigious signatories, he had actually never obtained their 
approval of the final version, which consequently contained some rather 
serious mistakes and lacunae.25 Given Fambri’s unassailable position as 
an authority on dueling and the fact that he was among Angelini’s 
supposed underwriters, this attack carried a great deal of weight, espe-
cially since no one else rose to dispute his accusation.26 In fact, Ange-
lini’s code never recovered, and although some would later refer to 
 20. Angelini 1888, xii–xiv.
 21. An account is in Fambri 1869, 192–200.
 22. Angelini 1888, 231–42. 
 23. Morelli 1904, 257. 
 24. Angelini 1888, xxix, xxxiv. 
 25. Paolo Fambri, “Il codice cavalleresco,” in La Venezia, Dec. 5, 1889, 1. 
 26. For a more detailed but biased analysis of the controversy over Angelini’s code see 
Iacopo Gelli, “Anomalie e codici cavallereschi,” in Scherma italiana, June 29, 1891, #11, 85–
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it, especially within the military, his book was never printed again.27 
Combined with Angelini’s death, Fambri’s attack clearly left the door 
open for a new authority on dueling, and Iacopo Gelli was more than 
ready to take advantage of the opportunity.
 Yet even without Fambri’s deprecation of Angelini’s code, Gelli 
would probably have risen to the top, for he was a man of energy, tal-
ent, and ambition. He was also erudite, and one cannot account for his 
success without recognizing his mastery over the literature of dueling. 
In particular, he prided himself on his knowledge of the history of 
dueling and of the many early treatises concerning protocol and points 
of honor. As one friend commented, “Gelli is not a man: he is a living 
archive: a human file cabinet.”28 Particularly important in this regard 
was Gelli’s familiarity with Italy’s Renaissance dueling literature. Rein-
vigorated by Napoleon’s troops, the resurgence of the duel during the 
Risorgimento had generally been based on French models, specifically 
on Chatauvillard’s famous code of 1836, an Italian version of which 
appeared in 1864. In contrast, it was clearly to Gelli’s advantage in the 
competition to create a national code that he could easily and accu-
rately refer to the Italian ur-texts which had established the code duello 
for the rest of Europe. To reinforce this connection, Gelli occasionally 
wrote under the pseudonym of famous sixteenth-century “doctors” of 
chivalry, such as Attendoli and Mutio, and he repeatedly affirmed his 
expertise with a steady stream of books and articles devoted to dueling 
in both the past and the present. He likewise constantly corresponded 
with other gentlemen, including Paolo Fambri, who sought his opinion 
over various points of honor.29 Finally, as an accomplished swordsman 
who authored his own popular treatise on Italian fencing (1901), he was 
well ensconced in the professional network of masters who ran schools, 
organized competitions, and participated in exhibitions. His two fenc-
ing magazines, Cappa e spada (Cloak and Sword) and Scherma Italiana 
(Italian Fencing), offered a perfect mixture of articles on both sports and 
chivalry.
 Erudition and expertise aside, Gelli’s code contained a number of 
important changes compared to that of General Angelini, despite the 
latter’s claim shortly before his death that they were essentially identi-
cal.30 First, Gelli made his book look more like an actual legal code. 
 27. See Morelli 1904, 260. 
 28. Banti 1996, xxi.
 29. For example, Fambri to Gelli, Jan. 1, 1892, in ACS, Carte Fambri, Busta 31. 
 30. Adamoli-Castiglioni 1900, 498–99.
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Indeed, the 493 articles of his 1892 edition numerically mirrored the 
498 articles of Italy’s first uniform penal code of 1889! Divided into six 
sections complete with technical glosses and precedent-setting decisions 
by juries and courts of honor, his Codice virtually dripped legislative 
authority in the grand Napoleonic tradition. Its detailed categorization 
and lengthy index made it a ready reference, just as its juridical tone 
made it seem the letter of the law. Such similarity was important for 
those attempting to argue their way into or out of a challenge, and it 
became even more important in the tribunals of Italy as people sought 
to demonstrate the “legality” of their duels. Some authorities found 
Gelli too precious and nitpicking to serve real men of action, but it 
was, in fact, Gelli’s penchant for pettifogging details that made his code 
so useful to men who might prefer to debate the fine points of their 
vertenze rather than face the sword points of their adversaries.31
 Gelli differed from Angelini in other respects as well. In terms of 
authority, Angelini had relied on the signatures of worthy gentleman 
(in fact, it had been his downfall), but Gelli rejected the logic of bor-
rowed gravitas and stood on his own, arguing that a dueling code had 
to be “in perfect correspondence with the tendencies of the public 
consciousness and customs, and not impose, like dogmas, the views of 
just one or of a few.”32 He viewed himself as an informed interpreter 
of current culture—a claim backed up by his experience on Florence’s 
Permanent Court of Honor—rather than the purveyor of a static table 
of laws, and he did not hesitate to change important parts of the code 
over the years.33 By the same logic, Gelli was less specific about defining 
aspects of honor itself. Unlike Angelini, he made little attempt to list 
the offenses—from staring too long in another man’s eyes to reading a 
man’s newspaper without permission—that might give rise to a duel. 
Thus he left the definition of honor to the sensitivity of the individual 
gentleman, and in doing so he broadened the parameters of the practice 
of dueling to a wider range of behaviors. Gelli was also more inclusive 
in his target audience and would eventually claim a gentleman to be a 
person of “refined moral sensibility” who found the laws of the state 
inadequate to the defense of his honor and who followed the rules of 
chivalry.34 Hence a gentleman was a man willing to fight a duel over 
 31. For example, Morelli 1904, 261. 
 32. Gelli 1892, 13–14. 
 33. For example, compare duels ad oltranza for grave insults in Gelli 1892, 33, 115–16, 
and Gelli 1926, 76.
 34. Gelli 1926, 1. 
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personal honor according to the regulations currently codified by Gelli. 
All of this amounted to an autodefinition of honor that opened up the 
benefits of chivalry to ever-larger groups. Gelli would therefore affirm 
that it was impossible for someone to avoid a legitimate duel with a Jew 
on the pretext that no Jew could be a gentleman.35 On the contrary, 
such a tactic was counter to the laws of chivalry, and anyone attempting 
to employ it would himself be denied the prerogatives of a gentleman. 
Using such arguments, Gelli proclaimed that he was trying to reconcile 
the duel with modern society “which would like to see democracy 
associated with the noble traditions of chivalry.”36
 Equal to his content and presentation, however, was the way he 
reached his audience. As a journalist, Gelli understood distribution, and 
he eventually selected a publisher that targeted a mass market37—the 
Casa Editrice Hoepli, of Milan, which in 1872 had started publishing 
a series of relatively inexpensive “how to do it” books. By 1912 the list 
of Hoepli “Manuals,” as they were called, amounted to some 1,200 
titles on virtually every conceivable topic, from spiritualism to seismol-
ogy. Gelli himself wrote the Hoepli Manual on billiards and fencing, as 
well as the Codice cavalleresco, which found a comfortable niche on the 
publisher’s list right above the Codice civile del Regno (the actual civil law 
of the Kingdom of Italy). Despite such an august neighbor, it is difficult 
to deny the somewhat banal appearance of Italy’s national dueling code 
among so many other reference books promising mastery out of literacy, 
especially with palm reading, tattooing, cycling, guitar, and cinematog-
raphy all on the same page.38 Nevertheless, listing the Codice cavalleresco 
provided Gelli with real advantages over his competitors. Above all, he 
had a national network of both advertising and distribution that really 
made his the first “Italian” code. Second, his very selection by Hoepli 
as Italy’s “authority” on dueling automatically conveyed a confidence 
that made it difficult for others to overcome. This status was reinforced 
as more and more people bought the book, and thus its own success 
created a self-fulfilling form of validation throughout the land.
 That validation was further bolstered by Gelli’s intimate relation-
ship with the institutional alter-ego of the dueling codes: the juries and 
tribunals of honor. His code succeeded because he was an intelligent 
 35. Ibid., 5.
 36. Gelli 1892, 13.
 37. The first edition with Hoepli was published in 1896. 
 38. This particular list appeared at the back (page 249) of the 1910 Hoepli Manual 
entitled Spiritismo by Armando Pappalardo.
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man who made himself an expert on dueling and then used his abilities 
and connections as a journalist to promote his own legitimacy. But one 
doubts that this would have sufficed if he had not placed himself at the 
very center of those groups that defined themselves as the arbiters of 
chivalry in Italy. He was secretary and then president of the Permanent 
Court of Honor in Florence, which was one of the most active in Italy, 
first for a short while in the 1890s and then for a long time after World 
War I. In that role he made contacts throughout the country, established 
his “juridical” credentials—even though he had no legal training—and 
rapidly created a clever, legitimizing circle of personal expertise and 
authority leading from his Codice to the court and back to the Codice. 
He consequently figured among the most vociferous advocates for state 
recognition of such courts, and in doing so he helped shape one of the 
most controversial and complex arguments regarding the duel during 
the liberal period.
Juries and Courts of Honor
No idea excited the imagination of the chivalric community more than 
the state sanction of tribunals of honor to deal with the many vertenze 
arising among Italian gentlemen. The courts were seen as a panacea for a 
variety of problems arising from the dueling code itself. These included 
the frivolous duels that seemed to make a mockery of the ritual; the fear 
of extortion by unprincipled spadaccini; the suspicion inherent in facing 
a “gentleman” of unknown or shady background; and the need to settle 
disputes of chivalric negotiation such as who should be considered the 
offended party and hence have choice of weapon and conditions. Courts 
of honor could further offer censure or condemnation of a gentleman 
who failed to meet his obligations of honesty, fair play, or courage. 
Ultimately, it was argued, the courts would help reconcile, pacify, and 
mediate many misunderstandings and contretemps that had hitherto 
ended up on the field of honor. Dueling would gradually be restricted 
to an ever-shrinking set of vertenze arising from only the most serious 
insults, and with society’s own evolution it might eventually disappear 
entirely. Equally attractive was the idea that such institutions would 
work hand in hand with the regular courts of the realm, advising them 
on points and procedures of honor that might impact their decisions in 
dueling cases and adding a much-needed arena of semilegal adjudica-
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	 Institutions	of	Honor	 /	 
for a regular courtroom. Given these lofty goals, it is hardly surprising 
that many of the dueling manuals praised the concept of the courts 
and occasionally provided lengthy sections on how they should oper-
ate. Even some opponents of the duel, including Italy’s Anti-dueling 
League, argued for their official establishment, although, in stark con-
trast to the “doctors” of honor, they obviously rejected the notion that 
certain select cases had to eventually end in bloodshed.39
 Yet for all this support, the tribunals of honor had a difficult time 
during the liberal period and failed to achieve the potential promised 
by so many. The reason was primarily one of legitimacy, for the Italian 
state understandably balked at granting its imprimatur to an institution 
whose ultimate sanction was an illegal act. There was also the difficulty 
of turning juridical power over to “gentlemen,” a category whose defi-
nition and recruitment tended to be lacking in academic or professional 
rigor. In the final analysis, the gentlemen who assumed that they would 
run the new courts could claim authority based only on status, reputa-
tion, and self-assertion: not the kind of criteria designed for a system 
of law that throughout the century had rejected privilege for equal-
ity. Consequently, except for the military which adopted official juries 
of honor in 1908, the tribunals either would remain attached to volun-
tary associations, such as the Press Association in Rome and the Fencing 
Academy in Naples, or, like the Permanent Court of Honor in Flor-
ence, would try to stand alone, confident that the gravitas and expertise 
of its members carried sufficient social clout to make a difference in 
men’s lives.
 Yet even without official government recognition, the courts, like 
the less formal juries, played an important role in liberal Italy, allow-
ing for the adjudication of a variety of vertenze over the years, offering 
advice to men stuck in tricky situations, and, above all, providing a 
forum in which gentlemen could assert their special, albeit unofficial, 
status in society. In this respect, the courts and juries, like the duel-
ing manuals, offered a constant propaganda of deed that publicly reaf-
firmed the principles of the code of honor as the key to being a man of 
respect and power. Their complex and sometimes convoluted history 
clearly deserves our attention because it offers an important window 
into the assumptions and pretensions of Italy’s chivalric community, 
just as it brings into focus the critical antimony of an essentially private 
 39. For a summary (and a condemnation) of this “bloodless” approach see Brunetti 
1916.
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system of justice operating successfully within the matrix of a modern 
state.
 Approaching the daunting literature that dealt with this topic, one 
must differentiate between “permanent” courts of honor and “contin-
gency” (eventuale) juries of honor, although even the experts some-
times muddled the terms during discussion.40 Contingency juries had 
been around at least since the Napoleonic period and were ad hoc 
organs of chivalric clarification and potential reconciliation made up 
of three or five members selected by the participants in a vertenza.41 
(We have already seen one in operation in the Agnetta/Bixio case in 
the first chapter.) They arose primarily when the representatives could 
not agree on some critical aspect of a vertenza, such as a dispute over 
who was the offended party, what degree of offense had been given, or 
whether both men were qualified to seek or give satisfaction. If both 
parties could not agree to submit a case to a jury, a man might call for a 
“unilateral” jury of his own choosing: an expedient usually adopted for 
cases in which one man felt his opponent unworthy of treatment as a 
gentleman.42 Of greatest relevance to the long and complicated debate 
surrounding them, these juries could also rule on the overall valid-
ity of a vertenza, and if there were insufficient cause for combat, they 
could attempt to reconcile the parties. Contingency juries thus offered 
discipline and legitimacy to duels on one hand and the possibility of 
pacification on the other.
 As an institution, however, such juries were flawed in that they had 
little formal organization or accountability and could be difficult to 
arrange. Moreover, they were often recruited along partisan lines, and, 
although the theory remained that all gentlemen would act according 
to accepted traditions of chivalry, the truth was that the jurors would 
on occasion act more as advocates for the rights of their principals.43 
Some could actually do more harm than good. Such was the case in 
1898 when a jury took a relatively minor encounter in a Trapani the-
ater between an officer and a gentleman (for which the latter actually 
offered to publicly apologize) and defined the offense as “extremely 
serious with disrespect,” a designation that consequently called for 
a dangerous pistol duel which resulted in the death of the officer.44 
 40. Gelli 1892, 162–66; Barbasetti 1898, 21, 26, 151–57.
 41. For a good description see D’Amico 1894, 27–29. 
 42. For specifics see “Giurì unilaterali,” Scherma italiana, May 8, 1893, #44.
 43. Fambri 1888A, 262–63; also Fambri 1874, 898.
 44. Case of Sacco and Serraino, in Gelli 1992, 260–64. 
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Despite such problems, however, their potential for pacification and 
their projection of calm adjudication made contingency juries popu-
lar with Italy’s dueling mavens, some of whom argued that all vertenze 
should be subject to such scrutiny. In order to force compliance, they 
advocated changes in the law that would deprive duelists of the lenient 
penalties currently accorded “legal” duels if they failed to submit their 
vertenza to a jury for consideration before proceeding to the terreno.45 As 
we shall see, much of the ensuing debate would focus on approving this 
form of legal encouragement of contingency juries, which would have 
entailed at least indirect state recognition of their authority.
Fambri’s Paradigm: National Tribunals of Honor
That debate, however, was continuously complicated by the call from 
important voices within the chivalric community, including various 
members of parliament, to completely replace the old contingency 
juries with a more uniform and better regulated system of adjudication, 
sanctioned or even organized by the government. These “permanent” 
courts would be composed of distinguished gentlemen who would vol-
unteer their good offices for a given period of time, and their status, 
expertise, and probity would overcome personal interests and connec-
tions for the sake of both truth and honor. The most ambitious and 
influential architect of such a project was Paolo Fambri who saw in such 
tribunals nothing less than a mechanism for the moral regeneration of 
all of Italy.
 Fambri took both inspiration and justification from the aforemen-
tioned Congress of Chivalry presided over by General Angelini in Flor-
ence in May of 1868 (only four years after the city had become the new 
capital of Italy). Angelini called the conference to deal with the frequent 
abuses surrounding the duel since unification, a point made clear in a 
letter he sent to Nino Bixio soliciting his participation: “We have in the 
front line and masters of the field unworthy men for whom grabbing 
a sword is a means of aggression no different than a dagger, if not for 
the material fact that it has a longer blade. Many of us have agreed to 
finish it and Nino Bixio must help us with all his great heart.”46 Bixio 
did indeed join Angelini, and along with some 30 other luminaries, 
 45. Digesto italiano, Torino: Torinese, 1899–1902, vol. 9, 1206–12. 
 46. Paolo Fambri, “Il codice cavalleresco,” La Venezia, Dec. 5, 1889, 1.
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including two ex–prime ministers of Italy, they sent out an invitation 
to select gentlemen asking them to help create a national system of 
tribunals of honor that would “put an end to the frequent encounters 
over petty causes, and whose authoritative verdict would be enough 
to reinstate the honor of whoever was attacked unjustly or who was 
offended by a person unworthy of wielding a sword.” They met in a 
private hall, and their comments were recorded by the official stenog-
rapher of the parliament, a shorthand symbol of the semiofficial nature 
of the enterprise. They eventually voted to create a commission of 10 
experts, with Angelini as president and Fambri as secretary, to write a 
statute establishing the new tribunals and a codice cavallersco to inform 
their proceedings.47 For all its gravitas and good intentions, however, 
the actions of the conference came to naught, a result perhaps of the 
rapid and unexpected translation of the capital of Italy from Florence to 
Rome in 1870. Whatever the reason, the 10 experts never met again as 
a statutory body, and no collective proposal was ever created.
 Nevertheless, the “Congress” had important residual effects. Ange-
lini, as we have seen, went on to write his famous dueling code in par-
tial fulfillment of its original charge. More to the point, in the second 
half of his appropriately named Giurisprudenza del duello (1869), Fambri 
took it upon himself to lay out a detailed blueprint for the creation 
of the proposed courts of honor. Fambri’s scheme matched both his 
bravado and his faith in the chivalric ethic. As with most other propo-
nents of the institution, he touted the success of the Prussian military 
courts of honor, established in 1843, but he found them too restrictive 
and wanted to create a uniquely Italian system which would find its 
roots in the country’s history. The courts were thus best understood 
as a “reinstitution” of Italian traditions rather than “an innovation or 
reform,” and he larded his text with references to medieval and espe-
cially Renaissance doctors of chivalry.”48 The goals of the courts were 
appropriately broad and ambitious: “The purpose of the institution of 
the courts of honor is to protect social morality as well as individual 
honor and liberty; to substitute for the impassioned judgement of the 
interested parties or their friends the unimpassioned decision of the 
judges; to limit the use of the duel according to the requirements of 
justice and the spirit and traditions of chivalry.”49 To achieve these ends, 
Italy’s gentlemen would have to swear to submit their own vertenze to 
 47. Fambri 1869, 192, 194–98.
 48. Ibid., 199, 215–17, 241–43.
 49. Ibid., 202.
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the new courts and to refuse participation in any disputes outside their 
jurisdiction. Duelists who fought without gaining a court’s consent and 
a license of campo franco—a direct and intentional reference to the legiti-
mate duels sanctioned by princes during the Renaissance—would be 
denounced to the legal authorities as common criminals. To make this 
work, Fambri argued, the regular justice system would eventually have 
to somehow recognize the new courts of honor, although he carefully 
skirted around the details of such an implication.
 Fambri’s plan envisaged a permanent “Assembly of Honor” (recruited 
from Angelini’s original congress) in the capital. This voluntary associa-
tion would then oversee a system of provincial courts located in the 
army’s divisional headquarters and run by the ranking general of the 
territorial militia. In theory the system would handle all chivalric dis-
putes arising in Italy. Judges would decide on the merits of each vertenze, 
seek reconciliation of the parties if appropriate, and invoke a hierarchi-
cal series of social punishments (such as temporary or permanent loss 
of the right to seek satisfaction) against men who acted counter to the 
laws of chivalry. Notification of these punishments would appear in a 
regularly published bulletin of the assembly. If a duel was seen as appro-
priate, the assembly would send representatives to oversee the com-
bat, thus assuring both its chivalric validity and its “juridical” legality. 
Anyone failing to follow the proper rules of combat would be “dis-
qualified” and turned over to the regular courts on charges of attempted 
homicide.50 Such a system, according to Fambri, would eliminate the 
charlatans and rascals who might abuse the concept of honor; it would 
protect people’s rights of free speech from armed extortion; and it would 
help reconcile many minor conflicts which currently led to unneces-
sary duels—all of which would have a civilizing effect on society. Thus, 
Fambri predicted that shortly after the tribunals’ introduction, dueling 
would fall off by 60%.51
 Aside from its grandiose goals and proportions, which rather handily 
sidestepped the question of who was going to pay for it all, Fambri’s 
proposal was stunning in its assumptions regarding the mixing of public 
and private power in Italy. Beginning with a small coterie of influential 
people, he hoped to create a national institution that would co-opt the 
structure and prestige of the military while impinging on the preroga-
tives of the judicial system. The motive force of such pretense was his 
 50. Ibid., 200–210.
 51. Ibid., x, 93.
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faith that he had the backing of some of Italy’s most honorable and 
prestigious men, who felt that they had the right to create a parallel 
system of adjudication, which was necessary because the regular courts 
could not satisfy their sensitivities or protect them from their own ritu-
als of violence. Perhaps more impressive, these men claimed the power 
to decide who in the new scheme of things could consider himself a 
gentleman, and in this sense Fambri’s tribunals would have been the 
greatest if not the grandest of all of Italy’s new and exclusive men’s clubs. 
It was, of course, an extreme plan drawn up by one of the country’s 
more flamboyant characters, but it fit the worldview of the chivalric 
community and helped set the terms of the debate over how much offi-
cial recognition should be given to gentlemen who wanted to regulate 
their own conflicts with the blessing of the state.
The Campaign for State Recognition
Considering its scope and complexity, it is hardly surprising that Fam-
bri’s system failed to come to fruition. Yet it helped promote the idea 
of permanent tribunals of honor, and within 10 years, as we have seen, 
the Press Association of Rome would create a working model, albeit for 
a limited community of professionals. To the south, the National Fenc-
ing Academy in Naples would also eventually establish a permanent 
Jury of Honor in order to serve the needs of its members.52 Interest 
in the juries and courts would be further promoted by the ongoing 
discussion among Italy’s legislators as they wrestled with how to handle 
the thorny issue of the duel in the construction of the country’s first 
comprehensive penal code, which would only be finished in 1889. As 
early as January 1870, a parliamentary commission adopted a suggestion 
from the Appeals Court of Naples that for a duel to be “legal” and hence 
enjoy lesser penalties, it had to have been preceded by a review of the 
vertenza by a jury of honor.53 The idea was later backed by Minister of 
Justice Paolo Onorato Vigliani, who deemed it an important innovation 
and included it in his proposed penal code of 1874.54 After the senate 
approved the provision and sent it on to the chamber, confidence rose 
 52. The Academy’s Web site lists the foundation date of its jury as 1880 (www.
accademianazionalescherma.it/documenti). 
 53. Crivellari 1884, 119. The Court of Appeals of Messina independently made the same 
suggestion.
 54. Crivellari 1884, 128–29. For other plans see Fambri 1874, 893–99.
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that it would become law, and during its national competition on fenc-
ing techniques (discussed in chapter II), the military related its enthu-
siasm for the proposal’s passage to the minister of war, predicting: “The 
tribunals of honor will have a legal existence; chivalric jury members 
will not be able to evade their delicate but necessary office any more 
than regular jury members evade theirs today; every affair (querela) will 
be placed under their adjudication and consequently under their inves-
tigation. Any armed solution of a personal affair that has not traversed 
this stadium of even handed research and attempted reconciliation [ . . . ] 
will involve ordinary [criminal] responsibility.”55 Headed up by Ange-
lini and Fambri, the Fencing Commission naturally failed to see that 
some legislators might see the matter rather differently.
 In fact, opposition to the proposal both in and out of the chamber 
was fierce, primarily because recognizing the juries or courts of honor 
could be construed as a legal acceptance of the duel itself.56 As one com-
mentator on the revision of the penal code explained, it would consti-
tute “a type of indirect consecration of the duel, making it impossible 
to punish a duel fought after having permission granted by a jury orga-
nized and made mandatory by the state.”57 As befit such a controversial 
proposal, references to the courts bounced into and out of subsequent 
drafts of the penal code as commissions and experts debated their mer-
its. As with the other issues regarding dueling and the law, the courts and 
juries of honor constituted a difficult issue for Italian legislators, with 
informed and heartfelt opinion on both sides.
 The key player in this drama was Minister of Justice Giuseppe 
Zanardelli, whose name is still attached to united Italy’s first compre-
hensive penal code, approved in 1889. Zanardelli was quite familiar with 
juries of honor, for he had been one of the founding members of the 
Press Association’s court of honor in 1879. What that experience had 
taught him is unclear, but when he presented the new code for final 
comment late in 1887, he specifically rejected the proposal, popular in 
earlier drafts of the law, that greater leniency should be granted duel-
ists who had sought the judgment of a jury of honor. Such latitude, 
he claimed, ran contrary to the logic of the law by legitimizing the 
mechanisms of an illegal practice.58 He did declare himself willing to 
 55. “Relazione della commission,” in Parise 1884, xxxi.
 56. For example, Digesto Italiano, vol. 9, 1899–1902, 1206–7, 1210–11; Crivellari 1884, 
84–86; Brusa 1871, 398–400. 
 57. Facchinetti 1890, 21.
 58. Zanardelli 1888, 391–92.
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promote the unofficial spread of such juries through Italy as a means of 
resolving vertenze peacefully, but he fundamentally rejected the idea that 
they could or should allow some affairs to proceed to combat; to do so 
would only feed the pretensions of the dueling establishment.
 Zanardelli’s expunging of all mention of the juries from the code’s 
penultimate draft brought forth a rapid reaction from the chivalric com-
munity, which began a vigorous campaign to bring the juries back in 
January of 1888. Lectures were arranged, articles were written, and Gelli 
published a 40-page pamphlet taking Zanardelli to task for not grasp-
ing the basic issues at hand.59 The exact influence of such propaganda 
is hard to measure, but by March rumors were coming from parliament 
that legal acknowledgment of the juries had finally been assured.60 This 
apparent victory galvanized Italy’s chivalric paladins into action: finally 
the government had realized the critical function of the juries. Surely, 
this created a need for their greater organization and coordination.
 To get the ball rolling, Fambri wrote to Gelli from Venice announc-
ing the creation of a Permanent Court of Honor under the auspices of 
the Venetian Fencing Society. He exhorted Gelli to establish a similar 
institution in Florence (something Gelli had already considered) and 
then to go with him to Rome to start a new tribunal, perhaps build-
ing on the one attached to the Press Association. Gelli declined the trip 
to Rome, but that did not stop Fambri from going to the capital to 
hold a conference on the topic. Meanwhile, Gelli had received similar 
encouragement to start a Florentine court in letters from Baron Ottavio 
Anzani, who was working to set one up in Naples, and from his friend 
Francesco Spirito in Rome, who had been chiefly responsible for the 
inclusion of the juries of honor in the revised legislation. To top it off, 
Gelli claimed that Zanardelli himself had written to him to push such 
a project.61 In an article in his fencing magazine, Cappa e spada, in April 
1888, he challenged the gentlemen of Italy to seize the moment and 
prove themselves no less chivalrous than their neighbors to the north, 
who already had such institutions: “Considering that the law promises 
us its moral support, let me flatter myself with the hope of seeing the 
juries of honor arise in Italy, and the day that we have achieved our goal 
we will be able to boast that we have marked a new era of moral civili-
zation for the nation and one well worthy of humanity. [ . . . ]. So what 
are we waiting for? Perhaps to be prompted by France or Germany? 
 59. Gelli 1888C, 22–23.
 60. In fact Gelli claimed a “triumph” of his ideas. Gelli 1888B, 6–7; 1888A, 62. 
 61. Gelli 1888B, 7, 10–11.
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Gentlemen, let us do it ourselves, like our fathers!”62 Venice, Rome, 
Naples, Florence—suddenly a nationwide system of chivalric courts did 
not seem so far away. Since the new penal code reportedly provided 
an official role for the juries of honor, they should be governed by 
permanent institutions throughout the realm manned by disinterested 
gentlemen/jurors and overseen by Italy’s chivalric experts: this as opposed 
to letting the exciting new legal responsibility fall to the old, unregu-
lated system of “contingency” juries, an unhappy alternative that Fam-
bri vigorously criticized in the July 1888 issue of Nuova Antologia.63
 No one could ever accuse Iacopo Gelli of missing an opportunity. 
Armed with his letters of encouragement from around Italy, he assem-
bled 32 other “eminent gentlemen” of Florence on May 28, 1888, to 
create a permanent court of honor for the city. It was an impressive 
group that included 5 aristocratic officers, 5 noblemen, 10 non-noble 
officers, 8 commendatori or cavalieri, 3 senators, and 2 current deputies in 
parliament. Gelli started with a short speech laying out the need for such 
courts, their historic pedigree back to Louis XIV, and the official juridi-
cal function soon to be bestowed on them by the new penal code. This 
impending sanction, he said, had led other cities to move toward their 
creation, and he appealed to regional pride by suggesting that Florence 
should not play second fiddle to anyone in “this rush of civil progress.” 
The group responded with a resolution proclaiming that the necessity 
of the courts was “universally understood” and that the new penal code 
“cries out for the help of all gentlemen to limit the abuse of the duel 
and mitigate penal action through the juries of honor [ . . . ].” They 
proceeded to establish a permanent court of honor open to all gentle-
men willing to swear to its authority and elected a president and sec-
retary to oversee its operations. The first president was Count Eugenio 
Giacomini, and the secretary was, as one might expect, Iacopo Gelli. 
Thus was born the Permanent Court of Honor of Florence, which for 
a time would become Italy’s most active and best-known chivalric insti-
tution.64
 Unfortunately, Gelli’s triumph and the “national” project of which it 
was a part suffered an immediate setback from Italy’s lawmakers. Con-
trary to the information and assumptions that had inspired the creation 
of the courts, Zanardelli ultimately rejected the modifications adopted 
by the chamber’s commission. Instead he again stripped all references to 
 62. Gelli 1888A, 62. “Do it ourselves” was a patriotic reference to the Risorgimento.
 63. Fambri 1888A, 262–63.
 64. Gelli 1888B, 14–17. 
0	 /	 Chapter	IV
the juries of honor from the final version of the code, which became 
law in 1889 and went into effect in 1890. In explaining this decision, 
he reiterated his original conviction that “the law cannot, without con-
tradicting itself recognize in any way the jury of honor.” Moreover, he 
claimed to have been influenced by the senate, which had criticized 
the untested novelty, lack of uniformity, and inherent instability of the 
juries, all of which were bound to create abuses.65 No doubt aware of 
the feathers his decision would ruffle among the champions of chivalry, 
he was quick to praise the basic concept of the juries as well as their 
participants:
It is truly desirable that the intervention of the juries of honor have an 
ever-greater application in duels, and those generous people who, in 
such a way, vigorously contribute to the diminution of dueling cases, are 
to be highly praised; but the law that would offer public recognition to 
the juries would only discredit itself and at the same time also discredit 
the institution of the jury of honor, when it incriminated, even with a 
minor penalty, a duel that the jury itself had declared imperative and 
necessary.66
These carefully chosen words were designed to encourage the peace-
making functions of the juries and the newly established courts while 
gently reminding them of their ambiguous position before the law. If 
they wanted to keep their essential character as effective arbiters of 
honor, complete with the right to sanction duels, they should keep out 
of the limelight of juridical rigor.
 Words of praise notwithstanding, this was a harsh blow to the chi-
valric community and probably to Gelli personally, although he never 
seems to have publicly lamented the decision.67 The failure to gain even 
indirect legal sanction of the juries or the courts from the state naturally 
shook the prestige of the fledgling institutions and deprived them of 
the coercive force that would have helped bring a majority of vertenze 
under their purview. The Zanardelli code, according to one of Fambri’s 
eulogists in 1897, had betrayed Fambri’s “ardent apostolate” of a national 
jurisprudence of the duel. As a consequence, the much-heralded perma-
nent courts, which had previously seemed to be taking root, had already 
 65. Zanardelli 1889, 107. Also see Il digesto italiano, vol. 9, 1899–1902, 1211; Facchinetti 
1890, 20–21.
 66. Zanardelli 1889, 107.
 67. Indeed, he praised the code; e.g., Gelli 1891, 131; 1894, 10.
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been forgotten when Fambri died.68 Gelli himself admitted in 1903 that 
the courts had by then become almost useless, and a year later, produel-
ing commentator Ercole Morelli analyzed their fatal flaw.69
[ . . . ] the Italian Courts of Honor are anchored to nothing; and I believe 
that there are few people who at present remember the Courts of Honor 
of Rome, of Venice, or maybe just that of Florence, which was however 
the one that showed the greatest practical action.
 And it was fated to be so: those tribunals of honor had no other sup-
port than the platonic approval of the citizens; they lacked therefore the 
force necessary to make their judgements respected. Hence, those people 
who did not find it in their favor [comodo] to adhere to them laughed at 
them: while the pusillanimous found in them a shield of their cowardice, 
and they could, under the aegis of that assembly of gentlemen, bluster 
with impunity.70
Once again, the grand scheme had foundered, hamstrung by the basic 
inconsistency of having privately established courts, even those populated 
by gentlemen, crossing the line into the business of the state. Zanardelli 
had encouraged the private creation of the courts to help restrict the 
duel, but he could not square the circle of legalizing a mechanism that 
at heart was based on a crime. Without some official sanction, the courts 
lacked any central reference or juridical clout, which made it more 
difficult to recruit men willing to put themselves in the role of judges 
over their compatriots in matters of delicacy and controversy.71 Indeed, 
Gelli would later complain about the abuse he personally had to with-
stand from certain “brigands in tailcoats” whom he had “unmasked” 
in vertenze which he had been asked to adjudicate.72 A truly effective 
permanent system of honor simply needed more than private good will 
and personal credentials to make it work. 
 We should not, however, underestimate the importance of the cam-
paign of 1888 and its results within Italy’s dueling culture. The Perma-
nent Court in Florence, to which it served as midwife, resolved several 
hundred vertenze during its first three years of activity and, in so doing, 
created a baseline of chivalric “legislation” that found its official registrar 
 68. Mariotii 1897, 12–13.
 69. See Gelli 1903, 2.
 70. Morelli 1904, 247–48.
 71.  Gelli had warned people of this problem during the campaign. Gelli 1888A, 62. 
 72. Gelli 1912, XII.
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in Gelli and his Codice. In the long run, these precedents would prove 
useful after the First World War when the Florentine Court was revivi-
fied in October of 1922 to deal with a new onslaught of duels during 
the advent of fascism.73 Even in the short run, Gelli maintained that 
despite its brief lifespan the Court had promoted greater use of unof-
ficial juries of honor: “Thus it is that while in 1889 these represented 
a laudable utopia, in 1890 they peacefully resolved twenty-five percent 
of the vertenze; in 1900 this percentage hit fifty percent, and in 1910 
seventy-five percent.”74 There is, unfortunately, no way to check the 
veracity of this assertion, and frankly his statistics seem rather off-the-
cuff. Yet as we shall see in the next chapter, the average number of duels 
began to decline after 1890, and Gelli would suggest that it was due in 
part to increased participation in juries of honor. Meanwhile, Gelli kept 
the image of a nationwide system of honor alive by tracking important 
decisions made by various contingency, fencing club, and press associa-
tion juries. Later versions of his Codice would cite these precedents from 
Milan, Torino, Bologna, Genova, Rome, and, of course, Florence.
New Attempts at Legalization
Despite its failure, the campaign surrounding the Zanardelli code only 
whetted the appetite of those who wanted the government to offer 
its authority to the chivalric tradition, and this would quickly lead to 
yet more proposals for some form of official recognition. Already in 
1889, in disappointed reaction to the final version of the penal code, 
the executive committee of the National Fencing Tournament in Rome 
proposed a new chivalric congress, similar to that of 1868, to create a 
truly national code, and it called on five parliamentary deputies, includ-
ing Paolo Fambri, to help organize the event. The congress was never 
convened, but one of the committee, Professor Ernesto Salafia Maggio 
from Palermo, was sufficiently inspired by the concept to publish a new 
dueling code in 1895 that dedicated over 30 pages to a new pan-Italian 
court of honor, sanctioned and paid for by the government.75 Unen-
cumbered by false modesty, he suggested that his own code would serve 
as the basis for this august body’s adjudication’s.
 Salafia Maggio’s ambitious program, which owed a great deal to 
 73. See Ettorre 1928, 174.
 74. Gelli 1920, xix.
 75. Salafia Maggio 1895, iii–vi, 17–21, 141–67. 
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Fambri’s earlier example, had little if any chance of affecting policy. 
More proposals, however, soon came to the fore in response to Caval-
lotti’s death on March 23, 1898. His dramatic end unleashed a wave of 
antidueling commentary across Italy, including demands for tougher 
laws and more-efficient enforcement. Amid the growing clamor for 
increased action toward abolition, defenders of the duel reacted by 
revivifying the call for national courts of honor as a means of reducing 
the number and severity of encounters. In fact, in 1898 the produeling 
camp provided a bumper crop of schemes devoted to chivalric tribu-
nals, including proposals by an army officer, a fencing master, a lawyer, 
and a politician.76 The latter, Deputy De Martino, argued in parliament 
(only one month after Cavallotti died) that the duel arose from a deeply 
rooted prejudice in Italian society and was consequently impervious to 
the normal sanctions of the law. Taking this fact into account, the state 
should limit the damage done by authorizing a nationwide magistracy 
of chivalry that would allow gentlemen to regulate their affairs of honor 
according to their own time-tested rules.77 De Martino’s project, which 
blatantly offered official judicial sanction to the entire dueling ritual, 
found little favor in a parliament that was still reeling from the violent 
death of one of its members, and it was immediately voted into the 
legislative limbo of “further study.”
 Nevertheless, the idea of chivalric courts would not die and even 
gained support from the other side of the dueling controversy. The 
Italian Anti-Dueling League, founded in 1902, adopted as part of its 
original statute a commitment to foster and support tribunals of honor 
throughout Italy.78 Their plan, which was laid out in detail in 1905, was 
to create regional juries of honor run by members of the league and 
designed to mediate questions of honor, but without recourse to the 
duel. As with the other schemes over the years, the league was long on 
details and short on results, but the promulgation of the courts as a tool 
of pacification remained a key part of the association’s propaganda prior 
to World War I. That in and of itself would prove important, because 
the league’s advocacy of the courts only added to the clamor com-
ing for them from the champions of the duel after Cavallotti’s deadly 
 76. Respectively, Lo Monaco-Aprile (1898); Barbasetti (1898); Modugno (revised edition, 
1898); and De Martino (see note 77 below). 
 77. Atti parlamentari, Leg. XX, 1st session, vol. 574, 5076–77, with discussion on 5800–
19: April 10 and 16, 1898, respectively. Also see Venturi 1898, 5–17.
 78. Statuto per la Lega Italiana contro il duello, BNR, Levi (P.4.I bis, I, p. 1); also see Brunetti 
1916, 611. 
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encounter. Albeit in radically different guises, the courts were becoming 
increasingly acceptable across a broad spectrum of public opinion, thus 
setting the stage for new attempts to gain official recognition.
 As mentioned in chapter II, the military was the first to respond, 
and on October 4, 1908, a decree demanded that all vertenze between 
officers be adjudicated by a jury of honor composed of three officers 
superior in rank and selected by the divisional commander.79 Within the 
long-standing controversy over the state’s sanction of courts or juries of 
honor, the military had an easier time of making such a move. First, there 
was no parliamentary review of the process: the decree came from the 
ministry of war more or less as an executive order. Also, as already noted, 
the military penal code did not contain any references to the duel, and 
so, at least regarding its own internal legislation, there was no obvious 
conflict of purpose. Equally important, the chain of command already 
provided a clear-cut and legal mechanism to recruit the juries, whereas 
civilian juries were notoriously ambiguous in their selection criteria. 
Draped in the mantle of hierarchy, the military’s juries simply added 
an extra dimension to existing obligations of obedience and provided 
a pan-Italian structure of enforcement with little or no extra expense 
to the state. Still, it was a big step, and one that had been avoided for 
years because it seemed to sanction the duel itself, an impression that the 
decree clearly tried to dispel by making no specific references to either 
dueling or chivalry. Significantly, that step had to be taken by a person 
who was free of the military’s corporate ethos. Senator Severino Casana, 
who signed the law and whose name it came to bear, was the first civil-
ian minister of war since Baron Ricasoli in 1861, and his bold innova-
tion inversely reflected the previous intransigence of chivalry among 
the officer class.
 The immediate consequences of this decree depended on one’s point 
of view. One Buenos Aires newspaper quipped that in the five months 
following its implementation, there were at least five duels among offi-
cers in Italy.80 This figure would no doubt have been appalling to a 
strict abolitionist, but five duels in five months actually worked out to 
an average of only 12 duels a year, and within the military this number 
would have represented a significant decline. Gelli, writing in 1920, 
recalled that in the long run the legislation was a “well-adjusted blow 
 79. Decreto di 4 ottobre, 1908, in Rivista penale 1908, vol. 48, 629.
 80. “Il duello e i medici,” La patria degli Italiani, Oct. 19, 1910. Cited in Capretz 1926, 
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of a club to the tradition.”81 In fact, the available statistics, which are 
examined at the end of the next chapter, suggest that the decree of 1908 
probably did help reduce the number of duels among officers prior to 
the First World War.
 The decree also paved the way for the most ambitious plan yet for 
official recognition of the courts, and it came from no less a personage 
than V. E. Orlando, Italy’s Minister of Justice. On December 1, 1908, less 
than two months after the creation of the military juries, he presented 
parliament with a proposal to establish official tribunals of honor attached 
to each of Italy’s courts of appeal. Orlando adopted a novel approach to 
the problem by focusing the new institution on changes to the laws 
regarding defamation rather than dueling. He acknowledged that there 
was a realm of honor-insults that was poorly served by the regular courts, 
and as a result many men chose to avoid legal redress in favor of the 
ease and acclaim of personal combat. He further noted that public opin-
ion had come to support the idea of special courts that could handle 
the tricky issues of honor while freeing the regular courts for more- 
concrete offenses. Acknowledging the power of the current culture of 
chivalry, Orlando’s courts were to be hybrids of public and private power. 
Every appellate court would have one of its members act as a magis-
trate of honor who would organize a special tribunal for each case. The 
tribunal would consist of two volunteer “judges” (selected by each of 
the litigants from a list proposed by their opponents) working together 
under the magistrate’s professional supervision. Orlando argued that such 
a system would combine the attributes of the private juries of honor, 
which were growing in popularity in Italy, with the gravitas and exper-
tise of a regular judge. The tribunal would consider the evidence in a 
secret and speedy proceeding and, depending on its findings, could cen-
sure either of the litigants or force reparations to be paid up to 10,000 
lire. With regard to the duel, representatives would be expected to sub-
mit all vertenze to the new tribunals, and failure to do so not only would 
deprive them of the protection currently provided by the penal code but 
also would actually increase the existing criminal penalties by one-third. 
He concluded by affirming his belief that such sanctions would indeed 
resolve “a large part if not all of the question of the duel.”82
 Coming from the minister of justice, this extraordinary compromise 
of official and private justice was understandably cheered by much of 
 81. Gelli 1920, 268.
 82. The proposal is appended to Ettorre 1928, 318–38.
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the chivalric community.83 Gentlemen would now have virtually their 
own courts, with legal sanction, where they might work out affairs of 
honor among themselves and even have the state impose hefty mon-
etary penalties. Yet for all its cleverness and the substantial support that it 
generated, Orlando’s project never became law. In fact, despite renewed 
efforts in 1909 and 1915, it failed to come to discussion before the full 
parliament: a result perhaps in part of bad timing within the legislative 
cycle.84 The project also stepped on the toes of parliamentary immu-
nity in some of its other particulars.85 Equally likely, however, is that 
the project’s failure stemmed from the fundamental inconsistency, evi-
dent throughout the controversy over the courts, of allowing certain 
individuals privileged legal status simply because they claimed adherence 
to a parallel code of chivalric honor. True, Orlando’s proposed courts 
would not have openly discriminated against any sectors of society, but 
his attempt to co-opt the existing private juries of honor pointed to the 
social exclusivity of the new institution. His project further raised the old 
problem of somehow reinforcing the “legal” status of the duel itself by 
offering sanction to vertenze that went unresolved through the courts.86 
Unlike Zanardelli, Orlando had attempted to bulldoze through the 
legal paradoxes of such a strategy, but the time for such an abandonment 
of liberal principles was not yet at hand. It would become easier, as we 
shall see, once fascism had moved Italy into more authoritarian modes 
after World War I.
Conclusion
The history of the courts of honor reveals a constant struggle of elites 
seeking to justify their illegal behavior vis-à-vis society and, frankly, 
 83. Gelli dedicated the 1916, 1920, and 1923 editions of his code to Orlando and “his ideas 
on the courts of honor.” Dissenting voices came from Di San Malato 1913, 10, and Brunetti 
1916, 624–25, both of whom found simple censure and money reparations demeaning to the 
ritual.
 84. “Per le corti d’onore,” La Nazione, March 13, 1930, 1; “Un’importante sentenza del 
giudice Poggiolini in materia giornalistica,” La nazione, Feb. 11, 1915, 3. 
 85. It would have made deputies and senators more vulnerable to investigation by judges 
seeking to ascertain the “facts” in cases of defamation.
 86. Juridical repugnance to these problems was obvious in a lengthy legal commentary 
that supported Orlando’s defamation law in theory but rather pointedly left out every single 
reference to the duel or judges of honor. Capello 1910, XIII–XIV, 283–91.
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vis-à-vis themselves. On one hand, this meant providing a self-defense 
mechanism that aimed to limit the actual bloodshed needed to lubri-
cate the gates that guarded gentlemanly status. If prickly sensibility and 
its armed defense determined one’s belonging to the ceto civile, then 
some recourse had to be available to keep a lid on the violence. Juries 
and courts of honor offered a second line of defense after would-be 
duelists had exhausted their limited options of reconciliation through 
their representatives. Moreover, having embraced an illicit ritual as a 
legitimizing force, elites had to somehow protect themselves against 
those who would take advantage of the system, forcing men to fight 
for either monetary or social advantage. Proponents of the courts of 
honor, like authors of the dueling manuals, often obsessed over who 
was to be allowed the privilege of combat, and the chivalric commu-
nity longed for some seemingly neutral source of selection that would 
allow them to refuse the unworthy or the unscrupulous. Needless to say, 
refusing a challenge from a swashbuckling scoundrel was a lot easier if a 
jury of honor backed you up. Such support was critical as well because 
the inner discipline of the chivalric community’s dynamics was suppos-
edly based on a collective judgment of qualification. Cheating at cards 
was grounds for disqualification, yet who could arbitrate such a charge 
without recourse to swordplay and thus prevent a man from “measur-
ing” himself against a cheater? Failure to act like a gentleman or follow 
the precepts of the code meant that one could no longer seek satisfac-
tion through the duel, but ultimate enforcement had to reside beyond 
the individual, and the juries and courts of honor, at least in theory, 
helped put teeth in chivalric sanctions.
 On the other hand, state recognition of these institutions, no matter 
how tenuous, was seen as critical in validating their membership and 
influence, because, in reality, the juries and courts were self-fashioned 
by self-appointed experts and gentlemen. Their authority lay primarily 
in the status their members could muster as individual men of honor 
who demanded respect from their own communities and constituen-
cies. The various tribunals that arose in Rome, Florence, Naples, and 
Venice depended on the organizing energy of local elites who took 
upon themselves the mantle of arbiters of regional honor. In this sense 
the courts ran parallel to the political culture of liberal Italy, where 
emerging groups clustered around strong individual personalities to 
create networks of informal power relations. Yet lacking the institu-
tional gravity of parliament and bereft of legal sanction, the tribunals of 
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honor naturally remained weak and ephemeral: a point reflected in the 
competing dueling manuals, each of which purported to represent the 
true essence of Italian chivalry and which more often than not backed 
up its claim with the signature of honorable men willing to attest to the 
contents.
 All of this revealed reams about the sociology of power in the new 
nation. Contrary to its frequent portrayal as a period of stasis and conti-
nuity, the Risorgimento offered new forms of social and political orga-
nization that would have previously been impossible. Dueling offered 
an important means of access to such new groupings for men like Fam-
bri or Gelli, who were willing to defend their honor according to col-
lective rules that placed them above the law of the land but not above 
the social pressure of their acquaintances. More than just a willingness 
to fight, the culture of chivalry demanded that gentlemen participate 
in the larger organizational framework of the ritual. On one level it 
might mean offering one’s services as a representative or padrino, but on 
another level it might include joining a jury of honor to help settle a 
vertenza or negotiate rules of combat—all actions which in theory could 
have life-or-death consequences for the participants. The point is that 
in its various attempts to create a “jurisprudence” of chivalry, the com-
munity of “gentlemen” was constantly struggling to get the state to rec-
ognize and affirm its right to such exclusive social power, even though 
the definition of “gentleman” was anything but certain.
 Aside from bolstering the status (and protecting the lives) of men 
who manned and used them, however, the courts and juries of honor, 
like the dueling manuals, had the oft-unstated purpose of preserving 
the dignity of the entire culture of honor. The emphasis on proper pro-
cedure, strict rules, and disqualification for those who failed to behave 
in accordance with them, all worked to protect the chivalric commu-
nity from charges of barbarism on the one hand and buffoonery on the 
other. The ability to adjudicate vertenze and allow only the most seri-
ous to end in carefully controlled conflict helped offset the image of 
a bloodthirsty ritual run amok and also protected the solemnity of an 
almost sacred act from being besmirched by neophytes and nonbeliev-
ers. The legalistic guise of the most popular codes and the deliberate 
formation of parallel legal structures such as juries, judges, and tribunals 
attempted to create an illusion of juridical legitimacy and rigor that 
reinforced the appropriateness of the practice among the participants 
themselves and offered a shield against the barbs of a variety of oppo-
nents. The many manuals and the mania for official courts betrayed a 
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fundamental uneasiness about the role of the duel in a “civilized” and 
law-abiding society, even on the part of its adepts. In the context of 
the great dueling debate, to which we turn in the next chapter, this 
much-sought-after discipline and uniformity were in and of themselves 
arguments that supposedly spoke well for honorable men who were 
genuinely dedicated to law and order throughout the land, yet who 
broke the law on a regular basis.

“ ike The deaTh PenalTy the duel has been so much discussed in 
school and in court, in academia and in parliament, that a new 
book, study, or dissertation can now only be just a mosaic of pallid 
contours and easy work.”1 As indicated by the lament of this legal 
scholar seeking to write something original about dueling in 1886, the 
continuing and constant presence of the ritual in the lives of Italy’s 
elites was hard to ignore and engendered endless discussion, argument, 
and diatribe throughout the land. According to Zanardelli (who cer-
tainly should have known), the duel posed “the most arduous and del-
icate problem” facing modern legislators, and it is fair to say that the 
code of honor provided one of the main topics of journalistic, juridical, 
and literary commentary during the life of the liberal regime.2 Antidu-
eling forces would deliver sermons, collect signatures, publish tracts, 
draw cartoons, promote laws, write novels, and eventually organize at 
both the national and the international level. Lawmakers would wran-
gle with their own demons of honor as they sought to prosecute a 
practice in which they themselves often engaged and which some felt 
necessary to the health of the country. Defenders of the duel were less 
organized and less prolific in their publications because much of elite 
society already embraced the code of honor, and they could count on 
 1. Vico 1886, 422.
 2. Zanardelli 1888, 371.
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its general acceptance as automatic and “natural” behavior. Propon- 
ents of the duel did speak out in a more formal fashion, but they sel-
dom defended the duel as a good thing in and of itself, preferring to 
portray it as a necessary evil that might one day no longer serve its 
current functions. This was an important ploy, particularly popular 
among authors of the many dueling codes published during the period, 
because it allowed duelists to admit the inherent dangers and inconsis-
tencies of the practice while proceeding right ahead with one vertenza 
after another. In this manner proponents sought to disarm their antag-
onists and mitigate the contradictions of proudly trumpeting an illegal 
behavior in a country dedicated to the rule of law. Meanwhile, as the 
debate ensued, dueling manuals flooded the market, juries of honor 
offered their pronouncements, playwrights promoted the efficacy of 
honorable combat, and newspapers dished up a daily “propaganda of 
deed,” in which prominent people, sword in hand, demonstrated what 
it truly meant to be a gentleman. In the end, the controversy betrayed 
the inherent contradictions of a regime that vaunted equality before 
the law and the end of corporate privilege, but that could not escape 
its own exclusive notions of honor and power.
The Duel as a Social Prejudice
One of the interesting aspects of the great dueling debate was the 
common tendency on both sides to define dueling as the result of 
a “social prejudice.” Unfortunately, commentators pro and con were 
equally unanimous in their assumption that there was no need, given its 
apparent currency, to explain what they meant by the term, leaving the 
modern analyst somewhat in the dark. Carefully examining this widely 
accepted notion of “social prejudice” with regard to the duel, however, 
we begin to see that it generally referred to the network of pressures 
ranged throughout Italian society which forced men to defend their 
honor no matter how trivial the offense or how great the danger. In 
this way the idea of “social prejudice” became a shorthand for a com-
plex set of assumptions concerning the nature of masculinity, bravery, 
and status, all of which needed no further discussion by either critics or 
supporters of the duel. Moreover, all involved in the discussion clearly 
understood how this prejudice operated on a practical level and how 
refusal to fight a duel could effectively “disqualify” a man from polite 
society and perhaps ruin him financially. Such was the pervasiveness of 
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this “prejudice” that various opponents of the duel, be they Catholic, 
socialist, or progressive, were unable to withstand the public and private 
pressures of a challenge and eventually found themselves fighting on 
the field of honor. Even more interesting, perhaps, is the fact that most 
commentators agreed on the negative nature of the prejudice but con-
sidered it so deeply rooted in society as to defy eradication. It was the 
very pervasiveness of this belief that helped perpetuate the dueling ethic 
well into the twentieth century and, in contrast to other western Euro-
pean countries, even beyond the cataclysm of the First World War.
 Attempting to unravel the concept of social prejudice is naturally 
frustrating because despite its ubiquity in the literature of dueling, or 
perhaps because of it, few authors actually ever bothered to explain it. 
For instance, in an 1839 tract against the duel, Michele Costi could 
claim that dueling was caused by an “almost general prejudice,” with-
out need for further details.3 Likewise, in 1888 Giuseppe Leti, although 
an opponent of the duel, argued that the crime of dueling deserved 
lesser penalties because against “inveterate prejudices, every legislative 
action will fail no matter how serious or even ferocious it may be.”4 The 
Italian military was hardly more useful with its decree against dueling in 
1908, which declared that “the duel does not constitute an act of cour-
age, but rather an illogical coercion arising from an inveterate prejudice 
which today no longer has a motive to survive.”5 Apologists for the duel 
were just as obtuse in their use of the term: witness Costantino Cac-
chione, the author of an 1895 dueling code, who freely admitted that 
the duel was “an absurd social prejudice.”6
 So what exactly was this “social prejudice” that could be bandied 
about with such great frequency and so little fear of misunderstand-
ing?7 One clue can be found in a revealing short story written by an 
antidueling author, Luigi Dossena, in 1864. Dossena’s protagonist sits 
about ready to commit suicide because he has been disgraced for hav-
ing honored a promise to his future father-in-law not to engage in 
duels. His fiancée had initially supported his resolve, but, when faced 
with the public disdain that came after he refused to defend his honor, 
she abandoned him. In his parting letter, he writes to her: “I do not 
reproach you, I do not have the right; I only say that we were mad to 
 3. Costi 1839, 236
 4. Leti 1888, 37–38.
 5. Decree in Gelli 1926, 243. 
 6. Cacchione 1895, 7. Also see Salafia-Maggio 1895, x; Borgatti 1914, 4.
 7. An early French usage of the term is in Rousseau 1960, 130–31.
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want to fight against society, against public opinion. God grant that I 
be the last victim of this prejudice.”8 Amazingly, Paolo Fambri used 
exactly the same story to emphasize why men had to be allowed to 
duel, his argument being that an attempt to buck the prejudice could 
only lead to social death and ultimately suicide.9 In short, the social 
prejudice surrounding the duel consisted of the assumption on the 
part of society that a man, once insulted, had no choice but to fight the 
transgressor so as to defend his honor. These assumptions thus formed 
the basis for what Ute Frevert has called in Germany the “social com-
pulsion” to duel.10
 But what was the nature of this compulsion, and what if one rejected 
the precepts of the prejudice or simply found the prospect of dueling 
unacceptable or unnerving? According to the published manuals on 
honor, refusing to fight a duel in the face of an insult or legitimate 
challenge was grounds for squalifica, or disqualification from the “pre-
rogatives of chivalry.” This meant that one was no longer guided or 
protected by the laws of honor, and thus one had forfeited honor itself. 
Likewise, since according to the Gelli’s popular Codice, “The sentiment 
of honor in a gentleman must dominate all other hierarchies of duty,” 
then one was no longer, by definition, a gentleman at all. At first glance 
this “disqualification” might appear both superficial and tautological—if 
one did not duel, then one was not allowed to duel. But having lost the 
right to duel meant that one could never request satisfaction for an 
insult, and one thus automatically entered—at least according to cur-
rent codes of chivalry—the same category as criminals, lunatics, cheats, 
gamblers, bankrupts, and police spies, to say nothing of the generically 
disqualified sectors of women, workers, and peasants.11
 On paper, such a pseudolegal reclassification appears abstract or even 
silly, but in practice it had devastating effects for anyone moving within 
the circles of polite society. In the first place, it was virtually impossible 
to counter the assumption that fear, not to say cowardice, had inspired 
a refusal to fight, no matter what the actual motive, and this assump-
tion struck at the heart of a man’s masculinity. This was a disaster for 
men in the military, where courage was seen as intrinsic to the profes-
sion, but it could be equally damaging for civilian gentlemen. Honor 
was by definition part of public behavior, and, within the close-knit 
 8. Dossena 1861, 24.
 9. Fambri 1869, 37–41.
 10. Frevert 1995.
 11. Gelli 1926, 1–6, 27, 45–47.
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communities of people who “counted,” one simply could escape nei-
ther the stigma nor the implications of disqualification. Affairs of honor 
served as romantic and titillating topics of discussion at social functions, 
be they dances, dinners, or operas; and a refusal to duel for an offense—
either received or given—set off a chain reaction of gossip, innuendo, 
disdain, and rejection that contemporaries compared to a public pillory 
or even a “social death.”
 What did such a living death entail? For Italy, at least, its conse-
quences were minutely dissected by Marchese Crispolti in his novel 
Un duello, published in 1899. As his protagonist, Crispolti offered 
Count Ermenegildo Canetoli, a young roman nobleman who attempts 
to break free of the prejudice surrounding the duel after being publicly 
slapped in the face for no apparent reason by an arrogant army offi-
cer, Tornabuoni, at the racetrack. With the insult witnessed by a large 
crowd, Canetoli is immediately encouraged to challenge the assailant, 
and his best friend offers his services as a second. But Canetoli has 
serious religious scruples about dueling. Although willing to frequent 
“normal” society—including a men’s club known for its liberalism— 
he is a scion of Rome’s “black” ultra-Catholic aristocracy. After consid-
erable reflection he decides that he must hold by the Church’s condem-
nation of the duel and refuses to issue the much-expected challenge. He 
has few illusions about what trouble lies ahead or where it will come 
from: “His true enemy was not Tornabuoni, but rather the many people 
who had already profited from the occasion to threaten him [Canetoli] 
with the pillory; those who were pushing him to fight Tornabuoni if 
he wanted to justify himself to them.”12 Nevertheless, Canetoli feels that 
he can rely on his reputation as an honest and brave man, especially 
since he had previously made no secret about his religious opposition 
to the duel.
 But Canetoli proves to be wrong. He immediately finds himself 
caught up in a whirlwind of gossip, accusation, and denunciation that 
rips through his many social circles. High teas, dinner parties, and fam-
ily gatherings all vibrate with opinions on the case, most of them aimed 
against his masculinity and courage. He fears that his company will 
embarrass his friends, so he offers them the option of not inviting him 
to functions, and, to his surprise and dismay, they take him up on it. 
Both friends and acquaintances warn each other not to be seen with 
him until society has sorted out his fate. This seclusion quickly begins 
 12. Crispolti 1899, 18.
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to erode his self-confidence as well as his informal influence in Rome. 
He finds, for instance, that his lobbying efforts for Catholic charities 
with members of parliament are curtailed because he no can longer 
see them socially.13 Eventually his adversaries place an announcement 
in the local newspaper condemning him as “a person who, having in 
other circumstances refused to ask satisfaction for a physical insult, has 
put himself beyond the rights of chivalry and therefore has no means 
to fulfill his obligations honorably.”14 This attack opens the door for 
others, and Canetoli finds that he cannot attend social events without 
being snubbed by people he thought were his friends. In a particularly 
dramatic incident, he goes to his club where one of the members tells 
him he is no longer welcome. When he attempts to argue the point, 
he is called a coward to his face and discovers that he has no recourse 
to such an affront. He raises his hand to slap his opponent, but the lat-
ter steps back and reminds him “the same maxims that prohibit the use 
of the saber also prohibit the use of the hands.” Caught between his 
convictions and his pride, Canetoli feels he can do nothing. His ostra-
cism is complete when the various members of the club witnessing 
the encounter all simultaneously turn their backs on him and leave the 
room in a public act of shunning.
 As the pressure continues to mount, Canetoli begins to crack. He 
feels trapped in a living death. “Day and night he passed between the 
horror of feeling buried and the hope and the fever of somehow lift-
ing the stone of the sepulchre.”15 At a certain point he decides his only 
alternative is to go to Greece and die fighting the Turks—a Christian 
death of bravery that will squelch the charges of cowardice back in 
Rome. But in the end, Crispolti saves his hero through a Christian 
transfiguration that is nothing less than a personal resurrection. Hav-
ing died the “social death” of honor, Canetoli is born again within the 
bosom of the ultra-Catholic community. With the help of his father 
confessor, he discovers his error in having cared for the opinion of lib-
eral society, and through his fiancée (who is shamelessly compared to 
Dante’s Beatrice) he discovers a brave Vita Nuova of Christian devotion. 
 We can hardly fault Crispolti for his happy resolution of Canetoli’s 
situation or for his hero’s relative willingness to give up the parties, 
dances, and dinners of “white” (read liberal) Roman society. After all, 
Crispolti himself was a member of the black Roman nobility, a leader 
 13. Ibid., 89–90.
 14. Ibid., 156.
 15. Ibid., 274.
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of the intransigent Catholic Opera dei Congressi, and, most significantly, 
the founder and leader of Italy’s Anti-dueling League.16 In a very real 
sense, he himself had already relinquished those things that he forced 
his hero to sacrifice in his novel. But besides his dramatic and colorful 
catalogue of the pressures pushing Italian men to duel at the end of the 
nineteenth century, what is most revealing about Crispolti’s account—
especially considering his own biases and purposes in its creation—is 
the fact that his hero actually loses the struggle. No matter how deep 
Canetoli’s convictions, he must withdraw from regular civil society into 
a much smaller social sphere of religious compatriots. Rather than sug-
gest the weakness of the “dueling compulsion” as a social prejudice, 
Crispolti’s book underlines its extraordinary vigor.17 
 That vigor was further witnessed by various cases of declared anti-
duelists who eventually were forced into fighting duels for fear of being 
branded as cowards. “The world,” declared Fambri with obvious rel-
ish in 1869, “is full of abolitionists who fight [duels].”18 As proof posi-
tive, he would later cite the case of Federico Gabelli, who wrote to 
condemn Fambri’s famous book in support of the duel and then two 
weeks later wrote back to ask him to serve as his padrino.19 The most 
famous such pentito was undoubtedly Francesco Lorenzini, a major in 
the Piedmontese army, who published a lengthy tome condemning the 
duel in 1852. Lorenzini was well-known as an avid duelist, and his 
public about-face on the issue created a storm of derision in the press 
of Torino. Consequently, despite his many dramatic arguments against 
the practice, Lorenzini fought two duels within as many days against 
his journalistic critics, sending one to the hospital seriously wounded. 
Likewise, Captain Filippo Abignente was forced into a duel in 1894 by 
Ferruccio Macola, a newspaper editor, specifically because Abignente 
had written a treatise criticizing the duel as a barbaric social prejudice.20 
In another case, Ernesto Teodoro Moneta—winner of the 1907 Nobel 
Peace Prize—offered a series of arguments against the duel in an article 
in 1872 and was immediately pilloried as a coward and poltroon by 
an opposing newspaper. Within days, Moneta found himself not only 
attempting to provoke his opponent Carlo Righetti into a challenge, 
 16. For a short biography see Martire 1943.
 17. A parallel portrait of social death from the produeling side is in Fambri 1869, 20–
27.
 18. Fambri 1869, 39.
 19. Letter to Abignente, quoted in La Manna 1901, 24.
 20. Gelli 1928, 208–9. 
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but eventually resorting to a court of honor to force Righetti to fight 
him.21
 For some opponents of the duel these contradictory pressures sim-
ply proved too much and led to suicide. Such was the case of Bruno 
Crescitelli, brother of the Reverend Alberico Crescitelli who was later 
beatified after his martyrdom in China during the Boxer Rebellion. A 
fervent Catholic like his brother, Bruno had become an army officer, 
and in 1893, during a posting in Torino, he was personally insulted at a 
party by a civilian guest. Exhorted by his fellow officers to defend the 
honor of the corps, Bruno held true to his religious convictions and 
refused to fight. Facing expulsion from the army and the scorn of his 
colleagues, he gave way to despair and ended his own life. His brother, 
writing from China, angrily condemned the “anti-Christian, ungrateful 
and assassin” government “in the hands of free masons” for deliberately 
using the dueling compulsion against the Church and knowing full 
well how it would test the allegiance of Catholic officers.22 Conspiracy 
charges aside, the case indicates the psychological power of the preju-
dice, which could run roughshod over strongly held religious beliefs 
and could lead from the rejection of one mortal sin to the commission 
of another, and this without hope of redemption. In short, as long as a 
man wanted to operate within the bounds of “normal” society, he had 
little choice but to obey the constraints of honor as they arose before 
him. And one must not forget that dueling as a prejudice was not only 
an external coercive device. The very strength and ubiquity of the code 
of honor derived from the fact that so many Italian men had internal-
ized the precepts of chivalry and felt empowered rather than threatened 
by their operation.
 The universally accepted notion that dueling resulted from a deeply 
rooted social prejudice on the part of the public was used in exactly 
opposite ways by proponents and opponents of the practice.23 The latter 
argued that because dueling was caused by such an illogical prejudice, it 
should be eradicated immediately as part of a post-Risorgimento “civi-
lizing” of Italian society. They viewed the duel as a barbarous atavism, 
similar to the superstitious persecution of witches or the pursuit of fam-
ily blood feuds, which was simply incompatible with modernity and 
 21. See “Agli Onorevoli Membri del Giurì d’Onore,” Aug. 3, 1872, a pamphlet in MRM. 
For other examples see Brunetti 1914, 80–81.
 22. Criveller 2004, 44–45. 
 23. This ambiguity regarding the duel was cleverly encapsulated in Clemente Tomei’s 
aptly named drama, Il pregiudizio, published in 1898.
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progress. In contrast, defenders of the duel claimed that the prejudice 
was so deeply woven into Italy’s social fabric that it was virtually impos-
sible to legislate against it without a long period of preparation. Any 
attempt to do otherwise would only cause more problems than it could 
possibly solve.24 There was, in fact, a general evolutionary conception 
among the advocates of the duel that eventually, sometime in the future, 
Italy would reach the same level of civilization as England and the duel 
would become unnecessary. At the same time, however, they argued 
that current conceptions of honor were so strong, the prejudice so 
deeply ingrained, that to abolish the duel would strike at the very heart 
of Italy’s civility.25 
 To conclude this necessarily convoluted discussion of dueling as a 
public prejudice, it is important to point to two interesting and inter-
related issues. First, the discourse that surrounded dueling in Italy after 
unification tended to a surprising degree to construe honor as a social 
construction rather than as an inherited or biological characteristic. 
Chivalric honor, for all its aristocratic overtones, was seen as an inven-
tion of society itself, which in turn could evolve. Second, although 
both sides of the debate acknowledged that the dueling prejudice was 
deeply woven into the matrix of Italian society, such an image was 
rather at odds with the fact that, except for Piedmont and Naples, duel-
ing was relatively rare in preunitary Italy, and in some regions, such 
as the Papal States, it was virtually unknown. For many parts of the 
country, then, the much-vaunted prejudice that promoted the duel was 
a relatively recent phenomenon, yet no one seemed to doubt either its 
ubiquity or its force under the liberal regime.
 A partial answer to this apparent paradox of the short reign yet per-
vasive power of the dueling prejudice can be found in the crucible of 
unification itself. The duel had been used as a metaphor and a mecha-
nism to bring about the creation of the country, and, as we have seen, 
proponents of the practice considered the birth of the dueling ethic 
and the resuscitation of the point of honor as necessary and positive 
steps in the creation of a virile, patriotic people. In this sense, the duel 
and the social prejudice that surrounded it were indeed woven into the 
fabric of united Italy’s elites’ social conscience, and the spread of the 
Piedmontese military machine throughout the peninsula guaranteed 
that the red, white, and green colors of that fabric would be dyed in 
 24. For example, Coelli 1904, 178–79.
 25. Fambri 1869, 30, 81. 
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the wool. On the other hand, understanding the patriotic regenera-
tion of the duel also helps in turn explain the popular vision of the 
prejudice as a social construction: there were numerous people, includ-
ing proponents of the duel, who had lived through the transition and 
who knew that issues of honor had not always led to the clanging of 
swords.26
Champions of the Duel: Fambri and Modugno
In Italy’s long, involved debate over the duel, its most prominent and 
influential defender was unquestionably, although not surprisingly, 
Paolo Fambri, who remained active and outspoken until his death in 
1892. Despite his enthusiasm for the code of honor, best summarized 
in his 1869 book, Della giurisprudenza . . . del duello, Fambri argued that 
in moral terms the duel was not in and of itself a good thing. On the 
contrary, he portrayed it as a necessary evil brought about by the coun-
try’s recent and rapid attainment of unity and liberty. Freedom was 
an incalculable good, but it brought with it responsibilities that many 
Italian elites—whose general character had suffered from long years of 
domination by foreign powers—were simply not ready to handle. The 
duel was thus a “master of ceremonies of civilization” forcing people 
to treat each other with respect and circumspection. For Fambri, what 
appeared to be an anachronistic return to medieval chivalry was, in 
fact, a necessary step forward after the intervening centuries of deca-
dence and abuse.27 Once the duel had finished its civilizing mission, 
it would disappear by itself, as it had in the more advanced nation of 
England.
 In the meantime, the duel not only set new standards of comport-
ment, but it also limited the violent consequences when men did tres-
pass across the boundaries of etiquette. With a duel, an altercation that 
might have turned a party or reception into an ugly shoving match, 
a bloody fistfight, or something even worse was now transported to 
a time and place far from the social arena of both polite and mixed 
company.28 More serious still was the possibility that without a formal 
means of dealing with insults, individual disputes could fester into feuds, 
 26. Fambri 1869, 32–33; Gelli 1992, 56. Also see Brancaleoni’s speech in Crispolti 1899, 
159–60, 191. 
 27. Fambri 1869, xi, 16, 32.
 28. Ibid., 21–22, 90.
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and Fambri found little need to remind his audience that Italians had 
patented the word vendetta as a universal term of revenge and suffering. 
At heart he had little confidence in the ability of Italian gentlemen to 
act civilly over matters of honor without such a ritual intermediary, a 
point that later informed his popular aphorism set in a fictitious parlia-
mentary debate: 
—The sword of the gentleman has its rights
—Let’s break it!—I was interrupted by a deputy.
—Break it—I replied—and you will have four shards:
these will be collected, sharpened, and instead of a noble sword you will 
have four assassins’ daggers.29
Murder lurked in the minds of men, and the old forces of cowardly 
vengeance rather than virile chivalry lay just below the surface. Gradu-
ally this scenario would change: political progress had cleared the way 
for economic and moral progress, and, with the help of the code of 
honor, Italy’s transition to civil society would come sooner rather than 
later.
 While Fambri’s defense emphasized the civilizing aspects of the 
duel, other authors would stress its inverse causal relationship to the 
inadequacies of the law, and specifically the way the courts dealt with 
issues of honor. The most sophisticated of these was Niccolo Modugno, 
a legal scholar whose 1880 treatise, Il duello, laid out a general theory 
of juridical evolution as a context for understanding the continuing 
necessity of the duel in Italian society. The history of positive law, he 
argued, represented a constant push for progress, which in its desire for 
reform and order could sometimes push beyond the sensibilities of cer-
tain groups within the community. Specifically, modern jurisprudence 
was necessarily based on the idea of equality before the law, but indi-
vidual sensitivity to issues of honor differed widely and was determined 
by class, profession, upbringing, and personal susceptibility. Punishments 
for insult—whether written, verbal, or physical—all had to be aimed 
at a common audience and tended to be of a minimal nature, while, in 
contrast, certain people held their honor in higher regard than others. 
An accusation of conjugal infidelity constituted completely different 
offenses when directed at a scoundrel who sold his wife’s favors as 
opposed to a man who “in his woman esteems and honors the clean 
 29. Fambri 1888C, 1.
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and pure mother of his children.” Yet the law applied the same minimal 
sanctions in both cases.30
 Considering this and other faults in the law, Modugno thought it 
only logical that the duel should have continued to exert its power 
as a means of reestablishing bruised honor. It was not a social preju-
dice; rather it was a “law of opinion” which had evolved out of medi-
eval juridical rituals to compensate for the contradictions of modern 
jurisprudence.31 The duel was thus born out of inexorable legal neces-
sity, and he unabashedly maintained that for certain serious insults or 
offenses, the law could never and would never offer adequate compen-
sation. Some aspects of honor simply needed blood in their defense. 
Although based on an evolutionary notion of society and law, this view 
was a far cry from Fambri’s contention that progress would render the 
duel a useless anachronism once it had served its civilizing function. 
Rather, the very nature of modern law determined that the code of 
honor would survive far into the foreseeable future.32 This was not 
to argue that the state should legalize the duel, for such radical action 
would be contrary to the progress of the law itself. Rather, it should 
keep penalties low, assign dueling cases to juries in tune with public 
opinion, offer judges ample latitude for leniency, and, for much of the 
time, quite simply “close its eyes.”33
 For all their learning and logic, Modugno’s arguments rather obvi-
ously indicated the degree to which he had internalized the precepts 
of the dueling code. They also propagated the belief that “real” issues 
of honor referred primarily to sexual discipline, that is, the defense of 
a woman’s reputation and a man’s right to her fidelity. Although he 
implied that there were serious nonsexual insults which the law could 
not assuage, virtually all of the examples designed to sway the reader 
to his point of view referred to adultery or accusations of other sexual 
impropriety. Who, for instance, would allow his daughter’s or wife’s 
name to be dragged through the mud of a regular court trial should 
someone slander her character: “The honor of a woman is like a sensi-
tive plant, which, being touched is ruined. It is not possible to allow 
the honor of a sister to be placed in discussion in order to convict a 
scoundrel of mendacity. To discuss something is to put it in doubt; and 
 30. Modugno 1880, 32–42, 50.
 31. Ibid., 76.
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one never discusses honor, especially that of a woman.”34 Men might 
equivocate on many matters, and friends or juries might compound 
many offenses away from the field of honor, but the bottom line for 
Modugno was protecting sexual propriety, and it would be the standard 
trope when one wanted to expose the helplessness of the law in the 
face of dishonor and reinforce the legitimacy of the dueling ethic. What 
good was judicial censure in the case of profound humiliation, when 
only blood and danger could restore honor and masculinity?
Literature as Legitimizer
Whatever the efficacy of their logic, Fambri’s and Modugno’s works 
were pretty heavy going, generally reserved for specialists seeking legiti-
macy for their dueling codes or for parliamentarians seeking to defend 
the duel in the face of abolitionist onslaughts. More accessible to the 
public palate were the various pieces of literature that presented the duel 
in a positive light.35 The most blatant of these works was Paolo Ferrari’s 
Il duello, a stage play first performed in Florence in 1868. Ferrari stresses 
that although the duel may seem cruel—especially to women—it serves 
the purpose of protecting honorable men against the slings and arrows 
of those who would seek to malign or insult them for fun or profit. 
Furthermore, he reflects the fascination that the duel exerted over Italy’s 
civil classes and portrays the risks of rejecting the principles and practice 
of chivalric honor.
 Set during an electoral campaign in Livorno, the play personifies 
these themes in characters that run the gamut of Italy’s new elites: a dem-
ocratic lawyer (and patriotic war hero of 1859) who is actually a Nea- 
politan nobleman in disguise; a respectable northern army officer; a 
conservative and upright Marchese running against the lawyer in the 
parliamentary elections; and a dastardly count (also from Naples) who 
has previously been a lackey of the corrupt Bourbon regime. The action 
revolves around the personal tragedy (including his wife’s death by star-
vation and his exile to South America) that afflicted the lawyer/noble-
man (and erstwhile antidueling author) when, under the old regime, 
he failed to defend his personal honor by dueling the evil count, who 
had set out to ruin him for his liberal politics. This already convoluted 
 34. Ibid., 58.
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plot is further enlivened by the appearance of the lawyer’s long-lost 
daughter who has been secretly raised by the evil count’s estranged wife 
out of repugnance for her husband’s wicked deeds. Needless to say, all 
is revealed and brought right again at the end of the play by no fewer 
than two duels, one of which leaves the villain cavalierly smoking a cigar 
as he bleeds to death on stage and the other which allows the lawyer 
to establish the honor of his true identity as he goes into the elections.
 Beyond the social utility implied by these outcomes, however, Fer-
rari concentrates not on the combat, which occurs offstage, but on the 
preliminary discussion in which the lawyer/nobleman denounces his 
previous opposition to the duel and declares it instead “one of the prov-
ident wisdoms of society which governs the improvident prejudices of 
our passions.”36 He later explains to his recently recovered daughter, 
who is appalled that she might lose him so quickly to such a “barbaric” 
practice, that the duel is necessary because “[t]he law can protect life, 
property, and probity; it cannot protect honor, which is a case of con-
science, which stands above the law, which the law cannot even define. 
A judge can punish a blow from a rock that has left a bruise, he can-
not punish a glove that has been raised towards my face!”37 Had he 
responded in the first instance to the villain’s insults according to the 
rules of honor, he might have saved himself, his wife, and his daugh-
ter their respective travails. With this preamble he confronts her with 
the necessary choice, “either catcalls, or a brawl, or the duel.” Despite 
her anguish, she rises to the occasion and commands him, “Go . . . go 
fight . . . it is the lesser of the evils.” Thus the natural propensity of the 
woman to seek peace is once again brought round to the necessary and 
dangerous imperatives of honor. In the end, Ferrari’s intent is obvious: 
the play is designed and executed as a piece of propaganda for the duel-
ing ethic as a critical part of the new Italy’s identity and as a facilitator 
of its moral and social regeneration.
 Not all literary proponents of the duel were as obvious as Ferrari 
in the focus of their subject matter, but they could be equally if not 
more effective in portraying the code of honor as a positive force in 
society. Take, for instance, Achille Torelli’s I mariti, which was first per-
formed in Florence in 1868—the same year as Ferrari’s Il duello. Set 
in Naples shortly after the fall of the old regime in 1861, the story 
revolves around the unhappy marriages of the Duke of Herrera’s three 
 36. Ferrari 1928, 8–9.
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children, two of whom have married fellow aristocrats and the third 
who feels superior to her middle-class husband. At first blush, the play 
is a social commentary on the foibles of hereditary privilege. The cur-
rent crop of noblemen—including a marchese, a baron, and the duke’s 
heir, or duchino—variously reveal themselves as dissolute, unmannerly, 
and insecure. As husbands (hence the title), they drive their wives to 
distraction with their indifference, infidelity, and, in one case, excessive 
jealousy. The protagonists of the tale are Fabio Regoli, a successful law-
yer (married to the duke’s daughter), and Enrico di Riverbella, a hand-
some naval officer. Honest, hardworking, and honorable, they prove 
themselves far more suitable as husbands than the play’s noblemen, and 
each in his own way helps make the point that talent, character, and 
upbringing are more important than pedigree, a point reinforced by 
the aging duke toward the end of the play: “I had to live seventy years 
to realize that race and blood are nothing but nonsense! Myself, I don’t 
acknowledge blood anymore. I boast of a pedigree that is as pure as that 
of the count of Chambord; and have you seen my son? Have you ever 
seen more of a peasant (bifolco) than him. Education, education, has to 
be it, not blood.”38 Written in the first decade of unity by a bourgeois 
playwright who had won a battlefield commission after being wounded 
at the battle of Custoza in 1866, Torelli’s play thus celebrates the fusion 
of the old aristocracy with the newly empowered elites of Italy. In 
the end, Regoli tames his aristocratic bride’s haughtiness with forth-
right actions and kind words, and she appropriately informs him in the 
last line of the play that she is pregnant with their first child. On the 
other hand, di Riverbella wins the affection of the old duke and sets 
himself up to marry his true love, whose current husband—the duke’s 
son—is terminally ill as a result of his dissipated lifestyle.
 Digging a bit deeper, one finds that the play is essentially a treatise 
on honor, reputation, and manhood. The women offer themselves as 
weak and emotional creatures whose instruction and protection have 
been betrayed by their aristocratic husbands and brothers, and who thus 
must rely on the good offices of the “real men” of the world. Constantly 
in danger of being compromised in their decorum and reputation by 
their husbands’ associations with fallen women and unscrupulous men, 
they bring the family to the brink of social disaster, only to have the 
situation saved by Regoli and di Riverbella who understand the impor-
tance of both proper comportment and public opinion. In this sense, the 
 38. Torelli 1954, 80.
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lawyer and the soldier give the aristocracy lessons in matters of honor-
able behavior. This comes out most clearly when di Riverbella challenges 
the baron to a duel for having attempted to seduce the duke’s daugh-
ter-in-law but then very cleverly manipulates the chivalric negotiations 
to hide the true cause of the vertenza, which would have embarrassed 
the duke’s family. In the ensuing combat, di Riverbella permanently 
disfigures the baron’s face with a saber slash—thus demonstrating the 
man’s true nature as a mostro or monster—but finds himself challenged 
by the duke who fears that the duel has somehow compromised his 
daughter-in-law’s reputation and revealed his son’s weakness. Di Riv-
erbella then reveals to the duke how he has actually saved the family’s 
honor, and he shows him the verbale di scontro signed by the padrini 
which successfully hides any mention of his son’s wife. The duke is 
astonished and delighted at di Riverbella’s gentlemanly expertise, for 
he understands these things and declares to Regoli, “Do you perhaps 
believe that honor is the privilege of the young? . . . We are of the old 
generation, and we only tremble when we have become paralyzed.” 
Honor now connects across generation and class, and the duke declares 
di Riverbella “a true gentleman” whom he sadly contrasts with his 
profligate son whose days are numbered.39 Together Regoli and di Riv-
erbella prove themselves perfect examples of true men, in stark contrast 
to the others and especially the overly jealous marchese who patheti-
cally stumbles through the last act yelling to all, “But I am a man!”40 
 In all of this, the duel itself takes place offstage before the fifth act, 
but it provides a major turning point in the action, and the many con-
flicts are sorted out and settled in its aftermath: a sort of deus ex duello. 
Whatever the political or social message of I mariti, its affection for and 
affirmation of the code of honor are obvious and effective. Men who 
know the rules of proper comportment and have the courage to back 
them up with blood are those fit to rule the country. It was a popular 
point of view, at least gauging from public reaction to the play. Torelli 
was celebrated immediately after its first performance, with members of 
the prestigious Accademia della Crusca crowding onstage to shake his 
hand and the minister of education (Florence was currently the capital 
of Italy) calling for his immediate knighthood. Verdi and Manzoni both 
publicly praised the play, and one critic declared “in all that various and 
splendid manifestation of an idea there is something that forms part and 
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substance of ourselves.” He consequently proclaimed it to be the start 
of a new national theater—an idea reiterated by Croce in 1904.41 Obvi-
ously having struck a chord within Italy’s cultured audiences, the success 
of I mariti constituted a continuing advertisement for the dueling code 
which, along with plays such as Felice Cavallotti’s Agatodemon (1889), 
Francesco Garzes’ Bianca d’Oria (1892), Clemente Tomei’s Il pregiudizio 
(1898), and Marco Praga’s La crisi (1904), constantly claimed to Italians 
that if they wanted to count, if reputation mattered, if they were to be 
real men and not poltroons, they would have to be ready to find their 
way to the field of honor.42
Treatises against the Duel
“Society is shocked, public tranquility is compromised, order is contin-
uously disturbed, truth, liberty, and life and limb (persona) of the citizens 
is in danger.”43 Such a complaint, from the antidueling author Jacopo 
Nicoletti in 1864, characterized the frustration felt by many Italians as 
the code of chivalry became the order of the day in the newly united 
country. For all its apparent force, the dueling compulsion immediately 
gave rise to an extensive antidueling movement, which would eventu-
ally include three intertwined and overlapping activities: first, agitation 
for legislative reform against duelists and their compatriots; second, the 
organization of various antidueling committees, including an Italian 
chapter of the International Anti-dueling League; and third, the pub-
lication of numerous antidueling tracts intended to galvanize public 
opinion against the practice. Despite their common goal of reducing 
and eventually eliminating dueling, however, antidueling advocates were 
neither uniform in their composition nor united in their efforts. On 
the contrary, some of the most vociferous attacks on dueling came from 
opposite extremes of Italy’s political spectrum, with the intransigent 
Catholics on the right and the nascent socialists on the left. Signifi-
cantly, these were the very groups most critical of the way in which Italy 
had been united as a liberal, parliamentary monarchy, and their attacks 
on the duel demonstrate its important ties to the postunitary regime. 
 41. Introductory notes, ibid., 5–12.
 42. Parallel to I mariti, Praga’s 1904 play offers the positive image of an ex-colonel who 
saves his brother’s marriage by dueling his sister-in-law’s lover and manipulating the verbale to 
save her honor. 
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Even those friendly to the liberals, however, could use the campaign 
against dueling as a political stalking horse for other purposes, and they 
did not hesitate to do so.44 Setting aside for the moment the legislative 
debate over penal sanctions and the organization of the Anti-dueling 
League, this section scrutinizes the various antidueling tracts that were 
printed in Italy before and after unification. It demonstrates how, despite 
the often-repetitious nature of the arguments invoked, such literature 
revealed a good deal both about dueling in general and about its many 
opponents, whose differences occasionally detracted from the effective-
ness of the movement to abolish the practice.
 Books and pamphlets against dueling were hardly new to Italy. A 
series of antidueling tracts had been written in the sixteenth century, 
the arguments of which had been reclaimed, repackaged, and expanded 
during the course of the next 200 years, although with diminishing 
frequency. The nineteenth century, however, saw a recrudescence of 
such propaganda, and between the Restoration and the First World 
War, scores of antidueling tracts were published in Italy, ranging from 
articles and pamphlets of 5 to 20 pages to full-length books complete 
with chapters and indexes. The very volume of tracts indicates the con-
cern generated by Italy’s new love affair with the duel, although their 
number was never matched by their creativity. As is the case perhaps 
with any long-enduring abolition campaign, one soon becomes struck 
by the repetitious nature of the rhetoric, a fact alluded to by the authors 
themselves who defended this redundancy as the nature of effective 
propaganda.45 True as that may be, the standard list also becomes rather 
tedious, and one understands why Ute Frevert, when facing the bar-
rage of antidueling literature that came out of Enlightenment Germany, 
attempted to clump the arguments according to their “typical char-
acteristics.” If one were to adapt her “abstracted” list somewhat to fit 
nineteenth-century Italy, it would include the following:
Dueling is irrational: it makes individual self-worth dependent on the 
opinion of others and subordinates questions of character to either 
luck or prowess.
Dueling is completely counter to Christian morality.
Dueling is a crime condemned both by society and by the laws of the 
state.
 44. Cf. Frevert (1995, 17) for Germany. 
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Dueling is exclusionary and based on class or caste privilege.
Dueling enjoys the protection of the state and thus perverts modern 
notions of justice such as equality before the law.46
Dueling runs counter to freedom of the press and speech.
Dueling turns public issues into personal squabbles.47
Although they would be enhanced, embellished, and exemplified, these 
basic arguments run like a litany through the antidueling literature of 
Italy, and as page after page rolls by, one looks with anticipation for 
something different, original, or exotic.
 One such notable feature was the frequent attempt to distance Italy 
from the origins of the duel. With amazing monotony, and cutting 
widely across political lines, antidueling authors argued at length that 
dueling had not derived from classical culture and indeed had been 
unknown among either the Greeks or the Romans. Events that might 
have been presented to the contrary, such as the single combats found 
in the Iliad, were explained away as aspects of ancient warfare rather 
than real duels, just as countless examples were offered of how duel-
ing, with its emphasis on individual private justice, had run counter to 
the essential legal principles of Roman citizenship.48 On the contrary, 
opponents insisted that the duel had only arrived with the fall of the 
Roman Empire, a gothic import brought out of the forests of the north 
by Germanic invaders.
 Whatever its historical merits, the affirmation of the duel’s “gothic” 
provenance automatically provided Italy’s antidueling advocates with 
three important pieces of ammunition. On the one hand they could 
stress the “barbarity” of the practice as being, quite literally, the inven-
tion of “barbarians.” On the other hand, they could demonize dueling 
as something imposed from without, something uncivilized and foreign 
to the great cultures of Italy’s past.49 Thus dueling was simply un-Ital-
ian and even antithetical to the Italian character. Finally, the flip side of 
this argument could be used against the current notion of honor itself. 
Surely no one could doubt that the Romans had been both courageous 
and honorable, yet they had no tradition of the duel. Therefore, those 
who vaunted dueling as a proof of honor were both clearly mistaken 
and also out of touch with the historical roots of Western civilization. 
 46. Frevert 1995, 18–22. 
 47. I have added these last two to Frevert’s list. 
 48. For example, Nicoletti 1864, 68–71; Minieri 1869, 5.
 49. For example, Scaglione 1869, 7; Patroni 1881, 10–12.
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Moreover, by focusing on the Romans’ rejection of dueling, critics could 
offer a new definition of honor, one tied to civic virtue and service to 
the state. This concept particularly served those who wanted to break 
the military’s close connection to the duel, for there was no arguing 
with the obvious valor and efficiency of the Roman army. Certainly, 
the Romans had had a strong sense of honor, but they had subordinated 
it to the needs of the community. Thus critics could point to stories 
from Roman history in which soldiers had had their personal disputes 
but, instead of dueling, redirected their competitive energies against the 
enemies of Rome. Time and again, then, the stalwart virtue of ancient 
Rome was vaunted over the individualistic and punctilious niceties of 
the “barbaric” code of honor.50
 Such rhetoric, of course, played to the nationalist sentiments of the 
early Risorgimento, which portrayed Italy as a leader of world progress 
with Rome (whether Mazzini’s or Gioberti’s) as its capital. To proclaim 
the duel “uncivilized,” “un-Roman,” and “un-Italian” was to establish 
the patriotic credentials of those who had to counter the nationalist 
and militarist ethos of the produeling forces. Moreover, as unification 
progressed, the assertion that dueling had come from the Germanic 
North allowed opponents of the duel to marry their campaign with 
Italy’s ongoing struggle with Austria. For example, Luigi Dossena wrote: 
“The duel is the last barbarian remnant to come to us from the forests of 
the North with those dear marauding friends, who like hungry locusts, 
fell upon our backs, and with the brutal supremacy of numerical force, 
turned us into their humble slaves, and began for us a long epoch of 
tears and humiliation.”51 Published in 1861 in Milan, which had only just 
been liberated from the Austrians, we should perhaps not be surprised 
that Dossena’s diatribe reduced the Germanic tribes to insects that had 
robbed Italy of its freedom. Yet even as the Risorgimento ended, and 
Austria eventually shifted in the 1880s from enemy to ally, the tradition 
of blaming the duel on the barbaric hordes remained a constant for the 
antidueling movement, revealing the importance of somehow breaking 
the link between Italian nationalism and chivalric honor.
 It also revealed an interesting blind spot on the part of the anti-
dueling forces, which consistently failed to come to terms with Italy’s 
close identification with the birth of the modern duel in the sixteenth 
century. Almost universally, opponents of the duel ignored the impor-
 50. Ibid., 11, 24. 
 51. Dossena 1861, 43.
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tant differences between the medieval trial-by-combat, or giudizio di 
dio, and the point-of-honor duel as it had developed during the Italian 
Renaissance. Thus Emilio Federici, a Catholic critic of the duel, could 
affirm that eventually the duel would disappear as was the case with 
“ritual proofs of fire, boiling water, and the other so called judgements 
of God.”52 Yet, by tying the duel so closely to medieval rituals, antiduel-
ists opened themselves up to the charge that they did not understand 
the nature of modern honor. In fact, many opponents railed against 
the duel because it reduced the decisions of justice to chance or brute 
strength, and in so doing they missed the essential and most interesting 
aspect of what was going on around them: that is it did not matter who 
won and that honor was washed clean by blood, no matter whose blood 
it was. Nevertheless, to have acknowledged an Italian genesis for the 
modern duel would have struck at one of the common cornerstones 
of antidueling propaganda. Consequently, opponents of the practice for 
the most part simply skipped from the Middle Ages to the modern 
period with hardly a glance in between.53 Dueling was un-Italian, end 
of story.
 The popularity and ubiquity of this claim, however, certainly did 
not mean that all opponents necessarily supported the regime that had 
emerged with Italian unification. On the contrary, Catholic critics of 
the duel used the “barbarity” argument as splendid leverage against the 
government and ideology that had despoiled the papacy of its tempo-
ral holdings. Monsignor Giuseppe Patroni, for instance, could assert in 
1881: “one notes the duel, a vestige of barbarous times, which current 
reformers seek to revivify by all means, thus setting our age back several 
centuries, while they continue to have on their lips the expressions: 
civilization and progress.”54 The duel demonstrated, according to Patroni, 
the true hypocrisy of the liberals who praised themselves and their revo-
lution as harbingers of rational modernity but who, in fact, had resur-
rected the barbarians’ duel against all logic. Having divorced reason from 
religion, the liberals had lost their moral bearings and had even gone 
so far as to create chivalric rules to govern the savage practice which, 
if observed, provided impunity from prosecution.55 The Risorgimento 
had embraced “the pronouncements of a vain and fallacious science,” 
 52. Federici 1903, 127.
 53. In contrast Russo-Ajello (1906, 37–38) acknowledged an Italian genesis but then 
blamed the French for its perversion. Cf. Di Menza e Vella 1875, 3–4. 
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and the increase in dueling clearly justified Pius IX’s 1864 Syllabus of 
Errors which had condemned any truck with liberal ideas and, one 
might add, any recognition of the new Italian government.56 Although 
some Catholic critics of the duel would gradually take a less antagonistic 
stance toward the Italian state as the battles of unification faded, oth-
ers did not relent. As late as 1898 Salvatore Brandi would still maintain 
that dueling in Italy was “the natural product of sectarian liberalism.”57
 A different refrain of this same antiliberal theme was the argument 
that dueling was a form of indirect suicide or even a combination sui-
cide/homicide. According to this point of view, exposing oneself to 
death in order to avoid the shame of dishonor and public derision was 
tantamount to complete despair and was thus analogous to suicide.58 
This was an old concept and may have been the reason that the Council 
of Trent had set forth basically the same penalties for dueling as it had 
for suicide: absolute excommunication and exclusion from Christian 
burial. But it had taken on new meaning in the second half of the 
nineteenth century as it came to light that proportionally more and 
more Italians were taking their own lives. It was thus easy to assert that 
these two plagues, dueling and suicide, were being visited upon Italy 
because the Risorgimento had embraced the forces of rationalism and 
materialism and rejected the moral anchor of Catholicism. Cut adrift in 
a rapidly changing and amoral society, people, according to one Catho-
lic critic, became “disfigured in the slime of transitory pleasures, no 
longer believing in the future.”59 As such, they looked for meaning in 
their lives and, unable to find it, sought to hide behind the false precepts 
of chivalry or instead sought final escape through suicide. Whichever the 
case, there was little doubt in the minds of the Catholic critics as to the 
basic causes of these two “epidemic” problems, just as a solution was to 
be found in returning to a Christian concept of the state.60
 Interestingly, however, Catholics were not the only ones interested 
in equating dueling and suicide. As Geltmaker has pointed out, criminal 
anthropologists also drew such a connection, with Enrico Ferri assert-
ing that the duel consisted of a “generic and indirect consent of one’s 
own death” as part of a desire for honor. Of course, they took a rather 
 56. Ibid., 6.
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different approach than the Church as to why both dueling and sui-
cide were on the rise in Italy. Although they agreed that suicide was 
tied to changes in society since unification, they argued that it was a 
natural reaction to the disruption of previous patterns of behavior and 
the shift from a rural agrarian economy to an urban industrial one. 
The quickening of the pace of life and the loss of familiar surroundings 
made people “nervous” and led those with innate and atavistic tenden-
cies toward instability to react in a degenerate manner. Since societal 
pressure was growing against violence and toward greater “civilization,” 
these individuals struck out against themselves either directly through 
suicide or indirectly through the duel.61 Such actions were seen in part 
as a beneficial “safety valve” because they reduced the number of homi-
cides, but there was also an assumption on the part of people like Ferri, 
who was a devoted socialist, that if living conditions were improved and 
people became more comfortable, fewer people with atavistic tenden-
cies would be pushed to manifest them, although there would always be 
a core group of “degenerates” who would never really fit into society.62 
Consequently, as Italy evolved socially, both suicide and dueling would 
abate in due time.
 The overlap of medicine and law, so clearly evident in the think-
ing of the criminal anthropologists, also affected regular physicians who 
opposed the duel, albeit in a somewhat different way. Doctors found 
themselves in a very ticklish position vis-à-vis dueling because in order 
for a duel to be “legal” a physician had to be in attendance. As with the 
other rituals of the “code of honor,” failure to meet this obligation could 
disqualify the duel and open the participants to more serious legal sanc-
tions.63 Although many physicians only assisted duels with reluctance, 
they did so in order to provide immediate medical care if necessary. 
Even more important, they were able to limit the damage done in duels 
by declaring one of the opponents in a state of “inferiority” because of 
a wound, thus ending the combat.64 On the other hand, attending physi-
cians were obviously participating in a ritual designed by its very nature 
to injure or kill at least one of its participants, and this seemed to make 
them rather culpable.
 61. Ibid., 37–43. For other examples of criminal anthropology’s influence on discussion of 
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 This moral/legal dilemma was complicated by the gains of positiv-
ism in Italy and the growing professionalization of medicine in the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century. Doctors could now argue that it was 
their duty to actively and collectively counter the duel as part of their 
“sanitary mission” working toward the “hygienic progress” of mankind. 
Hence dueling became something akin to a microbe against which pro-
phylactic action was necessary. The previous tradition of participating 
at duels had been only a reactive or “curative” process, but now doc-
tors had to lead the way and find a proactive, “preventive” cure for 
the problem. Professor Gaetano Parlavecchio could therefore argue that 
the medical community, armed with the weapons of modern medicine, 
had the “right and duty to modify the environment” and protect their 
gentleman neighbors from the dueling contagion.65
 His prophylactic scheme was eminently simple: doctors should as 
a group refuse to participate in duels. Without medical assistance and 
the legitimacy it provided to their actions, duelists would find other 
ways to settle their disputes. However, in order to implement this plan, 
Parlavecchio proposed that the government would have to give doctors 
greater power to police themselves. Thus he implored the parliament 
to “stop the worthless delays which it has previously interposed against 
the approval of the projected law for the juridical recognition of the 
Doctors Associations.”66 If such empowerment were not forthcoming, 
doctors would still be able to continue to participate at duels despite 
the general condemnation of the practice by the current medical orga-
nizations.67 Clearly then, the campaign against the duel became part of 
a larger campaign on the part of the medical profession, or at least cer-
tain important sectors of it, to create an officially sanctioned guild that 
could discipline its members for the overall good of society and, one 
suspects, for themselves.
 This blatant bid for professional power obviously transcended the 
issue at hand and once again underscored the often political nature of 
the antidueling movement in Italy. Thus, despite its common goal, the 
campaign did not have a common agenda, and arguments could be 
adduced from a wide variety of angles, interests, and factions. In this 
respect, the antidueling movement acted as a mirror to Billacois’ adage 
that dueling was a “total social phenomenon by virtue of the richness 
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of its meanings and implications.”68 Although diverse groups and indi-
viduals could be equally and honestly opposed to the practice, their 
assumptions, approaches, and desires often differed radically according 
to politics, profession, or confession. For instance, Russo-Ajello, a law-
yer from Palermo, published over 300 pages in 1906 denouncing Italy’s 
“duellomania” as antithetical to everything good, but he saved his con-
cluding chapter to condemn the duel as symbolic of everything wrong 
with the Italian military, including the government’s often tragic ten-
dency to use soldiers for internal security. Thus he argued:
The duel signals the degeneration of militarism: to use weapons sacred 
to the fatherland for killing companions instead of fighting enemies is 
the worst of faults.
 And we therefore criticize the government whenever it uses soldiers 
for police services or for the bloody repression and slaughter of innocent 
citizens [ . . . ]. 69
Dueling, like police work, undercut military prestige and efficiency, and 
it was no secret, Russo-Ajello chided, that Italy’s army was famous for its 
duelists rather than its victories. Leaving aside his rather tortuous logic, 
we are struck by the ease with which the duel became a touchstone of 
political complaint against the liberal regime and its practices. In a sense, 
because of its multivalent nature, the duel invited critics to come from 
every corner, and the very exclusionary principle that lay at the heart 
of the point of honor only emphasized the isolation of “legal” Italy, 
dominated by “little writers, little publicists, and little officeholders, now 
raised by their positions and social dignities” from the real Italy of the 
people.70
The Socialist Dilemma
Such rhetoric naturally found favor among Italy’s socialists. At the 
party’s fourth national congress, which took place in Florence during 
the summer of 1896, a large majority of delegates voted to prohibit 
members from fighting in duels or even acting as seconds. In addition, 
they pledged to promote a propaganda campaign designed to disabuse 
 68. Billacois 1990, 1.
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the masses of the prejudice “that he is dishonored who when challenged 
does not fight and when offended does not challenge.” They recom-
mended as well that socialist deputies work to pass legislation that would 
punish crimes of violence committed in a duel with the same severity as 
those committed under normal circumstances.71 Although some impor-
tant figures opposed such a motion, the fundamental social inequalities 
inherent in the dueling ethic prompted easy passage of the condemna-
tion. According to one delegate, “[I]t is precisely because proletarians 
are not considered gentlemen, to whom alone the honor of arms is 
accorded, that we, if we want to show the solidarity that ties us to the 
workers, must reject the duel.” How, asked another, could the party ever 
ask workers to give up the violent culture of their knives if its bour-
geois leaders were allowed to keep fighting with their swords? While 
the congress balked at expelling members who might get involved in a 
duel, delegates vented their ire against those who betrayed the socialist 
belief in an ideal future for the sake of medieval notions of honor. Col-
lectivist principles demanded opposition to a prejudice that was by its 
very definition tied to rampant individualism.72
 The party remained true to these precepts, and when the rest of Italy 
cheered the “triumph” of the Count of Turin in his defense of Ital-
ian honor against the Prince of Orleans in 1897, Avanti—the socialist 
newspaper—refused to be drawn into the celebration. Instead, it criti-
cized the affair as simply a result of Savoyard monarchical pretensions.73 
Less than a year later, however, the party joined the chorus of outrage 
over the death of Felice Cavallotti, and the socialist deputy Giuseppe 
Berenini called on parliament to deprive the duel of its privileged sui 
generis status as a crime, thus increasing penalties against duelists who 
wounded or killed their opponents.74 Respectfully consigned by the 
Camera to the oblivion of further study, the presentation of the project 
nevertheless allowed Berenini to point with pride to the fact that the 
socialists had openly and consistently opposed the duel in both word 
and deed.75 Here he was referring to those comrades, such as Camillo 
Prampolini, Enrico Ferri, and Mario Todeschini, who on principle had 
publicly refused to fight when challenged and who had endured the 
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resulting social pressure, including for Ferri a proclamation on the part 
of the Tribuna of his figurative death as a man.76
 Despite Berenini’s positive assertions, however, the socialist campaign 
against the duel remained sporadic and half-hearted. Some provincial 
sections attempted to expel members who dueled, but at the national 
level there was a notable lack of commentary or criticism.77 By 1910, 
Giovanni Zibordi, in a special report prepared for the National Party 
Congress in October, declared the party’s propaganda effort stillborn 
and chided the leadership for apathy and acquiescence in the face of 
the chivalric ethic. Key members had participated in various duels and 
vertenze, and the socialist press had more or less accommodated their 
activities. Had Zibordi looked back to the debates of 1896, he would 
have easily discerned the roots of the problem. Some of the most promi-
nent figures in the movement, including both present and future edi-
tors of Avanti, had spoken out against the original condemnation of the 
duel on both theoretical and practical grounds. Filippo Turati had argued 
that most likely the phenomenon would simply disappear in the near 
future, and he had seconded a statement by Carlo Tanzi that since the 
proletariat did not duel, and since the party worked for the proletariat, 
there was no need to deal with the issue. Claudio Treves had criticized 
those who wanted an official condemnation of the duel as a means of 
fending off sfide from the opposition for being weak souls of vacillating 
conscience. He felt that it was a matter of private morality which the 
party should not attempt to legislate, and he invoked the memory of 
Ferdinand Lasalle, who had died in a duel, but who had been a great 
socialist and was still highly revered in Germany.78
 Even more revealing were the comments of Bernardino Verro, 
founder of the Fasci Siciliani, who had only recently fought a duel and 
who defended his actions as necessary to his political efficacy. His oppo-
nents had accused him of cowardice, and, if he had not accepted the 
challenge, his working-class supporters would have agreed with them. 
Yes, he was against dueling as a barbaric custom, and he admitted that 
duelists were no more than marionettes going through the motions 
prescribed by society: 
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But, you know, the crowd is a little fanatic for certain vestiges of barba-
rism, and when the opposing parties utilize such fanaticisms to discredit 
us, one just has to do something. If I had not accepted the duel, many 
others would have done it in my stead, and the popolo, irritated, might 
have resorted to acts of violence.
 When I am not known, it is necessary to fight in order to make 
myself known. Our friends Ferri and Prampolini [who had refused 
duels] had already fought, and so no one could say that they were cow-
ards. I had never fought before and so one could say it of me; and in that 
case I could not have remained in the midst of my people.79
This was a remarkable admission in front of a public meeting, and it was 
particularly piquant in its assertion that once a man had demonstrated 
his bravery on the field of honor, it was easier to then refuse for moral 
or ideological reasons. Above all, however, it laid bare the connection 
of power and honor on the public stage, where the physical courage 
of one’s convictions was central to political action, and the need to 
prove one’s manhood through ritual violence trumped other consider-
ations.80
 This tension created a real dilemma for the socialists. They opposed 
the duel, yet they sought to foster an image of revolutionary dyna-
mism and virile force that was easily undercut by possible accusations of 
timidity.81 For instance, Leonida Bissolati, prior to fighting a duel with 
Ferruccio Macola in the 1890s, reportedly proclaimed: “It is necessary 
to demonstrate that socialism is not a school of cowardice.”82 We see a 
later example of this tension in Anna Kuliscioff, the grande dame of Ital-
ian socialism, who in 1922 chastised Mario Missiroli for accepting a 
challenge from Mussolini, while her attitude toward him following the 
duel was couched in chivalric admiration: “Missiroli came here, lightly 
wounded, and for it being his first time fighting he magnificently did 
his part. He was cool, composed, deadpan; the other was madcap with 
the saber, anything but courageous and totally vulgar in everything.”83 
The socialists’ need to protect their masculinity also naturally raised 
questions about the duels they fought for reasons of intimacy, and even 
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the most vociferous opponents of the practice admitted this issue was 
almost impossible to deal with.84
 These considerations naturally eroded the supposed solidarity of 
socialist resolve. When Walter Mocchi was wounded in a high-profile 
duel in 1905 over a private affair, he was taken to task by various local 
sections of the party, and the federation of Milan called for a special 
meeting, complete with advocates pro and con, to consider his expul-
sion. Yet the incident inspired an article by Vittorio Piva in Avanti della 
domenica which ran completely counter to the party’s official position on 
the duel. He warned that the current attempt to create a “confraternity” 
that encroached on the moral liberty and intimate matters of its mem-
bers would alienate good men who would shy away from such punc-
tilious control.85 Mocchi and Piva belonged to the more militant wing 
of the party, and the debate over the duel may have been more politi-
cal smoke than moral fire as the moderates and maximalists struggled 
for control of the Milanese federation. Nevertheless, Piva’s point fit his 
more general critique of the party’s pacifist and antimilitarist policies, 
and it can be interpreted as a hedge against possible charges of effemi-
nate weakness on the part of the left. Socialism needed men of fiber, but 
in Italy men of fiber had to be ready to duel.
 The political nexus of honor, masculinity, and chivalry naturally 
impinged most directly on socialist deputies, and it was a parliamentary 
incident in 1910 that forced the party to admit and analyze the weak-
ness of its previous policy. When Eugenio Chiesa’s unbridled accusations 
against the ministry of war (examined in chapter II) resulted in no fewer 
than five vertenze and two duels within a week, two socialist deputies, 
Leonida Bissolati and Giufredda De Felice, figured prominently in the 
negotiations and encounters, with minute details of their involvement 
appearing in Italy’s dailies, including Avanti. Turati, probably sensing a 
black eye for the party, tried to get the parliament to create a jury of 
honor to derail and pacify the various affairs, but he found no support 
for such intervention on the part of his fellow legislators.86 In response 
to this startling contrast of socialist theory and socialist actions, the party 
leadership asked Giovanni Zibordi to prepare a position paper for the 
national congress to be held in Milan in October. Zibordi, who claimed 
to be about the only socialist journalist to have consistently written 
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against the practice, rose to the occasion and offered up a lengthy and 
sophisticated denunciation of the duel as being completely contrary to 
the antimilitaristic and humanitarian principles of the party. He also 
reiterated the main theme of the congress of 1896, which had focused 
on the social inequality inherent to chivalric honor, and he bitingly 
noted that no democratic or republican borghese, no matter how radical 
his politics, had ever deigned to duel with a member of the working 
class (a charge that he could have, in fact, extended to his own party).87
 Zibordi went beyond these standard arguments, however, to inter-
pret the acquiescence of some party leaders to the dictates of the duel-
ing code as symptomatic of a larger problem: the gradual pollution of 
socialist faith by the bourgeois arena in which they were trying to oper-
ate. In the corrupting ethos of parliament, some socialists had acted 
like provincial innocents and had lost sight of their basic principles, 
bedazzled by the artificial individualism of power politics. They had been 
taken in by a ritual of false physical courage which was used—either 
consciously or unconsciously—to cover the many transgressions of the 
liberal regime. How many times, as had been the case with Chiesa’s 
accusations against the ministry of war, had important questions regard-
ing public policy been sidelined and silenced after being personalized 
as affairs of honor? The socialists should be, by definition, the party of 
opposition, the party of surveillance, but they gave up that role when 
they allowed themselves to be dragged like marionettes onto the chival-
ric stage: “The political duel is an alibi or a diversion; often calculatingly 
desired by interested parties, and always concluding in the same effect, 
that is that the right of control is circumvented and the higher good of 
the collectivity is obliterated thanks to a personal solution.”88
 In order to combat these seductions of the dueling ethic, Zibordi 
called on members of the party to recognize that the physical bravery 
supposedly demonstrated in a duel was already inherent in someone 
willing to risk the dangers of joining the militant avant-garde of social-
ism. Beyond such physical valor, however, socialists had to manifest the 
moral courage and civil virtue necessary to hold the course of right 
action leading toward truth and reason. They had to turn the logic of 
the duel on its head. By rejecting all participation in vertenze and resist-
ing the resulting social pressure, they would demonstrate the meaning 
of true courage, which would be reinforced by their moral rectitude 
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and “virile frankness.” Without the crutch of chivalry as a means of set-
tling personal disputes, socialists would have to comport themselves in 
a truly virtuous and straightforward manner, and their example would 
elevate the notion of courage for all civilized men. It was, in fact, a call 
to construct a new form of socialist masculinity, which would embrace 
a revolutionary notion of honor and leave the pathetic and artificial 
rituals of the duel in the dust.
 Nevertheless, Zibordi tempered this idealistic fervor with some 
pragmatic considerations, the most important of which was to make an 
exception for duels arising from affairs of the heart. He felt that in such 
cases no absolute prohibition could be applied by the party because 
matters of intimacy were “complicated and compelling.” Given the cur-
rent state of society, Italians were not ready for the “cold customs of 
other countries” by which a betrayed husband might turn to the regular 
judiciary. To offset such problems, he called on the party to push for 
civil reforms such as divorce and a more modern conception of mar-
riage that would blunt the “tyrannical concepts” that forced husbands 
to risk their lives in the wake of being cuckolded.89 These reforms were 
easy to project into the future, but Zibordi obviously still had to deal 
with the current tension between “rational” socialists and their sexual 
self-image as “real” men. Consequently, his final motion, which was pre- 
sented to the 1910 congress, railed against the duel as an abomina-
ble bourgeois prejudice and prohibited socialists from participating in 
vertenze no matter what the issue; yet it conspicuously failed once again 
to provide for the expulsion of those party members who might actu-
ally do so.90
 What the effect of such a draconian provision might have been is 
hard to tell, but, as it was, prominent socialists, including Claudio Treves, 
Emanuele Modigliani, Francesco Ciccotti, Pietro Nenni, and Leonida 
Répaci, would continue to duel up to the First World War and beyond. 
As with the other abolitionists, the socialists would thus come up against 
the frustrating reality of having their own fine words and arguments 
betrayed by the actions of their colleagues: actions that pointedly and 
counterproductively advertised the currency rather than the bankruptcy 
of the dueling compulsion. On the other hand, it is obvious that, over-
all, the socialists viewed dueling as an integral aspect of the class biases 
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of liberalism which would automatically disappear along with that 
regime. In consequence, they focused their attention on preventing peo-
ple in the party from participating in duels, and one searches the antidu-
eling literature in vain for any pamphlets written by socialists to a larger 
audience. Such an isolated approach, aimed purely at the party faithful, 
naturally proscribed participation with other groups and highlights a 
problem inherent in the antidueling movement as a whole: although 
vehement in their mutual denunciation of the duel, opponents of the 
practice were often at even greater odds with each other, especially the 
Catholics and the socialists. This antagonism, which mirrored the larger 
strategies of the two groups as they struggled to define their roles in 
Italy’s changing political landscape, would naturally hamper widespread 
cooperation as a more formal antidueling movement began to emerge 
around the turn of the century.
Filippo Crispolti and the Anti-dueling League
The catalyst for such innovation came once again from Cavallotti’s 
spectacular demise in 1898, which, as previously noted, helped revital-
ize the debate over the juries of honor. His death genuinely shocked 
public opinion, and at the news crowds of students reportedly marched 
through the streets of Rome yelling, “Down with the duel! Long live 
socialism!” while the masons issued a general denunciation of the prac-
tice.91 According to Cavallotti’s biographer, “For the first time in Italy, 
there were not just isolated voices rising up against the barbaric and 
absurd institution, but a wide movement of opinion, that finished by 
putting it in crisis.”92 He unquestionably overstated the case—the duel 
still had a long life to lead—but Cavallotti’s death did raise awareness of 
the problem to a new level and also paved the way for the first voluntary 
societies devoted specifically to the eradication of the duel as a means 
of settling disputes among gentlemen. Such societies were an old idea 
in Italy; Clemente Pellegrini had published a lengthy treatise advocating 
their creation as early as 1868, but a general impetus to action had been 
lacking.93 Now, before the fatal year 1898 had run out, Milan’s Interna-
tional Society for Peace, under the direction of the pacifist Teodorico 
Moneta, began organizing an Italian antidueling society. It appears, 
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however, to have immediately run afoul of the Lombard Press Asso-
ciation, which felt, given Cavallotti’s journalistic roots in Milan, that it 
should lead the charge against the “grotesque and barbarous prejudice.” 
Further confusion came when yet another committee in Milan formed 
for the same purpose in 1902.94 Cavallotti’s unfortunate end had cer-
tainly created a favorable climate of opinion, but some larger organiza-
tional structure seemed necessary for effective action to occur.
 That structure and the energy requisite to its creation would come 
from Marchese Filippo Crispolti, whose name became synonymous 
with the antidueling movement after the turn of the century. Born 
into a well-heeled aristocratic family of the Romagna in 1857, he ini-
tially trained as a lawyer but abandoned the law for journalism and soon 
emerged as one of the bright lights of the Catholic intransigent move-
ment as it came to grips with the evolving political situation in Italy. 
An editor of the influential L’osservatore romano from 1887 to 1895, he 
was a key player in the Opera dei Congressi and a faithful adherent of 
the careful and conservative policies of Leo XIII. Far from reactionary, 
he sought to integrate the Catholic movement into a wide spectrum of 
social and political activities, all the while renouncing any accommoda-
tion with liberalism or the Italian parliamentary system, both of which 
he considered doomed to eventual failure for their lack of moral center. 
He accepted (as some of his compatriots did not) the legitimacy of the 
Savoyard monarchy and the fact that Italy was a nation whose capital 
was in Rome. With these concessions in mind, he sought to prepare 
a sort of “Catholic patriotism” which looked to the traditions of the 
papacy as a source of cohesion for the upcoming day when the Church 
would return to power in a new political synthesis. In the meantime 
he used his journalistic skills to fight for those reforms that he thought 
appropriate and against those, such as the introduction of divorce, which 
he found contrary to Catholic doctrine.95
 With regard to the duel, Crispolti may have taken his lead directly 
from Leo XIII. Although Pius IX had reiterated the Church’s threat of 
excommunication against duelists and their accomplices in 1869 (a reac-
tion perhaps against the perceived “plague” of duels sweeping the coun-
try), his successor felt compelled to publish a full-length diatribe against 
the practice in 1891.96 Two years later, Crispolti outlined a campaign 
against the duel in a long treatise that promoted Leo’s condemnation 
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as a fundamental weapon of propaganda and persuasion. Crispolti was 
convinced that the dueling prejudice was so deeply ingrained in lib-
eral society that the standard apparatus of criminal justice was help-
less in its repression. The bourgeoisie, he claimed, had overthrown the 
old regime and, lacking any religious compass to guide it, had grasped 
on to the old aristocratic point of honor as a source of moral legiti-
macy. Thus the duel was difficult to deal with because high society 
had internalized its basic precepts and transformed them into a set of 
morally coercive behaviors designed to assure compliance. One could 
perhaps convince Italian elites of the fundamental illogic of the duel, 
but when push came to shove, so to speak, Crispolti was convinced 
that they would bow to the pressure of their clubs and compatriots.97
 Based on this analysis, Crispolti supported a campaign of confer-
ences and pamphlets aimed at creating a countervailing public opinion 
that rejected the false and flattering precepts of chivalry. Yet he offered 
an important caveat to such propaganda. One might easily win the war 
of words, but the battles of behavior would be consistently lost because 
the duel offered not only honor but also a dramatic sense of struggle 
and self-sacrifice that appealed to young people of spirit. Combined 
with the psychological compulsions of elite society, this was a seduc-
tive and dangerous package, and Catholic energies should be directed 
first and foremost toward protecting the faithful, and especially the 
young, from its enticements. Previous attempts in this direction had 
been overly defensive rather than offensive according to Crispolti. They 
had adopted the liberals’ own arguments of logic and reason, which 
lacked real moral clout, and consequently Catholic youth had been 
ill-prepared to stand up to the pressure of public opinion. In contrast, 
the Church needed to act “fiercely” on the issue of the duel and offer 
a virile program that stressed strict obedience to papal command, call-
ing on the very spirit of self-sacrifice and bravery that fueled the duel 
itself. The strictures of Leo’s 1891 prohibition should be sold to Italy’s 
Catholic youth as an onerous and difficult task, requiring courage and 
fortitude in the face of social adversity. From that perspective, the very 
challenge of resistance would reinforce its effectiveness. “Remember,” 
rang the last line of his project, “that only the strong understand the 
glory of obedience.”98 Such muscular Catholicism lay at the heart of 
Crispolti’s battle against the duel, and it helps explain, along with his 
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obvious leadership in the Catholic movement, why the league which he 
inspired had to consistently combat accusations of confessionalism.99
 With public sentiment primed by Cavallotti’s death, Crispolti felt 
he had an opportunity to launch a broad-based crusade against the 
duel, but he was also well aware that his clerical connections might limit 
the scope of his success. Looking beyond the Catholic community, he 
understood that a proactive campaign, which might have a general effect 
on the behavior of all Italian elites, would have to assert some authority 
other than papal pronouncement. He conveniently found his inspiration 
in Don Alfonso di Bourbon, pretender to the throne of Spain, who cur-
rently resided in Vienna. In the summer of 1900, Don Alfonso had been 
shocked by a notorious case in which an Austrian officer had refused 
to fight a duel out of religious conviction and had been cashiered from 
the army and excluded from polite society. He began corresponding 
with his many acquaintances throughout Europe in hopes of starting 
an international wave of protest and soon attracted adherents to his 
cause across the continent.100 A formal association emerged in 1902, 
and national branches soon appeared in Germany, France, and Spain. In 
June of 1808, delegates from the different countries attended a three-
day international congress in Hungary and adopted a 13-point plan of 
action, including the creation of a permanent headquarters, provision-
ally located in the host city of Budapest.101
 Italy joined this movement relatively early. Crispolti had been rec-
ommended to Don Alfonso as the perfect person to push the new 
crusade, and in November 1902 he published an article in Nuova anto-
logia, one of liberal Italy’s most prestigious journals, trying to create 
enthusiasm for the league. Keeping his intransigent Catholic fervor 
at bay, he described dueling primarily as a sociological problem, and, 
rather than attack the moral credentials of liberalism, he pushed for 
the creation of courts of honor to handle insults and libels. On a more 
ominous note, he hinted that the glaring class bias, obvious in the legal 
immunity afforded duelists, might help bring the proletariat to power, 
and then the duel would surely disappear—along with bourgeois soci-
ety in general!102 In dealing with the international antidueling move-
ment, he emphasized Don Alfonso’s stature as a king-in-exile and his 
military valor, proven under fire during Spain’s recent power struggles, 
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rather than the depth of his religious beliefs. This was to be a campaign 
open to civil courage as well as Catholic conviction. Equally important 
from a tactical point of view, Crispolti argued that Italy’s branch of the 
Anti-dueling League should be named after General Ettore Perrone di 
San Martino, a Piedmontese officer who had gone into exile in France 
after the revolution of 1821. San Martino had become the poster child 
of Italy’s abolitionist movement because he had written an impassioned 
denunciation of the duel (which he presented to the French legisla-
ture) and also because he had returned to Piedmont during the revo-
lutions of 1848 and had bravely died fighting against the Austrians.103 
Crispolti co-opted the cachet of this Risorgimento war hero, whom he 
cleverly dubbed the “Beccaria of the abolition of the duel,” as a perfect 
political foil to the monarchical, Bourbon, and Catholic background of 
Don Alfonso, under whose auspices the league was about to be born. 
The Bourbons had been traditional enemies of Italian unification, 
but adopting the name of a Piedmontese revolutionary and “constant 
liberal” like San Martino helped balance the symbolic scales.104
 Crispolti’s ecumenical approach apparently struck a chord, and 
within 15 days of the article’s publication he received some 475 let-
ters of adherence, including 21 from retired generals. An organizing 
meeting was held on December 21, 1902, in Rome, and the National 
Anti-dueling League “Ettore Perrone di San Martino” was born under 
the presidency of Prince Doria Pamphili, in whose villa the event took 
place.105 A second meeting held the following June approved a platform 
pushing for the revision of the penal code and the use of juries of honor 
to settle disputes.106 The league was self-funded, with founding mem-
bers paying a one-time fee of 50 lire and contributing members paying 
annual dues of 2 lire, a sum easily affordable to a wide spectrum of the 
middle class. Women were allowed to join, as were resident foreigners, 
and members were expected to promulgate the league’s goals without 
prejudice to politics or religion. While Crispolti stressed the primacy 
of winning over retired military officers and the old aristocracy, whom 
he called the true arbitri elegantiarum in Italy, he happily reported receiv-
ing affirmations from judges, politicians, academics, and journalists.107
 Despite this early enthusiasm, the league failed to produce much 
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practical action during its first few years, in part because when it came 
time for the members to do real work, Crispolti was forced to rely on 
his personal contacts, hence reinforcing the group’s conservative Catho-
lic identity.108 It gradually gained momentum, however, and 1906 saw 
a flurry of new organizing activity that produced affiliate committees 
and juries of honor in Pisa, Genoa, Florence, Turin, Venice, Bologna, 
Naples, and Casale, as well as a women’s league in Lombardy that could 
boast 300 members.109 In June of that year, Crispolti wrote a letter press-
ing the issue at the Congress of Retired Officers meeting in Rome, 
and it reportedly sparked that association’s public call for the creation of 
courts of honor on the part of the high command.110 One of the found-
ing members, Count Emiliano di Paravicino, successfully persuaded a 
national conference on the family to adopt a resolution calling for the 
incorporation of antidueling propaganda at the high school level and 
encouraging eighteen-year-olds to join the league.111 Eventually, the 
league embraced the international 13-point platform that came out of 
the 1908 congress, including a call for doctors to stop attending duels 
and the promotion of antidueling essay contests among students.112
 The big news came at the end of 1907 when, in rapid succession, 
the minister of war Viganò informed Crispolti in an open letter of his 
vigorous opposition to the duel in the army, and on the next day—and 
probably not without connection—King Victor Emmanual III declared 
that he had decided to become the high patron of the Italian Anti- 
dueling League.113 This was a major coup. The monarchy seems to have 
previously maintained a studied silence on the duel, and any argu-
ment to the contrary was undercut by the fact that successive kings had 
consistently cranked out pardons for convicted duelists. Now Victor 
Emmanuel III had declared royal support for the Anti-dueling League, 
and on December 17, 1907, he invited a delegation, including Crisp-
olti, to discuss the details of its program.114 One can only assume that 
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these developments helped set the stage for the decree of October 8, 
1908, establishing the courts of honor within the military, and Crispolti 
was congratulated by the Catholic hierarchy for having brought that 
particular reform into port.115 Reporting on the general progress of 
the movement in the fall of that year, Don Alfonso predicted that Italy 
would soon no longer need an antidueling league because the king and 
the army had begun to set an example for the rest of society.116 Crispolti 
was equally optimistic. By the time the First World War had brought 
the International Anti-dueling League to an abrupt end, he felt that the 
tide had turned against the duel, and he had focused his attention on 
other issues.117 Little did he know that he would have to return to the 
problem after the war as the duel rebounded in a completely different 
political context.
 We must also be careful in giving Crispolti’s organization too much 
credit. Virtually all of the glowing reports on the league’s achievements 
came from abolitionist sources or their allies such as Civiltà cattolica. 
The very act of proclaiming varied and widespread antidueling activity 
was seen as effective propaganda on their part, whatever the practical 
results on the ground. Nor was Crispolti able to co-opt the antidueling 
energies of the socialists, hardly surprising for an organization that drew 
over half its original executive council (13 of 24) from the nobility.118 
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the league helped focus much of the 
energy resulting from Cavallotti’s shocking death and provided a pan-
Italian forum for gentlemen to at least consider rejecting the dueling 
compulsion without losing face, especially once the king came on board 
as an official patron.119
 Crispolti’s success came in part because he understood the tie 
between the dueling ethic and nationalism, not surprising for the man 
who had created the concept of “Catholic Patriotism” as a means of 
healing the rancorous rift between church and state in Italy. His grasp 
of the problem was most obvious when he tied the Italian League to 
the memory of a Risorgimento war hero who had publicly opposed 
the duel and died fighting for Piedmont. Yet it is also hard not to notice 
 115. See the letter of Cardinal Agliardi in Martire 1943, 77.
 116. De Bourbon 1908, 26.
 117. Martire 1943, 31–32. Crispolti’s nephew, Giovanni B. Crispolti, confirmed this in a 
private conversation with the author.
 118. Membership list in Mazza 1904, 62. On the socialists see Crispolti’s senate speech in 
Capretz 1926, 153. 
 119.  Premoli 1910, 4–7.
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his constant emphasis on the fact that the Italian League was part of 
a grand European-wide project, backed by elites across the continent. 
Part of this pitch came naturally from his “lower-case” catholic concept 
of universal morality, but it also sprang from his grasp of the duel as a 
purveyor of symbolic courage for both individuals and Italian men as 
a group—a concept which he had dissected and attempted to co-opt 
in his own project of virile obedience to the pope back in 1893. If 
Italy had unilaterally and effectively embarked on the path to abolish 
the duel, it might have raised the old specter of an effeminate country 
lacking in martial fiber. If, however, the French, Germans, Austrians, 
and others were equally involved, then there could be no hint of cow-
ardice or national weakness in Italian opposition. Understanding the 
need for Italian elites to appear strong and courageous, his interna-
tional approach was a clever way of getting around the old bugaboos. 
Moreover, it would be, at least in some ways, more successful than the 
attempts of Italy’s lawmakers, who in their extended debates over the duel 
would often run aground on their own identities as men of honor.
The Legal Conundrum of the Duel
The rapid growth of dueling after Italy’s unification certainly did not 
go unnoticed by the country’s legislators, and they consistently decried 
the proliferation of the practice as antithetical to the rule of law and 
to Italy’s image as a civilized nation. They felt that at least part of the 
responsibility for the increase could be attributed to the new country’s 
dueling laws, which were complex, contradictory, and obviously inef-
ficient. In fact, united Italy had two penal codes, one for Tuscany and 
one for the rest of the country, and their widely divergent sanctions 
against the duel were respectively regarded as either overly severe or 
overly lenient. As a result, a Bolognese convicted of a duel resulting in 
a minor wound faced a maximum of six months’ confinement and no 
minimum, while his Florentine counterpart had to spend three months 
to five years in prison.120 The two codes had been allowed to stand 
together as one of the political compromises of the Risorgimento on 
the assumption that a unified code for all of Italy would soon be forth-
coming. For a variety of reasons such a code did not appear, and the 
 120. Article 589 of the Piedmontese Penal Code (1859) and Article 345 of the Tuscan 
Penal Code (1853).
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dueling issue got caught up in the confusion and delay that affected 
the overall reform of the country’s penal code. As we have seen with 
the debate over the juries of honor, that process finally ended with the 
creation of the Zanardelli code of 1889, and in the intervening period 
Italy’s dueling laws (like the rest of the criminal code) would be the 
focus of no fewer than three major parliamentary commissions and 
would evolve through some eight widely divergent draft versions, each 
appropriately vetted by the legal community. As frustrating as this pro-
cess may have been for legislators and citizens alike, the many drafts 
of the law and the extended discussion they prompted provide a gold 
mine of insights into elite perceptions of honor and their impact on 
the political landscape of liberal Italy.121
 Above all, the commentary and debate clearly revealed the numer-
ous difficulties that Italian lawmakers encountered in dealing with the 
duel, which, it was suggested, engendered more discussion than any 
other penal issue except perhaps for the death penalty.122 One legal 
wag complained in 1876: “The argument of the duel is the rock of 
Sisyphus. The more you roll it the more it stays where it is.”123 Almost 
20 years later, an Italian judge reiterated that the legal ink spilled over 
the duel had exhausted “the minds of intelligent men.”124 Dueling 
proved an especially thorny problem for lawyers and legislators alike 
because it was a crime committed primarily by members of their own 
class and because it was based on precepts of chivalry which they tended 
to embrace. In short, the lengthy legal discourse on penal reform clearly 
demonstrated the intimate ties between dueling, honor, and Italy’s lib-
eral elites, who frankly found it hard to legislate against themselves. 
Yet their own conception of the rule of law, their belief in the equality 
of justice, and their desire to have Italy appear as a civilized and mod-
ern country led them to try to find effective ways of preventing the 
practice. In the end, this tension would result in legislation that would 
generally increase penalties against the duel but at the same time would 
thoroughly reinforce the ethos of chivalry in Italy, bolster the privileges 
of the “honorable” classes, and offer unofficial sanction to a parallel sys-
tem of both legislation and adjudication that ran counter to their own 
legal imperatives.
 121. All of the draft versions, commission reports, and parliamentary debates regarding the 
duel up to 1884 were collected and published in Crivellari 1884. 
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 123. Rivista penale, vol. 5, 1876, 98. 
 124. Sost. Proc. Gen. Prampolini in Rivista penale, vol. 20, Sept.–Oct. 1884, 237. 
	 The	Great	Dueling	Debate	 /	 
 There were, of course, people who felt that the duel should not be 
treated as a crime at all.125 Some argued that because of its extensive 
roots in society, any law against it was unenforceable. Prosecutors would 
not bring dueling cases to trial, juries would not convict, parliament 
would not deprive its deputies of their legal immunity, and, in the 
end, the king would probably pardon those who were sentenced, espe-
cially if they were in the army. So what was the point of passing dead- 
letter laws? Others, such as the criminal anthropologists, suggested that 
neither dueling nor its violent results constituted crimes at all, because 
the participants entered the affray by their own free will and thus con-
stituted no threat to society.126 Some took a different approach and 
argued for the “French model,” which, after 1837, allowed for the pun-
ishment of homicides or serious wounds arising from dueling, although 
not for the practice itself.127 Later proponents of this policy argued that 
it was actually more effective than having special provisions against the 
duel, because the offending duelist was held fully responsible for a vio-
lent crime. A murder in a duel became just another murder.
 In general, Italian legislators did not buy these arguments. Rather, 
they felt very strongly that dueling was a crime that should be punished 
in and of itself, and that the goal of such punishment was to end the 
practice as soon as possible for a wide variety of reasons. First, despite 
its supposedly honorable roots, dueling caused pain and suffering not 
only to the individuals involved but especially to their families. It also 
kept the “best” citizens in a high state of anxiety from which they could 
not escape and, in the case of death or permanent injury, deprived the 
nation of their talents.128 Likewise, it replaced public justice with private 
vengeance, offering a bad example to the lower classes and offending 
the prerogatives of the state. Moreover, it smacked of premeditated mur-
der or assault because the principal players had had time to cool down 
from their affront—whatever it might be—before taking action against 
each other. Such logic could lead to some rather strange places, and in 
one piquant exchange in parliament, the Royal Commissioner of Italy, 
Senator Eula, proclaimed that he felt better disposed to a man who killed 
his wife’s lover in the hot blood of the betraying bedroom than toward a 
man who had the sang-froid to kill the interloper later in a duel.129
 125. A good synopsis is in Crivellari 1884, 35–45. 
 126. For a synopsis see Bruchi 1893, 4. 
 127. Nye 1993, 134–35. 
 128. For a summary see Crivellari 1884, 47–49.
 129. Session of April 26, 1875, in Crivellari 1884, 171.
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 Less romantic, but perhaps more important, was the leitmotif that 
ran through the entire discussion, and that was the rather simple idea 
that dueling was unworthy of a civilized country. This accounts for the 
constant vilification of the duel as a barbaric rite, an atavistic horror, 
a medieval vestige, all of which flew in the face of the progress and 
modernity that Italy had hoped to enjoy after unification.130 Yet the 
case against dueling ran deeper than that. Rather, the duel struck at one 
of the heartstrings of the Risorgimento: the rule of law itself. Consti-
tutional guarantees and equality before the law had been keynotes of 
the campaign against the tyranny of the preunitary governments, just as 
respect for public order and property had been a rallying cry of mod-
erates as they had adopted unity under Piedmont as the key to social 
stability. How damaging, then, was the image, reported on an almost 
daily basis in the newspapers, of Italy’s leading citizens flouting their 
own laws against dueling? Senator Chiesi railed against this “scandal” 
in 1875: “In Italy you can see important functionaries and politicians 
pass from the field of combat to the halls of parliament where they dis-
cuss laws and measures of public order in the general interest.”131 The 
legal considerations of such hypocrisy were compounded by an under-
current of uneasiness regarding the lower classes. Unable to appreciate 
the hypersensibilities of honor that might excuse the need to duel, the 
volgo could only take the message that the law was less than sacred, 
that public order was negotiable, and that social position could dic-
tate impunity: all disturbing conclusions for elites who considered the 
working classes as dangerous classes.
 But legislating against the duel was difficult. Most lawmakers felt 
that it constituted a special, sui generis, crime that deserved lighter pen-
alties compared to “regular” acts of violence. The assumption for such 
special treatment was that the duelists, although seeking to harm each 
other, were doing so by mutual consent and for what ultimately was 
a legitimate or at least a positive reason—the defense of their honor. 
Moreover, they were forced into this action by the weight of the “social 
prejudice” which both explained and excused their behavior. To not 
take that constant and powerful pressure into account when dealing 
with the legal sanction of the duel was to reject the reality within which 
the law had to operate.132 Likewise, legislators reiterated the common 
arguments which maintained that the dueling compulsion was to a 
 130. For example, Senator Chiesi, session of April 24, 1875, in ibid., 152.
 131. Session of April 16, 1875, in ibid., 134.
 132. See, for instance, Senator Ambrosoli in ibid., 122.
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certain extent justified, especially considering the weakness of Italy’s 
current laws regarding both verbal and written insults. Even trickier 
were the minor physical insults which virtually escaped sanction under 
the penal code but which if unanswered could wreck a man’s reputa-
tion and career. Thus Senator Pantaleoni argued that a man who was 
publicly slapped in the face but failed to seek satisfaction could never 
stand for public office, while the aggressor at most might get a minor 
fine from the courts.133 And, of course, there were affairs of the heart. 
How could the legal system compensate the loss of a sister’s virgin-
ity or restore a wife’s fidelity? All of these problems might one day be 
resolved by improving the press laws, punishing minor assaults more 
firmly, introducing divorce into Italy, or, in the end, hopefully educat-
ing people to act more civilly. In fact, the final version of the code 
did substantially increase Italy’s penalties for defamation and insult, and 
it clarified that some physical acts, such as a slap, constituted offenses 
against one’s honor as opposed to one’s body.134 But these reforms were 
unproven, and in the meantime one had to take it easy on those who 
gave way to the prejudices around them and followed the dictates of 
chivalry and society.
 Some lawmakers also adopted the arguments of Fambri and others 
that dueling had had a positive effect on Italian society, and, although 
deplorable as a crime, it had to be given special consideration that took 
its “honorable” role into account. Thus Senator Gallotti described in 
1875 how dueling served as an antidote to vendetta by restricting and 
structuring the violence commonly associated with feuding in certain 
areas of the country.135 His colleague Pantaleoni went even further and 
argued that there were nations of swords and nations of knives, with 
Corsica and Sicily serving as examples of the latter, where vendetta 
took the place of chivalry. Dueling, he claimed, limited conflicts, set 
rules, allowed reconciliation, and individualized offenses to honor rather 
than spreading them to entire families. But dueling, he claimed, went 
beyond the control of personal violence. Rather, it appealed to the best 
sentiments of men and had thus played an important role in helping the 
Italians find their way to freedom and independence:
 133. Session of April 16, 1875, in ibid., 141. On the extraordinary gravity attributed to 
slapping see Morelli 1904, 266–68.
 134. For an explanation of the changes in laws against honor see Zanardelli 1888, 568–
601, and 1889, 148–51. 
 135. Session of April 24, 1875, in Crivellari 1884, 154.
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The nations that had the duel were the greatest and the strongest; and 
those of the knife, of the assassin’s poison, were the conquered and the 
enslaved. And why is that? Because the duel is founded on the sentiment 
of dignity, on courage, on strong convictions, while the secret vendetta, 
which takes its place, includes treason, vileness, cowardice. If for many 
centuries we did not have the duel, from the barbarians we had in its 
stead servitude, slavery, tyranny; and if now for some years we have had 
a great vogue for the duel they have been the first years of regeneration, 
of our emancipation, of our liberty.136
Once again the intimate tie of Risorgimento and chivalry manifested 
its attraction, and to simply demote the duel to the status of a common 
crime, on a par with murder or theft, bordered on the unpatriotic.
 This nationalist theme was cleverly elaborated in 1888 during final 
discussions of the Zanardelli code by Luigi Indelli, a deputy from Bari 
working on the chamber’s revision committee. Indelli, like most other 
legislators, agreed that “in theory” the state had to punish the duel, 
but in reality it had to tread very softly because dueling was close to 
the hearts of Italians and to the destiny of the country. Harking back 
to the revolutionary traditions of unification, he compared dueling 
(which was not committed by common criminals and had noble honor 
as its cause) to the “political crimes” that had struck at despotism and 
oppression under the old regime. So much for the past: but the duel 
according to Indelli was also important to the future. The chivalric 
code had become engrained in Italy’s associations and institutions, and 
it deserved to stay there because it served the nation’s ambitions. As 
European society embraced a “general armament,” Italy needed stalwart 
men for its armed forces. Could the parliament, he asked, really expect 
an officer, like Christ, to turn the other cheek to a slap in the face and 
still be capable of defending the country’s borders?137 Such invective 
lay at the heart of the dueling dilemma for Italian lawmakers. They had 
to acknowledge the position that the duel and the point of honor had 
come to play in their own regime, yet they all believed mightily in the 
rule of law. Consequently they had to thread the juridical needle of 
treating the duel with greater leniency than other crimes, all the while 
providing penalties that would affirm the prerogatives of the state and 
eventually lead to its diminution.138
 136. Session of April 16, 1875, in ibid., 144.
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 Having made the decision rather early on to treat the duel as a spe-
cial crime with lesser consequences, however, Italy’s lawmakers quickly 
found themselves facing another conundrum that only seemed to rein-
force the code of chivalry and its imperatives. How was one to recognize 
a duel as being a duel, and what constituted a “legal” duel? Was there 
even such a thing since dueling was, by definition, illegal? Although 
they did not openly admit it, the logical consequence of such questions 
was to strengthen the juridical position of various experts in the field of 
chivalry. One could be assured of fighting a correct duel by relying on 
the instructions of a dueling manual, written by a recognized authority, 
such as Angelini or Gelli, and, as we have seen, there would eventually 
be over 20 manuals to choose from. In this sense Italy’s lawmakers came 
to legitimate the autoregulation of honor and its defense as controlled 
by the duelists, and thus they indirectly recognized a parallel legislation 
created by private parties.139 It was just this compromise that led to the 
interminable approach/avoidance response that the regime manifested 
toward the courts of honor as it flirted with a mechanism that offered 
another layer of chivalric expertise to the process.
 Nowhere was this connection between the code of honor and “offi-
cial” Italy clearer than in the consideration of penalties. Although much 
debate ranged over the amount of fines and length of prison sentences, 
the real controversy raged over the proposal to punish duelists and their 
accomplices with “civil disqualification,” or squalifica civile—that is, the 
revocation of the right to vote, hold government office, or sit in parlia-
ment. Proponents of this penalty considered it poetic justice that men 
claiming to protect their honor should be struck directly in their amour 
propre as citizens. Curtailing their ambition and declaring to the public 
that they were unfit for service, it constituted a perfect punishment for 
dueling, which found its adherents among the “educated and well off ” 
sectors of society.140 Such arguments carried considerable weight, and 
of the seven draft versions of the dueling law before 1889, no fewer 
than six carried penalties incurring various forms and lengths of civil 
disqualification
 Opponents, however, were adamant in their criticism of such pro-
posals and mustered impassioned pleas that easily demonstrated how 
close to home squalifica civile came. Dueling, they claimed, might be 
severe sanctions. Crivellari 1884, 31, 82, 140, 144.
 139. This parallel legislation was celebrated by dueling advocates such as Morelli 1904, 
255.
 140. Crivellari 1884, 83, 148.
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many things, but it was based on concepts of honor, and in the rest of 
the penal code, civil disqualification was reserved only for dishonor-
able crimes. To lump duelists with cheaters, perjurers, and embezzlers 
was to miss the point of honor entirely. It also jeopardized the admin-
istration of justice, because most people did not consider dueling as 
dishonorable, and to have it punished as such would only put the law 
at odds with public opinion and thus condemn it to dead-letter status. 
Moreover, everybody was aware that dueling was prominent among, if 
not restricted to, the classe civile from which Italy recruited its best and 
brightest political talent. What a sad state, protested Senator Gallotti, 
the country would be in now if such a penalty had been around before: 
“How many soldiers, how many ministers who fortunately offer ser-
vice and create honor for Italy, with this law, if it had been passed and 
placed in action earlier, would have not been able to serve the land of 
our birth, Italy.”141 Such arguments eventually won the day, and when 
the Zanardelli code was finally finished, it prescribed squalifica only for 
those duelists who had attempted to use fraud or trickery to gain unfair 
advantage or for those who had failed to carry out a “legal” duel.142 
Once again this prescription followed from the logic of chivalry: only 
those who had dishonored themselves in violating the ritual rules of 
combat deserved a dishonorable punishment.
 Indeed, a careful examination of the Zanardelli code, which was 
the result of all the debate and discussion, reveals just how consistently 
the legislators accepted the basic precepts of the dueling ethos in their 
deliberations. The most obvious case was the aforementioned elimina-
tion of squalifica, which specifically protected the new political class in 
its economic and social opportunities. But there were other examples. 
While it was true that the new code increased fines and prison terms 
compared to the Sardinian Code of 1859, it was substantially more 
lenient than the Tuscan Code of 1853. The new code also made issu-
ing and accepting challenges a crime unto itself, something the Sardin-
ian Code had neglected, and this fit the new description of the crime 
which was now categorized as being against the administration of jus-
tice rather than against persons or property. This definition was seen 
as more sophisticated than those of the past because it recognized the 
roots of dueling in the desire—or rather the need—to take the law into 
one’s own hands when it came to matters of insult and honor.143 But, at 
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the same time, the new definition also indirectly reinforced the semi-
legal nature of the dueling code as an alternative to sanctioned judicial 
procedure. However, what was most remarkable about the Zanardelli 
code, compared to the two codes that it replaced, was its attempt to 
adjudicate cases according to the severity and particulars of the affront 
to the defendant’s honor. True, issuing a challenge was a crime, punish-
able by a fine of up to 100 lire or detention up to two months. Yet if 
the defendant were “induced to the challenge by grave insult or seri-
ous disgrace,” he was exempt from penalty altogether. Similarly, penal-
ties for injuring or killing an opponent in a duel could be reduced by 
one-sixth to one-third if the guilty party could show that he had been 
“seriously” insulted.144
 These “loopholes” were mirrored in the rest of the code, which 
constantly hedged its strictures with distinctions, exceptions, and reduc-
tions, all drawn from a common conception of honor. Seconds might 
pay between 100 and 1,000 lire or spend up to 18 months in jail, 
but not if they attempted to reconcile the combatants. Whoever was 
determined to be the party provoking the duel was subject to greater 
penalties than the person insulted, but no means of determining this 
difference were mentioned. No one could fight a duel for another per-
son, unless, of course, he happened to be a close relative. And the lon-
gest article, #243, spent its time determining the various conditions 
by which a duel could be declared fraudulent or improper and would 
thus incur penalties that were far higher than those accorded to “legiti-
mate” duelists. In short, the new code had embraced the duel whole-
heartedly as a socially nuanced legal force, begging for commentary 
from dueling experts and courts of honor alike. And this accommoda-
tion naturally fit the tensions of the long debate from which the new 
code had evolved, the result of which had been to further inculcate the 
new dueling law with the ethos of the dueling tradition itself.
 The great debate over the dueling law demonstrated just how close 
this “crime” lay to the heart of the liberal regime. Proud of their honor 
and inhabiting the drawing rooms and social clubs where the compul-
sion of chivalry held sway, Italy’s ruling elites were conflicted as they 
attempted to legislate against what in reality constituted a privilege of 
their class and a manifestation of their supposed superiority. Count-
less times senators and deputies inadvertently referred to a dichotomy 
between themselves and the volgo, the volgari, and the plebe, who could 
 144. Articles 237 and 240, Italian Penal Code, 1889. 
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not share their conception of honor or utilize the chivalrous mechanisms 
to defend it. Ironically it seemed as if an entire legislation had been set 
up for a crime specific to a privileged group of people—and pointedly 
it was the group making the laws for everyone else. Italy’s legislators 
were not unaware of this paradox, but they could not get beyond their 
own “prejudices.” Their convoluted attempts to curb their own honor 
only underscored the political/social rift that dogged the new country, 
once again exacerbating the unfortunate image of an “official” Italy of 
ruling cliques and sabers as opposed to the “real” Italy of the people 
and stilettos: an image that would eventually help lead to the demise of 
liberalism and the rise of fascism.
Rhetoric and Reality: Effects of the Great Debate
On the eve of World War I, opponents of the duel could point with 
some justification to the success of their various efforts. Although the 
duel was certainly not yet eliminated from the Italian social scene, its 
reported numbers steadily declined between 1890 and 1915. Accord-
ing to the last major set of statistics compiled by Iacopo Gelli, as illus-
trated in table 12, yearly averages of duels dropped some 60% during 
the 1890s and another 50% in the first decade of the century.145 This 
trend continued during the five years before the war, with another 30% 
drop in the average number of duels per year. The decline was all the 
more impressive considering that Italy’s population was growing rapidly 
throughout the period, and thus rates adjusted per capita would be even 
more dramatic.
 Gelli attributed the gradual but steady decrease after 1890 to a num-
ber of factors, including a new sense of self-worth based on honesty and 
hard work in Italy’s growing urban areas; the spread of socialist ideas 
which condemned the duel; and the increased use of new dueling man-
uals (his own being the most successful), which helped adjudicate more 
disputes without the shedding of bloods. Even more important was the 
implementation in 1890 of the new Zanardelli penal code (approved 
in 1889), the impact of which seems overwhelmingly obvious when 
we illustrate Gelli’s original statistics (see table 2 in chapter III) as a 
line graph as shown in chart 2. So as not to skew the data line, I have 
extrapolated 1879, 1889, and 1895 from partial data for those years.
 145.  Gelli 1928, 17 footnote.
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	 Why	 the	 promulgation	 of	 the	 code	 had	 such	 a	 dramatic	 effect	 is	
something	of	a	mystery,	especially	given	its	previously	described	regard	
for	the	precepts	of	chivalry.	Also,	although	the	code	set	higher	penal-
ties	 for	 duelists	 and	 their	 seconds,	 it	was	 noted	 that	 actual	 sentences	
remained	very	low.	Case	in	point:	when	Giovanni	Coppola	and	Emilio	
Solari	were	convicted	in	October	1891	for	fighting	a	duel	in	which	one	
was	wounded,	they	could	have	been	punished	with	up	to	four	months’	
Table 12
Yearly averages of reported duels in Italy, 1879–1925
Period
Number of 
Duels
1879–1889 276
1890–1900 116
1901–1910 65
1911–1915 45
1916–1918 3
1919–1925 74
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detention; instead they each received three days.146 Nor did the new 
code bring a massive wave of enforcement against the duel. Referring 
to the relative number of prosecutions listed in chapter III, one notes 
from the somewhat spotty data that the percentage of known duelists 
who ended up in court did rise after 1890, from 11.3% between 1880 
and 1885 to 17.4% between 1890 and 1895. But these figures hardly 
constituted a serious crackdown on the practice, and a duelist still had 
less than a one-in-five chance of facing any legal penalty for his actions. 
Gelli, who was the closest observer, felt that the threat of greater penal-
ties under the Zanardelli code had had some effect, but he warned that 
only about half of the statistical decrease was real; the rest was due to 
people hiding their duels more effectively from the public eye.147 Gelli 
also credited the new code with improving the laws regarding personal 
defamation, which he thought had led to a tripling or even quadrup- 
ling of court cases that previously might have inspired vertenze.148 What-
ever the exact cause, there seems little denying that duels were becom-
ing less frequent. Even taking Gelli’s caveat about actual numbers versus 
apparent statistics, one can use the year 1890 as a baseline of visibility 
and suggest that the diminution that followed over the next 15 years 
probably mirrored reality fairly accurately, especially given the relative 
political calm of the Giolittian period after the turn of the century.
 Such assertions seem to be borne out by yet another set of sta-
tistics, shown in table 13, reportedly released by the Italian military, 
which Fredrick Robertson Bryson reproduced in his 1938 study on 
Renaissance dueling.149 Representing the number of duels fought by 
Italian officers between 1901 and 1910, this table shows a steady dimi-
nution that is generally consistent with the pattern portrayed by Gelli’s 
statistics. The data do not indicate whether this included only duels 
between officers or also those between officers and civilians, although 
one suspects the former. Whatever the case, the downward trend is 
rather obvious and suggests that within the traditional bastion of the 
chivalric ethic, duels were becoming increasingly rare, a trend appar-
ently hastened by the the1908 decree demanding that an official court 
of honor be convened prior to any combat. Thus in September of 1909, 
 146. See “Idee di Parmenio Bettoli” and “Processi per duello,” in Scherma italiana, Oct. 
1891, #20, 157–59. 
 147. Ibid. Compare to Gelli 1903, 2, and La Manna 1901, 20.
 148.  Gelli 1901A, 5–7. He further mentioned the recent frequency of deaths from duels, a 
reference perhaps to the six dueling fatalities that occurred between 1895 and 1898.
 149. Bryson 1938, 209. 
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Giuseppe Prezzolini reported in the influential Florentine journal, La 
Voce, that “officers, before fighting [a duel], have to pass through so 
many inquests, verdicts, and judges, that it would blunt the desire to 
duel of a revivified d’Artagnan.”150 The dramatic drop in 1909 and 1910 
suggests that Prezzolini was correct in his appraisal and that the policy 
was having the intended effect.151
 Returning to Gelli’s more general statistics, it is worth noting that 
Italy was at war with Turkey over Libya between September of 1911 
and October of 1912, and it was traditional that soldiers not duel when 
the country was actively engaged in armed conflict. This fact also 
helps account, of course, for the extraordinary decline of duels dur-
ing the First World War, as reported in table 12 of yearly averages and 
illustrated in chart 3 as a columnar graph. In this case the single largest 
influence was the Italian high command’s decision in 1915 to order the 
postponement of all military affairs of honor until the war was over. 
Other gentlemen may have followed the army’s example, putting off 
their personal grievances while the country was in danger, although the 
stringent press controls of the period may have been equally important 
 150. “Usi e costumi dell’Egregio Collega: il duello,” La Voce, Sept. 1909.
 151. A military commentator, Borgatti (1914, 5, footnote) noted that the number of duels 
had fallen primarily because people were not fighting as many frivolous duels. 
Table 13
Reported duels per year in the Italian military, 1901–10
Year
Number of 
Duels
1901 60
1902 56
1903 57
1904 54
1905 51
1906 35
1907 29
1908 29
1909 14
1910 13
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in that they perhaps limited both insulting debate between journalists 
and the public announcement of duels.
 Yet even before Italy joined the Great War, general sentiment seemed 
to be that the duel was indeed beginning to lose much of its vigor.152 
Gelli himself prefaced a 1906 antidueling tome by Antonio Russo-
Ajello with the confession that he had lost much of his faith in the duel 
and that chivalry had become a refuge for scoundrels and blackmail-
ers.153 By 1912 he admitted in the eleventh edition of his famous Codice 
cavalleresco that “public opinion today is no longer inclined towards the 
duel.”154 Similarly, one contemporary opponent of the duel, Orazio 
 152. See, for instance, Aldo Valori (2001, 137), a journalist working for the Resto del Carlino 
in Bologna in 1911 who compared his experience to that of his predecessor who “bore the 
scars of a large number of duels.”
 153. Introduction to Russo-Ajello 1906, 4. 
 154. Gelli 1912, xiii.
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Premoli, argued in 1910 that the Anti-dueling League had produced a 
real effect among Italy’s elites and that the tide had turned against the 
“prejudice of honor”:
[N]ot accepting a duel is no longer, as it was twenty years ago, con-
sidered an injurious derogation of social conventions, against which 
society, comme il faut, had the right, or perhaps the duty, to react, closing, 
if necessary, the golden doors of their clubs in the face of the disgraced 
person, but now [not accepting a duel] is a declaration of principles 
that, although not universally accepted, must be by everyone, society 
included, comme il faut, respected.155
His report was later echoed by the president of the Lombard Anti-
dueling Society, Lieutenant Generale Giulio Manzoli, who boasted at 
a conference in June 1914 that, although duels were still occurring, 
more vertenze were being resolved peacefully than ever before.156 Con-
firmation of these claims, although understandably without the attend-
ing enthusiasm, came from the other side of the debate when, also 
in 1914, the radically produeling author Carlo Mario Brunetti decried 
the “incontestable” diminution of the duel as an incontrovertible sign of 
the growing weakness, effeminacy, and vileness of Italian society.157
 Across the board, then, commentators just prior to the war reflected 
on the gradual demise of the duel, and one postwar author would look 
back with considerable frustration (and some exaggeration) to that time 
when the duel had become a “source of ridicule and humor” and “a 
mere shadow of its former vital self, utilized only for wayward affairs 
of the heart which could be settled no other way.” His frustration, of 
course, derived from the fact that, as he was writing in 1924, chivalric 
combat had regained much of its previous sway in Italy, and “slaps, chal-
lenges and duels” had become once again la musica di moda.158 As indi-
cated by Gelli’s own statistics, portrayed in chart 2, this was no chimera. 
The duel was back, and considerable time would pass before it began 
to recede again. By the time it did, the liberal regime with which it 
had had such a symbiotic relationship would be long gone, and fascism 
would be the order of the day.
 155. Premoli 1910, 4; also see Crispolti 1926, 2. 
 156. Conferenza sul duello tenuta al R. Liceo Cesare Beccaria il 6 giugno 1914, Milano: Turati, 
1914, 59–60. 
 157. Brunetti 1914, 89.
 158. “Duelli ‘primavera 1924,’” in La giustizia, Milano, May 21, 1924.

he recrUdeScence of the duel after the Great War, which 
appears so obvious in Gelli’s statistics, coincided with the coming 
to power of the fascists and the end of the liberal regime. Although 
partly provoked by the backlog of vertenze postponed by the military 
during the war, the increase drew continuing strength from the press, 
which, free of its wartime trammels, entered into the most politically 
volatile period of united Italy’s history. In newspapers, in parliament, 
and in the streets, fascists, liberals, and socialists literally fought for con-
trol of the country, and many were the challenges exchanged and the 
duels fought as insult and aggression became the norm of public life. In 
this mêlée, the fascists were noted as particularly quick to resort to the 
sword, and, not surprisingly, the renaissance of the duel persisted even 
after the mass political struggle ended and Mussolini began to consoli-
date his dictatorship in 1925. The fascist journalist Silvio Maurano thus 
recalled in his memoirs that there had been a new “epidemic” of duels 
in the latter half of the 1920s, during which the staff of his newspaper, 
L’Impero, had alone accounted for some 67 encounters.1 The dash, cour-
age, and danger of the dueling ethic harmonized well with fascism’s 
emphasis on virility, action, and violence. At the same time, it served 
the traditional functions of promoting status and buffering conflict as 
new elites, many from lower-middle-class backgrounds, scrambled for 
position and prestige within the new bureaucracies of the regime. At 
 1. Maurano 1973, 51.
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the end of the decade, however, as fascism moved ever further away 
from its revolutionary roots and became increasingly concerned with 
hierarchy, conformity, and obedience, the new “epidemic” would begin 
to abate.
 As in so many other aspects of Mussolini’s rule, the regime would 
maintain a contradictory stance toward the chivalric code and its 
enforcement. Although fascism based its rhetoric on conflict, energy, 
and national honor, the ideology of state power eventually came to 
dominate, and it found dueling too individualistic and too blatant in 
its flouting of the government’s monopoly over coercion. While many 
of the early fascists, including Mussolini, prided themselves on hav-
ing fought various duels during their rise to power, the regime would 
gradually and subtly direct its policies against the practice. Paying hom-
age to the traditions of chivalry by finally giving legal status to some 
courts of honor, it would increase penalties and pressure members of 
the party and militia not to fight. Rhetoric would shift from honor 
defined as personal sensibility to honor as personal duty to the regime. 
Affairs would arise and duels would occur in the 1930s, but always in 
shrinking numbers. In this sense, fascism managed to maintain the virile 
myth of the duel while undercutting its reality.
 Equally important, when fascism destroyed liberalism and its freedom 
of discourse in parliament and press alike, it restricted the public debate 
and publicity that often made duels worth fighting. This was even the 
case among fascist journalists who were increasingly expected more and 
more to toe the party line. Gradually after 1930 they too would lose the 
force of dialogue and dissent that might give rise to vertenze within their 
ranks. Coupled with the fact that Italy’s military became increasingly 
engaged in conflicts abroad, first in Ethiopia and then in Spain, limiting 
the opportunities for vertenze and duels between officers, these factors 
determined that the duel would once again become “a mere shadow 
of itself ” as the second great war of the century began. In short, as the 
fascists killed off the liberal regime, so too would they help kill off the 
dueling ethic, and this time—as the shock of war, defeat, occupation, 
and resistance took hold—the traditions of honorable individual com-
bat would disappear for good. 
A “Harder” Approach to Italian Honor
The reflowering of the dueling ethic in Fascist Italy would find its 
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ideological and literary roots in the decade preceding the First World 
War, as an aggressive and virulent attraction to violence permeated a 
new generation of elites. Ranging from the revolutionary syndicalists 
on the left to the antiparliamentarian nationalists on the right, a fas-
cination with danger, risk, and destruction as creative spiritual forces 
took hold of some of Italy’s brightest young writers. Inherent to this 
movement was a bitter criticism of Italy’s lackluster history since the 
Risorgimento—inherited from disgruntled intellectuals such as Gio-
suè Carducci, Angelo Sommaruga, Gabrielle d’Annunzio, Pasquale 
Turiello, and Alfredo Oriani—and a rejection of the rational and plu-
ralistic assumptions of liberalism and democracy.2 Although the voices 
of this strident call for a violent regeneration of Italian society would 
sometimes disagree over the legitimacy of chivalric honor—and some 
would even denounce dueling as inappropriate for literati defending 
their ideas—they all stressed courage, action, and conflict as a means 
of forging a new “real” Italy that would rightfully take its place among 
the superior nations of the world. Imbued as well with heavy misogy-
nistic overtones that condemned the current political system and its 
assumptions as weak and effeminate, writers such as Enrico Corradini, 
Giovanni Papini, and Luigi Ambrosini all expressed a disdain for women 
and domesticity that emboldened previous prejudices, hyperemphasiz-
ing the manly virtues of aggression and conflict, both private and pub-
lic.3 Issuing a common call for a new aristocracy that would bridge the 
much-maligned gap between Italy of the people and Italy of the state, 
these Avanguardisti, as they called themselves, put forth a pattern of ideas 
and rhetoric that would help resurrect a chivalric ethos of combat after 
the war. Combined with the Futurists—whose own manifesto of 1909 
called for the disdain of women, the love of danger, and the exaltation 
of war as the “world’s only hygiene”—they offered a new and militant 
virile vision of Italy’s future.
 How that vision might be applied directly to the dueling ethic came 
to fruition just before Italy entered World War I in a lengthy book writ-
ten by a Genovese lawyer, Carlo Maria Brunetti. Assertively entitled A 
loro (a word play on “a voi,” the command to attack in a duel), Brunetti’s 
tome promoted the duel as a means of pulling Italy out of the doldrums 
of poltroonish timidity into which it had supposedly fallen. Reenergiz-
ing the dueling ethic, according to Brunetti, would cultivate Italians’ 
 2. For specifics see Drake 1980 and Thayer 1964.
 3. See Adamson 1993. 
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“warrior spirit, sang froid, self control, resistance to pain” and would 
rehabilitate “nature, life, the superior man, the gentleman.” Although 
familiar with the works of the nationalists, Avanguardisti, and Futurists, 
Brunetti’s true hero was Friedrich Nietzsche, and he used the tenants of 
Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil to reject the standard argument that 
“blood washes honor clean” and instead offered the duel as an egoistic 
affirmation of a man’s resentment: “an affirmation of the real I, which 
proclaims all knowledge of the instincts, and says Yes to the total, full, 
complete, exuberant life” [Brunetti’s emphasis]. All of these ideas fit 
an individualistic notion of the will to power that had, according to 
Brunetti, been consistently blocked by those who lacked it: the moral-
ists, the dog-men, the non-vir, the men of modern times, who were all 
dominated by their women.4
 Within this general framework, Brunetti took to task those who 
attacked the duel as immoral, those who wished to legislate against it, 
and those who condemned it as barbaric, because this was all philosoph-
ical smoke covering their secret motivation: “the madness of impotence 
festooned with virtuous words.”5 Cowardly, commercial, materialistic: 
such were the liberal “non-men” and the socialist “eunuchs” who did 
not feel the force of their own manhood and thus misunderstood and 
misrepresented the duel. Nor did Brunetti spare the previous defenders 
of the duel, such as Gelli and Fambri, who he claimed had been half-in-
bed with its opponents and had mistakenly accommodated an image of 
the practice as a necessary evil, as a vestige of the past that would serve a 
temporary civilizing function, and, of course, as a “social prejudice” that 
would fall by the wayside with society’s progress. Liberal poppycock! 
So what, he demanded, if dueling is the result of a prejudice? Most of 
society and morality is a prejudice; what counts is that real men feel 
their own essential force and dignity and assert them without limita-
tions, without categorical imperatives.
 He naturally affirmed the old argument that dueling helped main-
tain a martial spirit among the people, but now he exalted war as a 
critical creative force that each nation had to embrace. To live is to fight, 
for both individuals and nations alike, and to deprive Italians of the 
right to duel, to deprive them of “the pleasure of combat” and to fail 
to inculcate in them “a certain contempt for death” was to hold them 
back while suppressing “glory, tradition, power, prestige, life.”6 True, 
 4. Brunetti 1914, 2, 39, 42–44.
 5. Ibid., 36.
 6. Ibid., 71–75.
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dueling had been in decline for a while, but not because of the efforts 
of its opponents. Rather, it was the result of the general degeneration 
and emasculation of modern society, which was “of a soft, vile, prosaic 
nature: self interested and utilitarian to the point of nausea.” Society had 
been at peace too long, and too much concern had been lavished on 
the timid, the weak, and the poor. In the grip of utilitarian commerce 
and industry, and seduced by sentimentalism and pity, Italy had lost its 
fighting edge, and people no longer enjoyed fencing, not even in the 
military.7 This sad state of affairs, according to Brunetti, was equally 
evident in the growing power of women in society. Abandoning their 
natural feminine instincts, they were now demanding new rights and 
seeking to exert their subtle mastery over men, who for the most part 
were growing correspondingly “weak, ulcerous, and prematurely impo-
tent.”8 
 In contrast to these weaklings, Brunetti ended his book with yet 
another description of a “true gentleman,” or rather a “true man,” for 
they were one and the same, to the exclusion of the rest. These men 
were, in fact, superior beings who knew they were somehow special. 
Such a gentleman had individualità, a sense of self that refused to coun-
tenance the mediocrity and uniformity of society, and consequently 
he would return “often and gladly” to the field of honor. Italy, whose 
race was strong and chivalrous and recognized the value of great deeds, 
could only hope that the number of such punctilious and pugnacious 
men would multiply, “even if they might occasionally practice the 
cult of force, even if they might occasionally glorify the exaltation of 
power.”9 Although Brunetti did not say it, these gentlemen were, for 
all their positive traits, different from their earlier liberal brethren, for 
they were men who had to live outside the bounds of normalcy, who 
had to eschew conventional morality, and who had to force their will 
upon the rest of society. It was an image that would soon become all 
too concrete.
 With regard to the growth of dueling after the war, Brunetti’s book 
was probably more a symptom than a cause.10 Although he won the 
praise of some journalists and fencing masters, as well as a Grand Gold 
Medal conferred by the Italian Fencing Federation, neither his book 
nor his new Codice was republished, and Gelli’s work would continue 
 7. Ibid., 89–98.
 8. Ibid., 99.
 9. Ibid., 265
 10. Cf. Di San Malato 1913.
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to dominate the chivalric scene well into the 1930s. Rather, Brunetti 
demonstrated how the literary, philosophical, and political obstreper-
ousness popular before the war, and obvious in the avanguardisti and 
the futuristi, could be applied to a practice that had begun to lose its 
hold on the ruling elites. The war and its aftermath would soon offer 
an opportunity for that rhetoric to work its way into reality, as massive 
social and political forces came to loggerheads across Italy. Yet Brunetti’s 
book had already caught the essential paradox of a group of violent 
and forceful men—whose will to power, rejection of convention, and 
disdain for danger would prefigure the me ne frego (I don’t give a fig) 
motto of the squadristi—but who still needed to adhere to the dictates 
of a code, a set of rules determined by a collective. Soon, this same ten-
sion would be written large as the fascists came to confront their own 
paradoxes of personal honor in the course of the 1920s.
Fascism and the Postwar Plague of Duels
In March 1925 a young idealistic professor, Giuseppe Capretz, put the 
finishing touches on a lengthy collection of letters, essays, and docu-
ments entitled The Shame of the Duel, attacking the renewed popularity 
of chivalric combat in Italy. Capretz’s hope was to demonstrate support 
for his cause against the duel from a wide variety of Italian professionals 
and academics, in order to counter the image that it had again become 
universally accepted. He was incensed that there had been so little pub-
lic outcry at the current “paroxysm” of dueling, and he was particu-
larly enraged that the Italian parliament had recently placed its seal of 
approval on the new “duellomania” by voting on January 3, 1925, to 
not move against four deputies who had blatantly violated the duel-
ing laws of the nation.11 Capretz had launched this campaign in 1924, 
and it stands out as the year when it became obvious to many Italians 
that the duel was truly back in fashion, with the number of encoun-
ters consistently increasing, despite the supposed political stability 
provided by Mussolini’s march on Rome two years earlier. Thus the 
Corriere del Mattino reported from the capital in June of 1924 that the 
number of parliamentary vertenze had been rising at an alarming rate,12 
and in July, Il cittadino of Genova complained that the dueling “mania” 
 11. Capretz 1926, 16–17. 
 12. Ibid., 1926, 270–71. 
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had returned in a “frightening manner”: “Everyday one reads news of 
at least one saber encounter, with the usual touches and almost always 
with embraces and the formal shaking of hands; [e]verything that has 
been written and said against the duel—with the usual debates, compe-
titions, volumes etc.—has not served and does not serve for anything.”13 
Somewhat capriciously, the newspaper went on to blame the duel’s cur-
rent popularity on the increasingly warmer weather. The Italian mili-
tary had a rather less whimsical explanation of the trend. Aside from the 
backlog of vertenze left over from the war, the high command noted in 
March of 1924 that the huge number of officers who had served during 
the war years had simply created an expanded pool of men in Italian 
society more disposed to duel.14
 Substantial blame also fell on Mussolini and his followers. For 
instance, the liberal journalist Piero Gobetti specifically accused the fas-
cists in 1922 of poisoning Italy’s political system and promoting the duel 
as the “ultimate and perfect exaltation of individual activity.”15 Gobetti 
was echoed two years later by Giovanni Vidari, a professor of philoso-
phy in Turin, who derided the “adoration of force” and the propaga-
tion of “fierce” doctrines that had brought new vigor to the dueling 
ritual.16 Meanwhile, Marchese Crispolti, erstwhile head of the defunct 
Anti-dueling League and now a senator, specifically took the fascists to 
task in parliament for embracing and promulgating the dueling ethic.17 
Capretz himself alluded to the fascists in his book and argued that the 
duel’s current vogue had derived from the war, which had unleashed 
a form of political immorality that praised both ferocity and cynicism 
as virtues.18 Having reduced politics to combat, embraced the love of 
danger, heaped scorn upon their opponents, and overturned traditional 
patterns of power, the fascists had helped reinvigorate the duel as an 
acceptable and even laudable means of settling disputes in the public 
sphere.
 Mussolini, of course, had offered his adherents an early advertise-
ment for the dueling ritual. According to his wife’s memoirs, he fought 
at least a dozen duels, and she soon complained of the expenses incurred 
for fencing lessons, gifts for his seconds, and the new shirt he seemed 
 13. Il Cittadino, July 11, 1924—“Quando si era coraggiosi senza batersi in duello,” BNCR, 
Levi.
 14. “Le vertenze cavalleresche,” CDS, Nov. 3, 1920, 2. 
 15. Piero Gobetti, “Uomini e idee,” La rivoluzione liberale, May 28, 1922, 56. 
 16. Letter in Capretz 1926, 214.
 17. Speech of Dec. 3, 1924, Atti parlamentari, vol. 1091, Senato, Discussioni, 1924, 349.
 18. Capretz 1926, 22–25. 
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to require for each encounter.19 Although Rachele’s recollection of a 
dozen duels is surely exaggerated (I can only substantiate five), there 
is no denying that Mussolini came to embrace the duel as part of his 
public persona, and the timing of his earliest encounters is revealing. In 
fact, prior to his break with the socialists in 1914, he had obeyed the 
party’s ban on dueling, even though he had not necessarily agreed with 
it.20 With his move to interventionism and his subsequent expulsion 
from the PSI, he quickly changed his ways. In February 1915, he found 
himself involved in a vertenza with the anarchist Libero Merlino, who 
had publicly scorned Mussolini’s new-found patriotism and accused 
him of not having the courage to face his neutralist opponents. Meet-
ing by chance in the law courts of Milan, the future Duce flew into a 
rage and assaulted Merlino, who responded by sending his seconds with 
a challenge. The notoriety of the event was such that the police put 
surveillance on Merlino and even managed to frustrate a first attempt 
to fight, confiscating the men’s sabers and issuing rather meaningless 
citations. Conspiring against the state’s interference, the dueling party 
broke up into four different cars and managed to regroup at a predeter-
mined spot outside one of the city’s gates.21 Having successfully eluded 
the police, a saber duel transpired in which both men fought furiously 
and were simultaneously wounded in the arm after only two “assaults.” 
They parted by shaking hands, although, according to one account, 
there was no formal reconciliation.22
 The encounter with Merlino seems to have been a revelation to 
Mussolini, appealing as it did to his taste for action, his eye for political 
drama, and his need as an interventionist to show his martial spirit.23 
Consequently, within a month, he had begun a campaign designed 
to force Claudio Treves, a leading socialist who had been attacking 
Mussolini’s “betrayal” of the party and its policy of neutrality, into an 
affair of honor. Cleverly, Mussolini began with a journalistic assault in 
Il popolo d’Italia that accused Treves of supporting neutrality not out of 
conviction but because it ran to the financial advantage of his wife’s 
wealthy family in Venice. More clever still, he maintained that such 
 19. Mussolini 1974, 34–36. 
 20. Rossi 1958, 60–61. 
 21. “La vertenza Mussolini-Merlino risolta con un duello,” in Mussolini 1964, vol. 7, 
474–75.
 22. Rossi 1958, 62–63.
 23. Rachele would remember that his first duels directly coincided with his shift to the 
interventionist camp. Mussolini 1974, 34.
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motivation and circumstances automatically disqualified Treves from 
seeking satisfaction through a duel. He thus simultaneously slurred his 
socialist opponent for making a marriage of convenience, for living off 
the money of a woman, and for bending morality to opportunity. For 
good measure, he added that Treves was a “rabbit” who had undercut 
the revolutionary energy of the socialists and who “loves not risks but 
only stipends.” More important, however, he had from the start man-
aged to focus the public’s attention on the chivalric question of disqual-
ification and whether Treves had a right to even fight him in response 
to the accusations. 
 Mussolini continued his provocations. On March 24 he reiterated 
Treves’ supposed cowardice by calling him “Claudio Tremens,” and on 
March 28 he claimed to have finally revealed to the world the social-
ist’s true nature: “perfidious, wicked, vulgar, disgusting.” By this point, 
Treves had had enough and took the chivalric bait. He responded in 
print, calling Mussolini “canaglia,” “invidious bum,” and (my personal 
favorite) “a shoeshine brush,” while affirming that Mussolini himself 
was the coward for trying to disqualify him as a gentleman while in the 
process of insulting him. “What,” he asked, “is to be done with a man 
who begins a campaign of slurs with the premise that a chivalric affair 
is impossible?”24 Apparently, the answer was to challenge him to a duel, 
and Treves sent his emissaries almost immediately to make contact with 
Mussolini.
 The encounter took place in a villa outside of Milan at 3:00 in the 
afternoon. By that point, emotions between the two men ran so high 
that they jumped the command to start and had to be brought to order 
by the director, an accountant named Leonardo Pracchi. When they 
finally began in a proper fashion, the two men rushed at each other 
with enormous fury, and one of the attending physicians, Dr. Ambrogio 
Binda, who had already seen some 40 duels, reported it to be the most 
violent in his experience. By the third assault, Mussolini’s saber was 
bent beyond use and had to be replaced. Five more assaults produced 
wounds to both men’s arms, Treve’s forehead, and Mussolini’s ear. At 
that point, the doctors did their job and stopped the fight before some-
body got really hurt.25 Needless to say, the two antagonists were not to 
be reconciled, and both sides claimed victory for their respective causes. 
From the beginning, however, it was Mussolini who had orchestrated 
 24. Matteoti 1987, 30–32.
 25. Ibid., 34; Rossi 1958, 65.
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the event. He had laid out the most damaging insults, both personal 
and political, by questioning the sincerity and courage of the neutral-
ist forces, and he had gained public revenge for his expulsion from the 
Socialist Party. He had also dramatically demonstrated his own physical 
courage and willingness to fight—important credentials for a man who 
was actively pushing his country into war.
 As was the case for all of Italy, Mussolini’s chivalric career was put 
on hold as the war unfolded, but he would soon make up for lost time. 
Between the armistice in 1918 and the March on Rome in October 
of 1922, he was involved in at least six bloodless vertenze, including one 
with Gaetano Salvemini, and three actual duels. His opponents in these 
latter encounters ranged across the political spectrum and included, in 
chronological order, his old socialist comrade, Francesco Ciccotti; his 
fellow fascist and founder of the blackshirted arditi, Lieutenant Colonel 
Cristoforo Baseggio; and the left-leaning liberal journalist, Mario Mis-
siroli. Significantly, the only one of these duels to end with the tradi-
tional reconciliatory handshake was that with Basseggio, which helped 
heal a potentially damaging breach in the movement and symbolically 
reinforced Mussolini’s co-optation of the arditi’s traditions.26
 The duel with Missiroli, which occurred in May 1922, would be 
Mussolini’s last. The success of the March on Rome radically changed 
his status within the movement and placed him in a position of power 
that demanded a different decorum. He truly had become the Duce 
and psychologically may have put himself above the equality implied by 
the dueling ethic. Be that as it may, the rapidity with which he adopted 
the duel in 1915 and dropped it upon achieving power in 1922 suggests 
that Mussolini viewed the code of chivalry as simply another arrow in 
his quiver of political combat—useful but expendable as circumstance 
demanded. Certainly his challenges and duels had the ring of orches-
trated tactics as opposed to outraged honor, although such ambiguity 
had always been part of the practice’s success throughout the liberal 
period. The line between personal honor and practical politics was a 
porous one, and Mussolini had certainly taken the politics of personality 
to a new height on his way to becoming prime minister.
 There is also evidence that Mussolini was not totally cynical about 
the mechanisms of honor as a means of settling disputes between “real” 
men. Cesare Rossi, a journalist who worked for him at Il popolo d’Italia, 
remembered what he called Mussolini’s “passion” for the duel: “There 
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was a period in which, not content to duel on just his account, he forced 
his editors, even the sedentary and good-natured ones, to resolve their 
little political and personal differences with four sabre-blows; some top 
fascist journalists owed their success with the [now] defunct dictator to 
a certain scribbling arrogance using the threat of chivalric combat.”27 
The duel, Rossi claimed, appealed to Mussolini’s sense of exhibition-
ism and taste for conflict, the latter perhaps a product of his upbringing 
in the traditions of the Romagna. Rachele, his wife, remembered his 
recalling his duels with fondness and remembered that he had liked 
to regale her with the details of combat.28 Galeazzo Ciano noted in 
his diary that the Duce had complained to him in 1939 that 17 years 
in power had cost him “the pleasure of fighting several dozen duels.”29 
One must also keep in mind that chivalry offered the upstart Musso-
lini a sense of legitimacy. Particularly once he had become a deputy in 
parliament, the duel provided a traditional means of asserting authority 
and also of diverting attention away from his more illegal activities. The 
onorevole Mussolini thus played the part of the gentiluomo in parliament 
while his squads wreaked havoc in the streets, part of a general pattern 
by which he consistently offered the promise of domesticated force to 
the old liberal establishment while acting against its essential institu-
tions.
Blackshirts and Sabers
Mussolini’s example in this regard was taken to heart by his fellow 
fascists, who throughout the movement engaged in vertenze and duels 
with various political adversaries. For example, Gino Calza Bini, head 
of the fascio of Rome, battled Alberto Giannini, editor of the anti-
fascist newspaper Il paese in November 1921.30 A few months later, 
Dino Grandi, future fascist Foreign Minister, fought two saber duels on 
consecutive days in Bologna: one against the liberal lawyer Giuseppe 
Cangini and the other against a certain Professor Osti.31 Back-to-back 
duels occurred again in 1922, when the fascist newspaper Giovinezza 
 27. Rossi 1958, 59.
 28. Mussolini 1974, 36. Cf. Mussolini 1958, 72–74.
 29. Entry of Feb. 15, 1939, Ciano 1946, 29. 
 30. CDS, Nov. 18, 1921, 2.
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of Empoli provoked the democratic journalist Athos Gaston Banti into 
fighting first the secretary of the local Fascio on June 20 and then its 
managing editor on the following day.32 Italo Balbo, ras of Ferrara and 
soon-to-be quadrumvir during the March on Rome, was wounded three 
times in a sword duel with Colonel Pavone of the arditi in May 1922 
in Bologna over an article published in La balilla.33 The arditi figured in 
another incident in August of that year, when Captain Padovani, a fas-
cist in Naples, had to face an opponent chosen at random from a group 
of Fiume’s Legionaires who were incensed at unfortunate comments he 
had made about Gabriel D’Annunzio.34 In Trieste, the secretary of the 
National Fascist Syndicate of Architects and Engineers dueled with the 
socialist communal counselor, Nicola Cupolo, with whom he was rec-
onciled after both were lightly wounded.35 In Sicily, a fascist newspaper, 
Messina Fascista, so thoroughly insulted five local men in April 1925 
that four duels immediately resulted.36 Any slight toward the fascists as 
individuals or as a group could become grounds for a sfida, and in 1923, 
Lieutenant Carmelo Garagozzo forced a fellow officer in Udine into a 
duel simply because he had not risen fast enough to his feet when the 
fascist anthem, Giovanezza, had played in their local café.37
 Such encounters, which ranged from one end of Italy to the other, 
included some of the brightest lights of the movement. Apart from 
those mentioned above, they included Francesco Giunta (secretary of 
the Fascist Grand Council), Galeazzo Ciano (future foreign minister 
and Mussolini’s son-in-law), Giovanni Giurati (future president of the 
Fascist Chamber of Deputies and secretary of the PNF), Renato Ricci 
(founder of the fascio of Carrara and future head of Ballila, the fascist 
youth organization), Augusto Turati (secretary of the Partito Nazio-
nale Fascista from 1926 to 1930), Leandro Arpinati (ras of Bologna and 
early confidant of Mussolini), Aldo Finzi (fascist deputy, interior under-
secretary, and head of Mussolini’s assassination squad), Achille Starace 
(vice-secretary and then secretary of the PNF), Ezio Maria Gray (fascist 
deputy, founder of the fascio of Novara, and member of the Fascist 
Grand Council), Carlo Scorza (founder of the fascio of Lucca, fascist 
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deputy, and eventually commander of the Young Fascists), Alfredo Rocco 
(organizer of the fascist state, president of the Chamber of Deputies, and 
minister of justice), and Giuseppe Bottai (founder of Critica fascista and 
future minister of corporations).38
 Although some of these men dueled for purely personal causes—
Arpinati, for instance, fought a captain with whom he had had a con-
tretemps on the beach at Rimini—the vast majority of their encounters 
were obviously political and journalistic in nature.39 In this respect it 
must be remembered that between the March on Rome in October 
1922 and the declaration of Mussolini’s dictatorship in January 1925, 
Italy remained a country with a functioning parliament and a relatively 
free press. The fascists thus availed themselves of the dueling traditions 
of those liberal institutions to enhance their status, protect their public 
reputations, and keep their opponents, who ranged across the political 
spectrum from arditi to anarchists, off balance and on the defensive.
 What was strikingly different about duels and vertenze in the post-
war period was how often their description in the papers appeared 
alongside reports of fascist beatings, punitive expeditions, and street 
battles. In this sense the fascists engaged in a constant counterpoint of 
legal, semilegal, and illegal political combat that generally and effectively 
muddied the division between honor and brutality. Take, for instance, 
the case of Augusto Turati (future secretary of the Partito Nazionale 
Fascista) who, as ras of Brescia, ordered the beating of local Catholic 
activists in 1922 while simultaneously challenging one of their lead-
ers, Leonzio Foresti, to a duel.40 On the receiving side of such “mixed” 
violence was the example of Alberto Giannini, a democratic journalist 
whose mordant wit proved particularly infuriating to the fascists. He 
recalled with his typical brio how he had set up a successful opposition 
newspaper in 1921: “For me it was really a triumph. After only 106 
issues I had taken a saber blow to the side, a stab wound to the right 
forearm, and a club to the head. . . . I then suffered a second attack: 
twelve days in bed.”41
 Equally revealing of such tactics was the experience of Randolfo 
 38. These offices, taken primarily from Cannistraro 1982, indicate only the highlights of 
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 40. Fappani 1985, 18. 
 41. Giannini 1934, 113–14.
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Pacciardi, a republican lawyer, who, in April 1923, was supposed to 
deliver a talk on the Risorgimento at the Popular University of Gros-
seto. Aware of his anti-fascist principles, the local fascio sent a warn-
ing to Pacciardi that “to avoid possible incidents” he should not stray 
from his topic of national unity during the Risorgimento to criti-
cize the current regime. Pacciardi naturally balked at this restriction, 
refused to hold the lecture, and took the fascists to task in La voce 
republicana. Umberto Pallini, the political secretary of Grosseto’s local 
Fascio, took umbrage at Pacciardi’s complaints and sent his emissaries 
with a challenge. A saber duel ensued on a farm north of Grosseto, 
and after 34 assaults, the seconds called a halt when Pacciardi, having 
received numerous blows to his sword arm, could no longer maneu-
ver his weapon effectively. According to the verbale, the two men had 
demonstrated “superlative courage and ardor,” and after the bout “they 
professed for each other the maximum esteem and consideration, and 
they cordially shook hands as a sign of their complete reconciliation.”42 
This was, of course, all very chivalrous, but the fact remained that Pac-
ciardi had been successfully muzzled by the fascists, and then he had 
validated their gentlemanly right to satisfaction, including a friendly 
reconciliation, after he had complained of their repressive tactics.
 This imbroglio of honor and intimidation intensified during the 
tumultuous electoral campaign of 1924: the year when critics began to 
complain about a new plague of duellomania in Italy. Having unleashed 
the violence of the squads in their attempt to win the three-quarters 
majority necessitated by the Acerbo electoral law, the fascist leader-
ship had thoroughly confounded the traditional rules of parliamentary 
competition with the reality of raw force. Consequently, the Corriere 
della sera could report side-by-side stories on February 12, 1924 (page 
4) that Francesco Giunta, current secretary of the PNF, had dueled 
in Rome with the journalist Mario Baseggio over “injurious words” 
printed in a social-democratic newspaper, while the Socialist deputies, 
Di Vittorio and Vela, were being informed by a “fascist commission” 
that they had been banned from Bari for the entire electoral campaign 
and had only hours to leave the city under the threat of death. The con-
fluence of club and saber in 1924 was again obvious when Luigi Bellini, 
a maximalist socialist from Emilia, complained of the fascists’ squadristi 
tactics in March and was quickly challenged to a saber duel by Alberto 
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Montanari, a seniore in the Fascist Militia. Within minutes of the com-
mand to start, both men were so badly cut up they had to stop the 
fight.43
 The prize for 1924, however, went once again to the liberal journal-
ist Alberto Giannini, who had just founded the Becco Giallo, a satirical 
and bitingly anti-fascist weekly. Attacked in mid-March by squadristi 
during the electoral campaign, he subsequently fought two duels within 
two weeks: one with Mario Carli, editor of the fascist L’impero, and 
the other with Amerigo Dumini, the fascist enforcer who would soon 
become internationally infamous for his part in the murder of the 
socialist deputy, Giacomo Matteotti.44 As usual, Giannini recounted the 
events with sardonic wit in his memoirs, published in Paris, where he 
eventually went into exile.
Between one issue and another, I calculate on average [I had] two beat-
ings a week and one duel a month.
 Speaking of duels, I noted that, in my haste to take saber blows and 
sword pricks, I gained fame as a great fencer.
 Speaking of beatings, I noted as well that, in my haste to collect 
wounds and contusions, people would say of me: Don’t tangle with that 
guy, he’s trouble for sure.45
Nothing could better testify to the confusion that had come to reign 
within rituals utilized in the world of liberal discourse but that now 
faced the challenge of illiberal action. As with their leader Mussolini, 
chivalry for the fascists was on a continuum of violence that could be 
invoked to justify, to intimidate, to retaliate, or to warn. Simply telling 
the truth about fascist excesses became an insult worthy of a challenge, 
and in this regard the nightmare, which had so frightened both oppo-
nents and proponents of the duel, of cynical spadaccini abusing the ritu-
als of the sword to hamper freedom of speech was finally being played 
out, and on a very large stage.
 However, the power of the chivalric ethic for the fascists was not 
just in maintaining silence but rather, as for Mussolini, in creating legiti-
macy. Their many vertenze constantly renovated their status as gentle-
men, while their opponents kept being pulled into the double bind of 
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fighting or losing face. The fact that a number of the duels listed above 
ended in reconciliation illustrates how easily intimidation and thuggery 
could be washed away by the blood of manly ritual. In the postwar 
period personal transgressions had far exceeded the liberal sphere of 
operations—a whole new political game was afoot that transcended 
the dishonor that a duel could exonerate. The point was brought home 
in November 1924 by Vittorio Vettori of the Giornale d’Italia who had 
been challenged to a duel by Roberto Farinacci for some journalistic 
transgression. After a stinging condemnation of the fascists, he categori-
cally refused to accord the rights of chivalry to Farinacci who was, he 
claimed, no gentleman in either his person or his politics. He contin-
ued: “You have to choose: either the club or the sword.”46 Yet less than 
two months earlier, Farinacci had been accorded just such status by no 
less a person than Prince Pignatelli, a celebrated war hero and aristo-
cratic ardito. Severely wounded in his right arm, Farinacci had managed 
to continue the encounter with his left, simultaneously broadcasting 
both his courage and his chivalric credentials.47 Clearly, despite Vettori’s 
invective, Farinacci and many other Italians did not find the club and 
the sword mutually exclusive as tools of political action.
Honor and Fascism
We must be careful, however, not to let the jarring juxtaposition of 
squadrismo and duello reduce our understanding of the fascists’ penchant 
for chivalric combat purely to cynical opportunism. Early fascism had 
particularly appealed to demobilized young officers, and especially 
members of the arditi, who, one assumes, had all been exposed to the 
Italian military’s traditions of honor. According to Adrian Lyttelton, 
Mussolini sought to capitalize on the militant energy generated during 
the war and give it an “internal social content” which would prevent 
a “demobilization of the spirits.”48 The raw material for such a “spiri-
tual” conversion could be seen already in d’Annunzio’s expedition to 
Fiume in 1919. In a propagandistic panegyric, published while the city 
was still occupied, the futurist “legionnaire” Mario Carli portrayed the 
entire episode as a “chivalric deed” designed to save Italian honor in 
the face of the Versailles treaty. Combined with images of the attempted 
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“castration” of Italy’s veterans by postwar politicians, who had to be 
combated with “the overwhelming ostentation of our bronzed virility,” 
such rhetoric appealed to men who had recently risked their lives on 
the front lines and who, like Carli, proudly proclaimed themselves to 
still be “in the trenches.” Carli, who was the founder of the postwar ardi-
tissmo movement and the first fascio di combattimento in Rome, felt that 
Fiume offered a perfect moment of politics, art, and action in which the 
blackshirted arditi—who had, he claimed, been scorned and dispersed 
by the regular army to the cheers of the socialists and “defeatists”—were 
appropriately honored by d’Annunzio as “Cavaliers of Death”: that is, 
nothing less than a new order of knights forged in the defiant struggles 
following the defeat of Caporetto. Together with the other legionnaires, 
and led by the indomitable poet/warrior d’Annunzio, their daring and 
patriotism would, Carli claimed, help push Italy into that new era of 
spiritual regeneration and glory so easily predicted by the nationalists 
and avanguardisti prior to the war. As befit these themes, he ended his 
book on Fiume with a description of a duel that he had recently fought 
with a carabiniere, whose corps he had insulted for acting against the 
legionaries. A lieutenant aviator presented himself as the “paladin of 
the corps’ honor” and offered a pistol duel to settle the matter. Bravado 
prevailing over custom, the two agreed that they would use the same 
pistol in sequence and thus unflinchingly face each other’s fire unarmed. 
On the fourth shot Carli wounded the lieutenant in the chest and the 
men parted with honor satisfied but personally unreconciled. Combin-
ing courage, theatricality, and a rivalry between licit and illicit military 
activities, the event nicely summed up Carli’s call for honorable action 
in the name of the new “ardent” and artistic Italy.49
 Expanding this élan beyond Fiume into the mainstream of Italian 
public life, the fascists quickly militarized the political process—which 
generally left their liberal and socialist opponents overwhelmed—and 
often co-opted the language of chivalry as a justification of their actions. 
Consequently, much of the struggle against the socialists, who were por-
trayed as internationalist backstabbers, was couched in the rhetoric of 
protecting Italy’s national honor during the tumultuous postwar period.50 
Even a liberal journalist like Aldo Valori, who worked for Il Resto del 
Carlino in the early 1920s, remembered approvingly in his memoirs 
that “fascism presented itself as defender of the honor and right of the 
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fatherland. It opposed the iniquitous devaluation of the victorious war. 
It spoke in the name of the combatants.”51 Such tropes would eventually 
find their way into Mussolini’s mass “oceanic” dialogues, one of which 
pointedly asked “To whom the honor” to the group response “To us to 
us.”52 Combined with Italy’s desire to save face in reaction to the “muti-
lated peace” of Versailles, this could all be parlayed into chivalric images 
of national regeneration, and Il Duce did not hesitate to do so. Thus in 
the June 25, 1922, issue of Gerarchia, Mussolini talked about the fascists 
as a new elite, or hierarchy, which had come to take the place of the old 
liberal regime and rejuvenate the blood of the Italian nation. He then 
compared the battle with the liberals and the socialists to a duel which 
had begun after the war.53
 The extent of these images as they impinged on the issue of honor 
was probably best exemplified in the affirmations contained in the regu-
lations of the Fascist Militia as published in October 1922:
The Fascist Militiaman has a morality all his own. For him honor is, as 
it was for the knights of old, a law that seeks, without ever reaching its 
goal, the peak of a limitless perfection, even if he falls into error; it is 
all-powerful, absolutely just, even outside, and always superior to, written 
and formal law. Absolute honor is the law of discipline for the militia-
man and is defended not only by the political organ but by the leaders 
of the hierarchy.54
Considering such rhetoric and the martial spirit of the squads, one 
should not be surprised to find that the blackshirts occasionally utilized 
the language of chivalric vertenza as they confronted their opponents in 
the streets.
 We see this in an incident involving the honorable Benedetti, a lib-
eral deputy who ran afoul of the fascists for not displaying the Italian flag 
during a political rally in Pescia, a small town in Tuscany. The secretary 
of the local fascio had been arrested for “outrageous insult” (technically 
a crime) against Benedetti, who proceeded to testify in court against 
him and print an account critical of the fascists in the Florentine news-
papers. In retaliation, a crowd of fascists surrounded Benedetti’s house 
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and scuffled with the police who were guarding him inside. More seri-
ous confrontations were avoided by the arrival of two fascist deputies, 
Ciano and Luiggi, who agreed to get Benedetti to “explain” his actions. 
As violence threatened, the two deputies, acting like classic chivalric 
representatives, helped Benedetti write out a verbale explaining that his 
injurious words in the article were perhaps excessive and possibly based 
on faulty information. This was a textbook retraction of a journalistic 
insult, implying that no intentional harm had been done and that it 
was all a big misunderstanding beyond the control of the principals. 
It did the trick, and following the signing of the verbale, an accord was 
reached and the fascists gave orders for demobilization. The scene offers 
an important insight into how issues of honor and its defense could 
become embroiled with the actions of the fascist squads. The fascists 
felt that they and the Italian flag had been insulted, and the two fascist 
deputies, who shared characteristics of both “principals,” were able to 
bring the vertenza to an honorable conclusion. It was not, however, a 
completely bloodless solution, because during the turmoil of the day 
supporters of Benedetti had mixed it up with some of the fascists, and 
one “Benedettiano” had been shot with a revolver. The ambiguity of 
the semilegitimate chivalric ritual and illicit political action of the fas-
cists could hardly be better illustrated.55
 Mussolini himself revealed this connection in his famous speech of 
January 5, 1925, when he took responsibility not only for the murder 
of Giacomo Matteotti but for all fascist violence during the postwar 
period:
If I had founded a Cheka, I would have founded it following the criteria 
that I have always placed in command of that violence that cannot be 
expelled from history. I have always said, and here those who have fol-
lowed me in these five years of battle will remember, that violence, to 
be resolute, must be surgical, intelligent, chivalric. But the acts of this 
so–called Cheka have always been unintelligent, disorderly, stupid.56
The key here is the concept of “resolution” in that the violence is 
intended to be effective and finite. The use of the term “chivalric” is 
not accidental but rather can be construed as referring to the functions 
of the duel as a means of ending conflict, just as the term “surgery” 
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counteracts images of random butchery.57 At the same time, “chivalric” 
offered honorable status to all fascist violence and could even confer a 
certain honor to its victims (as we have seen in the case of Benedetti). 
Indeed, in the same speech, Mussolini offered a grudging admiration to 
Matteotti as a worthy opponent “that I held in esteem because he had a 
certain crânerie, a certain courage that sometimes resembled my courage 
and my obstinacy in defending my positions.”58 Matteotti might have 
been a man worth dueling, but not murdering, and hence the specific 
crime was supposedly beyond the scope of the Duce’s vision of vio-
lence.
 Despite the obvious ambiguities involved in such cases, there seems 
little denying the early fascists’ genuine affinity for the duel. Renato 
Ricci (future leader of Balilla, the fascist youth organization) report-
edly went so far as to argue in the early days of the movement that all 
personal disputes between fascists should be solved through the laws 
of chivalry.59 In fact, the recrudescence of dueling in the 1920s was as 
much a product of inter-fascist conflicts as it was of challenges aimed at 
their political opponents. Time and again, newspapers would proclaim 
duels “fra fascisti” ranging across all levels of the hierarchy. Such was 
the frequency of chivalric combat among the fascists of Alessandria, in 
Piedmont, that in March 1923, the city’s fascio held a plenary session 
and voted that its members could not duel with each other upon penalty 
of expulsion. All vertenze within the fascio had to be submitted to a jury 
of honor, and permission to duel would be granted only in “extraor-
dinary and extremely serious cases.”60 A similar prohibition might have 
been useful in Naples where, also in 1923, the three Scarfoglio brothers, 
Paolo, Antonio, and Michele, were all wounded across the course of a 
week in duels with a rival faction of fascists.61 The fascist deputy Alfredo 
Misuri actually fought two pistol duels within an hour of each other 
in 1922, one against his fellow fascist deputy Guido Pighetti, and the 
other against Felice Felicioni, Secretary of the fascio of Perugia.62 Pighetti 
and Felicioni were both lightly wounded in the chest.
 Of course, many of the inter-fascist encounters derived from purely 
personal antagonisms amongst men thrown together in new and unfa-
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miliar political circumstances.63 The situation was exacerbated by the 
rather raucous and unruly nature of the fascist movement itself as it 
sought to incorporate and coordinate the energy and efforts of a wide 
variety of actors, from syndicalists and futurists to arditi and nationalists, 
into a cohesive organization capable of effective action.64 Early fascist 
meetings seem to have been rather tumultuous, and individual egos 
often clashed as controversies arose over tactics, strategies, and goals, at 
both the national and local levels. Thus in December of 1922, the pro-
vincial secretary of the fascio of Torino, “following an incident which 
erupted a couple of evenings ago in the headquarters of the fascio,” 
battled a lieutenant of the arditi in a saber duel, after which “the adver-
saries hugged each other repeatedly.”65 Such individual tensions were 
heightened by the major divisions within the early movement which set 
“centralizers” who supported Mussolini’s “normalizing” parliamentary 
maneuvers against the more independent and action-oriented “revolu-
tionaries” of the provinces.
 That particular conflict was played out in a duel in October 1923 
between Massimo Rocca, who represented the moderate “revisionist” 
branch of the movement, and Ferruccio Lantini, an “intransigent” ally 
of the provincial leaders. The two had vied for top positions in the 
executive committee (Giunta Esecutiva) of the party hierarchy, and their 
rivalry had come to public attention in a letter, published by Rocca, 
attacking the intransigents as disloyal to Mussolini and the nation. The 
attack inspired a challenge from Lantini, and they subsequently fought 
with sabers at a villa outside of Genova. The duel ended quickly when 
Rocca was wounded in the arm during the second “assault,” and the 
men refused to be reconciled. However, their seconds arranged a meet-
ing later in the day, and this time they not only shook hands but ended 
up in each others arms as Rocca apologized for his letter being caught 
up in the “ardour of the polemics.”66 Their chivalric rapprochement, in 
fact, mirrored the compromise between the two sides that had recently 
been arranged by the Fascist Grand Council.67
 The point is that as fascist politics became Italian politics and gradu-
ally replaced the old liberal system, the dueling code still provided a 
number of important functions by which men could assert their right 
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to belong to and operate within the new elite. Moreover, the fascist 
“revolution” opened up an avenue for men who previously might have 
been beyond the pale of chivalric honor to enter a rapidly changing 
social and political matrix, often devoid of previous markers of adhesion, 
while previous elites sought to defend their own “turf ” as the situa-
tion evolved around them. Party discipline was necessarily weak in the 
beginning, and Achille Starace, future favorite sycophant of the Duce, 
fought a duel in 1922 with Ugo Questa, the editor of La nazione, for 
simply reporting problems in the internal affairs of the Florentine fascio. 
Who was a good fascist, who was a better fascist, and how did these 
definitions fit with the old patterns of privilege allocation? All of this 
gave rise to the kind of fluctuation and social shifting that reinforced 
and reinvigorated the role of the duel as a demarcator of success, iden-
tity, and ability. Moreover, the duel could still be used to solve traditional 
conflicts of honor which now arose between fascists. Thus when the 
head of the Bolognese fascio, Gino Baroncini, accused the fascist edi-
tor of the Resto del Carlino, Nello Quillici, of profiting from his ties to 
the party, Quillici was able to call him out and defend his honor at the 
expense of a wound to his arm.68
 In a sense, fascism exacerbated the personalized nature of Italian 
politics of the liberal period, infusing it with armed muscle and intoler-
ant illegalities as the movement went through a series of identity cri-
ses that set many different factions and individuals at odds. Heavily 
leavened with men recently returned from the trenches and familiar 
with military honor, the fascio offered new social convergences that 
were overwhelmingly male, loose on rules, and charged with potential 
violence. This all reflected the central paradox of the fascist movement 
towards violence in general, in that men were supposed to be assertive, 
combative, and even reckless, yet acting on such principles amongst 
themselves sometimes made it difficult to achieve discipline and una-
nimity of purpose. In this context the duel offered the early fascists a 
disciplined means of settling disputes amongst men for whom violence 
had become a way of life and who might otherwise have resorted to 
rifles rather than sabers.69
 An excellent example comes from the fascist journalist Silvio Mau-
rano, whose memoirs relate a duel arranged by Augusto Turati, secre-
tary of the PNF from 1926 to 1930. Turati, whom Mussolini promoted 
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with the purpose of creating a more disciplined party, found himself 
faced with two fascists from Sardinia whose history of family vendetta 
had already led to one killing and promised further retaliation. Turati 
prompted a duel between the two men to end the conflict permanently 
and went so far as to assign each of them padrini of proven value. In 
addition, a particularly stern (not to say brutal) “director” was chosen 
to oversee the combat and thus assure that enough blood would flow 
to satisfy the purpose at hand. The padrini, one of whom was Maurano, 
quickly discovered that neither of the men had ever handled a sword, 
and consequently they were given a month to prepare for the event. A 
capable swordsman and proven duelist, Maurano tried to impose pru-
dence on his “primo,” teaching him a defensive technique that might 
get him through the ordeal with minimal damage. Unfortunately, his 
advice fell on deaf ears, for his pupil had his blood up and demanded to 
be taught only how to skewer his opponent. The folly of this approach 
became quickly apparent during the duel when, as he unsuccessfully 
dove to drive his saber home, his adversary slashed his face so badly as to 
reveal both rows of teeth through his cheek. One of his seconds, General 
Sanna, confided to Maurano that he was sickened by the spectacle, but 
he understood its logic: “Fortunately there is a ‘good result,’ this little bit 
of spilled blood will save a lot more in Sardegna.”70
 If the fascist hierarchy countenanced the duel within its ranks, fas-
cist journalists embraced and promoted it as a given tradition of their 
trade. Lando Ferretti, who served as head of the fascist Press Office 
from 1928 to 1931, proclaimed shortly before taking office that he felt 
“the pen and sword” offered the “synthesis of fascist journalism,” and 
he elaborated: “to have ideas and know how to express them: [that’s] 
the pen; to know also how to defend them against everyone and every-
thing, [that’s] the sword.”71 Even as the regime tightened its control over 
the mass media, editors and reporters of the major fascist news organs 
delighted in duels and vertenze amongst themselves and with others. For 
instance, as editor of the fascist L’Impero, Mario Carli—erstwhile futur-
ist, ardito, and cofounder of the first fascio in Rome—was a notorious 
bretailleur, whose pugnacious belief in the cult of force helped contrib-
ute to the 67 duels reportedly fought by himself and his staff in the 
latter half of the 1920s. According to his colleague Maurano, “Amongst 
the editorial staff of the L’impero, dueling was necessary like eating and 
 70. Maurano 1973, 76–80.
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sleeping. . . .”; and he recalled with fondness the many encounters that 
eventually ended with a bit of blood followed by friendly reconcilia-
tion, usually over a plate of spaghetti and a bottle of Frascati.72 Maurano 
claimed in explanation that the many duels among fascists and against 
their enemies were not really important in any political sense but rather 
“[t]hey were only ventings of vitality, which served to render public life 
less incandescent.” In other words, they were natural manifestations of 
the fascists’ will-to-power as they came to rule all of Italy. What Mau-
rano and his dashing fellow fascists did not know, of course, was how 
quickly this romantic image of “white-hot” public life would disappear 
into the maw of fascist conformity. For Mussolini and Italian fascism 
were already making their way out of the postwar muddle toward a new 
brand of dictatorship, and in that mutation from revolutionary move-
ment to totalitarian regime, the virile traditions of individual honor 
would give way to the mass virility and duty of the “new fascist man.”
Fascism versus the Duel: The Rocco Law
The transition from macho man of action to dutiful servant of the 
regime would be neither rapid nor complete, and, for the most part, the 
fascists would finesse rather than force issues regarding the duel and its 
role within the new Italy. In some ways the iconography of the early 
dueling days would become part of fascism’s public image, just as the 
Duce’s encounters became part of his public myth.73 Mussolini loved 
to be seen in fencing garb or skirmishing with sabers, and the Italian 
fencing team became a jewel in the crown of fascist sports propaganda.74 
At the 1936 Berlin Olympics, Italian fencers swept four of the six top 
prizes, and the coach, Nedo Nadi, was appropriately honored by the 
regime.75 In creating the monumental Foro Italico sports complex, the 
“Casa delle Armi,” or fencing hall, was lavishly appointed and became a 
focal point for public receptions and exhibitions.76 Meanwhile, Musso-
lini’s fencing lessons with Maestro Rodolfi (sometimes called Ridolfi) 
during his later dueling days were purported to be the catalyst for his 
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general interest in sports, which would become famous in the prolifera-
tion of his photo-ops as a uomo sportivo. Rodolfi, in fact, became one 
of Mussolini’s most common public companions, offering continuing 
instruction in fencing and riding. He was made head of the new Fascist 
Fencing Academy in 1934, and on one state visit to the facility, he and 
the Duce pulled off a secretly rehearsed “impromptu” saber match with-
out benefit of protective masks. The event was filmed and photographed 
by the Istituto Luce for popular consumption and may have been staged 
in part so as to impress Hermann Goering, who was in attendance.77 
Given such myth-making fodder, the regime would find it difficult to 
simply dump its chivalric traditions and would thus occasionally send 
mixed messages about its attitude toward the duel, especially when it 
concerned the military, where honor was considered critical to fascism’s 
international aspirations.
 In the main, however, the fascist state would undertake a series of 
actions designed to weaken the culture of individual honor and reduce 
the number of duels, oftentimes using the formal mechanisms of chiv-
alry as a ploy to undercut the actions of would-be bretailleurs. Specifi-
cally, the fascists encouraged the proliferation of juries and courts of 
honor and offered them semi-official recognition in ways that the liberal 
regime had steadfastly rejected. This allowed the regime to embrace 
the traditions of chivalry, while simultaneously enforcing discipline 
and delay among potential duelists, who talked their conflicts into the 
ground rather than carrying them to the field of honor. Combined with 
a stricter legal code and a clamp down on liberal discourse, these efforts 
gradually eroded the impulse to duel while still trumpeting the virile 
nature of fascism in particular and Italians in general.
 The first major evidence of a rift between the dueling ethic and the 
fascist hierarchy came in September 1927 with an article in Il Tevere, a 
newspaper generally regarded as an unofficial vehicle for Mussolini’s 
personal views.78 Commenting on the project for a new “fascist” penal 
code, the paper celebrated the harsher penalties to be levied against the 
duel and its “propagandists.” Rather than fall back on weak “moral” 
arguments against personal violence, which would not have been appro-
priately fascist, the article simply satirized the dueling ritual as both silly 
and venal, and, in anticipation of the impending force of the new law, it 
concluded by already putting the duel into the past tense:
 77. Mancini 2003, 24–28.
 78. Cannistraro 1982, 281.
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In sum, the duel was no longer a school of courage in Italy. It was a 
school of equivocal pseudo-chivalric formulae, a school of low dialec-
tics, a ridiculous parade, of which the most impressive part was the large 
packages of cotton-wool lined up to repair an imaginary fainting fit. 
The fascist life, intense, adventurous, full, offers a thousand occasions to 
demonstrate courage and, where it is necessary, to multiply courage.79
The critical message here was that a repudiation of the duel had nothing 
to do with a repudiation of courage. By painting duelists as bumbling 
clowns waiting to swoon at the sight of blood, the article isolated the 
practice from the seriousness of real, fascist, men who could find many 
other ways to manifest their mettle.
 Actually the law for which Il Tevere had such high hopes in 1927 
would turn out to be less forceful than the newspaper predicted, and 
its relative leniency clearly reflected the regime’s ambivalence on the 
issue. The contradictions of the duel for fascist legislators could already 
be seen in the commentary collected from various authorities on the 
first draft of the law, which was circulated in 1928. For instance, the 
Royal Commission of Attorneys in Padova defended the practice in 
light of fascism’s own values: “Since the Regime is taking the race back 
to the height of its magnificent virtues, among which shines bravery, 
one should not set a challenged man between the generous impetus of 
his soul and respect of the law.” In contrast, however, other authorities 
argued that the triumph of the fascist movement automatically dictated 
a harsher attack on the duel. The University of Urbino, for instance, 
demanded the end of the practice’s privileged sui generis status because 
“the old outfit of challenge, of carriers of challenge, of padrini or sec-
onds, of the use of arms in duel, of insult for refusal to duel, etc. breaks 
across the animating spirit of the regime.” The lawyers and prosecutors 
of Cagliari also wanted harsher penalties, arguing that fascism’s new 
“ethical conception of the state” put it more in line with the Catholic 
faith which had always condemned the duel.80
 Responsibility for reconciling such divergent visions of the duel 
under fascism fell on the shoulders of Alfredo Rocco, minister of jus-
tice from 1925 to 1932. Although the bulk of the fascist penal code 
was written by a commission of experts dominated by his own brother, 
Arturo, who was (like himself) a professor of law, Alfredo Rocco had the 
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final say over its contents, and it was he who explained its various provi-
sions to the fascist parliament. An integral nationalist with a profound 
sense of historical purpose, Rocco mixed the ideas of Vico, Mazzini, and 
others to interpret fascism as part of an almost cosmic cycle of rising 
and falling civilizations. The keynote of this cycle was the competition 
between forces of integration and disintegration in which progress was 
made when private and group interests became subordinate to those of 
the nation as a whole. Rejecting what he perceived as the selfish and 
destructive individualism of liberalism and democracy, he argued for 
the totalitarian organization of society so as to serve the Italian state in 
its own struggle on the world stage. He thus embraced and promoted 
Mussolini’s famous adage, “everything in the State, nothing outside of 
the State, nothing against the State,” but he combined it with a firm 
conviction in the rule of law as the basis of society: hence his work to 
codify and institutionalize the historical dynamic of fascism, moving 
beyond the “sentiment and action” of the early years.81
 With regard to the duel, one would assume that Rocco’s subor-
dination of the individual to the state, combined with his rigid for-
mal legalism, would have militated against a practice rooted in private 
honor and illicit activity. Indeed, in his comments introducing the code, 
Rocco explained that he considered the duel to be a crime because 
“[w]ithout doubt, the political argument must prevail that it is not 
allowed to resolve conflicts with individual force and private violence.” 
Moreover, he had increased the penalties against it because “the citizen 
must put these personal qualities to the service of the collectivity and to 
the interests of the fatherland, and not waste them in private struggles 
which give a dangerous and mischievous example of the triumph of 
force and violence over Justice. Such arrogance of private force can be 
tolerated only in times of irrepressible and anarchic individualism.” In 
its very essence, then, the duel was antithetical to Rocco’s conception 
of the well-ordered fascist nation.
 Rocco admitted, however, that while regarding the duel as illegal, he 
had followed the lead of the liberal state and resisted the extreme posi-
tion of simply treating it as a common crime with regular (read higher) 
penalties for any bloodshed incurred. Such a course, he suggested, would 
have been inconsistent with Italy’s traditions of honor and ignored the 
social importance of the “inveterate” customs of chivalry. Moreover, 
he felt it necessary to explain that, even though he was increasing the 
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penalties for dueling. he in no way wanted to discourage “that exalta-
tion of the sentiments of energy, honor, and courage, which the fascist 
regime considers one of its major tasks.”82 Having fought a duel himself 
in 1921 against General Roberto Bencivenga, and well aware of the 
chivalric exploits of his fascist brethren, Rocco had to be careful not to 
throw the baby of virile honor out with the bathwater of private com-
bat.83 He was, in fact, convinced that until Italian customs changed, and 
a new means of dealing with insults was found, men would continue to 
fight for honor no matter what the penalties invoked.84
 Such leniency in fact marked much of the new dueling legislation, 
despite Rocco’s claims to the contrary and his code’s overall reputation 
for rigor.85 It was true that the new law closed the old liberal loophole 
which allowed duelists who had been “gravely” insulted to avoid pros-
ecution for the simple act of dueling. Now all duelists and all padrini, no 
matter how serious the offense involved, were subject to legal sanction. 
Rocco also raised the minimum prison sentence for homicide during 
a duel from six months to a year while keeping the maximum at five 
years, and he substantially increased the fines applicable at all levels. Still, 
as some critics pointed out, the increases in fines either only kept up 
with inflation since 1889 or constituted something of a tax on honor, 
which could be easily borne by the well-to-do.86 Indeed, the new law 
actually weakened the minimum penalty for dueling, which previously 
was subject to some jail time, but which could now be paid off with a 
fine between 1,000 and 10,000 lire.87 In addition, the new law main-
tained all the chivalric escape clauses and exemptions for representatives, 
padrini, and doctors, just as it maintained all of the justifying explana-
tions about what did and did not constitute a “legal duel.” For all the 
talk of the power of the state, the parallel private jurisdiction of the 
dueling code remained intact, integrated, and forceful.
 Rocco could afford a certain leniency regarding the penalties for 
dueling, because his most innovative moves against the ritual were to be 
of a more indirect nature. The first of these was aimed at the public face 
of honor and punished the publication of any news or verbali concerning 
a duel with a fine up to 500 lire. This provision, which ultimately did not 
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make it into the code, had a very revealing history. It had originally been 
suggested by Catholic Action, but the fascist parliament had rejected its 
inclusion, with Roberto Farinacci, who was an avid duelist, leading the 
resistance on the grounds that it singled the duel out for special obscurity 
among all the crimes.88 Rocco stood up to Farinacci, but eventually the 
produeling forces prevailed. The code that went into effect July 1, 1931, 
did not mention the publication of “dueling news.” Yet Rocco’s revenge 
was rapid. In December of that same year the new head of the fas-
cist press office, Gaetano Polverelli, simply forbade newspapers tout court 
to report any aspect of vertenze cavalleresche.89 This preventive censorship 
was actually far more effective than Rocco’s reactive fines, because—as 
some critics had noted—the latter system allowed editors the latitude to 
“say and pay” as the occasion demanded. In this sense Rocco had lost 
the battle but won the war over chivalry’s public face. 
 Rocco’s second innovation was even more oblique in its approach. 
In fact, it did not appear in the same section as dueling at all but rather 
came under crimes of personal insult and defamation. Here in article 
596 the code took the revolutionary step of offering official recogni-
tion to the jury of honor as a valid legal institution in certain cases. 
Provided that both sides agreed, it allowed judges to appoint such juries 
from “lists” of suitable gentlemen—and it also gave legal status to juries 
attached to certain “moral entities,” such as the Naples Fencing Acad-
emy or the Nastro Azzurro Veterans’ Association.90 Specifics on how these 
juries could be set up by the courts were contained in Regulations of 
Criminal Procedure, and the official nature of their duties was reaffirmed 
in the fact that they would have access to the same documents and wit-
nesses as the regular courts.91 The intention of the legislators appears 
to have been to resolve at least part of the cases involving defamation 
in an amicable fashion through the good offices of other gentlemen, 
while maintaining the personal privacy of the people involved—the lat-
ter being impossible in a regular court of law.92
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 This was a controversial maneuver and one that the liberal govern-
ment had consistently rejected despite (as we have seen) constant and 
sometimes powerful pressure from the chivalric community. It was 
also confusing, perhaps intentionally so. While some existing perma-
nent juries were now recognized, Gelli’s prestigious Corte permanente in 
Florence—which had been revivified in 1922 and had been doing a land 
office business as the postwar duellomania continued—was rejected as 
a “moral entity.”93 Furthermore, whatever their provenance, the actual 
force of such juries was highly ambiguous. Agreement to take a case to 
a jury of honor automatically eliminated the possibility of penal sanc-
tions, but the juries had no official sanctions to use against possible 
slanderers or libelists. And what code would be applied? The famous 
jurist Piero Calamandrei argued that the state should drop its hypocrisy 
on the duel and accept the norms of chivalry as real law—but which 
ones?94 Others claimed in the same vein that since the state now recog-
nized courts of honor, it would have to offer one of the various dueling 
codes official sanction in order to have consistent decisions.95
 The ambiguity of the law concerning the courts and juries was not 
lost on its authors, as was revealed by Rocco’s immediate subordinate, 
Giuseppe Morelli, during discussion of the code in parliament. On the 
one hand, according to Morelli, all crimes of honor could be logically 
assigned by the presiding judge to a jury of honor if the parties mutu-
ally agreed. However, since a jury of honor could lead to a duel, which 
was a crime defined by the code itself, the judge could do nothing to 
impel the disputants to accept a jury, nor could he sanction any of its 
decisions—this despite the fact that all legal evidence had to be made 
available to its members. By keeping the juries of honor “facultative” or 
optional, the law gained the advantages of the chivalric tradition with-
out having to admit the legal possibility of a duel. The twist came in the 
legislators’ own recognition of the validity of the duel, especially in the 
fascist setting. Thus Morelli argued that the duel was still deeply rooted 
in the traditional customs of the country and that the upper classes in 
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particular still felt that certain offenses had to be resolved with an armed 
encounter. He continued in his comments to the chamber:
Whence, from the strictly legal point of view the speaker can augur that 
the day will come when the Italian people will be able to definitively 
abandon the custom of the duel; without passing judgement however 
on the subject, either as a man or a fascist. Certain it is that our mental-
ity, which is neither too quietist nor too pacifist, does not see close the 
day when every offense, even the most intimate and atrocious, can be 
washed away with a verdict from a regular judge or a special judge.96
Thus Morelli, as a fascist and as a man, obviously approved of the duel 
as a symbol of Italy’s dynamic militancy, but at the same time, as under-
secretary of justice, he worked to segregate its criminal essence from the 
new dictates of the state.
The Bureaucratization of Honor
Despite such rhetoric, however, and the apparent sanction given the 
culture of chivalry by the code, the new law aided and abetted a general 
movement in the fascist regime to try to reduce the number of duels. 
The keynote of this campaign was the proliferation of juries of honor 
through an ever greater number of Italy’s institutions, and it clearly 
coincided with the emphasis that Rocco’s code put on such semiformal 
mechanisms of adjudication. As one might expect, the military was of 
primary concern, and with Regio Decreto #1875 of July 11, 1929, the 
government issued “Norms for the definition of vertenze cavalleresche 
among soldiers.”97 This was actually a restatement of the decree of 1908 
which forced all vertenze between soldiers to be reviewed by a jury of 
honor, but it now extended the rule to the air force and the navy. To 
that end, it offered precise details on the composition of such juries in 
each of these branches as well as rules regarding interagency confronta-
tions. For officers not in active service, use of a jury was optional but 
considered a “moral obligation,” whereas “mixed” vertenze with civilians 
could be adjudicated by a military jury, but only with the consent of 
both parties. The decree served the function of restating a pre-fascist 
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policy in a fascist context, while making it easier, and necessary, for all 
military men to try to resolve their conflicts.
 The decree also served as a model for other institutions. Less than 
two months after the decree’s promulgation, the head of the fascist mili-
tia, General Attilio Teruzzi, issued an exact duplicate for members of 
his organization, changing only the corresponding titles and grades of 
seniority.98 The Guardie di Finanza, Italy’s treasury police, followed suit 
on January 16, 1930. The Fascist National Party included a shortened 
version of the decree, requiring obligatory juries of honor for vertenze 
among its members, in its revised constitution of 1932, but the provision 
was not officially adopted until 1939.99 Nevertheless, combined with 
the now-official juries of honor residing in the National Fencing Acad-
emy and the National Veterans’ Association, this flurry of chivalric leg-
islation, crowned by Rocco’s law, created a network of obligation and 
control at the beginning of the 1930s that could be used to derail, defuse, 
or at least delay vertenze before blades and blood could be drawn.100
 That this bureaucratization of honor under the fascists was effec-
tive in reducing the number of duels was indirectly evidenced by the 
military’s eventual decision to add yet another layer of review to the 
process. In February 1938, Minister of War Alberto Pariani submitted 
to the fascist council of ministers a new law regarding vertenze between 
members of the military. Already approved by the other branches of 
the service and the Consiglio di Stato, the project would have forced 
potential duelists to submit their cases to a two-tiered system consisting 
of a jury of honor and then, if a peaceful resolution were not reached, 
to a higher court of honor, with an appeals process at each stage. More 
comprehensive than previous decrees, it would have expanded its pur-
view to any affair including a member of the military or the militia, 
even those involving civilians. The authors of the bill made no secret as 
to its intent, which was to further decrease the number of duels in the 
country. The earlier juries of honor had had a positive effect, but there 
had been too many loopholes. Consequently, a number of duels had 
been allowed to occur, and, having gone through the jury process, they 
carried the semi-official blessing of the hierarchy.101 The new proposal 
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was designed to reduce to only an absolute minimum the cases that 
might actually end in bloodshed, and the details of the decree were such 
that—if adopted and enforced—it would have most likely sounded a 
death knell for dueling within the Italian military.102
 It was also too bold a move for Mussolini’s government. The council 
of ministers, of which he was president, postponed the measure indefi-
nitely in the spring of 1938, apparently because, according to the attend-
ing commentary, it clashed too openly with the “antimony” currently 
reigning between the “necessity of keeping high the sentiment of honor 
among the members of the armed forces” and the continuing illegal- 
ity of the duel as recently defined by the Rocco law. Therefore, the gov-
ernment preferred to continue its policy of avoiding “in both its con-
sultative and jurisdictional activity the solution of a problem that can be 
considered immature for a definitive solution.”103 By postponing rather 
than rejecting the decree, the government reinforced its own ambiva-
lence between admiring the positive military aspects of the chivalric 
tradition while deploring its obvious infringement of state power.
 Meanwhile the fascists’ dilemma of the duel for the military was 
being played out in other ways. In October 1934, the IVth section of 
the Consiglio di Stato emphatically stated: “Refusing a duel, for the sim-
ple reason that this constitutes a crime, is not allowed to officers, who 
in wanting to maintain their rank, must accept the military traditions, 
even if these present themselves as clashing with the dispositions of the 
Penal Code.”104 Thus the old informal rule that an officer had to either 
duel or lose his commission was openly sanctioned by a branch of the 
administration, and similar, albeit somewhat less blunt, rulings would 
follow through the 1930s.105 Yet all of them ran counter to the govern-
ment’s ongoing project to create a new, fascist, military penal code that 
would deal with the perceived problems of the old 1869 code, including 
its total lack of reference to the issue of dueling.106 This internal conflict 
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clearly influenced the final version of the code, which appeared in 1941 
and which proved a revealing masterpiece of exemption and false rigor 
when it came to chivalric combat.
 True, the new code declared for the first time that dueling between 
officers of the same rank was a crime to be handled by the military 
courts, and punishments could go as high as three years’ imprison-
ment. But there were no minimum sentences, there was no connection 
between penalties and physical damage inflicted (not even death), and 
a sentence could be reduced by one-sixth of its severity if the duel had 
been caused by a grave insult. Padrini were never to be punished, and 
no officer should ever suffer removal from his rank for having been 
convicted of a crime connected to dueling. Obviously, there could be 
no dishonor attached to a crime of honor. To top it off, judges had the 
power, in consideration of “circumstances of particular moral value,” to 
not send cases to trial, to not condemn sentenced officers, and to reduce 
punishments from one-third to two-thirds. Such discretion rivaled the 
notorious ad arbitrium judice of the ancien régime that had so incensed 
Beccaria, and it revealed the extent to which the military was afraid to 
challenge its own ties to chivalry. Nevertheless, the code closed the old 
loophole inherited from the Piedmontese army that had helped protect 
officers who dueled, and in its most innovative measure it threatened 
prison for up to a year to those representatives who allowed fellow 
officers to fight without first submitting the vertenza to an official jury 
of honor. Such severity stood in stark contrast to the more lenient 
treatment of representatives under the Rocco code, and its intent was 
obvious: the military wanted to repress the duel with honorable and 
chivalric prevention rather than with reactive criminal prosecution.107 
Thus while the new code clearly demonstrated the paradoxical relation-
ship of fascism to the dueling tradition, it also showed the continuing 
willingness of the military to reduce the practice to a slowly vanishing 
minimum.
The Decline of the Duel and the “New Fascist Man”
That the duel was incompatible with the totalitarian nature of the fas-
cist state became clear as it steadily diminished in frequency through 
the course of the 1930s. Already by 1934, Niccolò Molinini would 
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assert, “The duel, struck by the new moral and social dispositions, and 
rendered impossible by the new development of western civilization 
and by the more severe sanctions of fascist law, has lost that halo of leg-
end that still in the last century raised it up to vainglory and heroism, 
and has disappeared from the present life of the nation.”108 Antiduel-
ing authors, such as Filippo Crispolti and Carlo Lovati, agreed by the 
end of the decade that the dueling ethic had lost most of its adher-
ents, while the penultimate edition of Gelli’s Codice, published in 1935, 
could declare success in settling most vertenze amicably.109 Indeed, when 
Gelli died in December of that year, his obituary in the Corriere della 
Sera recalled his broad erudition and bibliographic skills, while mildly 
degrading his much-vaunted code as being tied to antiquated notions 
of honor: “For us his already retrograde conception of chivalry and chi-
valric discipline was surpassed, and his name rather than representing an 
innovator remained as a sign of a great scholar.”110 The trend was par-
ticularly obvious in memoirs and diaries from the period. For instance, 
Giovanni Comisso, Giuseppe Bottai, Galeazzo Ciano, and Aldo Valori 
do not mention any duels in their accounts of the 1930s.111 Especially 
revealing in this regard was Silvio Maurano’s Memorie, which had hap-
pily reveled in its descriptions of duels in the 1920s but did not mention 
a single encounter during the following decade. Looking back from 
1947, another journalist recounted that the fascists had placed the duel 
“in the attic” for the last 20 years.112
 One must be careful here not to overstate the case. Challenges were 
issued and duels were fought during the second decade of fascism, as 
was evidenced by the testimony of a fencing master who admitted to 
having trained seven duelists to fight in the 1930s, including one after 
the Spanish Civil War.113 A high ranking fascist could still openly duel 
and even privately publish the results, as was the case of the hierarch 
Gino Rocca, who was wounded by a lawyer, Rino Valdameri, over a 
disputed government appointment in March of 1936.114 Also, from a 
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methodological point of view, one must bear in mind that, as we have 
seen, after December 1931, fascist press censorship specifically blocked 
any and all mention of chivalric disputes. Thus the best historical source 
for keeping track of vertenze and duels disappeared, along with a free 
press, although some verbali, such as that regarding the Rocca and Val-
dameri duel, were printed for private distribution. Nevertheless, all evi-
dence indicates that the diminution of the duel was not just a reporting 
error; and the archenemy of the practice, Filippo Crispolti, declared 
pointedly in 1939 that it was, in fact, the fascist state’s prohibition on 
dueling news that had had the greatest impact. Blocking the publica-
tion of the verbali, he claimed, had broken the “mainspring of the duel” 
which had been the vanity of the participants.115
 Growing regulation of the press had other serious consequences 
for the dueling tradition. Having first eliminated the socialist newspa-
pers and then co-opted the liberal ones, the regime used a variety of 
laws and professional organizations to turn the press corps into what 
Ermanno Amicucci, president of the press union, praised as “a weapon 
at the disposition of the Duce and the Party.”116 As Mussolini consoli-
dated his dictatorship, and the PNF became ever more bureaucratized 
under its vexingly punctilious secretary, Achille Starace, journalists had 
to increasingly adhere to a strict party line, while serious debate or 
criticism, even among the fascists themselves, faded from public view.117 
Words as well as topics were dictated from the top because, as a journal-
ist turned politician, Mussolini believed almost mystically in the force 
of rhetoric and constantly checked the Italian papers for proper vocab-
ulary and style.118 Those writers who failed to conform sufficiently in 
either form or content were soon out of a job or marginalized.119 The 
fascist journalist Silvio Maurano, who had been both an ardito and a 
squadrista, bitterly described the process in 1943:
For years and years, beginning with the cursed reign of Starace, it has 
been prohibited to write and to speak: all of a sudden we came to the 
paternalistic regime in which only the elect had the right to have a brain 
and everybody else, including those of us who had something to say 
between 1919 and 1930, were put to the side or confined to secondary  
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newspapers. . . . With the new system, I was not a “simpatico” and there-
fore ended up in the provinces, where my abilities were perfectly unuti-
lized, especially after the Prefects had the possibility of ferociously 
strangling any mention of criticism or control over local life.120
Such a system, where news became propaganda and editorials became 
adulation, soon extinguished the old fires of controversy and insult that 
had led men to put steel behind their words.
 A parallel process affected parliament, the other great arena of polit-
ical discourse and chivalric challenge during the liberal period. Marred 
by fascist violence and coercion, the last “free” elections had been held 
in the spring of 1924, and a new law in 1928 arranged for the selection 
of deputies by the Fascist Grand Council from a list prepared by the 
fascist syndicalist federations. Eventually the old chamber of deputies 
disappeared completely in 1939, to be replaced by a Chamber of Fasces 
and Corporations, but it was only window dressing for the fact that 
all real legislative power had long fallen to Mussolini and his advisors. 
The successful establishment and articulation of his dictatorship limited 
any real debate to the secret realms of the Fascist Grand Council and 
the Council of Ministers, thus depriving politics of the public space 
that had been so important for the dynamics of private honor. Even 
for high ranking fascists this process was stultifying, and Giuseppe Bot-
tai, an early fascist who served in a variety of posts, complained in a 
diary entry of January 1936 about the complete sterility of discussion 
in the Fascist Grand Council, a fault it shared with “all the organs of 
the Revolution.” “Unanimity,” he remarked dryly, “is now presupposed 
in the unfolding of our political life.”121 With political conformity so 
rigidly enforced, personal slights that might previously have occasioned 
a vertenza could now become criminal acts. For example, according 
to Galeazzo Ciano, when, in 1939, the honorable Egilberto Martire 
accused him behind his back in the corridors of the parliament of 
having the “evil eye,” he was overheard by Achille Starace, reported 
to the police, and taken to jail. Pointedly, Mussolini’s comment on the 
case was that it was a pity he had not been able to personally chal-
lenge Martire to physical combat in Ciano’s name and, more generally, 
that he regretted his having had to forego dueling since coming to 
power.122
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 With political polemics and a free press sacrificed to the cult of 
authority and repressed by a police state, the totalitarian pretensions of 
the fascist regime as it evolved in the 1930s became ever more anti-
thetical to the individual notions of honor that had fed the dueling 
compulsion. Reacting to the economic pressures of the depression, the 
increased fear of working-class opposition, and the continuing agitation 
of its own “intransigent” party members—who wanted more “revolu-
tion” and less accommodation with the institutions and assumptions 
of the old liberal regime—Mussolini and his supporters embarked on 
a massive program to reorganize Italian society and culture. The task 
was a complicated one since the regime lacked the ideological clarity 
of dictatorship in Communist Russia or Nazi Germany and had to be 
careful not to alienate the elite capitalist classes whose interests it had 
come to power defending. Nevertheless, once overt political opposition 
had been muzzled, co-opted, exiled, or executed, the way was clear for 
a broad series of measures that changed the style of many people’s lives 
if not necessarily their relative positions on the social ladder.
 The most telling feature of this movement was the creation of pan-
Italian institutions and programs designed on one hand to “make the 
masses adhere to the state” and on the other to create a race of “new 
Italians” who would be capable of meeting the demands of a young and 
vital nation.123 Large bureaucracies, such as the Opera Nazionale Dopo- 
lavoro (OND), the Opera Nazionale Balilla (ONB), and the Opera 
Nazionale Maternità e Infanzia (ONMI), were created to organize 
the leisure time of workers, shape the character of young people, and 
promote the health and number of babies born to the regime. The 
party itself became the most prominent feature of Italy’s public life, and 
membership was a critical prerequisite of employment within the gov-
ernment or its ever-expanding parastate agencies. Likewise, the party 
dominated public space and filled it with ceremonies that often mir-
rored Catholic rituals but served a new secular religion of fascism, par-
ticularly the cult of the Duce.124
 What was especially important about all of this mass “organization” 
for the dueling ethic was the insidious uniformity that cut across class 
lines and lumped Italians together bureaucratically, politically, and spa-
tially. As the regime articulated its power, it pushed the social matrix of 
Italy into interactive modes, often in a common functional landscape 
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such as sports fields or movie theaters. That is not to say that it broke 
down class boundaries; on the contrary, scholars agree that fascism only 
widened the disparity between rich and poor, and opportunities to 
attend university became even more exclusive under the reforms of 
Giovanni Gentile. Yet children of all classes wore the distinctive uni-
forms of their cohort in the Balilla youth organizations, members of 
the lower middle classes joined the haute bourgeoisie in the blackshirts 
of the party, university students were recruited and regimented in the 
Gruppi Universitari Fascisti, and fascist women’s groups recruited widely 
across the social spectrum.125 Cheap tickets to theaters and concerts 
obtained through the OND brought workers into spheres previously 
privileged to the upper middle classes, and mass sports events came to 
include a wide variety of people in their participants and spectators. Party- 
organized spectacles and Mussolini’s “oceanic” speeches deliberately 
sought mass audiences and attempted to catch them up in the collective 
identity of the moment. Fascism did not seek to obliterate hierarchy; 
indeed it celebrated the concept and actively vaunted its desire to recruit 
and train new elites through party structures. Yet all such social ranking 
of a “new aristocracy” fell within the guidelines of the “ethical state” 
and beneath the discipline of the omniscient Duce. Hence, as Emilio 
Gentile has pointed out, the regime became increasingly obsessed with 
enforcing standard dress codes as each echelon and branch of the party 
and its far-flung organizations came to share uniformity despite their 
place in the hierarchy.126 
 Within this social logic, according to Gentile, conformity was con-
sistently validated through “parallel processes of regimentation, indoc-
trination, and integration” and depended on the “total subordination 
of all those values belonging to the private sphere (religion, culture, 
morality, love, and so forth) to the supreme political value which was 
embodied in the state alone.”127 To this list of “private” values he might 
well have added “honor,” for there was little room for a traditional sense 
of personal honor in this collective geography. The energy, indeed the 
body, of the individual belonged to the greater purposes of the “ethi-
cal state” and was not to be thrown away on frivolous or “haughty” 
conceptions of chivalric honor.128 Such was the message of a pamphlet 
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entitled “Suicide and the Duel in the Fascist Conception” printed in 
1934: “The duel is contrary not only to the ethical and social prin-
ciple of conservation and perfection, but it is an arbitrary fact, because 
the individual has a mission, an end that supercedes his individual exis-
tence: as part of an everything he cannot for personal matters and for a 
misunderstood sense of honor put himself under the risk of death.”129 
In this sense, honor and its defense had to be subsumed by the larger 
purposes of the nation.
 The ultimate goal of all this energy, regimentation, and organiza-
tion was nothing less than an “anthropological revolution” capable of 
creating a “new fascist man” who would fulfill the destiny of Italy as a 
great power.130 Italy had purportedly started this process with its inter-
vention in the Great War, which had created a battle-hardened and 
selfless “aristocracy of the trenches” ready to take on the internal and 
external enemies of the patria. With fascism triumphant, the role of 
the regime was to inculcate future generations with that same spirit of 
self-sacrifice, daring, and patriotism so as to assert Italy’s rightful place 
in the Mediterranean as the heir of Roman imperial tradition. Italians 
had to be ready for the physical challenge as well, in terms of both 
fertile reproduction and military action—hence the regime’s heavy 
emphasis on sports and physical education for Italy’s youth, which was 
aimed at preparing them for the battlefield.131 This was made clear by 
Lando Ferretti, first fascist head of Italy’s Olympic committee, in his 
1930 treatise, Examples and Ideas for the New Italian: “Without qualifica-
tion, sports are a militia[;] they are a militia of peace that knows, how-
ever, how to do their duty in war.”132 From this perspective, then, mass 
spectacles, in which athletes of both sexes performed synchronized 
maneuvers, symbolized not only dynamic and youthful agility but also 
the group discipline and coordination necessary for effective modern 
combat. 
 The fascist approach to sports corresponded to the general mili-
tarization of Italian society, and the martial rhetoric of Mussolini and 
Ferretti also brought to the fore the regime’s ambiguous relationship to 
the duel. Honor, chivalry, virility, and combat all obviously figured in 
the creation of the “new fascist man,” but the cult of individual honor 
manifested in the code duello clashed mightily with the images of mass 
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mobilization, integral nationalism, and the all-powerful, all-absorbing, 
“ethical state.” This clash was a result of the more general contradiction, 
noted by George Mosse, inherent in the masculine ideals of the fascist 
regime “between the revitalized, active, individual and the duties of 
the ‘citizen soldier.’”133 Men had to be aggressive, daring, and dynamic, 
yet adhere consistently to the dictates of discipline. Such contradictory 
demands became increasingly more problematic for fascism as Rocco’s 
legal apparatus of dictatorship arose out of the conflict, and the party 
focused on organizing, mobilizing, and militarizing the masses. The 
regime’s conundrum was to promote honor (even utilizing the chival-
ric images of Italy’s past) as a motivator of the new Italian man, while 
regimenting those new men into a cohesive, spiritual totality capable 
of carrying out the wishes of the Duce, who presided over all as the 
ultimate man of honor.
 This was hardly a new problem; the military had long understood 
the dilemma of promoting the courage and élan of chivalric combat 
while expecting men to obey orders and fight together as a disciplined 
collective. Fascism had only raised the stakes by glorifying aggres-
sion, praising romantic adventure—e.g., better one day as a lion than a 
thousand as a sheep—and militarizing society to the point of routinely 
placing uniforms on children starting at the age of six. Not surprisingly, 
then, the means by which the fascist regime solved the conundrum 
of the duel reflected those used by the military, more or less success-
fully, in the recent past. The first of these was the system of courts of 
honor which, as we have seen, proliferated starting in the late 1920s 
and then became enshrined in Rocco’s legal code. Forcing members of 
the militia, the military, and eventually the PNF to take their issues of 
honor through laborious formal procedures, while empowering vari-
ous “moral entities” to adjudicate vertenze for the rest of society, offered 
the regime the advantage of trumpeting its concern for chivalric honor 
while bringing its conflicts constantly under greater control. As with so 
many of their other problems, the fascists simply attempted to bureau-
cratize the duel to death.
 The other military tradition that acted against the duel, although it 
was probably not a conscious policy on the part of the fascists, was the 
postponement of all vertenze during times of active war. In this regard, 
Mussolini militarized society, but he did so as part of a permanent state 
of war in which the fascists constantly fought the regime’s enemies 
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both inside and outside the nation. This went far beyond the simple 
fact of first fighting the socialists and then rooting out anti-fascist activ-
ities.134 Rather, it was related to the portrayal of Italy as being in a 
series of crises that took the mass mobilization of the people to resolve. 
The “battle of the baby” against the degeneration of the race, the “bat-
tle of the lira” against the devaluation of the currency, “the battle of 
the grain” against the country’s dependency on foreign imports: all of 
these placed the Italians in a state of constant symbolic combat that 
demanded the subordination of the individual to the needs of La Patria. 
The exigencies of individual honor therefore had to give way to mass 
duty to the nation.135 This transformation resonated quite nicely with 
the fascist regime’s attempt to resurrect and capitalize on the traditions 
of the Roman Empire, whose armies had often been at war to pro-
tect the internal Pax Romana. As antidueling propagandists had never 
tired of saying, the Romans had not dueled and had instead saved their 
virile energies for the battlefield. This was perfectly summed up in 
the ancient Roman aphorism, MOLTI NEMICI—MOLTO ONORE 
(many enemies—much honor), and it was no accident that those words 
appeared in large mosaic letters at the entrance of Mussolini’s giant 
sports arena in Rome (1934–38). Of course, Italy’s nemici became all 
too numerous as the metaphors of war switched to the realities of con-
flict in a series of military adventures designed to establish its place in 
the sun and among the great powers. Ethiopia (from 1935 to 1936), 
Spain (from 1936 to 1939), and Albania, Libya, Greece, Russia, etc. 
(from 1940 to 1943), all saw Italian soldiers and fascist militiamen on 
the battlefield and under fire. All of these forces militated against the 
duel in Italian society as the regime claimed symbolic and then physi-
cal allegiance over the honor and blood of Italy’s men. Significantly, 
Mussolini’s last word on the duel was a directive, dated May 29, 1941, 
postponing all vertenze between military men until after the end of the 
war.136 
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Conclusion: The Sword and the Dagger
Generally speaking, the trajectory of the duel under the fascists paral-
leled the rapid rise and gradual decline evident in both the Renaissance 
and Risorgimento periods. Emerging from the devastation and disrup-
tion of the First World War, the fascists promoted the duel to prove 
their martial merits, assert their aggressive political credentials, and keep 
their opponents off balance. The war had accelerated and exacerbated 
many of the economic and social conflicts of the liberal regime, and 
the resulting confusion allowed a new elite to come to power backed 
by a violent paramilitary movement. Like the gentiluomini of the six-
teenth century and the liberals of the nineteenth, these elites (generally 
co-opting elements of the old) laid claim to the chivalric tradition and 
modified its supposedly universal precepts to fit their particular social 
and political needs. The duel was thus one mechanism, among others, 
by which the fascists laid claim to legitimacy as they consolidated their 
power. However, as the regime eliminated all opposition, controlled 
public communication, and created a civil religion based on a cult of 
the Duce, the duel lost much of its usefulness and was relegated, like the 
revolutionary energy of the fascist squads, and with all the appropriate 
platitudes, to the realm of recent myth rather than current reality. At 
heart, the monopoly of coercion demanded by the totalitarian regime 
was inconsistent with the private yet public combat of the duel.
 Likewise, the duel embraced a notion of personal honor that ran 
counter to the organic, integralist theories of nationalists such as Rocco, 
who claimed excessive individualism to be the “congenitive Italian ill-
ness” that had held the country back under atomistic liberalism.137 The 
uniforms, the marching children, the gymnastics exhibitions, all denoted 
a mass movement in which the individual was swept away to higher 
spiritual purposes. At the same time, the regime had to make itself pop-
ular, in both senses of the word, and attempted to create a mass culture 
that would unite the peninsula and the islands, all the while celebrating 
the rural roots and peasant traditions of the “true” Italy. Mussolini, in 
particular, was portrayed as a “man of the people” who could—thresh-
ing wheat or riding tractors—hark back to his rustic beginnings, all the 
while leading Italy forward.
 One aspect of this populism manifested itself in the portrayal of the 
dagger as an icon of power projected by the fascist party. Admittedly, 
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this interpretation takes an intellectual leap of faith, but for someone 
sensitized to the long-standing denigration of the “perfidious stiletto” 
to the advantage of the “loyal sword” by elite proponents of the duel, 
the images of blackshirts constantly saluting the Duce with rows of 
drawn daggers virtually crackle with meaning (see image 7). As with so 
many fascist “innovations,” the original emphasis on the dagger rather 
than the sword came from the arditi, who had prided themselves on 
attacking the enemy at close quarters. After the war, it became part of 
a consciously anti-elitist ideal that was described by Giovanni Comisso, 
an ardito and a legionnaire in Fiume, in a conversation he had with 
Guido Keller, Gabrielle d’Annunzio’s quartermaster in 1920: “We spoke 
of making a revolution that would begin to change the structure of the 
army by abolishing the ranks above captain, by recreating the old Italian 
tradition of companies of adventure, by taking the ardito as the typical 
example of the true Italian soldier, and by modifying the uniform, abol-
ishing the closed collar and the useless sword” [my italics].138 In fact, the 
symbolism of the dagger became intricately tied to the redemption of 
Italian honor at Fiume, as postcards and photos from the period attest 
(see image 8).
 From these roots, the fascists embraced the image of the dagger 
along with the blackshirt and deathshead symbol (see image 9) of the 
arditi, and it became part of the standard uniform of the militia as 
it evolved in the 1920s.139 Although military in its origins, the iconic 
dagger could only appeal to the popular traditions of Italy’s knife- 
carrying lower classes. Here is not the place to elaborate the details of 
that pervasive “blade-culture,” but one need only cite the introduction 
to Giancarlo Baronti’s exhaustive Coltelli d’Italia to grasp the concept:
There is no man of the people who, in his own personal knife, chosen 
carefully by weighing, hefting and trying at the moment of acquisition, 
sees not just a versatile instrument of work, useful for a thousand daily 
needs, [but] the tangible sign of his humanity, his virile solidity, and his 
personal pride and dignity. The knife is a faithful companion—light in 
weight yet instilling assurance in one’s step—a friend of the night—
always diligently ready for those exciting moments during which one 
can, and indeed must, place one’s life on the line in order to maintain 
the respect of others.140
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By taking the dagger rather than the sword as fascism’s iconic weapon 
of honor, the party reached out not only to the trenches of World War 
I but also to the honor traditions of the popular classes, which the lib-
eral regime had so often ignored or disparaged. Yet the fascist dagger- 
cum-bayonet was, in fact, uniform; it was controlled and disciplined, 
and it became part of the mass display designed to subordinate indi-
vidual honor to that of the collective (see image 10). Popular, potent, 
and obvious, it symbolized a bellicose tie between the Duce (who, one 
remembers, was dismissed from school for stabbing a fellow student 
with a knife) and the people. It thus offered an environment in which 
the elite traditions of the sword and the ritual of the duel no longer 
held the upper hand. By the time World War II shook Italy to its core 
and betrayed the dangers of Mussolini’s virile rhetoric and military dar-
ing, the duel was already mortally wounded. It would not rise again.
Image 8
Propaganda postcard for Fiume invasion
Image 9
Mussolini’s office with deathshead symbol
Image 10
Postcard, “Befana fascista anno XIX (1941)”

lThOUgh PerhaPS easily dismissed as a quirky “side issue” of his-
tory affecting only a small number of people, the duel, as por-
trayed in the preceding pages, figured prominently in the construction 
of men’s social and political identities during much of Italy’s modern 
history.1 In the Renaissance, during the Risorgimento, after unification, 
and with the rise of fascism, new groups vied with old for power and 
prestige and found the armed defense of honor both a talisman and a 
touchstone of legitimacy. As a general pattern, a period of frequent 
“plague-like” combat gave way to gradual decline as publications and 
institutions adjudicating affairs of honor tended to mitigate and pacify 
previously explosive encounters of personal insult and injury. The sci-
enza cavalleresca of the sixteenth century, the dueling manuals of the 
nineteenth, and the honor courts of the twentieth, all worked to restrict 
the membership of those capable of seeking satisfaction and to disci-
pline the violence among them. Overall, the actual combat involved 
was relatively limited—nothing compared to war, brigandage, or 
revolt—but it always provided the possible threat and occasional reality 
of the ritual blood necessary to sustain the system as it proliferated and 
matured in each phase. Most members of the chivalric community 
would never face another man’s sword, but they generally lived as 
though they might, and in consequence the dueling ethic helped shape 
 1. Thanks to Elizabeth Cohen for giving focus to this point.
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behavior in both the public and the private sphere. Gentlemen often 
participated tangentially in duels as representatives, padrini, or jurors of 
honor, while the many vertenze that never came to bloody fruition still 
offered them the legitimizing semblance of ritual combat. At the very 
least they might own a dueling manual or two and remain secure in the 
knowledge that they were “in the know” when it came to matters of 
honor.
 Having virtually disappeared from most of Italy during the eigh-
teenth century, the duel returned with the French occupation and 
became inextricably entwined with the movement toward, first, libera-
tion and then unification. Whereas aristocratic continuity of the chi-
valric tradition seems to have informed much of the dueling sentiment 
in countries such as England, France, Ireland, and Germany, in Italy 
it was specifically the breakdown of the compulsion during the many 
years of foreign occupation under the ancien régime that helped promote 
the practice as the ultimate arbiter of honor. For dueling experts like 
Paolo Fambri and fencing masters like Cesare Enrichetti, the Italians 
had been cut off from their Renaissance roots of chivalric dominance 
by a period of poltroonish subservience to tyranny and foreigners. 
Consequently the regeneration of honor was tied to the regeneration 
of Italy, and the duel became intrinsic to the identity of the country.
 The role of France in this process of rediscovery and reaffirmation is 
particularly revealing. It is an old debate about how much credit should 
be given to the Napoleonic experience in shaping Italian nationalism, 
but the history of the duel comes down foursquare on the side of the 
little corporal. While historians, including me, have played up the eco-
nomic, administrative, and political changes that occurred under French 
hegemony, the reintroduction of the dueling ethic suggests a social/ 
psychological dimension that penetrated to some of the most funda-
mental cultural attributes of what it meant to be a man who counted. 
In providing a military experience for hundreds of thousands of men, 
including 222,000 in the Kingdom of Italy alone, the French offered a 
model of armed honor that would reverberate throughout the penin-
sula following the restoration. Officers who had fought under the flags 
of the empire would orchestrate the revolutions of 1820 and 1821, 
and their influence was still evident in those of 1831 and1848.2 Their 
important political role, as exemplified in the duel of the revolutionary 
exile Pepe, would assure an identifying link between the recrudescence 
 2. Ceva 1999, 16.
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of the dueling ritual and the resurgence of Italian manhood in the 
defense of the honor of Italia, who was generally and effectively por-
trayed as a woman. Thus the “rearmament” of Italian honor determined 
attitudes and aptitudes for generations to come and played a critical role 
in the risveglio militare, or military reawakening, that swept up Italian 
elites during the Risorgimento. As John Whittam has suggested, the 
period from the restoration to 1848 saw a sea change in public opin-
ion, from “Italians don’t fight” to “Italians do fight,” and this shift saw 
its individual analogue in the gradual proliferation of dueling through-
out the peninsula.3 Overall, then, our portrait of the duel’s resurgence 
offers yet another example of how deeply Italian society was affected 
by Napoleon’s policies and how the very definition of what it meant 
to be a man, or at least a gentleman, could be altered by a mass military 
experience.
 It bears mentioning in this regard that the history of Italian duel-
ing reinforces the causal connection between changing conceptions of 
honor and warfare in general. The Renaissance chivalric ethic matured 
in Italy and then spread to France (and beyond) during the Italian wars 
(1494–1559), only to fade in the former as demilitarization bolstered 
other factors, such as papal condemnation, militating against it. The 
Napoleonic incursion reintroduced the dueling ethic to Italy, which 
then received a major boost from the Risorgimento wars of indepen-
dence, and a third lease on life from the “aristocracy of the trenches” 
coming out of the First World War. But warfare, and especially mass 
warfare, could also have the opposite effect. The American Civil War 
is generally credited for ending the practice of dueling in the United 
States, as did the First World War in France and Germany. As discussed 
below, Italy did not follow their example, but in the end it was the 
Second World War that definitively finished the job of killing off the 
duel which had been begun by the fascist regime. The point is that 
cultural habits are not so deeply engrained that they can necessarily 
resist the psychological and social dislocations of extreme events in the 
collective lives of a community.
 Shifting to a different register, the marriage of the masculine duel and 
national honor forged during unification only became more complex 
as the new country emerged from the Risorgimento, and Italy’s history 
of the duel clearly confirms the viability of current studies that link 
 3. Whittam 1977, 11–41. 
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gender and nationalism in the nineteenth century.4 In fact, issues of gen-
der ran rampant throughout the construction of the dueling ethic among 
Italy’s elites and consistently conditioned the resulting debate over its 
continuing hold over society. Respectability became a key ingredient 
of status and translated into ever-greater control over elite women, who 
were increasingly isolated from the public sphere where men handled 
the business of the nation in both an economic and a political sense. 
Proper behavior in maintaining these social distances figured heavily in 
the dueling codes as they regulated the actions of men in both mixed 
company and the all-male settings of private clubs and electoral politics. 
As seen in the fictional literature regarding the duel, women were gen-
erally regarded as emotional countertypes whose inherent sentimental-
ity prohibited their immediate grasp of chivalric honor, but with proper 
patriarchal guidance they could be brought to not only accept but rein-
force the ethic among their offspring. Enshrined in terms of Italian 
regeneration, female sexual conformity trumped all other conceptions 
of honor, and the duel was consistently seen as the ultimate arbiter of 
offenses so intrinsically injurious, such as the adultery of wives or the 
seduction of daughters, that no official court could ever offer alterna-
tive recourse, an argument that consistently stymied opponents of the 
practice through the years. All of these factors and forces add up to a 
prime example of what R. W. Connell describes as “hegemonic mas-
culinity” in which a reinvigorated gendered hierarchy advertises and 
undergirds the realigned power structures of a new regime emerging 
from a period of crisis.5 In the Italian case dueling placed elite women’s 
unidimensional honor under the control and tutelage of their male 
relations while conspicuously denying complete masculine identity to 
lower-class men. Only those who understood and embraced the duel-
ing code as a guide to proper behavior could be considered real men to 
whom the affairs of the nation could be entrusted.
 The great dueling debate likewise indicated the potency of gender 
pressures even for those who rejected the nationalist precepts of the 
liberal state. Socialists and Catholics alike faced the difficulty of work-
ing against the duel without opening themselves to charges of feminine 
weakness. The muscular religiosity of Crispolti, who tried to inject a 
crusading image of young men suffering for their beliefs into the abo-
litionist campaign, in some ways mirrored the general deficiency of 
 4. Aside from Patriarca, De Grazia, Ben Ghiat, Spackman, and Mosse, one gets an idea 
of the variety of topics open to this line of analysis from Blom et al. 2000.
 5. Connell 2002, 102–8.
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the socialists in policing their comrades who dueled in direct defiance 
of party policy. Indeed, some socialists, despite the obvious class basis 
of dueling, simply argued that private matters of manhood should stay 
beyond the pale of party discipline, while others stressed revolutionary 
violence as a manly substitute for the duel, and still others feared that 
energetic recruits might be lost to a party that rejected the dictates of 
honor. By the same token, liberals who argued against the duel had 
to emphasize over and over again the martial and masculine traditions 
of the Romans who had not engaged in duels and who had relegated 
one-on-one combat to condemned slaves for the enjoyment of others. 
Across the board, then, opponents as well as proponents of the ritual 
had to keep their discourse within rather narrow parameters of what it 
meant to be a man.
 Gender also permeated the discourse on dueling by asserting the 
virility of Italian men as the country sought to establish itself as a seri-
ous player in the European community and eventually in the world. 
This assertion became increasingly manic after Italy performed poorly 
in the Austrian-Prussian War of 1866, thereby giving lie to the mar-
tial myths so easily created around Garibaldi and Victor Emmanuel II 
during the earlier wars of unification. Fencing schools and chival-
ric conflict were the elite analogue of gymnastics for the masses, and 
defenders of the duel argued that the ritual kept officers on their toes, 
prepared them to lead upon the battlefield, and offered concrete evi-
dence of Italian courage in the face of danger. Defeat in Africa at Dogali 
and Adua only heightened concerns about Italian weakness and effemi-
nacy and led to an increasingly shrill rhetoric of redemptive violence 
that prompted dueling manuals, such as those of Barbasetti, Brunetti, 
and San di Malato, to become ever more petulant and bloodthirsty. 
Informed by the growing scientific tendency to “sex” everything, the 
discourse of both national and individual honor became more radi-
cally gendered, and promotion of a more violent dueling ethic offered 
a means of reclaiming Italy’s true masculinity—a pattern that Robert 
Nye has examined for other European countries.6 Following World War 
I, Italian fascism served up the most virulent form of modern male 
identity with its glorification of impetuous violence and disdain for 
“womanly” prudence, all of which found their honorable counterpart 
in the recrudescence of dueling in the 1920s. Eventually, however, the 
individualistic manhood of the chivalric ethic ran afoul of the evolving 
totalitarian concept of the “new fascist man,” and the regime actively, 
 6. Nye 1995, 77–78. 
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albeit carefully, began to draw the teeth of the dueling ethic. In gen-
eral, then, the history of the duel enhances our understanding of elite 
conceptions of gender and points up how critical issues of masculinity 
were to Italian leaders throughout the course of the liberal and fascist 
regimes.
 Beyond its confirmation of virility, the duel offered practical advan-
tages to the new Italian state. Alberto Banti has discussed how national-
ism provided a crucial form of identity for Italy’s new elites and indeed 
formed one of the few common denominators that papered over the 
many fragments and strata of the mutating multi-borghesie.7 The same 
might easily be said of the dueling code. Given its Risorgimento roots 
and ties to continuing national regeneration, the chivalric ethic sup-
plied an important pan-Italian set of assumptions that helped bind 
the disparate elites of Italy together under the rubric of “gentlemen” 
as they struggled to create a workable polity. Hence, the supposedly 
universal aspects of male honor offered a lexicon of behavior, comport-
ment, and redress that helped forge a portrait of what it meant to be an 
Italian who mattered. If, as everyone points out, d’Azeglio was correct 
in his famous dictum that “we have made Italy, now we must make the 
Italians,” he was referring not only to the lower classes but also to the 
upper echelons of society as well—and the reintroduction of chivalric 
combat offered them a readily understandable model with historical 
roots in the Renaissance which could be handily appropriated as intrin-
sic to the national character.8 This paradigm was especially important in 
the realm of post-Risorgimento politics, and the dueling code allowed 
for the honorable settlement of disputes between men who radically 
disagreed about how the country had been created and where it should 
be going. It set limits over how far one might go in political and jour-
nalistic discourse and then enforced those limits with blood or, ever 
more frequently, polite negotiations backed by the threat of blood.
 Socially, it offered a handy and restrictive tool for the definition and 
legitimization of new notables, all the while assuring previous elites 
of their place in the changing order of things. Indeed, no better case 
for the new chivalry’s potential for social mobility can be found than 
Iacopo Gelli, who became the ultimate arbiter of honor in Italy, ris-
ing from an artisan background in the Tuscan provinces to marry his 
daughter off to a member of the aristocracy. On a different level, one 
 7. Banti 1996, 214. Also see Lanaro 1988, 70–81.
 8. Thus Fambri in an article on the courts of honor would claim, “Making Italians is the 
second and as yet unsolved part of the problem of making Italy.” Fambri 1888A, 267.
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could argue that the duel helped stimulate the growth of a fencing 
“industry” that became a source of national pride as Italian masters and 
champions competed for jobs and prizes on the international stage, 
a tradition that remains vibrant even today.9 Combined with potent 
patriotism and masculine symbolism, such functions make it anything 
but astonishing that the liberal regime consistently failed in its attempts 
to end the practice of dueling. On the contrary, the track record of 
legislature, police, and courts was consistently one of accommodation 
rather than confrontation.
 There was, however, a heavy price to be paid for the favors granted 
by the chivalric ethic. First, as bemoaned by such disparate critics as 
the socialist Zibordi and the avanguardista Prezzolini, the mechanisms 
of personal honor could cloud the transparency critical to a liberal 
society. Frequent recourse to sfida and duello were allowed to sidetrack 
real debate as politicians lost sight of issues for the vertenze they sparked. 
For instance, during a parliamentary session in 1889, Felice Cavallotti 
accused the undersecretary of war, General Corvetto, of lying about 
current circumstances in Sicily. This charge went beyond the pale of 
reasonable discourse, and Corvetto sent General Pelloux (the future 
prime minister of Italy) and General Mocenni to request satisfaction. 
Cavallotti agreed to a duel but demanded that the verbale specifically 
guarantee that he be able to return to the facts at issue back in parlia-
ment. However, after Corvetto was seriously injured in the head and 
arm, Cavallotti let the matter drop. The personal had triumphed over 
the political import of the moment. In the proper circumstances, then, 
the chivalric code could allow the obfuscation of charges of malfea-
sance, and it fit handily into the general pattern of informal barter and 
civil illegalities that undergirded the system of trasformismo.
 The most impressive of those illegalities was, in fact, the extraor-
dinary toleration of the crime of dueling by the Italian state over the 
course of the liberal period. High crime rates and the attending fear 
of disorder had been one of the major weak points of the preunitary 
governments, and one of the major goals of the Risorgimento had been 
to achieve the “rule of law” as a panacea for the problems incurred by 
the old regime’s “absolutist inefficiency” and its corporate concepts of 
privilege and power.10 The duel, however, seemed to fly in the face of 
good government. It broke the liberal covenant of impartial juridical 
 9. For example, Biblioteca Nazionale 2005.
 10. See Davis 1988 and Hughes 1994.
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equality and determined that a new, albeit amorphous, aristocracy had 
the right to flout the word of the law in an incredibly open fashion, as 
long as it was in the name of chivalric honor. The almost daily spec-
tacle of duels being reported in the newspapers with little or no action 
on the part of police or prosecutors clearly enhanced the prestige of 
elites as well as broadcasting to the others the importance of staying 
within their hierarchical range of influence. Yet it also had a negative 
effect on society in general. Italian legislators often bemoaned the pos-
sible consequences of allowing such obviously illegal activity to be car-
ried out in the open with virtual impunity, and they were not wrong. 
The whole juridical approach to the duel in Italy reinforced “a wink 
and a nod” approach to the strictures of the law and suggested that 
personal power and status could consistently override any notion of 
equality before the law or even of the importance of the law itself. This 
attitude in turn reinforced the worst aspects of trasformismo, which was 
based on a culture of clientelism that promoted what Amalia Signorelli 
has called “the mass socialization in the practices of illegality.”11 This 
tradition of honorable impunity came home to roost with a vengeance 
when, after the First World War, the liberals faced the fascists who 
explained their crimes—chivalric and otherwise—in terms of defend-
ing bruised Italian honor.
 It was, however, the paradox of liberal “men of order” consistently 
breaking the law that helps account for the voluminous and sometimes 
tortured debate about the duel under the liberal regime. As much as 
legislators and jurists might denounce the duel as an evil example to 
the lower classes and a barbaric prejudice unfit for a progressive country, 
they simply could not relinquish the mechanism that sanctioned their 
status and their virility in society and in the world. Honor was a positive 
force for the country, and honor had to be defended, even if by illegal 
means. It was in order to mitigate this paradox that Fambri, Angel- 
ini, Gelli, and other promoters of the duel all couched their support of 
the practice in terms of a necessary evil whose rapid disappearance was 
to be hoped for in some not-too-distant future. Their obsession with 
finding a “national” dueling code and creating a parallel system of chi-
valric courts symbolized their desire to seem to be acting legally, know-
ing full well that they were not. The same paradox led them through 
a variety of projects to seek state recognition for the courts and juries 
of honor, but the parliament, led by the legal community, consistently 
 11. Quoted in Ginsburg 2003, 101. 
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refused to do so. Liberal legislators might be willing to create a sui gene-
ris category of crime for those who dueled according to the rules, but 
they would not fall into the self-contradiction of sanctioning an illegal 
act, no matter how indirect the connection. Significantly, it was finally 
the fascist government, which could afford to look askance at the trou-
bling liberal sensibilities of consistency and equality before the law, that 
allowed the courts of honor to finally come into the legal realm, albeit 
in a very limited fashion.
 The obvious juridical impunity of the duel ran parallel to its other 
significant consequence for united Italy, which was that it socially and 
symbolically broadened the gulf between the people and the ruling 
elites. Contemporary commentators as diverse as the Catholic Stefano 
Jacini and the Marxist Antonio Gramsci pointed out (and later histori-
ans have consistently echoed them) that the liberal period was dogged 
by a split between “legal Italy,” represented by the official institutions 
of the parliament, the bureaucracy, and the military, and “real Italy,” 
which consisted of almost everybody else. Failure to bridge this gap 
created a resounding dissonance in Italian society that undermined 
allegiance to the state and even the basic precepts of liberalism, even-
tually contributing to the rise of fascism. As demonstrated by the cur-
rent study, perhaps no clearer line could be drawn between “legal” and 
“real” Italy than the distinction between those who could and those 
who could not defend their honor through the code duello, and the 
very assumptions of the ritual reinforced an elitist worldview that made 
communications across the gap all the more difficult.
 Such should have been the role of parliament and the press, but, as 
we have seen, they were both institutions caught up in the blatant dis-
tinctions between popolo and gentiluomini that fed the dueling phenom-
enon. In a sense, this was a natural product of the way in which Italy 
was united. With the failure of the revolutions of 1848 and 1849, much 
of the Italian democratic movement shifted toward a “sterner plan” 
based on Piedmontese hegemony that aimed at the limited goals of 
liberation and unification.12 The process played into the hands of the 
moderates who were interested primarily in creating an “administrative 
revolution” that would avoid popular participation and allow necessary 
reforms and economic progress without threatening the social order.13 
Italy was to be made by a cultured and politically aware minority, 
 12. See Grew 1968. 
 13. See Lyttleton 1979 and Davis 1988, 145–69. 
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backed by the Piedmontese army, with the rest of society only tangen-
tially involved in the process. The dueling ethic mirrored this partition 
of participation and offered a legitimizing social aesthetic whose mili-
tary and masculine imagery appealed, like the monarchy, across divi-
sions of left and right while excluding the majority. Consequently, we 
must consider that the code of honor was not just a symptom of Italy’s 
postunitary real/legal political dichotomy: rather, it was a critical set of 
assumptions that allowed the system to work the way it did, constantly 
reinforcing the gulf between men of honor and those below.
 In so doing, it often denied honor to the vast bulk of Italy’s popu-
lation. One of the most striking aspects of the various dueling codes 
and the discussion that surrounded them was their general disregard 
for forms or manifestations of honor that did not fit the definitions 
or patterns of chivalry and heraldry. Students of Italian culture today 
emphasize that Italy’s peasant classes set great store by the idea of honor 
(perhaps because they had precious little else).14 Yet one gets the sense 
that Gelli, Angelini, and the others had no conception of this fact, or 
at least chose to ignore it. Indeed, Angelini affirmed, “Public opinion 
does not consider an honest day-laborer, a servant, or an artisan to be 
dishonored even if they are slapped.”15 This comment might have been 
true of Angelini’s “public,” but one doubts very much if it held for 
these peoples’ own communities. Even honest members of the popolo 
were generally portrayed in the dueling literature as lacking the self-
control and rationality to adjudicate insult honorably, and their knives 
and daggers were denigrated as both pedestrian and perfidious. No 
wonder that Italy’s growing collection of elites failed to understand the 
mafia or omertà or high homicide rates or even peasant culture in gen-
eral. They were self-absorbed in their own struggle for self-validation 
through honor as defined by their fellow “gentlemen” and adjudicated 
by the sword.
 The study of the duel in united Italy equally offers an interesting 
adjunct to current theories of how Italian elites functionally defined 
themselves and their country by representing the Mezzogiorno, and 
especially Sicily, as an African “other” or “oriental” countertype. Jane 
Schneider (1998), Nelson Moe (2002), and others have analyzed how 
language and illustrations were consistently selected and manipulated, 
both consciously and unconsciously, to reinforce a negative image of 
 14. For example, Fiume 1989, and for the earlier period see Hanlon 2000, 26–30. 
 15. Angelini 1888, 4.
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southern barbarism and irrationality that contrasted with the modern-
izing Euro-centric north. With regard to the duel, this analysis applies 
nicely in that the sword/dagger binary was more often than not aligned 
geographically on a north-south axis. As John Dickie has demonstrated, 
southern peasants eventually could be used to represent all Italian peas-
ants, and the violence of postunitary brigandage in the Mezzogiorno 
reinforced a continuing stereotype of the bestial and savage dark side 
that underlay later “picturesque” portrayals of rural life. In that world 
of conflict, the peasant/brigand had no honor, and Dickie provides an 
insightful analysis of how real or putative brigands slated for execution 
were shot in the back rather than the front by firing squads: a traditional 
military symbol of disgrace and dishonor.16
 More broadly, however, Dickie’s central themes provide an informa-
tive perspective on the duel as part of the discursive “problematic” of 
creating a national identity on the part of Italy’s elites. While acknowl-
edging the importance of inclusive concepts such as those laid out 
generally by Benedict Andersen (1983), and more specifically by A. M. 
Banti, Dickie emphasizes as well the internal exclusionary boundaries 
of the “imagined community,” at least for those elites engaged in its 
construction. Thus the “slippery” nature of defining the nation empow-
ered elites to assert, maintain, and justify their privileged position as 
part and parcel of the patriotic enterprise, all the while claiming to 
include everyone.17 They justified their leadership in terms of a moral-
ity that implied “both a civil competence, which one must achieve 
through such skills as literacy and the capacity to reason impartially, 
and a social sphere from which one may be excluded.”18 In a similar 
fashion Italy’s elites embraced the duel in a spirit of patriotism that 
projected martial courage and personal honor as vital to the health of 
a young nation, yet it clearly served their social and political purposes 
of exclusion and self-definition. In the end this tension helps explain 
the constant anxiety that surrounded the dueling ethic during the life 
of the liberal regime, even among its proponents. Their own inclusive 
notions of nationhood and their belief in the liberal project of good 
government sat poorly with their practice of legally privileging gentle-
men over issues of honor. Angst over who was allowed to duel; fear 
of unscrupulous spadaccini; endless legislative and juridical wrangling; 
to say nothing of Gelli’s “democratization” of the duel and Fambri’s 
 16. Dickie 1999, 44–47. 
 17. Also see Bollati 1983, 42.
 18. Dickie 1999, 57–61.
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justification of it as a transitory and necessary stage in the progress of 
the country, all betrayed the fundamental paradox of men who touted 
the totality of the nation but based their own social identities on exclu-
sion. 
Looking beyond the borders of Italy, our study offers an obvious oppor-
tunity for comparison with dueling in other countries. In an early 
treatment of the topic, Robert Nye suggested that Italy represented 
a sort of middle way of dueling in the nineteenth century between 
France and Germany—both well-known for their affinity for the cult 
of honor. Having gone through an early liberal phase, France became 
more democratic in its dueling practices, with a rhetoric of egalitarian 
honor that fed the patriotism of the republic as a nation in arms looking 
forward to revenge after the “humiliation” of the Franco-Prussian War. 
As befit this model, the French dueled with high frequency and rela-
tively low mortality rates using the traditional épée, with civilians rather 
than soldiers serving as the most common combatants. In contrast, the 
Germans maintained a more military, and some would say aristocratic, 
ethos of honor marked by a higher death toll, the latter assured primar-
ily by the use of rifled pistols rather than swords.19 Unlike its French 
counterpart, the German army (along with the reserve officer corps) 
provided the critical epicenter of chivalric combat. Italy, according to 
Nye, offered aspects of both styles.20 The Italian army, backed by the 
Savoyard monarchy, unquestionably supported the dueling compulsion 
throughout its duration. Officers constituted the single largest group of 
duelists, and the overwhelming use of the saber rather than the épée—
notwithstanding Italy’s primacy in developing Renaissance rapier tech-
niques—can be interpreted as carrying a military message that went 
back into the roots of the Risorgimento. On the other hand, Italian 
duels with their high frequency and relative lack of severity mirrored the 
French experience and made the ritual more useful for journalistic and 
 19. In contrast to Frevert, McAleer has stressed the overwhelming primacy of the 
aristocratic/military ethos of German dueling. Frevert does not dispute the importance of the 
military in the German dueling tradition, but she sees the bourgeoisie as redefining it to suit 
its own social purposes through the nineteenth century. Cf. Frevert 1995 and MacAleer 1994, 
especially 183–212.
 20. Nye 1995, 74–77. For the sake of full disclosure I would add that Nye used my early 
work for his information on Italy.
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parliamentary purposes. This mélange of traditions would seem to flow, 
on one hand, from the key importance of the Piedmontese military 
and monarchy in the unification of Italy and afterwards, but it was 
combined with the growing need to settle disputes arising from the 
political complexity and controversy reigning in the new country. Pied-
mont was not Prussia, unification was both messy and contested over 
a couple of decades, and things had to be sorted out with minimum 
damage and maximum honor. Moreover, Italy had regained its taste 
for the duel from the French, not the Germans, and even in the 1860s 
Chatauvillard’s dueling manual was still the reference of choice among 
some of Italy’s gentlemen.
 Where Italy primarily differed from both Germany and France was 
in the recrudescence of dueling after World War I. Nye has effectively 
argued that for France the extraordinary bloodletting occasioned by 
the war simply put the personal combat of honor into a negative light. 
From the perspective of the trenches the terreno seemed petty, and 
the war required a “new standard of masculine courage” that made 
the sang-froid demonstrated in a duel seem “a Tinkertoy” in compari-
son.21 Frevert has made much the same case for Germany, where the 
mechanized industrial nature of the war’s violence dissipated the duel’s 
heroic individualism, but she also stresses the massive reduction of the 
officer corps that came out of defeat and that weakened the clout 
of the army and its chivalric traditions within society. Moreover, the 
destruction of the empire and the abdication of the kaiser deprived 
the duel of its official backers and replaced them with politicians, 
many of whom, like the socialists, had consistently opposed the prac-
tice. Staged student duels or Mensur would survive and even thrive in 
the 1920s, and the military would offer a stream of pronouncements 
upholding the old way of things, but compared to its earlier currency, 
the point-of-honor duel in Weimar Germany became an increasingly 
rare occurrence.22
 In contrast, the duel returned with renewed vigor to Italy during the 
postwar period, and the reasons seem obvious enough. First, although 
one should never underestimate the impact of the war on Italian soci-
ety, the raw devastation of the army was less drastic than in France 
or Germany. Italy joined the fray a year later than the other two and 
thus enjoyed a corresponding reduction in its casualties, with signifi-
 21. “The End of the Modern French Duel,” in Spierenburg 1998, 92–93.
 22. Frevert 1995, 200–219.
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cantly fewer than half the number of dead and even fewer wounded.23 
Furthermore, the Savoyard monarchy remained in power, as did the 
old parliamentary system, and although they would both soon prove 
unequal to the challenges wrought by the war, they still represented 
traditional bastions of honor. Finally, and most important, when revolu-
tion did come, it was carried out by the fascists who, as we have seen, 
embraced the dueling ritual as both an instrument of legitimacy and a 
symbol of their martial virility. Thus, far from coming to power as they 
did in Germany, the socialists (complete with their antidueling attitudes) 
were soon forced into submission or exile, and the Catholics acquiesced 
in the face of fascist pressure. The new regime promoted and tolerated 
the duel, and only later would they decide to alter its course. Even then, 
the delicacy with which the fascists handled the dueling issue provides a 
new example of how the regime dealt with inveterate institutions such 
as the army, the Church, or the bureaucracy as it compromised its way 
toward a supposedly totalitarian state.
 While such contrasts are highly interesting, they primarily prove 
the chameleonlike nature of the chivalric code as it adapted to fit the 
needs of elites in different social and political environments. In this 
regard they underscore the consistency of the core values of masculin-
ity and courage attached to the late-eighteenth-century construction of 
the “Image of Man,” so carefully delineated by George Mosse, all the 
while demonstrating their high cultural valence in both time and place. 
The Italian example, however, emphasizes to a high degree the affin-
ity of the dueling ethic with the political structures of liberalism and 
leads us to look for parallels in other countries. As noted, France fits 
the model particularly well, with the duel serving the purposes of 
politicians and journalists as they created a society based on the open 
exchange of information and public debate.24 The rise of new elites 
into realms of political power naturally coincided with these changes, 
and the elastic definition that could be applied to the term “gentleman” 
increased the number of men who would seek satisfaction through 
either the duel or its auxiliary mechanisms such as the vertenza or jury 
of honor. Developmental timing seems to be important, for dueling 
flourished in the United States between the Revolution and the Civil 
War and in England at the end of the eighteenth century and prior to 
the Reform Bill, both periods in which new elites struggled for power 
 23. The total proportion of casualties per number of men mobilized was 39.1 for Italy, 
76.3 for France, and 64.9 for Germany. See Gilbert 1994.
 24. Nye 1993, chapters 7–9; Reddy 1994.
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using the rhetoric and the devices of liberal government, free speech, 
and individual achievement.25 Can one then postulate a period of “lib-
eral” development in which up-and-coming elites “learned” how to 
handle their new freedoms and used dueling as a means of both setting 
limits on behavior and legitimizing their own status in society?
 Three national examples, Ireland, Belgium, and Portugal, taken in 
chronological order clearly illustrate the argument. First let us consider 
Ireland, a country that enjoyed a widespread reputation for aggressive 
and ubiquitous duelists up through the early nineteenth century. Rely-
ing on a variety of sources, James Kelly has clearly demonstrated that 
starting in the 1750s the frequency of dueling increased (and its dan-
ger declined) as economic growth encouraged the number of would-
be gentlemen and as politics became an increasingly common source 
of conflict. Pamphlets and newspapers expanded in number, offering 
greater coverage to affairs of honor and quickening the pace and pub-
licity of political discourse. These trends accelerated in the 1760s to 
become a veritable “plague” of dueling, similar to that in Italy after 
unity, and Kelly makes no bones about attributing the phenomenon 
to the “emergence of a younger generation of more aggressive politi-
cians who aspired to make government in Ireland more responsive to 
the wishes and needs of Protestant opinion at large.”26 Intrinsic to this 
change was the imposition of a new electoral law in 1768 which estab-
lished regular parliamentary elections every eight years. Suddenly mem-
bers of the emerging factions had a chance to gain or lose power on 
a regular basis, which raised “the political temperature in the country 
at large. . . .”27 With increasing ideological divisions between nationalist 
reforming “Patriots” and conservative “Castle” supporters and the even-
tual granting of legislative independence, the 1770s and 1780s would 
see twice as many duels as occurred in the previous five decades. Kelly 
interprets increased political dueling in Ireland as the result of flaring 
tempers and clashing ideological animosities, but he is surprised at how 
so few of the duels ended in death or even serious injury. It is here that 
the Italian case offers an extra layer of interpretation and allows us to 
suggest that the dueling “fever” that gripped Ireland was not just about 
confrontation and ire but also about allowing Irish elites to come to 
 25. Simpson 1988, 106–7. Cf. Shoemaker 2002, 542–45. Shoemaker argues that dueling 
became less violent in the “long” eighteenth century and suggests this may have allowed it to 
flourish as it became increasingly tied to print culture. Also see Andrew 1980.
 26. Kelly 1995, 97.
 27. Kelly uses the barometric metaphor throughout; see, for example, 94, 98, 128.
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terms with their often emotional interchanges in a sphere of civil power 
and personal politics.
 An even closer parallel with the Italian case can be found in Bel-
gium, where nationalism and liberalism also arrived on the scene at 
the same time. Dueling had become a relatively limited phenom-
enon in the Southern Lowlands under Austrian control during the 
eighteenth century.28 Like Italy, the Lowlands were then sucked into 
the French orbit after the revolution and came into direct contact 
with the recently revamped and more inclusive chivalric code of the 
republic. Such exposure was then reinforced by mass participation in 
Napoleon’s armies, which by 1813 included 160,000 Belgian troops.29 
These influences only came to full fruition, however, following the 
revolt against the Dutch in 1830 and the eventual establishment of a 
parliamentary monarchy under the watchful eye of the European pow-
ers. At that point observers began to mark a “plague” of duels involv-
ing officers, journalists, and politicians which would rage throughout 
the decade and beyond.30 The setting for this “most remarkable parox-
ysm” of dueling, as the contemporary Fourgeroux called it, is highly 
instructive. Having broken away from the Kingdom of the Nether-
lands, Belgium established the most liberal constitution on the conti-
nent, based primarily on the English model. Freedom of speech, press, 
and religion undergirded a representative monarchy in which suffrage 
was tightly limited by property qualifications to a small percentage of 
adult males.
 Overall, the new system represented an extraordinary compromise 
between Catholic and liberal elites, who were willing to accommodate 
controversial settlements regarding education, marriage, and the status 
of the clergy, so as to offer a united front against the Dutch Crown, 
which did not recognize Belgian independence until 1839. Despite this 
uneasy truce, however, politicians and journalists were unaccustomed 
to unrestricted public debate and pulled no punches in their discus-
sions. Observing from France, Fourgeroux found French parliamentary 
debate a model of decorum in comparison to its Belgian counterpart.31 
At the same time, the Belgian army had to be fashioned from a muddle 
of military components, including a number of French soldiers who 
 28. Fougeroux 1835, 54. 
 29. Cook 2002, 53.
 30. For contemporary complaints see “Du Duel,” in Journal de Flandres, Jan. 1, March 13 
and 15, 1836.
 31. Fougeroux 1835, 54–56.
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had intervened against the Dutch and then stayed to compete for pre-
ferment and promotion within the new system.32 In short, it was a 
situation rife with possibilities for personal insult, bruised honor, and 
armed satisfaction as new political and military leaders demonstrated 
their bravery to each other, to their constituents, and to the rest of the 
world—especially the Dutch and the French. Likewise it allowed strate-
gies of settling potentially disastrous disputes among elites coming from 
radically different ideological and professional directions.
 Similar forces were at work in Portugal, although later in the cen-
tury. According to Mário Matos E Lemos, dueling was not fashionable 
in Portugal in the first half of the nineteenth century, but it began to 
increase after the chaotic reign of Maria II ended in 1852, and parlia-
ment began to play a more viable role in running the country. By the 
1880s it had become a more common practice, especially among politi-
cians and journalists who were operating in an extremely complicated 
and highly contested political environment. Harsh words and recrimi-
nations both in print and in parliament led to challenges which had to 
be sorted out using French and later Italian dueling manuals because 
there were no native sources. Despite the government’s adoption of 
antidueling legislation, the practice continued into the next century 
and apparently increased in intensity with the creation of the republic 
in 1910. In fact, one of the first acts of the new government was to set 
up tribunals of honor in hopes of adjudicating the many affairs affecting 
the top ranks of society, but it met with little success. Despite the duel’s 
popularity during the republic, which filled the newspapers with excit-
ing tales of chivalric negotiations and bloody encounters, its lifespan as 
a practice would be relatively short. Following the military coup d’état 
in 1926, the liberal regime ended, and public notices of duels began 
to decline rapidly. The coup de grâce came with the consolidation of 
Salazar’s dictatorship around 1930. A jurist with a Catholic corporativ-
ist approach to government, Salazar found dueling antithetical to his 
morality and his regime, and he did not hesitate to use his ever-growing 
police power to enforce its extermination.33
 The death of the Portuguese duel at the hands of its dictator effec-
tively points up again the complex relationship between dueling and 
liberal politics in modern European society, a relationship that is further 
evidenced by Sandra Gayol (1999), Pablo Piccato (1999), and David 
 32. Leconte 1949, 250.
 33. Matos E Lemos 1993, 561–97.
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Parker’s (2001) various studies on dueling in Latin America between 
1870 and 1920. Piccato has shown, for instance, how duels (which had 
previously been rare events) notably increased in Mexico after 1880: 
The code of honor became a guide for the behavior and speech of 
public men during a key period in the construction of a modern politi-
cal legitimacy. A national ruling elite was trying to establish its primacy  
after conflicts—such as the Reforma war (1857–1860), and the French 
intervention and Second Empire (1861–1867)—which generated deep 
and often bloody political cleavages. In this context of recent factional 
strife, the practice of dueling coexisted with other elements of the Mexi-
can state’s and upper classes’ embrace of European progress.
 Dueling reveals, perhaps better than any other cultural product, 
the contradictions of Mexican ruling elites’ embrace of modem poli-
tics. They construed the duel as a prestigious gesture of modernization, 
because it echoed the uses of other political elites in contemporary 
Europe.34
According to Parker, much the same process took place in Uruguay and 
Argentina as these nations embraced a troubled liberalism in the wake 
of anarchical postindependence. Although he agrees with Piccato that 
there was a strong demonstration effect coming from France, Germany, 
and Italy, he stresses the inherent usefulness of the duel as it “filled a need 
created by the destruction of the colonial consensus and the explosion 
of modern competitive politics within a legitimacy vacuum.”35
 Such parallels leave us only to reiterate the reasons for such a consis-
tent connection. Obviously, the code of honor functioned in a variety 
of ways to provide stability and status to elites trying to consolidate 
power in times of transition. In this sense it is anything but the “cultiva-
tion of eccentric identities and behaviors” suggested by Geltmaker in 
his efforts to see it as a form of suicide.36 Rather, it offered a supposedly 
universal set of norms governing male behavior that could actually be 
quite flexible in dealing with local conditions, and it helped govern 
public conflict among men with sometimes radically different visions 
of how the world should operate. As the public sphere became an open 
forum of personal opinion, reputation had to be increasingly defended 
 34. Piccato 1999, 331.
 35. Parker 2001, 10.
 36. Geltmaker 2002, 82. However, Geltmaker’s other comments on the duel in liberal 
Italy are quite cogent.
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as men sought to gain credibility for their words and actions. Critical to 
that forum, however, was an understanding and acceptance of the loyal 
opposition by which men agreed to disagree and continued to play by 
the rules of “civil society” and parliamentary process. The duel provided 
a constant dramatic reiteration of this political ritual at the personal 
level, for—in theory—neither man ever admitted his fault in a vertenza 
that ended on the terreno. Both remained adamant in their words or 
actions, but by carefully following the script of chivalric combat each 
was vindicated as a gentleman who acknowledged the worth and loyalty 
(however oppositional) of the other.
 On the other hand, when new patterns of political power consoli-
dated, dueling helped demarcate membership in an honor group that 
allowed for the rise of a limited number of new men armed with talent, 
élan, or luck while keeping the rest of society at bay. The duel offered 
what Piccato calls a “technology of honor” that laid out rules and rituals 
that only literate elites could internalize and articulate, while lower-class 
forms of interpersonal honor conflict were relegated to barbaric or at 
least criminal status.37 The truthfulness and self-control supposedly sanc-
tioned by the ritual spoke directly to the public ability of special men 
who wanted others to place power in their hands. Courage might be 
proven by martial sang-froid, but in the public realm it denoted a strength 
of conviction and a willingness to take responsibility for collective deci-
sions. In short, it demonstrated a man’s willingness and ability to lead 
and accept the consequences of his decisions, after older justifications of 
entitled power, such as birth, had disappeared. Nevertheless, the strength 
it drew from its class exclusivity and its ties to individual freedom would 
also prove its weakness, and the duel of liberalism would fade in the face 
of either disciplined democracy or preemptory dictatorship.
 Shifting toward a more philosophical tone, what is most striking 
in all the examples above is what they reveal about modalities of mas-
culinity in the modern world. It is an axiom of the new gender studies 
that notions of manhood are malleable and socially constructed, but the 
vicissitudes of the duel in Italy (as well as Ireland, Belgium, and Portu-
gal) tend to surprise us with the rapidity with which those notions and 
their attending actions can mutate. On one hand, we might bemoan 
the obvious currency and ubiquity that the virile and violent “image 
of man,” so aptly illustrated by Mosse, has enjoyed since the eighteenth 
century. But, on the other hand, watching the relative speed with which 
 37. Piccato 1999.
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groups of men could adopt and then abandon assumptions and behav-
iors that they felt essential to their very existence—indeed worth dying 
and killing for—should give us all hope that perhaps with a little luck 
and a lot of reason we might be able to head things in the right direc-
tion. 
Note: Newspaper articles, many of which were unsigned, are given full citation in 
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